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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the constitution of Cape society 
under the Dutch East India Company. The conceptual approach 
combines aspects of marxism and pluralism. It draws on the 
necessarily partial perspectives of specialist histories and other 
disciplinary contributions to knowledge of that period. It offers 
a new interpretation of the major forces involved in shaping Cape 
society prior to systematic Colonial encounters with Nguni and 
Sotho. The first two chapters specify the problems and outline the 
analytical framework. The third chapter examines the Dutch ante- 
cedents and origins of the V. O. C. It is argued that there is little 
foundation to the common view that 'Dutch Calvinism' influenced Cape 
'race relations'. Chapter 4 analyses the pre-colonial structure 
of Cape Khoisan societies and the relations between them and the 
Sotho and Nguni. Chapter 5 illustrates how, through a combination 
of forced trade and military and political offensives, the political 
economies of Khoisan. societies were destroyed by Y. O. C. and settler 
colonialism. Chapter 6 analyses the process of differential 
incorporation of Khoisan and slaves in the labour arrangements of 
the Cape, and underlines their centrality in shaping social structure. 
In chapter 7 that structure is analysed, and the forces shaping and 
sustaining the structurally plural society are contrasted with those 
making for change. While economic factors made for limited 
alteration of structure, demographic and slow acculturative processes 
(especially systematic hypergamy), contributed to the changing system 
of relationships. Chapter 8 explores the origins in the western Cape 
of the trekking movement of the 18th century, and contrasts the 
structure of that ranching society with the west. Chapter 9 concludes 
by summarising the argument and under4ing the secondary and contingent 
nature of 'colour' as a factor in the constitution of Cape society, by 
contrast with the causal primacy of culture and class. 
vi 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS FOR ANALYSIS 
The formation of Cape society in the second half of the 
17th century and during the 18th century is the earliest instance 
of European colonialism in Africa in the modern era. It is 
remarkable that so little attention has been paid to the 
constitution of Cape society, for it exemplifies in many forms and 
particulars the central features of settler colonialism which have 
been analyzed for other parts of Africa, or for later periods in 
South African history. 
In the analysis of the Cape, as a case study of colonialism 
and the constitution of a new society, all the main features of that 
general process may be identified. There was a clash of competing 
and contrasting economic systems and their associated ideologies, 
cultures and normative universes; there was disruption and 
destruction of indigenous societies and their cultures; there was 
the more or less forceful incorporation of indigenous peoples as 
labourers into the new political economy and social structure formed 
by the colonial encounter in the pursuance of metropolitan objectives 
and emergent local settler interests; there was the consequent 
emergence of specific local ideologies and attitudes which reflected 
the economic and other relations between the dominant and the 
dominated, and which also influenced those relationships. In 
addition, in the case of the Cape, there was the importation of slave 
labour from a third geographical and cultural arena, with important 
implications for the patterns of social structure and group relations. 
Moreover, the history of colonialism at the Cape is illustrative of 
two other phenomena which have been identified by social scientists 
1 
in recent years. First, it can be regarded as a clear early 
example of that relationship between Europe and the 'third world' 
which has been described as a metropolis-satellite or centre- 
periphery relationship, through which the interests of the metropolis, 
or centre, have been systematically pursued to the disadvantage and 
increasing dependency of the 'satellite' or periphery: In the case 
of the Cape, the international mercantile operations of the Dutch 
East India Company, served to provide for the accumulation of 
capital and wealth in the Netherlands. The peoples of the Cape - 
colonists, indigenous groups and imported slaves alike - were 
subordinated to the interests and orders of the Company, and the 
political economy and social structure of the new society there was 
in no small way influenced in its shape by those interests and 
dictates. Secondly, and related to that, the history of the Cape in 
the 17th and 18th centuries may be seen as one of the earliest 
instances of the 'development of underdevelopment' in so far as the 
Khoisan were concerned. Indeed the process went further than that. 
Not only was there a process of the 'underdevelopment' of their 
economies, there was also set in motion a series of economic, 
political, social and military forces which resulted in their 
effective destruction and disappearance. 
To the student of colonialism and so-called 'race relations' 
in colonies of settlement, the Cape thus offers a fascinating 
example of many features which later became common elsewhere. Seen 
in those terms -ratter than, say, as simply an early and preliminary 
part of South African history in the modern era (though of course 
such characterizations are not mutually exclusive) - the dynamics 
and structural sequences of Cape history in the 17th and 18th centuries 
take on a meaning and coherence which is generally lost in the 
standard histories. 
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In this first Chapter, some of the dissatisfactions 
with the existing accounts are recorded by posing a series of 
questions which form the cores around which the subsequent Chapters 
are organized, and which thus form the general framework of enquiry. 
Few histories of South Africa fail to mention how, on 
6 April 1652, three ships - the Rei er, Hoop and Drommedaris - 
of the Dutch East India Company1 dropped anchor in Table Bay after 
a voyage from the Texel lasting more than four months. 
2 The leader 
of the fleet - who was to be the first Commander at the Cape - was 
armed with clear instructions3 
Whereas it has been thought fit, by Resolution of the 
Assembly of Seventeen, representing the said etc Company, 
that - in order to provide that the passing and re- 
passing East India ships, to and from Batavia respectively, 
may, without accident, touch at the said Cape or Bay, and 
also upon arriving there, may find the means of procuring 
herbs, fresh water, and other needful refreshments - and 
by this means restore the health of their sick - it is 
necessary that a general rendevouz be formed near the 
shore of the said Cape. 
Manifestly, there was at first "..... no intention of 
founding a settlement or colony; it was simply a secure port of 
call that the needs of trade seemed to demand". 
4 This 11 .... 
cabbage patch on the way to India ..... ", as de Kiewiet has 
described the port, was not intended to be anything other than a 
1. The abbreviated form for the United Netherlands Chartered East 
India Company. In Dutch it is the Generale Vereenigde Ge-Octroyeerde 
Oost-Indische Compagnie, or, for short, the V. O. C., and 
colloquially, 'Jan Compagnie'. See Leo Fouche: "The Origins 
and Early History of the Dutch East India Company". 
2. E. A. Walker: A History of Southern Africa, P-31- 
3- "Instructions for the Commanders proceeding for the service of 
the said Company, with their ships Dommedaris, Reijger, and the 
Yacht the Hoop, to the Cabo de Bona Esnerance, in order, upon 
arriving there, to execute as follows: .... " Cited in D. Moodie: The Record, PP-7-8- 
4. A. G. Keller: Colonization, p. 442. 
3 
victualling point for ships pursuing the grander purposes of the 
Company. 
5 Within three days of anchoring in the Bay, van Riebeeck, 
the Commander, issued in turn his own firm instructions to the men 
responsible for executing the immediate objectives. He re-iterated 
what these were and added some special comments with respect to 
their behaviour towards the indigenous people. 
6 
And as such new undertakings should be conducted with great 
caution, particularly as regards the wild people of that 
country, (they being very impudent), and especially great 
care be taken that we be in every respect on our guard and 
in a posture of defence, also, that no cause of offence may 
be given by us or our men to that people, but that on the 
contrary, that all kindness and friendship be shown to them, 
in order that by our amicable conduct they may become 
inclined to an intercourse with us, so that by this means 
we may have the greater supply of all kinds of cattle, and 
suffer less molestation from them in plantations etc. which 
we are to cultivate and to rear for the supply of the 
Company's passing and re-passing ships, the chief object, 
in the first instance, of our Honourable masters - and what 
further may in time be sought for the service of the 
Company ..... 
And accordingly, whoever ill uses, beats, or pushes, any of 
the natives, be he in the right or in the wrong, shall in 
their presence be punished with 50 lashes, that they may see 
that such is against our will, and that we are disposed to 
correspond with them in all kindness and friendship, in 
accordance with the orders and objects of our employers. 
There were, in all, approximately 100 men from these three 
ships who went ashore to start building fortifications and to get 
ready for the cultivation of fruit and vegetables.? They were, 
5. C. W. de Kiewiet: A History of South Africa. Social and 
Economic, p. 4. 
6. "Extract of Proclamation", 9 April 1652. In D. Moodie: Op. cit., 
pp. 10-11. (My emphasis A. L. ) 
7. M. F. Katzen claims that there were 90 in the party. C. L. Leipoldt, 
referring to a dispatch dated 28 May 1652 from the Cape to 
Batavia, claims that the total population at the settlement then 
was 126 persons in all, while E. G. Malherbe, quoting Theal, states 
that there weretiabout100'. See (a) M. H. Katzen: "White Settlers 
and the Origin of a New Society", p. 187, (b) C. L. Leipoldt: Jan 
van Riebeeck, p. 118, and (c) E. G. Malherbe: Education in South 
Africa, p. 41. 
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moreover, explicitly forbidden from engaging in any "... traffic 
or barter with the natives or savages .... whether in cattle, 
refreshments, or any other article whatsoever..... "8. 
These men were all European employees of the Company. 
None were farmers or entrepreneurs operating on their own account. 
There were no slav6s, no political exiles from the East Indies, and 
no other ethnic collectivities within the employ or domain of the 
Company. Though it is true that in his Dagboek (and there is 
some dispute as to how much of it was personally written by van 
Riebeeck) the Commander was, within 19 days of his arrival at the 
Bay, reflecting how useful it would be for speeding up cultivation9 
..... if only there were enough men for the purpose, for 
which we require some married Chinese and other free 
Mardijkers (liberated slaves, A. L. ) or even Hollanders, 
who could be allowed on certain conditions to occupy 
some plots of land. 
Now, despite the fact that our ".... knowledge of the 
history of the hunters and the herders is still fragmentary"1° we do 
know that at that time the indigenous people of the Cape (commonly 
8. "Extract of Proclamation", Op. cit., loc. cit. 
9. Jan van Riebeeck: Journal of Jan van Riebeeck, Vol. 1, p. 35, 
entry dated 26.4.1652. 
10. Monica Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders", p. 74. A careful 
recent study by R. H. Elphick has added generally to our knowledge 
of the origins and migration of the Khoi. He postulates the 
development of a San core, originating in northern Botswana, 
getting cattle and sheep and becoming herders over many 
generations, and moving south. R. H. Elphick: The Cape Khoi 
and the First Phase of South African Race Relations, Chapters 
1, II and III, especially. 
5 
referred to in the literature as the 'Hottentots' and the 'Bushmen', 
though the terms Khoi and San will be used in this study) were 
widely distributed throughout South Africa, though more concentrated 
in south-westerly areas. 
11 Though estimates differ, Wilson 
considers it likely that there were some 200,000 Khoi south of the 
Orange river in 1652.12 And though there are some good anthropological 
reasons for questioning the distinction made between Khoi and San, 
13 
and hence an argument for referring to them collectively as the 
Khoisan, Schapera estimates that there were, in what is today the 
Cape Province, a 
. 
minimum of 10,000 San. 
14 
To the north and north-east were large groups of Nguni and Sotho 
- essentially distinguished from each other by linguistic criteria. 
15 
We need not deal further with them here for they will not figure 
significantly in the account which follows, though it is important to 
note in passing that, as Harinck has shown, contact and interaction 
between some Nguni and Sotho groups and Khoi hordes had been going on 
for a long time. 
16 The relationship however between the San hunting 
11. Ibid., pP"40-41. 
12. Ibid., p. 68. Elphick contests this and suggests that there are 
unlikely to have been more than 100,000 Khoi in the Western Cape 
in 1650. Elphick: Op. cit., p. 54. 
13, Shula Marks: "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries", pp. 57_8. Also, I. Schapera: The 
Khoisan Peoples of South Africa. 
14. I. Schapera: Op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
15. See Monica Wilson: "The Nguni People", and "The Sotho, Venda 
and Tsonga". 
16. G. Hardnck:.. "Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi: emphasis on 
the period 1620-1750", passim. There had also been assimilation 
and incorporation of San into both Khoi and Bantu-speaking 
groups. See Elphick: Op. cit., pp. 77-9. 
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bands on the one hand, and the pastoral Khoi and Bantu-speaking 
people of South Africa on the other hand, was less cordial, and the 
number of 'hunters and gatherers' had, according to Schapera, probably 
declined considerably over the years prior to the arrival of the 
Dutch, as a consequence of conflict and warfare between them. 
17 
Thus in the very middle years of the 17th century - the period 
when the "Golden Age of the Dutch Republic"18 was at its peak -a 
small, insecure and limited victualling station was put down at the 
tip of the African continent to service the vast monopolistic 
operations of the Company in the East Indies, and thereby to enhance 
and ensure profits at home - its major and single-minded purpose. 
Though the Khoi had been in desultory contact with Europeans from 
the late 15th century, after the Portuguese had rounded the Cape, 
the establishment of this 'settlement' was to represent the beginning 
of the first systematic 'contact' and interaction between the agents 
of the thrusting mercantilism of Northwest Protestant Europe and the 
transhumant 'hordes' of the indigenous Khoi and the San hunting bands. 
Whatever may be the limitations of the notion of 'culture contact' as 
it has been used in historical and anthropological studies19 the 
situation at the Cape at that point in time may be simply described 
for our immediate purposes as two very different 'cultures' facing 
each other across a frontier - as much sociological and psychological 
as physical and economic - constituted by a combination of curiosity, 
wariness, mutual uncomprehension and, probably, suspicious dislike. 
17. I. Schapera: Op. cit., pp"39-40. 
18. C. R. Boxer: The Dutch Seaborne Empire, p. 40. 
19. See for example, B. Malinowski: The Dynamics of Culture Change, 
and Max Gluckman's critique of this in his "Malinowski's 'Functional' 
Analysis of Social Change". Also, see John Rex: "The Plural 
Society in Sociological Theory" for an examination of Malinowski's 
approach and for a suggested research strategy on these questions. 
7 
On the one hand there were some 100-125 Europeans, with 
rudimentary equipment, inadequate skills and limited motivation for 
the achievement of their given objectives. For the first few years, 
they lived, huddled at the foot of Table Mountain, somewhat more 
miserable than enthusiastic - for they had not joined the Company to 
end up in such a place for such purposes. The sheer physical 
survival of the settlement was far from assured. Its existence was 
precarious, its initial successes meagre and its prospects doubtful. 
Strictly controlled in their activities by the orders from the 
Seventeen, as implemented by van Riebeeck and his Council, and 
confined to a small area around the ramshackle fort they built on the 
edge of the Bay, these men must have reflected sourly upon their bad 
luck in being sent to the Cape, by contrast with what they might 
have been able to achieve had they been posted to Batavia, where the 
prospects for a rather more lucrative and speedy personal aggrandize- 
ment were known to be considerably better. On the other hand, roaming 
over the land with their herds of cattle, sheep and goats, the 
acephalous Khoi 'hordes' and the small bands of San hunters, went 
largely undisturbed in the pursuit of their daily life, though there 
is evidence to suggest that some groups, at least, were probably 
rather concerned about possible developments, depending on how long 
these strangers planned to stay. 
20 For they had some experience of 
" how previous visitors had behaved. 
If the above rather brief description of the position in the 
middle of the 17th century is somewhat cursory, it will nonetheless 
serve as a contrast to the situation just over a century later. For 
by then the picture looked very different indeed. A short profile 
will help to demonstrate the contrast. 
20. Shula Marks: Op. cit., and John Cope: King of the Hottentots. 
8 
There were, in 1768, some 7,818 'Europeans' (perhaps better 
categorized as 'burgers' for the Caucasoid purity of all these is 
highly questionable) distributed across the categories of free farmers, 
entrepreneurs, Company officials and employees. The same source21 
tells us that there were in that year some 8,207 slaves, most of whom 
had been brought to the Cape from the East Indies, and East Africa. 
Most were from Madagascarand Mozambique. In the 17th century there 
had already been a proliferation of 'settlements'. Hottentots 
Holland (Somerset West) in 1678; Stellenbosch in 1679; the Great 
Berg Valley in 1687; Drakenstein (settled largely by the French 
Huguenot immigrants) in 1687; Wagenmakers Vallei (later Wellington) 
in 1698, and Waveren (later Tulbagh) in 1700.22 During this period, 
and continuing through the first half of the 18th century, these 
'settlements' were given a more formal constitutional status and a 
variety of legal, religious and political institutions were set up. 
By 1750 there were courts of law in Cape Town, Stellenbosch, 
Swellendam (founded in 1746), and there were churches at Cape Town, 
Stellenbosch, Drakenstein, Tulbagh and Zwartland (Malmesbüry). 
23 
And, whereas in January 1653 van Riebeeck had only 230 horned cattle 
and 580 sheep24 there were (according to the not too reliable opgaaf 
figures) in 1763 a total of 33,523 cattle and 199,339 sheep in the 
" Cape Colony. 
25 (Since the opgaaf was the basis for tax assessment, 
farmers tended to give low estimates of the size of their flocks). 
21. Victor de Kock: Those in Bondage. An Account of the Life of the 
Slave at the Cape in the days of the V. O. C., p. 237. Based on 
Beyers' Kaapse Patriotte, Theal's Records and Barrow's Travels. 
See Bibliography for details of these works. 
22. M. H. de Kock: Selected Subjects in the Economic History of South 
Africa, p. 18. 
23. G. M. Theal: History and Ethnography of Africa, III, p. 88- 
24- G. M. Theal: Ibid., II, p. 31. 
25. S. D. Neumark: Economic Influences on the South African Frontier 1652-1836, P"75. 
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By the middle of the 18th century the status and condition of 
what had once been independent Khoi groups, moving freely with their 
flocks, had changed radically. As Marais describes it: ".... by 
the second half of the eighteenth century most of the colonial 
Hottentots were in the position of servants". 
26 And Hodgson, dealing 
with the period around the 1770s, observed: "... To all intents and 
purposes the Hottentots had now been absorbed into the economic life 
of the community .... ". 
27 The San had not fared much better - 
indeed their fate had, on one view, been somewhat worse. Though the 
resistance of both Khoi and San had been a lot fiercer than is 
usually allowed, as Marks has usefully shown28, the combination of 
encroachment onto San hunting grounds by colonists and systematic 
attempts by Commando parties to eliminate them physically, had 
drastically reduced their numbers and forced many to flee to the 
mountain fastnesses in the north and north-east. One century after 
the establishment of the campe at Table Bay, the independent economic 
basis for Khoisan existence had been effectively undermined and 
destroyed, and, of those who remained and survived, their incorporation 
into the structure of the colonial society had moved beyond the point 
of no return. 
Thus, what had once been a 'frontier situation'29 around the 
port - later to be called Capetown - had become totally transformed. 
The control of large areas of the western Cape Colony by the Company 
and settlers was assured and firm: this had in part been achieved by 
the eastward expansion of the colony. A large slave population had 
26. J. S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, 1652-1937, pp. 11-12. 
27. M. L. Hodgson: "The Hottentots in South Africa to 1929: A 
Problem in Labour and Administration", p. 598. 
28. Shula Marks: Op. cit., passim. 
29. On this concept see the useful short paper by Martin Legassick: "The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography". 
been imported, and natural increase added to this. Agricultural 
farming in the Western Cape and the growing importance of cattle 
and sheep ranching in the East characterized economic activity. 
Relative to the early days, a colonial community30, derived largely 
from Dutch, German and French immigrants, (as well as widespread 
illicit unions and marriages with slave women) and their offspring, 
and calling themselves 'Africanders'31 were spread out through the 
colony, whose borders - it should be noted - were far from clearly 
defined. These are well known historical 'facts'. So too is the 
fact of the Western Khoisan demise and, as a result of miscegenation 
between individuals of most groups, the beginning of the emergence 
of those who later came to be called the Cape Coloured people. 
There are also reliable figures relating to the number of ships 
calling at the Cape. There are, too, useful and illuminating details 
concerning the rearing, sale and export of cattle and sheep, and 
derived pastoral produce. Comprehensive studies of educational 
policies and practices, slave life and conditions, missionary 
endeavours and social and political activity, help to give us a 
picture of what life - mainly for the so-called European community - 
was like at different times and places during this period. Whatever 
its other defining features may have been, and however one concept- 
ualizes it, few dispute the view that the socio-economic and political 
structure of Cape society in the middle of the 18th century was one 
in which the colour of/ man's skin seems to have become a crucial fact. 
30. What Balandier, dealing with more recent times in Africa, has 
referred to as the 'colonial society'. G. Balandier: "The 
Coloni-al Situation", PP-36-57- 
31- Rene' de Villiers and others before him claim that the term 
'Africander' was first used by Hendrik Bibault in Stellenbosch 
in 1707. See de Villiers' piece on "Afrikaner Nationalism", 
P-365. 
11 
People of colour, so-called, to the extent that they were part of 
the society, were, in the main, located in inferior and subordinate 
positions in terms of status, wealth, power or prestige - or any 
other such index. Why? 
What were the central dynamics and processes of historical 
change which had shaped the new society that had come into existence? 
It is with that central question that this study is concerned. 
Most of the general and specialist histories of this period give 
a reasonable picture of the major sequences of events, the significant 
happenings, and what are seen to be the relevant consequences of 
these. But it is unquestionably the case that despite differences 
in emphasis and moral tone, the dominant tradition in South African 
historiography dealing with this period has involved a pre-occupation 
with the dating of events and a rather flat charting of the geo- 
political and economic growth and expansion of the colony. The 
approach of that kind of historical writing has, as Hobsbawm has 
ritish, lamented with reference to aspects of 
Aistoriography, 
"... lent 
itself most readily to chronological narrative". 
32 Its methodology 
moreover has assumed that "... hypotheses arise automatically from 
the study of 'facts', that explanations consist of a collection of 
chains of cause and effect, the concepts of determinism, evolutionism 
etc. "33 Even the few historical studies which reflect an awareness 
of sociological parameters do not, in any systematic manner, attempt 
to interpret these. For example, C. W. de Kiewiet, writing more than 
30 years ago, observed that34: 
The true history of South African colonization describes 
the growth, not of a settlement of Europeans, but of a totally 
new and unique society of different races and colours and 
cultural attainments, fashioned by conflicts of racial 
heredity and the opposition of unequal social groups. 
32. E. J. Hobsbawm: "Karl Marx's Contribution to Historiography", p. 266. 
33. Ibid., Op. cit., loc. cit. 
34. C. W. de Kiewiet: Op. cit., p. 19. 
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Such a view, despite some of the questionable biological metaphors 
in the language, remains remarkably modern in its approach. In so 
far as it was intended to have relevance for the period under 
consideration,, as well as the 19th century, and in so far as it 
identifies a central theme in South African history, it forcefully 
points one in the direction of a systematic, historically-anchored 
analysis of the emerging social, political and economic structures 
of the 'new and unique' society. Moreover, it implicitly raises 
questions about the kinds of asymmetrical and conflicting goals and 
purposes which helped to create it, and the emergence and elaboration 
of the ideology which served to legitimate it. 
More recently, the Editors of the Oxford History of South Africa 
have underscored this view by stressing the argument that35 
the central theme of South African history is interaction 
between peoples of diverse origins, languages, technologies, 
and social systems, meeting on South African soil. 
Yet, despite such declarations neither de Keiwiet nor those Chapters 
in the Oxford History concerned with the Cape in this period, deal 
with questions and problems which, prima facie, are raised by such 
general frames of reference, and thematic commitments. Indeed, it 
would not be inaccurate to assert that there is no systematic 
historical sociology of the period, which attempts to move beyond 
chronological reconstruction. It is necessary to specify more 
analytically the processes which gave rise to the new formal and 
informal institutions, the manner in which particular patterns of 
economic behaviour were instituted, the structure of relationships 
within and between groups, the specification of the latter, and - to 
35. Monica Wilson and L. M. Thompson (eds): The Oxford History of 
South Africa, Vol. 1, p. v. 
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borrow a phrase from M. C. Smith36 - the modes of "inter-ethnic 
association" and incorporation, which constituted the 'new society'. 
The implosion of a European 'fragment'37 into a totally alien and 
distinctive ethnic and cultural zone offers a challenging opportunity 
to redefine the components of this history, and to reconsider the 
relationships emerging within it. 
It seems thus that there are substantial gaps in our under- 
standing of that process of historical change. This study attempts 
to close some of those gaps by adopting the following strategies. 
First, to pose a series of closely related and logically connected 
questions designed to establish a set of problems for interpretation 
and explanation which the histories have not satisfactorily answered. 
Indeed, some of the questions which I propose to explore have not 
greatly engaged the interest of most historians. 
Secondly, I shall set out the broad theoretical orientation, the 
relevant conceptual constructs and the appropriate subordinate 
analytic categories in terms of which such an analysis may be carried 
forward. 
Thirdly, it will then be possible to answer the questions posed by 
relating the analytic framework thus established to the evidence, in 
order to give meaning to the 'facts' which it identifies, and hence 
to trace out those connections and relationships which have been 
overlooked, or which the narrative approach has not been concerned 
to uncover. 
36. M. G. Smith: "Pluralism in Pre-colonial African Societies", p. 106. 
37. The concept of 'fragment' is discussed in L. Fartz (ed): The 
Founding of New Societies. See particularly L. M. Thompson's 
contribution to this volume entitled "The South African Dilemma". 
Also, B. M. Schutz: The Theory of Fragment and the Political 
Development of White Settler Society in Rhodesia. 
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Before setting out the core questions with which the 
subsequent chapters will be concerned, it would be useful to 
summarize the argument thus far. In this way it may be seen how 
the proposed strategies converge. I have argued that the absence 
of a systematic historical sociology for the first century bf V. O. C. 
rule at the Cape has meant that we do not have a coherent explanatory 
account of its historical development. The fault lies not simply 
in the kinds of questions which historians of various political 
persuasions have conventionally asked, but also in the historio- 
graphical tradition in terms of which they have been generated, and 
answered. As subsequent chapters will indicate, the answers to the 
questions with which the histories have been concerned, contain a 
wide range of asserted correlations, postulated connections between 
certain phenomena and statements about cause and effect. Prima facie, 
they give rise to a scepticism because they rest on a set of 
(usually implicit) assumptions about social behaviour and organization 
in the formation of the new society which are not self-evident, and 
leave one with a sense of things only partially or inadequately 
explained. This situation provokes a different set of questions 
which are derived from an alternative orientation to historical 
explanation. The manner in which they may successfully or plausibly 
be answered depends crucially on the conceptual framework and 
analytic categories in terms of which the historical material is 
confronted and the evidence presented. There is thus a dialectical 
relationship between, first, the kinds of questions to which 
dissatisfaction with the historical accounts have given rise, and, 
secondly, the theoretical perspectives in terms of which they might 
most usefully be answered. Here lies the convergence, and the 
methodological starting point. The claim being made is that the 
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conceptual categories elaborated here identify 'significant inter- 
connections, and thereby justify turning to the broader perspectives 
and a variety of disciplinary approaches from which they are derived. 
The approach makes possible a plausible account of the growth of Cape 
society, and provides a perspective in terms of which more detailed 
studies can be undertaken. In the next chapter I will examine the main 
theoretical categories more closely. The remainder of this chapter 
will be devoted to a specification of the questions to be asked, and 
the reasons for asking them. 
One general point needs to be made here. Periodization 
inevitably entails a degree of arbitrariness. The central questions 
in this study are inextricably tied into a determinate period during 
which various political economies and 'cultures' met and mingled on 
South African soil. But each of these had a history. How far back 
does one need to trace the elements in each? The problem, I think. 
will resolve itself by specifying what it is that the questions are 
designed to answer, by the way in which they are framed and by the 
limitations - with respect to the Khoisan for example - which our 
ignorance imposes upon us. I suggest, finally, that there is a 
logical connection between the questions to the extent that, located 
as they are within an historical epoch, they give rise to each other 
in a sequence whereby the one feeds out the next. This is not to 
assert that they are the only worthwhile questions, but rather repeats 
an earlier part of the argument. That is, the questions being posed 
are not simply a random collection of supplementaries aimed at 
plugging gaps. Collectively, they represent an alternative frame- 
work for the analysis of historical change at the Cape. What follows 
here is an advance notice of the issues to be examined. 
16 
1. Whether the settlers at the Cape constituted a 
representative 'fragment' of 17th century Dutch socidty, or whether, 
as L. M. Thompson claims, they were ".... an inferior, partial selection 
from it", 38 the fact remains that those people from the Netherlands 
and north-west Europe who joined the V. O. C. or who emigrated to the 
Cape, originated in a society whose socio-economic, cultural and 
ideological dimensions need constantly to be borne in mind. For, if 
we are dealing with a subject which centres crucially on the inter- 
action of economic and social systems, cultures and ideologies, and 
which gave rise, in a 'colonial situation', to a whole set of new 
institutions, practices and customs, then it seems reasonable to 
argue that we cannot analyse that process without tracing backwards 
in time the interests, perceptions and predispositions which the 
colonists brought with them and which were anchored in their social 
and geographical origins. Without doing this one cannot make sense 
of the way in which they behaved towards the indigenous people. One 
cannot, in short, situate them. 
What were the relevant components of Dutch culture - and 
particularly their concentration in the V. O. C. - that were 'exported' 
to the Cape? What we have to ask is what kind of weltanschauung 
dominated Dutch society in the 17th century? What kind of goals, 
purposes, intentions, hopes and aspirations did it generate which, 
when interacting with, and impacting upon Khoi and San culture and 
the imported slaves, contributed to the shaping of a 'new society'? 
Can we locate, in this, a kind of sociological 'multiplier' by which 
we can identify and then explain the relationship between (for example) 
on the one hand, the mercantilist and materialist ethos of Dutch 
society, and, on the other hand, the patterns of socio-economic 
38. See L. M. Thompson: "The South African Dilemma", Op. cit., p. 103. 
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organization and stratification, division of labour, and political 
arrangements at the Cape? Will it assist in identifying an 
unfolding ideology which both influenced and then justified the 
particular development of Cape society and the way in which the 
settlers reacted to their new environment and acted to shape it to 
their purpose? In short, what were the salient features of value 
and ideology in the social consciousness of Dutch society in the 17th 
and early 18th centuries? How, through the medium of the settlers 
and Officials did these influence the shape of Cape social structure 
during the first century of Company 'rule'? There are some 
important implications for the relationship between ideology and 
social structure involved. 
There is a further and related problem concerning attitudes 
and perceptions. And that is the taxing question of how people of 
colour in the wider world were perceived in the Netherlands. If 
there was a 'colour consciousness', what form did it take? To what 
extent was it fused or confused with attitudes to alien cultures? 
The question is rather crucial, though answers to it have differed 
considerably. Moreover the limitations of the evidence constrain 
its use as a basis for inference. If it is the case, which may be 
impossible to establish with confidence, that the settlers came to 
the Cape with already hostile and hard attitudes to people of colour, 
then the subsequent developments there have a not very surprising 
logic to them. If, on the other hand, such attitudes were not 
firmly established in the social consciousness of the Netherlands, 
why and how did they develop and harden at the Cape? What are the 
connections, if any, between the goals, aspirations and ideology of 
the colonists and the way they came to regard and treat people of 
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colour? Is there a relationship to be uncovered in the way in 
which material interests and economic imperatives conditioned 
attitudes to labour, how these were then related to the development 
of colour attitudes, justified later in more or less spurious 
Scriptural terms and hence, perhaps, rendered comfortable in 
psychological terms? What is the connection between material 
interests, social attitudes and the formation and development of 
social structures in the 'colonial situation'? 
These kinds of questions have relevance not only for the 
17th and 18th centuries at the Cape, but the contemporary situation 
in South Africa. They are worth exploring in their own right as 
part of the debate about the relationship between ideas, attitudes 
and beliefs and social structure. One way of entering the debate is 
by examining the issues in a specific historical context. No simple 
statement of what is a very complex problem can be satisfactory. 
However, it will be interesting to explore the view that ".... human 
attitudes and beliefs fail to persist unless the situations and 
sanctions that reproduce them continue to persist, or, more crassly, 
unless people get something out of them", and its corollary that 
".... values change in response to circumstances". 
39 It may be 
rather more complicated than this suggests. 
A significant part of the answer to such questions will 
surely be found - if it is to be found at all - in an analysis of the 
processes of social differentiation and subordination of various 
categories of people in the shifting context of emerging socio- 
economic and political purposes, of sustained and systematic 
39" Barrington Moore Jnr: The Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, p. 335 and p. 487. 
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relationships between groups, and the changing balance of power. 
But before one can unravel these processes it is important to be as 
clear as possible about attitudes prior to such continuous contact. 
At least it seems to be a logical starting point. The argument is 
well stated by Jordan in his study of white attitudes to blacks in 
the U. S. A. from the earliest days. He says: 
40 
It only gradually dawned that I was .... cutting into the 
seamless webb of time at just the wrong moment, that it 
was necessary to probe the characteristics of Englishmen 
before rather than when they first confronted Africans. 
Likewise, we must ask about the representative attitudes and 
dispositions of Dutchmen in their native land before they first 
confronted on a regular basis the Khoisan people and before they were 
in systematic relations with an imported slave population. 
To answer such questions one needs to define rather more 
closely such terms as 'culture', 'ideology' and 'society'. I propose 
to do that in the following chapter as part of the general outline 
of the conceptual approach and theoretical perspective in terms of 
which this study will be cast. 
2.1 shall argue that the pattern and structure of group 
relations which emerged in the colonial or contact situation was 
fashioned in part by the interaction of asymmetrical structures and 
the relative strengths of both 'immigrant' and 'host' political 
economies and cultures. It follows that it is important to define 
more clearly the collective predispositions, attitudes, commitments 
to a type of social organization etc., of the 'invading' culture. 
It is equally important to have an accurate picture of Khoisan 
societies, prior to that impact. In a discussion of the distribution 
40. Winthrop D. Jordan: White Over Black, p. iv. 
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of what he calls 'racial and cultural types' in the New World today, 
Marvin Harris argues that41 
the variable which initially deserves emphasis is the 
nature of the aboriginal societies with which the 
European societies came into contact. One of the most 
important features of the American environment from the 
point of view of the colonists, whether conquistadores 
or pilgrims, was not the climate or the topography. It 
was instead the level of socio-cultural integration 
characteristic of the Amerindian societies with which 
the Europeans were obliged to interact. 
Though in this study, the prime concern is not the distribution of 
'racial or cultural types', but rather the process of development of 
a new society, Harris's point is important. The interaction involved 
conflict, but too often in the literature on the Cape this is 
conceived of in terms of one dimension -a fractious and bitter 
squabble over resources such as land and cattle. This forecloses on 
the possibility of disentangling the intricacies of 'culture conflict' 
which the notions both of 'culture' and 'conflict' can be seen, on 
another view, to entail. It has been pointed out that42 
conflicts between cultures, depending on the nature of 
the contacts, might well include conflicting ideologies, 
religions, interests, rights and all other types. 
This raises a question of methodological and interdisciplinary 
substance. By training the focus of analysis on aspects of conflict 
we are concerning ourselves with a process which is multi-dimensional, 
and has a variety of levels, in this kind of context. I shall argue 
that there was a great deal more to it than simply a conflict over 
resources: I shall suggest that we must also describe a complex clash 
of meanings, purposes, behaviours, beliefs and visions which were 
embedded in the histories, and which made for the particularly rasping 
41. Marvin Harris: Patterns of Race in the Americas, pp. 2-3. 
42. Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder: "The analysis of social 
conflicts - towards an overview and synthesis", p. 221. 
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and acrimonious form of conflict. People thought, talked and acted 
past each others' comprehension. To establish that, and to trace out 
its manifestations, demands a certain kind of evidence which questions 
about the nature of Khoisan culture and society are designed to 
elicit. But there are problems here. In the above section dealing 
with Dutch society I have presumed that by asking certain questions, 
one will be able to educe from what historians tell us about that 
culture some relevant information about ideas, purposes, goals and 
meanings, which the analytic categories organize into a more or less 
coherent and manageable set of facts concerned with a range of 
associated predispositions etc. In order to abstract a comparable 
profile (if such can be done) of Khoisan beliefs, interests, ideas 
and predispositions, etc., we turn not to the historians, but to the 
anthropologists and the ethnographers. We ask similar kinds of 
questions, but rely on a different type of evidence, collected in a 
different way and organized by the two disciplines in their own 
categories. 
43 Can we abstract from the anthropological and ethno- 
graphic material the relevant features, characteristics and beliefs 
of Khoisan societies and cultures and cast them in the kind of 
conceptual mould which will permit a more intricate analysis of the 
forms and levels of conflicts between the two 'cultures'? The attempt 
must be made, despite the methodological and evidential constraints, 
if claims to analyse interaction between the 'immigrant' and 'host' 
groups are to be taken seriously. It will thus be necessary to scan 
the evidence from the different disciplines and to reorganize it in 
terms of the appropriate categories which will provide the basis for 
analyzing the variety of levels and forms of interaction and conflict. 
43. These problems of 'interdisciplinarity' are treated at the start 
of the next chapter. 
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This second set of questions started by referring to 
asymmetrical structures and societies of relative strengths. The 
point needs to reclaimed here. We shall never know whether, had 
the Bantu-speakers been established in the Western Cape, things 
would have turned out differently. But from the late 18th century 
and through the 19th century there were frequent and ferocious 
battles between them and the colonists, which raged from the Eastern 
Cape° at first, and then - as the trekboere moved north - in Natal, 
the Transvaal and what is today the Orange Free State. By contrast, 
the conflict with the Khoisan in the 17th and 18th centuries was 
limited. Yet no major Nguni or Sotho 'tribe' was ever annihilated 
culturally, and therefore as an ethnic entity in the way the Khoi, 
and most San, were. Why? Was there, within Khoisan society - if we 
can use the term 'society' in this context as Nadel has defined it44 
-a fatal structural weakness which, when faced with a threat such as 
that which the colonist came to pose, prevented Khoi and San from 
banding together in sustained self-defence, as Nuer sections might 
have done? 45 Was it simply a question of their relative technological 
weakness in the face of European weaponry and their vulnerability to 
certain diseases? Some argue that this is always the fate of nomadic, 
segmented, acephalous hunters and herders in situations of this kinds 
others argue that it was unique. 
3. Armed, as it were, with their pre-contact histories, 
ideologies, cultures and some preconceptions of each other, two of 
the parties to the colonial situation met on a regular basis for the 
first time. It is to the examination of one crucial and cumulative 
44. S. F. Nadel: The Foundations of Social Anthropology. 
45" E. E. Evans-Pritchard: The Nuer. 
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aspect of that interaction that the strategy of enquiry now logically 
points. There were no settlers initially and the first colonists 
as such were Free Burghers, local ex-employees of the Company, who 
were given a limited degree of freedom to farm in a restricted area 
on their own account in 1657. 'Settlers' as such came later. But at 
the same time as the Free Burghers were set up the first slaves were 
systematically introduced at the Cape. All this marks a new system 
of relationships, with important implications for attitudes, percept- 
ions and behaviour of all parties, and in particular the Khoisan and 
the Dutch. Though it took time before the Council of Seventeen was 
reluctantly to recognize it, the de facto establishment and 
extension of the settlement was occurring with a logic and dyhamic 
of its own, given that situation and those conditions. 
The theme that must be here examined is the process whereby 
the destruction of Khoi hordes and undermining of the independent 
basis of their political economies was brought about. From the start 
of this process precedents affecting relations between groups were 
created which were to throw their shadows forward. What was the 
nature of the initial contacts? Were there any indications, at this 
stage, of the pattern that was to emerge? What did the Company want 
and what policy and practice did it - and the colonists - adopt to 
achieve those ends? What was the nature of the relationships and 
institutions which this phase and theme brought into existence, and 
is it possible to detect from early on the logic of conflicting 
interests, sharpened by mutual non-comprehension and contrasting 
goals, which was to bring about the demise of the Khoi hordes in 
particular? 
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4. Most accounts do not fail to mention some, or all, of the 
following factors as being responsible in differing degrees for the 
destruction of the Khoi and, subsequently the Cape San, as identifiable 
and independent societies: coercion and compulsion through warfare, 
the undermining of the relatively fragile Khoi economic infrastructures, 
'acculturation' (both as cause and consequence), political subjugation, 
and the random but disastrous effects of disease. But before this 
took place there had been a period of nervy economic interaction 
largely through the cattle trade. That condition did not prevail for 
long. Remorselessly, it will be argued, the material imperatives and 
interests of the Y. O. C. and the settlers bit further and further into 
Khoisan autonomies and the structure of relations between the various 
Khoisan groups, which was based on their flocks and access to land, or 
their hunting grounds and the game. This was a crucial condition of 
Khoi demise and a precondition of their political subordination and 
incorporation as dependents within the Cape society. As this 
happened, a very slow cultural transformation was taking place, and 
the whole process was punctuated by warfare and the battering effects 
of various diseases. The socio-economic and political dimensions of 
this process were not distinct or sequential: they overlapped in 
time and affected each other in cumulative ways. To examine how Khoi 
societies were undermined and destroyed, it is necessary to stand back 
from the immediacy of specific events - the 'Hottentot war' of 1658-60, 
(a "scuffling affair", Walker dismissively calls it46), the second 
was during the 1670s, the 18th century outbreaks of smallpox, the 
pressure on land and, crucially through all this, the depletion and 
loss of Khoi herds through pressure trading by the Y. O. C. and 
colonists, both when they were permitted to trade and when not. The 
1UNIVERSITY 
46. E. A. Walker: Op. cit., pp-40-1- OF YORK LIBRARY 
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power and demand of the Company and settler material interests fed 
on themselves and drove deep into the heart of Khoi societies, 
shattering their vulnerable political economies. As one of 
Conrad's characters observes in Nostromo: 
47 
Only let the material interests once get a footing, and 
they are bound to impose the conditions on which alone 
they can continue to exist. 
There is nothing damagingly determinist in this view, 
provided 'material interests' are defined in the context of the 
perceptions, ideology and social purposes of one group of human 
beings in relation to others, in terms of their antecedent histories 
and the characteristic norms of economic behaviour in the societies 
from which they have come, and which they bring to bear in the new 
context. 
There are two major questions for the analysis here, which 
the way the whole process is conceptualized will help to answer. 
First, a conceptual scheme is needed in terms of which one can 
describe, at different points in time, the structure of relations as 
it developed between Khoisan and colonists (and, later, slaves). For, 
initially, it is clearly not possible to talk either about a 
'colonial situation' which involved regular relations between the 
groups,. or a 'society' constituted, in part, by these groups. The 
social, political, economic, and cultural boundaries between them 
were too marked to talk, in any sense, of a 'common' society. But 
this was to change. A conceptual scheme which enables one to chart 
and describe these changes in structure is necessary. I will argue 
that a sequence of synchronic snapshots of various 'moments' will 
help this, and I shall draw on contributions to the theory and analysis 
47. Joseph Conrad: Nostromo, p. 81 
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of 'plural societies' to do so. In the next chapter I propose to 
deal with this question more fully, and later to operationalize 
some associated concepts in the substantive account. 
Secondly, if pluralism will help us to conceptualize and 
describe different stages in the slowly articulating socio-economic 
and political arrangements, it does not, I think, have the explanatory 
power to aid our understanding of the dynamics which generated the 
changes and forged the new structure of relationships. Here we need 
a theory (or theories) of change and development that can be used 
diachronically to point up, differentiate between and evaluate the 
various factors and forces. While pluralism provides a useful set 
of conceptual constructs to describe and highlight the characteristic 
features of a range of distinctive and special societal types, under- 
lining the obstacles to and consequences of certain kinds of change 
in them, it does not - because it does not set out to do so - offer 
much in the way of an explanation or theory of change. There are 
more useful insights to be derived, for example, from marxism which 
will help here, and to this it will be necessary to turn also in the 
next chapter. 
In this section of the study, then, matters of substance 
concerning the fate of the Khoisan will be tackled. The focus will 
be on two interlocking strands in the historical process. First, 
the ways in which Khoisan culture was broken down and secondly, how, 
through this process, their 'incorporation' into the new society came 
about. From taarxism it will be possible to identify a variety of 
driving forces - epitomized (and caricatured if seen as the 'only' 
cause) by the thrust of material interests - and from pluralism it 
will be possible to delineate and describe the constitution of the 
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emerging 'society' at different historical moments, its 
institutional arrangements and structural characteristics, as they 
hardened over the century. 
5. The process of Khoisan 'incorporation' into the structure 
of Cape society was intimately tied up with labour demands and 
arrangements, and most Khoisan came to occupy menial positions in 
the occupational hierarchy of the society. The structure and shape 
of stratification that emerged in the first century of Company rule 
was in large measure defined by the way in which the 'labour' 
question was resolved. Moreover, on one perspective, the so-called 
'race relations' pattern was both cause and effect of this, though 
it was a great deal more complex than this formulation suggests. 
Nonetheless, a discussion of the fate of the Khoi leads one 
procedurally, therefore, into an examination of a particularly 
knotty aspect of this period: the sociology of labour/slavery 
at the Cape. It is a remarkably under-researched area, and deserves 
a careful study in its own right. But so many of the emerging 
characteristics of the society can be traced to and from the labour 
arrangements, ' that it must be of prime concern, for the essence of 
'incorporation' as a concept, and its dynamics, can be most clearly 
located and operationalized in a sociology of slavery and labour. 
Various disciplinary studies might ask different questions 
of the evidence. Was the slave system 'efficient'? Whether it was 
or was not, why were slaves introduced? Who wanted them, and how 
was Khoisan labour distributed and regulated? Was there a 
distinctive 'culture of slavery'? Did it have implications for all 
groups, and consequences of any particular kind on the generations 
after emancipation? Historians and sociologists of slave systems 
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might want to ask whether the form which slavery took at the Cape 
is comparable to that 'peculiar institution' in the Americas and, 
if there are differences, how might one account for them? Social 
psychologists might find it useful to enquire whether the system 
of slavery at the Cape and the incorporation and 'freezing' of 
people of colour into subordinate positions in the socio-economic 
structure was affected by and/or gave rise to explicit and 
articulate colour antagonisms and prejudices. But in this study a 
focus on the sociology of slavery/labour at the Cape must be concerned 
with most, if not all, of these questions, for the answers have 
direct relevance to the overall analysis. They are crucial to an 
understanding of the interaction between various interests, goals, 
purposes, ideologies etc., in fashioning the political economy, 
social structure and legitimating ideas of Cape society. At almost 
any point of analytic entry, the search for connections and 
relationships between attitudes, beliefs, objectives and institutional 
arrangements, leads one - given the ideological orientation in terms 
of which both Company and settlers may be seen to have operated - to 
ask questions about the role of slavery and labour in the develop- 
ment of the society. In order to argue for, and assert, the 
centrality of the 'labour factor' in supporting the overall 
explanatory perspective, subsidiary analytic categories will be 
used to shape the answers to questions such as the above. It may be 
questioned whether it is legitimate to collapse slavery and the 
employment of 'free' people of colour into one general category. 
I shall argue that there are strong reasons for doing this. Though 
there were differences - both in form and substance - between the 
two, their elision for the purposes of this analysis will be 
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justified in terms of the similarity of the objectives for which 
both groups were harnessed and pressed into service, and in terms 
of the implications which 'unfree' and 'free' labour by people of 
colour had for social structure and attitudinal developments. 
Frazier has commented on this general question in the following 
terms, and his observation is germane to the argument. He writes: 
48 
The recruitment of 'free' native or coloured labour in 
many parts of the world where Europeans have settled or 
gained political control has often concealed a system 
of forced labour. The element of force become apparent 
when one examines the methods of recruitment, the terms 
on which the workers have been engaged and the control 
which Europeans have exercised over native or coloured 
workers during the period of their employment. 
And in his detailed study of Maynier and the Graaff-Reinet 'Republic', 
Marais observed: 
49 
The fact is that many Hottentots were far from being the 
free men of the official theory. If they were not 
actually slaves, they may be described as bondmen. 
An analysis of slavery and labour at the Cape does not 
constitute an end in itself. It's significance lies in the contrib- 
ution which it will make to the overall explanation of the birth 
and growth of the institution and norms of the new society. Indeed, 
outside of that context, such an analysis would be robbed of much of 
its meaning. Bloch, in his work on Fuedal Society, puts this kind 
of argument succinctly: 
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A society, like a mind, is woven of perpetual interaction. 
For other researches, differently oriented, the analysis 
of the economy or the mental climate are culminating points; 
for the historian of the social structure they are a 
starting point. 
48. E. Franklin Frazier: Race and Culture Contacts in the Modern 
World, p. 120. 
49. J. S. Marais: Maynier and the First Boer Republic, P-73- 
50. Marc Bloch: Feudal Society, p. 59" 
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A consideration of the question of slavery and labour 
will be, then, one of the building blocks for a larger expository 
purpose. And on this question - the manner in which slavery and 
labour relations both expressed and helped to fashion over time the 
structure and ideology of the society - the historians have 
delivered an incomplete report. 
6. At this point it will be appropriate to pause, for a 
number of strands in the argument which will have been independently 
pursued will need to be consolidated. A summary evaluation of the 
socio-economic and political structure of the Western Cape will help 
to establish starting points and prepare the way for the analysis of 
subsequent substantive developments which grew out from this. To some 
extent the procedural steps to this stage in the argument will have 
kept pace with 'key' historical events. But analyses of some of 
the factors and forces - such as the above consideration of slavery 
and labour - will have necessarily run on beyond the limits which a 
strictly chronological frame of reference imposes. In passing, this 
will demonstrate the limitations of that approach, and the problems 
of this one. Similarly, other trends developing simultaneously 
within the interstices of the society will have been by-passed, or 
only referred to tangentially in the process of chasing forward in 
time (and tracking sideways in uncovering structural connections) 
certain aspects which the conceptual lenses will have brought into 
focus. For example, the beginning of the gradual Eastward movement 
of the veeboere in the early 18th century is a complex matter of 
substance to which specific attention will have to be given. But 
the analytic programme of this study and the framework on which it is 
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based necessarily establish a hierarchy of related problems, which 
don't mesh neatly with the chronology of events and which, for 
rather practical reasons and for analytic convenience, can only be 
dealt with in terms of a logical order shaped by the theoretical 
orientation. And it is, after all, the case that ".... you can only 
say one thing at a time - elegantly". 
51 The problem of what Nettl 
calls ' simultaneity' inevitably dogs the heels of the sociological 
approach to a case study in historical change. At this point in 
the study that problem surfaces decisively. But by this stage a 
number of questions will have been answered and it will be useful 
to effect a synthesis at an appropriate level of generality. I will 
have explored the relationship between the historical antecedents 
to the 'contact' situation, the collective and representative pre- 
dispositions, preconceptions and perceptions of the groups, levels 
and kinds of conflict, forms and modes of subordination and 
incorporation, and the institutions of 'free' and 'unfree' labour. 
It will be possible to describe the hardening social structure and 
the set of norms about behaviour in the new context, in the 18th 
century, and as the frontier of people, and their ideas, began to 
move east, initiating new phases of interaction. 
I have suggested earlier that one of the dominant forces 
which contoured the shape of the new society and which may largely 
be held responsible for the way in which groups were distributed un- 
evenly and unequally in its formation was the manner in which the 
material interests of the Company and the settlers - not to be 
regarded as anything like a unified group - adapted themselves to 
local conditions. In the process these interests will be seen to be 
51. J. P. Nettl: Political Mobilization, p. 23. 
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expressed in local enterprises which in turn generated certain 
imperatives - like labour requirements, land and the need for 
cattle - which developed a particular logic of their own, and had 
implications for the behaviour of all groups. 
Generally, I shall argue that material and ideal interests 
can be shown to be causally and dialactically connected to a range 
of practices affecting and locking together labour and social 
relations. If this can be shown to have established precedents 
for behaviour and attitude which were carried outwards in the 
expansion of the colony, and if this can be seen to have issued in 
an elaboration of more or less integrated ideas about social 
organization then, at this point in the study, it will be useful to 
examine closely the ideological condition during the course of the 
18th century. 
Ideology plays a central role in the conceptual framework 
to be deployed. I shall deal with it more fully in the next chaper. 
For the present it needs to be said that the notion will be used 
both as a descriptive term and as an explanatory concept. Briefly, 
it will denote the purposes, values, ideas, aspirations, dispositions 
and beliefs of a group, in the context of their history and their 
social location in a given but changing economic situation. The way 
such a group acts in the situation contributes to changing it, 
though they do not alone dictate the terms of change. But they 
perceive the changed situation differently over time. Ideology, in 
this sense, is like a two-way prism: it refracts purposes and 
generalized beliefs onto reality, thereby affecting it, and mediates 
the group's social interpretation and definition of that reality. To 
intersect this interplay between men and their environment at any 
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point is necessarily an arbitrary operation. But for our purposes 
it will be helpful to construct a profile of the kinds of ideas which 
were becoming current at the Cape at this time and relate them to 
the shifting bases of stratification and the social structure which 
was being forged and legitimated in terms of the ideology, and the 
way in which inter-group relations were being defined. Will it be 
possible to compare the state of the ideology with what it had been 
half a century before? What will this tell one about change? 
An answer to that question will be essentigl before one 
can commence to look seriously at the factors which gave momentum 
to the eastward expansion of the colony, the kinds of ideas the 
trekkers may reasonably be expected to have taken with them, and 
hence their purposes, grievances and commitments. If a relationship 
can be established between aspects of Dutch culture and the kinds of 
arrangements which emerged in the interaction with Khoisan and 
slaves at the Cape, so. too it seems logical to proceed on the 
assumption that the experiences of people in and around the western 
districts had implications for their beliefs and behaviour when, as 
trekkers, some of them moved into the interior. Likewise, the 
experience of the Khoisan in their early dealings with the Dutch 
were to have implications for their responses to this new development. 
7. In the previous section different aspects of, probably, a 
more or less consistent set of ideas - the ideology - which had 
gained currency amongst settlers at the Cape by the turn of the 
century will have been examined. It will be useful to 'divide' this 
ideology into a set of more or less interlocking facets: 'economic 
ideology', 'colour' attitudes, political ideas, religious beliefs, 
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and so on. Whether they were, in fact, more or less coherent, 
whether they were mutually supportive and whether they had begun to 
constitute an explicit and identifiable weltanschauung, almost in the 
form of a creed, will be a question to be examined later, and set 
against the empirical evidence about institutional practice in 
education, the churches, farming and politics, and so on. But in 
this section the specific focus of analysis will be on the explanation 
of the trek out of the Western Cape, and on the political economy of 
this initially mobile society in the 18th century. The connection 
with the examination of ideology will be made apparent. 
What factors pushed, and what factors pulled (or lured) 
them out of the settled western districts? Why did they leave and 
what did they seek? And who were they? 
Interpretations of this movement and the kind of society 
which it brought into existence differ widely. There are three 
points that need to be made here about this question. First, one is 
dealing with at least two dimensions of historical change. On the 
one hand, one seeks an explanation of why the movement commenced and 
what sustained it. On the other hand, though clearly related, one is 
setting out to identify and analyse the kind of society which 
developed. In what respects, if any, did it differ from that which 
had begun to consolidate in the western areas? Secondly, the overall 
purpose - to expose connections and identify relationships between 
events and developments - points logically to this expansion of the 
colony as the next matter for enquiry. And thirdly, it seems there- 
fore to be the case that the explanation for, and analysis of the 
trekking movement must be rooted in, and related to, an understanding 
of the structure and ideology of that society from which it came. 
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Part of the answer to the set of questions which such a consideration 
precipitates will have been suggested in the previous section. But 
it will be necessary to give closer attention to those, and additional 
factors, which will have only been referred to in passing. Again, 
the problem of 'simultaneity' raises its head. In concentrating on 
the outward expansion of the colony it will be necessary to look 
back and organize into an integrated focus a series of political, 
economic, ideological and sociological variables, which - in terms of 
the general theoretical orientation - will be combined and concentrated 
to explain this movement. 
The effects of monopolistic and authoritarian policy of 
the Company on settler interests and attitudes, the consequences of 
population increases and land pressure, the increased demand for 
meat at the Cape, the hopes of and belief in the promise of 
lucrative ranching possibilities in the east, political corruption, 
frustration and agitation, and the 'labour factor' will be examined. 
By using appropriate analytic categories it should be possible to 
confront somewhat more analytically the relatively undifferentiated 
collection of 'facts' in the histories and other sources, and thus 
relate various dimensions of the social, economic and political 
processes in the society to the causes, structure and consequences 
of the trekking movement. In the light of this approach an 
explanation for that movement and an account of its emerging structure 
of relationships and its ideology to the latter years of the 18th 
century will be offered. 
It is not within the scope of this study to trace further 
interaction in the East. The last quarter of the 18th century marks 
the beginning of a decisive new stage in South African history. For 
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though there is written evidence that Europeans and Nguni had been 
in contact from the 16th century, 
52 the period of systematic conflict 
and cooperation between them across a "cultural frontier"53 begins 
towards the end of our period. Moreover, the further development 
and consolidation of the Cape colony in late 18th century is also 
beyond the scope of this study. The cut-off point is of course 
arbitrary in a number of respects. Certain features of the Eastern 
Cape were crucially affected by the growing interaction with Nguni, 
even in the period under investigation. Hunting, exploring and 
trading parties had been travelling east and north from the second 
half of the 17th century, and contact with Nguni was not infrequent. 
But I am concerned with the evolving structure of colonial relation- 
ships prior to systematic contact with the Nguni: conceptually, 
therefore, I will be regarding the first 125 years as constituting 
a field of enquiry in its own right, though the limitations in doing 
so are obvious. Khoi and San were in contact with Nguni, and had 
been - in a variety of ways - for a long time. Europeans were in 
contact with Nguni too. Colonist parties, with Khoi servants and 
interpreters, moved between the western districts and the Eastern 
'frontier', which, following Wilson, may be regarded as the Gamtoos 
River and beyond. But the period and problems under consideration 
were not substantially influenced by those developments. Where they 
are relevant, they will be introduced at the appropriate points. 
At this point in the analysis, it will be necessary to take 
stock of the situation in the whole colony, constituted by the 
'settled' western districts and the more fluid and mobile East, in 
52. Monica Wilson: "The Early History of the Transkei and Ciskei". 
53. Monica Wilson: "Cooperation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape 
Frontier", p. 233" 
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the last years of the 18th century. Three remaining questions have 
to be tac11ed, which will complete the study. They are best identified 
separately in advance, here, but will be treated together by way of 
conclusions. 
8(a) If it is possible to talk about the 'new society' which 
had been formed as a consequence of various levels of interaction, 
what, if any, were the differences between its western and eastern 
wings? What links - political, cultural, social and economic - were 
there which more or less bound the 'society' together? Is is 
plausible to talk of a single 'society'? Or, if not, how may the 
differences in kind or degree be characterized? I will argue, first, 
that it is plausible to view the colony as a single society though 
there were important fissiparous tendencies. These will need to be 
explained. I will suggest, secondly, that the differences between 
west and east lie more in degree than in kind, and that these may be 
conceptualised in terms of degrees and forms of pluralism, related to 
the characteristic features of economic life. The definition and 
elaboration of these forms of pluralism will be rehearsed in the 
following chapter, and then worked into the substantive account at 
later points in the argument. I shall look once again at the economic 
and ideological condition of the whole colony, and describe how the 
structural differences in degree may be conceptualized in terms of 
pluralist categories. What customs and institutions had grown up in 
the west which were or were not present in the east, and if not, why 
not? In what ways did structure and stratification differ? Schools 
and churches were less prominent formal institutions in the East: 
slavery was predominant in the West, though the use of so-called 'free' 
38 
(i. e. non-slave) labour, including San was common in the East. 
Thus, the structural and ideological character of the Colony in the 
latter years of the 18th century will form the core of this section. 
Attention will be devoted particularly to the differences, and the 
explanations for these, between the West and the East, a 
distinction which, in itself, is somewhat formal, since the former 
merged with the latter, and economic and social ties were close - 
though politically, the east was already beginning to rumble and 
express irritation at efforts to dictate policy and practice from 
Capetown. New ideal and material interests evolved mit the 'frontier', 
with implications, yet again, for the new phase of contact there. 
But that is not my concern here. 
8(b) In the conbxt of the developing analysis, the preceding 
section will have abstracted from and imposed on the history a series 
of accounts of relationships and interconnections between events and 
developments. Each step in the argument will, of necessity, have 
had to take into account an increasingly inclusive range of factors 
as the complexity of the society grew. But each will have given a 
limited view of the whole, from a particular angle, asking subsidiary 
questions. To provide a more holistic overview of the processes 
which were at work through the century, two lines of enquiry will now 
have to be tracked through the major points of the partial analyses 
in order to pull them together and to establish a more comprehensive 
relationship between the 'parts' of the account which the analytic 
programme will have isolated for special treatment. The first is 
the crucial question of how, in the process of incorporation, 
"culture conflict" gave way to "colour conflict", as Patterson 
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describes it. 54 Previous sections will have offered partial 
contributions to the explanation for this by examining specific and 
subordinate dimensions of the problem. Now it will be necessary to 
adjust the lens and to relate these contributions, in a tighter 
perspective. Thus the focus here will be on the shifting bases and 
forms of stratification and structure over the whole period, as the 
colony expanded in geographical and demographic terms and as its 
increasing complexity was expressed in hierarchies of power, wealth, 
status, occupation and group definition. Whether a 'caste' type 
social structure was emerging, or whether a 'plural' structure can 
be identified will have important implications for the analysis of 
stratification between and within groups. Conceptually, the notion 
of a shift from culture to colour conflict, as the defining feature, 
seems both too limited and too diffuse. I will argue, instead, that 
an analysis of the changes is more usefully conceived of in terms 
of a series of more inclusive and societally extensive structures, 
starting with the meeting of at least two 'cultures' and social 
systems, and ending up with a single 'structurally plural' society 
brought about by the differential incorporation of groups, the 
definition of which came increasingly to be based on class not 
colour, as cultural distinctiveness slowly began to fade at the 
middle levels. The explanation for this, I will argue further, can 
be located, in short, in an understanding of the varying relationship 
between the purposes of the colonists in the light of their ideology, 
the local economic situation and its constraints and possibilities, 
the response of the Khoisan and the presence of an increasing slave 
population. 
54. Sheila Patterson: Colour and Culture in South Africa, PP. 5-6. 
This may not be the most useful way of conceiving the process, 
and it will be suggested later why a different conceptual 
orientation makes better sense. 
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This leads to the second conceptual net which will have to 
be drawn through the insights derived from the previous historical 
and structural analyses, in order to pick up relevant detail, 
evidence and indications about social relations and the social 
definition of group. consciousness. 
8(c) In looking back at the development of the colony during 
that first century the emergence of a consciousness of colour and a 
sense of white superiority amongst the settlers is often remarked 
upon. The actual definition of 'whiteness' then - as indeed now - 
was somewhat imprecise, mixing social as well as pigmentocratic 
categories. Now, whether the early colonists and officials brought 
with them, in their ideological baggage, a predisposition which 
facilitated this development or whether it was entirely an indigenous 
growth at the Cape, or a mixture of both, will have already been 
partly dealt with. But it is central to this argument that - 
whatever the balance and mix of the two possibilities and however 
powerful the phenomenon may or may not have been - the growth and/or 
elaboration of colour consciousness and attitudes of superiority 
must be seen to have been rooted firmly in the socio-economic and 
political processes of the developing society. And only in that 
context, not forgetting the histories and pre-conceptions, can its 
course be traced and its causes explained. 
But the manner and extent to which 'whites' came increasingly 
to define the whole situation and most social relationships in terms 
of colour needs to be clarified. This will find its anchorage and 
expression in the evidence and argument about the institutionalization 
of 'colourism': the explanation for the process, however, is only 
partly accounted for by that. 
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Initially, no legal distinctions were made on grounds of 
colour. Across a range of practices and procedures - marriage, 
education, profession of Christianity, baptism of children and even 
manumission of slaves - the colour of a person's skin alone was not 
grounds for differentiation or exclusion or segregation. Yet, it 
seems to have become subsequently the basis for distinctions, 
exclusions and unequal treatment. It is said that 'mixed' schools 
declined or disappeared; that the profession of-Christianity did not 
last long as a basis for a slave claiming his or her freedom; that 
marriage between 'white' and 'coloured' (whether of Khoi or manu- 
mitted slave origin) were frowned upon and became less frequent - 
though sexual relations across the colour line remained common. The 
processes we will have been looking at gave rise to a social order 
in which it seems as if colour became a major index of group 
differentiation. Was that the case, and if not, what was? 
Some writers have tried to isolate single, or major, causal 
factors. Mason, amongst others, for example, identifies the 
"Calvinistic religion" as being crucial. 
55 But, if this was the case 
then why, according to one historian of Christian missions in South 
Africa, was there, for example, in relation to marriage in the early 
days, no distinction ".... on the score of colour" made by the 
Calvinistic church? 
56 Another single factor - or major factor - 
explanation, followed by Katzen, suggests that attitudes of white 
superiority amongst, for example, the stock farmers ".... stemmed 
from the slave-owning traditions of the western Cape". 
57 
55. P. Mason: Patterns of Dominance, p. 198. 
56. J. du Plessis: A History of Christian Missions in South Afrida, 
PP-32-3- 
57- M. F. Katzen: Op. cit., p. 184. 
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Monocausal explanations for phenomena of this kind are 
rarely satisfactory. They tend to be reductionist in approach and 
thus divert attention away from the complex interplay over time in 
any society between structure and ideology -a distinction which in 
itself is questionable when simply formulated in those terms. Each 
of the preceding sections will have contributed parts of a larger 
answer which needs to be located and distributed, in terms of the 
evidence, across a fair period in time. The parts need to be pulled 
together in terms of the wider perspective by asking relevant 
questions of the relationships that have been traced. Did particular 
kinds of ideal and material interests which have been identified, 
nestling in a broader ideology, generate a need for labour which, 
once obtained, had structural consequences and hence implications 
for ideology? Did these in turn - given both the constraints and 
the possibilities of the time and the place - generate further 
purposes and aspirations as the local situation became more familiar 
and its prospects more 'rationally' evaluated? How far did perceived 
and experienced differences of various kinds between colonist and 
Khoisan, and colonist and slave, have implications for the former's 
behaviour and attitude? Under what circumstances and at what point 
did the often-asserted correlation between 'black men's work' and 
tough physical labour emerge? We know that, according to some 
observers, farmers and trekkers and others worked exceptionally hard 
on their own behalf. Did local predikante, identifying with their 
largely burger congregations help, perhaps, to adjust Scriptural 
teaching to accommodate local practices? To what extent? Did fear 
and suspicion of an alien 'outgroup', and physical conflict, contribute 
to the genesis of hostility which some of the above factors later 
sustained and transformed and carried forward? Could a restricted 
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market situation, fierce competition and labour shortages perhaps 
have influenced local settler communities not to permit or encourage 
upward mobility of labourers, or easy manumission of slaves, who 
were mainly people of colour? 
Some contemporary theories and comparative accounts of the 
causes and course of group conflict, hostility, stereotyping and 
prejudice will be examined in the light of the historical evidence 
and assessed within the context of the theoretical orientation being 
used. Various interpretations of this particular development at the 
Cape can then, in passing, be evaluated. In the process a more 
rounded answer should emerge. Certainly, no simple explanation in 
terms of a base-superstructure argument will suffice. For, I shall 
argue, aspects of the 'superstructure' - the ideology - were as 
instrumental as the 'base'. Indeed, the distinction between base and 
superstructure is a clumsy one. It will need to be collapsed and re- 
organized in the course of the various questions isolated for treat- 
ment. For 'superstructure' - or ideology - is not simply or only a 
consequence: it can also be a cause, and in the kind of situation 
with which we are dealing here, it is ignored as a causal factor at 
substantial explanatory cost. 
9. The study will conclude with a summary re-statement of the 
argument. I shall compare the approach used, and what the analytic 
and conceptual frameworks have been able to identify and relate, with 
the dominant historiographical school and what its practitioners have 
been able to explain. Further I shall suggest that, however well 
documented, the general and specialist histories have not been able 
to uncover significant interconnections and relationships because they 
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have, in the main, been immersed in that kind of empiricist 
historical tradition which assumes that the discovered 'facts' speak 
for themselves. And, following from that, the kinds of questions 
which are designed to extract and trace out interlocking relation- 
ships can only be answered by an explicit analytic programme and set 
of organizing concepts. These are located in a body of theoretical 
orientations to the analysis of levels and dimensions of historical 
change. As opposed to and contrasted with that approach in which 
hypotheses arise from the study of 'facts', I shall submit that a 
more useful and revealing account can be offered by starting with 
a broad theoretical perspective and testing and evaluating it 
against the historical evidence of a particular instance of colonial 
conquest and its consequences. 
"History is not a succession of events, it is the links 
between them". 58 We shall have to see if it proves possible to 
identify and magnify some of those links. 
58. E. E. Evans-Pritchard: "Anthropology and History", p. 48. 
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Chapter 2 
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter the central interpretative propositions 
and the conceptual structure which organizes the evidence are set 
out. Although these represent a bald and somewhat unsupported 
summary of the more complex argument which follows, the reader 
deserves to be alerted to the kind of approach which is being used 
here, and to be informed in advance of the meanings that will be 
given to terms which carry much of the explanatory weight. 
A study of this kind makes explanatory claims not in terms 
of contributing to general theory, nor in terms of some new 'inter- 
disciplinary' synthesis. The scope is more modest, and the 
objective more realistic. What is being offered is an argument, an 
explanatory account of the constitution of Cape society which will 
expand our understanding of that period in South African history. It 
is rare that understanding in social science proceeds by knocking 
down everything that has 'gone before and building afresh. Equally 
rare is the discovery or presentation of new 'facts', , though it is 
refreshing when it happens and hence when myths evaporate. More 
frequently, we proceed by re-organizing 'old' evidence in terms of 
different initial hypotheses, theoretical hunches or conceptual 
schemes. Hence what is crucial is the conceptual structure which 
mediates between the general propositions and the evidence. The 
subordinate concepts and categories which do the work of organizing 
the evidence thus have a dual role: on the one hand they operation- 
alize the argument, that is they serve to identify and arrange the 
evidence in a particular way; on the other hand, the very 
organization of the evidence in such a manner serves to justify and 
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support the overall argument. There is necessarily something 
circular about this formulation, and rightly so, for the better and 
tighter the working relationship between the relevant concepts and 
the evidence they mobilize, the more plausible will be the 
explanation and the more convincing the argument. 
1 
The fasionable plea for more 'interdisciplinary' work has 
its weakest case - if it is a case at all - in the call for an 
integrated social science. It is not at all clear what that would be. 
Nor is it clear how one would proceed, in some holistic fashion, to 
be 'interdisciplinary'. The hope or claim that some interdisciplinary 
synthesis will one day be achieved is misplaced. For the synthesis - 
if that is what it is - takes place in practice not in, or between, 
the disciplines, but in the context of the actual argument or 
explanatory account which is aimed at answering a series of questions 
about a particular historical problem or set of problems, in a 
comparative framework. And, crucially, it is such a set of questions 
which the problem provokes (or, the subsidiary ways in which the 
problem is formulated) that initiates the searching movement into the 
various disciplines, which are of course not each dominated by single 
orthodoxies. Each of the disciplines has its own partial standpoint, 
perspectives and preoccupations. Each explores different relationships 
at different levels. The questions require that one tries to make 
connections between those discrete perspectives and relationships. 
It is these connections which in practice shape the argument by linking 
the perspectives (or aspects of them) in a wider and more rounded 
1. These problems are lucidly explored in the compact analysis by 
Gerald Studdert-Kennedy in his Evidence and Explanation in social 
science, especially chapters 8 and 9. 
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interpretation. But such linkages are not expressed in terms of 
either a new synthetic language of modish interdisciplinarity, or in 
terms of a patchy eclecticism. They are forged in, and expressed 
through, the arrangement of the historical material and evidence in 
new and different ways, thereby exposing interconnections which had 
not before been identified in causal, functional or dialectical 
relationships. 
2 
Josg Nun argues that3 
the social sciences do not differ from each other in 
their empirical referrents - all deal with human behaviour - 
but in the way they structure their respective objects of 
analysis. 
The task thus is to structure the structures, as it were, and relate 
them to each other in revealing or illuminating ways which have been 
provoked by the questions that are put to the history. This brings 
one back full circle to the initial point of entry to the discussion 
- namely, the importance of the conceptual scheme that organizes the 
major interpretative thrust. There is no point in exploring further 
those areas of 'higher methodology' which Barry, with appropriate 
wryness, describes as ".... that bourne from which no traveller 
returns". 
4 A discussion in the abstract about these matters, or the 
nature of 'theory' is not productively pursued here. The matter is 
best left to rest with the above statement of my position. 
2. A classic instance of this is Barrington Moore's study on the 
variety of paths to the modern world, as he calls it. See his 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
3. Jose Nun: "Notes on Political Science in Latin America", p. 92. 
4. Brian Barry: Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, p. 166. 
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The questions raised earlier and which are dealt with in 
detail in the following chapters are framed so as to identify 
relevant evidence and to look for plausible causal relationships 
which will support the central interpretative proposition. That is, 
the development of Cape society in this period can most usefully be 
described and analysed in terms of the process of differential 
incorporation of various groups over time, a notion which, happily, 
also sums up the main conceptual structure of this study. I will 
argue that the various kinds and levels of conflict, of ideological 
formation and development, of labour demand, economic behaviour, 
social relationships and political action may all be analysed in 
terms of their contribution to this process of differential 
incorporation -a process, which, at the same time, decisively shaped 
the peculiar structural features of the society. It is now necessary 
to look in some detail at the main and subsidiary orientations which 
are the starting points, and the subordinate but related concepts, 
terms and definitions. 
A sociological theorist has recently described the history, 
structure and forms of social differentiation in modern South Africa 
as being the product of the way in which 
groups of varying histories and ethnic origins .... 
enter the modern society with varying rights and 
degrees of rightlessness according to the kind of 
conquest or unfreedom which was imposed on them in 
an earlier period. 5 
While his concern is with modern South Africa it is clear that this 
view applies with equal force to the 17th and 18th centuries. It is 
5" John Rex: "The Plural Society: The South African Case", p. 58. 
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a particularly useful observation because it combines the dimension 
of time with that of structure, and the variables of ethnicity with 
those of conquest and 'unfreedom'. However, to make such a view of 
the process of differential incorporation operational for 
explanatory purposes we need a more detailed account of what is 
involved. It is first necessary to set this discussion in the context 
of the debate concerning pluralism. While this debate has, almost 
entirely, been concerned with the analysis of colonial and culturally 
complex societies in recent times, it has serious analytical 
implications for the development of Cape Society, and is therefore 
of relevance for this study. 
While the 'pluralists' insist that there ".... does not now 
exist any agreed or systematic body of concepts and analytic propos- 
itions which could pass muster as a theory of pluralism or of the 
plural society"6 their case rests firmly on the view that established 
social and political theory cannot adequately account for the emergence, 
structure and functioning of a certain identifiable type of society. 
This type is variously called 'plural', 'composite', or 'segmental'. 
Most social and political theory, they argue, ".. remains bound by 
its basic presuppositions and applicable only to those societies that 
fulfill its exclusive criteria". 
7 Plural societies, on their view, 
are characterized by substantial diversity in institutional systems, 
6. M. G. Smith: "Some Developments in the Analytical Framework of 
Pluralism", in Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds. ): Pluralism in 
Africa, p. 415. Both Smith and Kuper contribute important articles 
to this volume, and a useful history of the development of the 
pluralist tradition can be found in these pages. 
7. Ibid., p. 419. 
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by an absence of value consensus and by cultural heterogeneity of a 
kind that has crucial implications for the socio-political and 
economic life of the society. It is important, in passing, to note 
at this point that the pluralist perspective presupposes a conceptual 
distinction between 'society' and 'culture'. The former is more 
inclusive than the latter. They are not defined in terms of each 
other and are not regarded as being coterminous, though they might be. 
Even those, like Rex and van den Berghe, who would not call themselves 
'pluralists' agree that societies like South Africa are remarkably 
difficult to classify. 
8 Moreover - and this is central to the 
debate - they are not persuaded that "... concepts derived from 
stratification theory ...... adequately cover crucial cases of race 
relations .... ". 
9 The categories of stratification theory which are 
applied to those, at least, culturally homogeneous advanced industrial 
societies are not of much help in looking at plural societies. Factors 
such as ethnicity, institutional diversity, religion and cultural 
diversity are held to be of more salience and thus deflect the 
application of the analytic categories of stratification theory with 
its assumptions about a substantial degree of institutional 
uniformity in the bases of societies. 
Those who are sceptical of, or downright hostile towards 
this kind of view take a variety of positions. Lockwood usefully 
surveys the debate. 
10 Though it is difficult to give a brief and 
8. See John Rex: Race Relations in Sociological Theory, and "South 
African society in Comparative Perspective". See also P. L. van 
den Berghe: Race and Racism. 
9. John Rex: "South African Society in Comparative Perspective", 
Op. cit., p. 258- 
10. David Lockwood: "Some Notes on the Concepts of Race and Plural 
Society" and his "Race, Conflict and Plural Society". See also 
H. Wolpe: "Class, Race and the Occupational Structure". 
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and representative account of the various objections to pluralism, 
there are perhaps two central ones which should be stated here, 
shortly, for they are relevant to the wider purpose. It should also 
be said, in passing, that it is a pity that much of the debate has 
been mixed up with the debate about 'race relations' and the analysis 
thereof: it is, in fact, both deeper and wider than that. Those who 
are hostile to pluralism argue that there is no need for special 
categories in the analysis of the structure and functioning of 
societies characterized by racial, ethnic, cultural or other such 
cleavages to which pluralists attach significance. Race and culture 
relations can (and ought to) be analyzed in terms of general socio- 
logical categories and those of stratification theory. There is no 
need for special treatment. Furthermore, they claim, the pluralist 
preoccupation with discontinuity and diversity in the institutional 
bases in society, diverts attention away from an examination of the 
central economic, political and legal institutions in the society, 
and how those who dominate these came to do so. One of the critics 
of Smith accuses him of leged main: "Smith has succeeded in 
eliminating the initial problem of pluralism: under what conditions 
does cultural diversity in a society promote social cleavage? ". 
11 
Now it seems to me that the 'debate' could be constructively 
resolved by recognizing two things, and drawing the appropriate lessons 
from them. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion it is 
necessary to get these points clear here. The first is that the 
developing pluralist tradition offers a series of descriptive 
categories for, as well as a number of highly suggestive insights about 
11. Martin Legassick: Review of Kuper and Smith: Op. cit., in 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 19, No. 4. 
JulY, 1971, p. 679" 
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the formative processes of those societies which, on everyone's 
admission, are clearly not in any sense culturally, ethnically, 
racially, institutionally or in religious terms homogeneous. And 
there is general agreement that these cleavages cannot be overlooked: 
the differences concern the significance to be attached to them and 
the manner of so doing. The elaboration of the distinction between 
a corporate group and category, and its identification in institutional 
discontinuities between rather more closed than open social segments 
assists considerably when trying to disentangle dimensions of class, 
colour, culture etc., in colonial and other plural situations. 
12 
Moreover the notion of differential incorporation - to which I shall 
turn in detail in a moment - conceptualizes helpfully the kinds of 
structural relationships and historical processes which institute 
them, and which we can so often recognize in these societies. The 
second point to be made in respect of this 'debate' is that the 'critics' 
of pluralism are right in arguing that there are very limited criteria 
and explanatory principles within pluralism for explaining w such 
discontinuities take on the significance they do, or how certain 
groups within such societies come to dominate their structures. 
Institutional discontinuities do not in themselves explain w 
certain social structures and systems develop. In short, where 
pluralism offers the categories for describing a particularly complex 
structure of relationships, it is not able to offer a systematic or 
comprehensible explanation of the causes of such structures other than 
the suggestive notion of the process of differential incorporation. 
12. I have expanded on this in "The Constitution and Continuity of 
South African Inequality: Some Conceptual Questions". 
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But, it may be argued, pluralists have not set out to offer a theory 
of change or migration or colonization. Rather they have been 
concerned to develop a conceptual scheme which will contribute to 
the analysis of certain types of society - including, but not being 
limited to, the colonial society - which have been constituted in 
various ways as a consequence of different processes and which pose 
severe problems for conventional theories. 
Likewise, while the 'critics' - and the group is a mixed 
one - of pluralism claim that social and political theory (be it 
iiarxist or functionalist) does have the conceptual tools with which 
to explain the causes of the peculiar structure of plural societies, 
it does seem to be the case that the actual constitution of these 
societies at various points in time can best be described in 
pluralist terms. 
The establishment of an analytical programme based on a 
selection of concepts and insights from both approaches will be 
useful, not for the sake of setting up some abstract 'theoretical' 
synthesis, but precisely because each approach contributes most 
helpfully where the other is weakest. It remains only at this point 
-to endorse the view that "the elaborating of plural empirical theory, 
explicitly married to the classic discussions of group formation, 
action, consciousness, conflict and change ..... " promises progress. 
13 
Certainly, such elaboration in the context of interpreting particular 
historical case-studies - such as the Cape - is worth exploring. 
That, at least, is the broadest 'theoretical' orientation 
of this study. The subordinate organizing concepts, categories and 
terms will, however, have to bear much of the explanatory burden. The 
13. Ira Katznelson: "Comparative Studies of Race and Ethnicity: 
plural analysis and beyond", p. 151. 
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way in which these will be mobilized in the substantive account 
which follows needs now to be discussed. 
The notion of 'differential incorporation' is central to 
this study. 
14 It describes an historical process as well as 
conceptualizing the way in which groups came to be incorporated 
unequally in terms of access to, and participation in the economic, 
political, and social arrangements of an increasingly common society. 
The notion of 'incorporation' directs attention to the processes 
whereby two or more collectivities - usually with important antecedent 
differences in history, culture, ethnicity and so forth - are drawn 
together. There is, however, nothing mysterious about the process: 
in examining the case of the Cape in the 17th and 18th centuries it 
is possible to specify the factors which were instrumental in doing 
this. Furthermore, the emphasis on the differential nature of the 
process focuses attention on those forces which acted to lure or 
compel (or both) certain groups into more or less subordinate 
positions within the slowly articulating structure of the society. Thus, 
in examining the processes of differential incorporation over time, 
it is necessary to focus on the antecedent histories, cultures and 
ideologies of the specific groups in conflict, as well as on the 
resources at their disposal, the material and ideal goals they 
pursued (such as access to land, labour, possessions, a way of living) 
and the manner and consequences of establishing and maintaining 
domination and hegemony. In sum, then, differential incorporation 
as a conceptual tool identifies a particular kind of group interaction 
involved in the formative stages of, here, a colonial society, being 
14. M. G. Smith: "Pluralism in Pre-colonial Africa". There is a 
full discussion of this and related terms. 
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forged out of the relationships between groups defined in terms of 
prior differences in history, culture, and ethnicity, at least. It 
is, however, important to stress again that it is not only or simply 
because of these distinctions that a social order based on 
differential incorporation is instituted. On the contrary, it is 
necessary to explain the development of this peculiar structure of 
relationships in terms of additional factors, such as competing 
ideologies, purposes, and the distribution of power. The relation- 
ships between these factors and the structures they helped to form 
are crucial. Some of the more flexible . arxist interpretations of 
these - by scholars such as A. Gramsci, G. D. Genovese, E. P. Thompson 
and E. J. Hobsbawm - are useful in this respect. 
Thus, differential incorporation describes a particular 
and recognizable social structure which is brought about by all these 
factors. It suggests, in addition, that instead of a stratification 
system constituted by gradations and strata through which, in 
principle, people may move upwards or downwards, the particular form 
which stratification takes in such societies is characterized by an 
explicitly inegalitarian arrangement of composite groups and 
categories defined in terms of cultural, class or ethnic differences, 
or a combination of them. Once again it is to factors other than 
these differences along that one must look for the explanation of why 
they may be given a special social significance, and why they may 
become the bases for 'locking' groups into a structure of inequality. 
Such an arrangement will be termed 'structurally plural', and its 
meaning explained shortly. Such a system, furthermore, then becomes 
legitimated, for the dominant, in a developing ideology. It originates 
in their antecedent experiences, their definition of the situation, 
and the goals and purposes they pursue. And it is expressed in the 
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new structures of group relationships which they have been 
instrumental in shaping, and which, in their view, promote their 
ideal and material interests. 
15 
The analytic advantages of using this approach, and its 
entailed subordinate strategies are considerable. A number of 
methodological requirements are satisfied. First, the dimension of 
time is built into this way of conceptualizing aspects of the process 
of societal formation and change. Secondly, the structural 
dimension is, broadly speaking, given a conceptual definition in 
terms of a patchwork of groups locked together in a peculiarly tight 
arrangement of inequality. And thirdly, the need. to look elsewhere 
for a fuller explanation of how and why this structurally plural set 
of relationships becomes instituted is underlined. 
Smith has defined structural pluralism as the most complex 
form of plural society, and it presupposes the prior existence of 
both social and cultural pluralism. He distinguishes between the 
three modes in the following way. 
16 
Cultural pluralism 
consists solely in institutional differences to which no 
corporate social differences attach. Social pluralism 
is the condition in which institutional differentiations 
coincide with the corporate division of a given society 
into a series of sharply demarcated and virtually closed 
social segments. Structural pluralism consists further 
in the differential incorporation of specified 
collectivities within a given society and corresponds 
with this in its form, scope and particulars. 
The meaning of cultural pluralism is, I think, quite clear. It 
denotes a situation in which cultural differences have no significance 
15, For discussion of 'The Definition of the Situation' see 
W. I. Thomas: "The Comparative Study of Cultures", and 
Robert Merton: Social Theory and Social Structure, PP-475-493- 
16. M. G. Smith: "Some Developments .... ", p. 440. Italics added. 
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- nor are they invested with any - for social, political or economic 
purposes. They are, in short, marginal to the central socio-economic 
and political arrangements in the society. Social pluralism may be 
conceived of as standing midway along a continuum of plural types. 
17 
The corporate sections defined by their cultural distinctiveness - in 
respect of which their institutional systems are crucial - are not 
arranged in any hierarchy but are rather 'federated' and incorporated 
within the society on more or less equivalent terms, while nonetheless 
being effectively 'closed' sections. 
18 Structural pluralilm 
necessarily presupposes social and cultural pluralism, or it can 
institute it. In other words it can either be built up out of a 
prior system of cultural and social pluralism, or - and this is 
important - it can be the result of a consequent social definition of 
a situation - by custom, necessity or by legislation, or a combination 
of the three - which invests previously irrelevant features 
(be they 
colour, religion, culture etc. ) with a significance which then 
becomes the basis for discriminatory treatment and unequal access to 
the social, political and economic resources in the society. 
Moreover, the way in which the notion of structural pluralism will 
be used in this study entails an explicit sense of group hierarchy. 
The explanation for and description of this hierarchy will focus on 
those processes which, in Rex's terms as were mentioned earlier, 
brought the groups with "varying histories and ethnic origins" into 
the society with different kinds of rights and "degrees of rightless- 
ness" consequent upon the manner of their incorporation, or - as he 
17. For a detailed discussion of this see Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith: 
Op. cit., and also M. G. Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism". 
18. See Leo Kuper: "Ethnic and Racial Pluralism". 
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describes it - the "conquest or unfreedom" imposed upon them. 
This 
recognition that a structurally plural order exists is, then, the 
starting point for working backwards through time to seek an 
explanation for how it came about. A most helpful way of 
conceptualizing this process is by use of the notion of differential 
incorporation. But it is not enough. The conceptual scheme has to 
include other concepts and explanatory aids to answer this question, 
and it is to these that I now turn. 
How, it may be asked, do plural societies come about? At 
the most general level of explanation the answer must surely be that 
they are brought into existence by the meeting of at least two 
cultures, which may be the result of a variety of factors such as 
conquest or migration. But this is too general. In any specific case 
a very complicated historical analysis would be necessary to 
establish empirically the causes and contours of such movements. 
But even that would not be sufficient. It would clearly not take us 
very far to try to explain the formation and structure of the new 
society at the Cape in terms of the causes of Dutch overseas 
expansion, though that would be, by definition, part of the 
explanation, but not the most important part. Of equal importance is 
an analysis of the culture and ideology of the Dutch component of 
Cape society, in the form of the 'fragment' which was established 
at the Cape. 
19 Equally, as was pointed out in the previous Chapter, 
an analysis of Khoisan society in similar terms is necessary. But 
before proceeding to those questions it is important here to get 
clear the stipulative meaning which will be given to the central 
concepts of 'society', 'culture' and 'ideology', for they will be 
19. Louis Hartz (ed. ): The Founding of New Societies, and 
B. M. Schutz: op. cit., chapter I. 
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used frequently. There is a rather wide ranging debate amongst social 
scientists as to the definition of these concepts. Consensus about 
their usage seems unlikely, for very good reasons, and hence a 
stipulative definition as to how these terms are to be used in this 
study, and for what purposes, is necessary. A discussion of these 
terms will also involve some wider conceptual and theoretical issues, 
which are most usefully dealt with here. 
The first point to be made in this respect is that an 
analytic separation of 'culture' and 'sodiety' is required. For, 
clearly, if one asserts that there are and have been plural societies 
defined, in part, by internal cultural differences, then it is 
obvious that 'society' cannot be defined in terms of 'culture'. They 
are not, manifestly, necessarily the same thing, nor are they 
expressions of the same thing. Yet the elision of the two concepts 
has a long history. In his Primitive Culture, Tylor offered the now 
classic definition of culture as "that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society". 
20 
Kluckhohn is 
rather more explicit in his running of 'culture' and 'society' 
together. He says: "A'society' refers to a group of people who have 
learned to work together; a 'culture' refers to the distinctive ways 
of life of such a group of people". 
21 
Likewise, Malinowski develops 
a notion of culture as a highly integrated set of institutions, and 
it seems that he viewed these as coterminous with 'society'. 
22 It 
20. Cited in A. L. Kroeber: Anthropology, p. 252. 
21. Clyde Kluckhohn: "The Concept of Culture", p. 21. 
22. B. Malinowski: A Scientific Theory of Culture, p. 40. 
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may be the case that this kind of approach reveals from another 
perspective the way in which much social theory has operated with 
categories which have been evolved to deal with homogenous societies, 
and it underlines the objection raised earlier that such theory is 
too often bound by its basic assumptions and is hence of relevance 
only to those societies which fulfill its criteria. 
23 It is worth- 
while, then, to endorse the view of Lienhardt that ".... it is 
necessary to distinguish between culture, as the sum total of 
material and moral resources of any population, and social systems". 
24 
He proceeds to argue thus: 
25 
Peoples culturally heterogeneous are commonly drawn 
together in a single political system, and not only in 
modern states. On the other hand, cultural homogeneity 
is by no means always accompanied by political unity. 
The question is of course more complex than this. There is bound to 
be some variable relationship between given cultures and societies. 
The two, while not being the same, are clearly related. But not in 
the way which Nadel suggests. Or, rather, in the case of plural 
societies, the 'two-dimensional' view of the relationship between 
culture and society which he suggests, does not hold. He says: 
26 
Society, as I see it, means the totality of social 
facts projected on to the dimension of relationships 
and groupings; culture, the same totality in the 
dimension of action. 
It is necessary, I think, to conclude that none of these theorists - 
23. See Note 6, above. 
24. Godfrey Lienhardt: Social Anthropology, p. 155. 
25. Ibid., loc. cit. and of course it may be argued that there are 
sub-cultures - for instance based on class - within such 
homogenous societies. But that would be using the notion of 
culture in a very wide sense indeed. 
26. S. F. Nadel: The Foundations of Social Anthropology, PP-79-80- 
M_y emphasis, A. L. 
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with the obvious exception of Lienhardt - could have been allowing 
for those societies - termed here as 'plural' - in which at least 
two (and in some cases more) 'cultures' co-exist. Moreover in 
examining a situation like the Cape, we are examining the emergence 
of a new society. Part of the explanation for its peculiarity will 
lie in the fact of two or more cultures being drawn together, which 
makes the definition of 'society' in terms of 'culture' - and vice- 
versa - problematic. For, an additional aspect of the explanation 
lies in the elucidation and specification of the structure of 
relationships between the 'cultures', the relevant corporate groups 
and so on in a common society. And while it may be possible to 
" indicate how a 'common' culture begins to emerge, it is first 
necessary to insist that the common society predates the common 
culture. This time-lag creates special problems for the equal and 
uniform incorporation in one society of individuals from different 
antecedent cultures while such individuals undergo socialization and 
acculturation. For these reasons the concepts of 'culture' and 
'society' will be used as analytically distinct in this study. 
Conceptually, the notion of 'society' is more inclusive than that of 
'culture'. Historically, it is prior to, and empirically it is more 
complex than, that of 'culture'. Yet, in this disembodied conceptual 
form it tells us the least. That may indeed be the fate of the most 
general and inclusive kinds of concepts. 
Precisely because I propose to explore some relationships 
between more or less 'cultural wholes', it is necessary to make this 
distinction between society and culture. A rather more fine 
distinction - between culture and ideology - will also have to be 
made and I shall turn to that shortly. Thus, as an initial 
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bench-mark I will use the term 'society' to apply only to a 
population over and in which effective and recognised political 
authority is exercised. The temptation to tie the notion down to a 
territorial base - as Smith does2-7 must be resisted, if only because 
nomadic groups do qualify in all respects - except their nomadism - 
as 'societies'. If a crucial feature of a 'society' is its 
regulation of internal political affairs then a Khoi horde or San 
band must be viewed as societies, however small they may be, and 
despite any wider 'federation' of similar small units. If they are 
not societies it is not at all clear what they are. 
This approach, then, follows the alternative view of 
'society' to which Nadel holds, a view which seems to run counter to 
his cultural definition of society. He regards 'society' as ".... 
the relatively widest effective group, regarding a certain kind of 
effectiveness as crucial". For him, the political unit will usually 
combine both the widest group with the most effectiveness. "We are 
in fact saying that, when we look for the widest population most 
effectively held together in a group, we find that it is the 
population held together by the employment of force (apart from other 
things); and the employment of force which is so effective we call 
'political"'. 28 Used in this sense it can accommodate a number of 
other less inclusive dimensions, though there are some problems that 
need to be dealt with. First, in the case of the Cape it is not 
always entirely clear in the 17th and 18th century that effective 
27. M. G. Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism", Op. cit., p. 62. 
28. S. F. Nadel: Op. cit., p. 187 
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government was exercised over the regularly increased area defined 
officially as the political unit presided over by the Company. 
Though de facto changes in the border of the Colony were formally 
proclaimed by Plakkaat of the Council of Policy, it did not follow 
that effective political control was exercised over the area thus 
defined. Indeed the border areas were, particularly as the 18th 
century moved on, characterized by a measure of unruly and largely 
unchecked interaction between the settlers and the Khoi and, further 
afield, the Nguni. Hunting parties, traders, and others established 
both co-operative and conflict-ridden relationships in that region. 
One author refers to this as the "trading-raiding" syndrome. 
29 
Although by the 1780s the boundary of the Colony was still to the 
West of the Fish River there were probably some 30 families, if not 
more, living on the Eastern side of the river, grazing their cattle 
there. These men - including well-known figures such as the Prinsloo 
and Bezuidenhout brothers, Lucas Meyer, Christoffel and Jan Botha, not 
to mention the 'infamous' Coenraad Buys - are usually described in 
the literature as 'ruffians' and 'turbulent'. 
30 They are viewed as 
the scum of the frontier tide. One can, of course, see them in a 
very different light: as rather ruthless entrepreneurs playing for high 
stakes: playing, as it were, both sides of the frontier. They struck 
deals and alliances with Xhosa chiefs when it suited them, just as 
they reneged on such deals when it became profitable to do so. Their 
submission to Company authority was, similarly, erratic, and hardly 
continuous. Secondly, during the period various Khoi groups moved 
into and out of the formal orbit of the Company's domain. The 
29. M. Legassick: "The Frontier Tradition in South African 
Historiography", p. 12. 
30. M. Whiting Spilhaus: South Africa in the Making, p. 162, and 
E. A. Walker: A History of Southern Africa, p. 118. Also 
Monica Wilson: "Cooperation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape 
Frontier", p. 234" 
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geographical dimension of the unit defined by Company edict as 
subject to its government did not always correspond with the 
political dimension entailing the effective exercise of authority 
over various groups. Neither the frontier 'ruffians' nor the Khoi 
groups were always or consistently a part of the 'society' in the 
sense in which the term has been defined above, though they may have 
been moving through the geographical area. Such groups were perhaps 
in the society but not of it. This remained true for the 'ruffians' 
throughout the 19th century, and further afield than the Cape. 
31 
Thirdly - and this is central to the argument - it was the progressive 
de-constitution of Khoi hordes as independent cultures and societies, 
by a complex of forces, and their absorption into the new society 
that both constituted the process of differential incorporation and 
established the structural features of the society. It was their 
vulnerability to politico-military force and their subsequent economic 
and material dependence on the society that made them part of it. 
Viewed from the perspective of 'frontier studies' it can legitimately 
be said that in South Africa "... the frontier from the start involved 
inclusion as well as exclusion: in whatever capacity, non-whites 
became integral parts of the total society". 
32 
But what needs to be borne in mind here, however, is that 
though they were later to contribute to the formation of the so-called 
Cape Coloured people, at the point where their socio-economic fate 
compelled their political submission, Khoisan cultural distinctiveness 
did not fade overnight. Change is rarely that 'total' or sudden. 
31. M. Legassick: Op. cit., loc. cit. 
32. Ibid. 
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Moreover it is improbable that Khoi experienced any 
profound sense of 'belonging' to the newly evolving society. In 
this respect to describe them as being part of it does not fulfil 
Nadel's requirement that there be a subjective awareness "... as it 
is expressed, above all, in names and verbal statements on being 
one people, tribe, nation and so forth; so that the widest group 
must be a group proclaimed". 
33 But I'm not sure that this matters, 
as my initial stipulative definition will have indicated. However, a 
brief comment on Nadel's formulation usefully carries the discussion 
forward. There seem to be severe limitations in his conception of 
'society'. The 'objective' and 'subjective' requirements he 
enunciates - namely that of effective political control and that of 
belonging - entails one of two analytic consequences, or both. 
Either it means that by definition a plural society is not a society, 
or it means that - as with many other social theorists - the scope of 
his definition is too restricted to include systems which, unlike the 
homogeneous ideal type on which the notion seems to be based, are the 
products of complex historical tides which have thrown groups, 
cultures and highly asymmetrical sets of institutions together and 
initiated new societies. The Cape during this period, and later, is 
just one of these societies: to explain and describe adequately the 
processes that were involved in its development, a wider and more 
inclusive conception of society is needed. 
Thus, despite the inevitable problems, in reality, of much 
blurring at its empirical edges, the conception of 'society' which 
will be used here hinges on three components. Two have been mentioned 
33" S. F. Nadel: Op. cit., p. 184. 
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earlier. First, that of a distinct population unit, and secondly, 
a system of government having effective political authority over 
that population. What qualifies for effective political authority 
may be rather more difficult to identify in practice. The 
successful and effective use of power - in the Weberian sense - 
seems to be influential in Nadel's definition. 
34 But there are 
problems here too, particularly in the colonial context where, as 
pointed out above, the societal boundaries (both in geographical and 
demographic terms) are uncertain. For it is not altogether clear 
whether the resort to coercive power, say through the force of arms, 
is evidence of either the unambiguous assertion of authority in an 
already constituted society, or the process of colonial conquest 
itself. The conceptual problem here is rather well demonstrated by 
the following extract from the Journal of the Cape Commander, dated 
September 26th, 1705.35 
Some Hottentots arrived from 'Zuurveld' reporting that 
their Captain 'Claas' has departed this life. The 
Governor appointed his brother Hoeza to succeed him and 
presented Hoeza with the cane with the brass knob on 
which his name was engraved .... 
Apart from being a splendid early instance of attempted Indirect Rule 
and the 'appointment' by a European colonial authority of the 'Chief', 
it is not immediately apparent whether such a symbolic act in fact 
represented the exercise of political authority, nor whether the 
Zuurveld horde could be said to have been subject to such authority. 
After all, they did not have to request permission to move away, 
cross the colonial boundary or engage in barter: and they were not 
subject to the various edicts nor to punishment for infringement of 
34. Ilax Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
PP-152-153- 
35. H. C. V. Leibbrandt: Precis of the Archives of the Cape of Good 
Hope. Journal, 1697-1732, p. 80. 
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of them. For at this time, these Khoi were not - as far as can be 
assessed from the context - entirely subservient economically to the 
Company or any settlers, though they were moving in that direction. 
Thus their membership of the 'society' is questionable. It is 
precisely for this reason that it is useful to add the third component 
in the conception of 'society' to be used here. And it is this: the 
economic involvement and interaction on a systematic and continuous 
basis with other groups. This may arise from necessity or volition 
or compulsion; but what characterizes it, crucially, is the 
dependent and consequently interdependent nature of the activity. 
Unless and until Khoi becameeconomically dependent on, and therefore 
of necessity involved in the economic life of the colony, the fact 
of their formal and apparent political incorporation did not mean that 
they were part of the society. Furthermore, their 'cultural' identity 
remained for some time as an independent variable, though it was to 
crumble as the economic basis of their society disappeared from under 
them. On this view, the conception of 'society' is sufficiently 
inclusive to be used for more complex analytical purposes. It permits 
one to disentangle the different axes along which differential 
incorporation took place - the geographical, social, political, cultural 
and economic. In the Cape context it is important to have the 
analytical tools to do this. Moreover it facilitates the simultaneous 
treatment of the temporal and structural dimensions involved in the 
formation of a 'new' society. Further, it offers the scope, in a 
study of this kind, to treat 'culture' as a separate, but related, 
factor. Finally, while separating culture from society and hence 
allowing for a multi-cultural society it does not preclude mono- 
cultural social systems. Rather it liberates 'society' from its 
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identification with a single culture, and a single consciousness of 
belonging thereto. Hence it breaks with the dominant tradition in 
social theory of regarding 'society' as being in some sense necess- 
arily anchored in a uniform institutional base and a value consensus. 
What it encourages, on the other hand, is a wider conception of 
'society' and a recognition of the variety of forms it may take, 
including the plural society and its forms. In the case of the Cape 
the interesting questions that can now be asked of such a society 
concern not only the degree and consequences of institutional 
incompatability between the cultural components but also the kinds 
of structures of relationships which held the sections together, the 
prior histories, ideologies and purposes of the various groups and 
the manner in which new groups and categories came into existence. 
Central to this conception of society is not institutional uniformity 
and value consensus, but a high degree of pluralism and chronic 
conflict. It is important however to add that this view does not 
imply that conflict is in some sense necessarily less, or more 
unlikely, in other societies. Also, as with all stipulative 
definitions, it is neither water-tight nor all-embracing. For the 
purposes of this study, however, it may be seen to work rather 
usefully. 
Bearing in mind the subsequent history of South Africa 
during the 19th and 20th centuries, and with some comparative glances 
at other 'plural' societies such as Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Israel, 
Indonesia and Trinidad, it is tempting to speculate about their past 
constitution, present condition and forseeable future. I think I 
would want to argue that such societies as these are deeply flawed 
historically, and the causes are various: imperialism, migration, 
colonial expansion, conquest, trade and slavery. While they cohere 
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as societies, the structural sources of conflict are sunk deep within 
them. It is associated in part with the institutional incompatabilities 
that come from their plurality of cultures. So long as the collect- 
ivities who enact and enforce these cultures continue to do so (and 
socialize their young to do so) - often for very good reasons - and 
so long as, in consequence of this, a cultural, religious or ethnic 
consciousness predominates over and against a more universal sense of 
citizenship, the prospects for any of the standard ideal outcomes do 
not look good. What is more, this applies with equal force to 
liberal-democratic, social-democratic and socialist scenarios. It 
is simply not the case that only so-called 'western liberal-democratic' 
societies - or models of them - have, or assume, or are said to have 
a high degree of 'consensus'. On close examination liberal-democracy, 
social-democracy and socialism all necessarily presuppose a degree of 
institutional uniformity in the structural base of a society and a 
consensual ideology appropriate to it. Put more crudely - and hence 
as a caricature - the programmes of parties and organizations, or the 
writings of theorists which favour any one of these preferred 
outcomes all assume one or another 'identikit' or 'uni-cult' subject, 
citizen or comrade. Consciousness of membership and participation 
first as a citizen - instead of as Jew or Arab, Zulu or Afrikaner, 
Malay or Chinese - is rather important. But this is another 
argument on a grander and perhaps more speculative level; it cannot 
be pursued here. However, concerns of this order follow decisively 
from some of the conceptual issues which have been raised and are 
wo`th mentioning precisely because of their historical significance 
and continuing relevance. The problems of analysing and explaining 
the constitution and functioning of both historic and modern 'plural' 
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societies are substantial, and claims for the omincompetence and 
universal applicability of general theories of societal formation 
and change meet their sternest test when confronted by such societies. 
36 
It has not yet been made clear what stipulative definition 
is to be given to the concept of 'culture' -a central notion for 
this study and the more general considerations just mentioned. It 
is to this that I now turn. 
It is only the foolhardy non-specialist who enters the 
debate about the definition and proper use of the term 'culture' with 
any confidence. Kroeber and Kluckhohn reviewed literally hundreds of 
definitions of the term. 
37 One's sense of the fierceness of the 
debate amongst anthropologists, and between them and sociologists, 
is given an anxious edge upon discovering that not ".... until 1958 
did the Dean of American anthropoligsts, A. L. Kroeber, and the Dean 
of American sociologists, Talcott Parsons, agree to sign a non- 
aggression pact(! ) in which both culture and society are recognized. ""38 
But even the most limited survey of'the literature by an amateur 
tends to suggest that, however acrimonious and fierce, the academic 
36. See Norman Bromberger: "Economic Growth and Political Change in 
South Africa", and James Jupp: "Modernization and Pluralism: 
Ceylon and Malaysia", both in Adrian Leftwich: Op. cit.. Also 
A. Rabushka and K. A. Shepsle: "Political Entrepreneurship and 
Patterns of Democratic Instability in Plural Societies"; 
S. N. Eisenstadt: Israeli Society, and Uri Avnery: Israel 
without Zionism. And Edward Alan Robins: Pluralism in Israel: 
Relations between Arabs and Jews. 
37. A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn: Culture: A Critical Review of 
Concepts and Definitions. 
38. See Milton Singer: "The Concept of Culture", p. 528. 
My emphasis. 
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debate does not seem necessary. And although Kroeber and Kluckhohn 
formulated a 'compromise' definition of culture, it is itself so 
inclusive that, even from beyond the discipline and the debate, an 
outsider is bound to see that it is without much advantage. 
39 The 
attempt by any group of scholars to impose a conceptual orthodoxy 
or negotiate a definitional consensus is bound to be of little value 
because the implied initial premise upon which such efforts are based 
is flawed. Thus the debate about 'culture', the legitimate field of 
'culture studies' and the compromise definition achieves little, it 
would seem. This is because the rival definitions and usages flow 
from differing inquisitive purposes for which the concept is used. 
And it is simply not possible to legislate about the kinds of questions 
which scholars can or can not legitimately ask, nor the concepts they 
must use to facilitate their enquiry, as was argued at the start of 
this chapter. The most that can be asked is that their usage be not 
too outrageous, that the terms be clearly defined, consistently 
applied and open to challenge. The differences, however, will 
presumably continue. Not only is the concept used by different 
scholars in various disciplines to identify and organize social 
phenomena for different purposes, it is also used at a variety of 
analytical levels. Precisely for these reasons it is necessary to 
stipulate what it is that one's use of the concept is designed to 
identify, how such usage fits into the broader analytical purpose and 
at what level of abstraction it operates. 
39. They say: "Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, 
of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, 
constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, 
including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of 
culture consists of traditional (i. e., historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture 
systems, may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, 
on the other as conditioning elements of further action". 
A. L. Kroeber and C. Kluckhohn: Op. cit., p. 357. 
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Taking these points in reverse order, there is manifestly 
a considerable difference between Tylor's now classic definition and 
a recent expression of the school of thought which conceives of 
culture as essentially cognitive and conceptual. Thus, Harris 
argues that "... culture consists of an immense series of systems of 
concepts, many of them in constant change and interpenetration". 
40 
(This, in fact, is closer to the conception of ideology which will 
be used in this study, and it will be examined shortly). Recalling 
Tylor's definition, with its emphasis on some more empirically 
identifiable phenomena, such as art, morals, beliefs, law, custom and 
habits, it would seem that there is a noticeable difference in the 
level of abstraction. But that does not exhaust the difference. 
For while both include ideas and social behaviour together in their 
conception of culture, Tylor's definition appears more concerned with 
the description of what this is, whereas Harris' approach (drawing on 
Geertz and Levi-Strauss) directs attention not only to what men do, 
but the processes whereby they structure what they do and the 
purposes for which they do it. In short, for Tylor, culture describes 
how men live their lives in groups, whereas for Harris it is more than 
a descriptive concept; it has explanatory potential too, for its 
role in social life (and thus the way in which the scholar should 
understand it) "... is to present us with a diversity of partial or 
coherent systems with which to organize our experience". 
41 Clearly, 
then, it is not only a matter of a difference in the level of 
abstraction. There is also, and rather crucially, a differing centre 
of gravity given to the proper field for the analysis of the content 
40. Nigel Harris: Beliefs in Society, p. 28. 
41. Ibid., p. 33" 
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and function of culture. So the problem becomes more complex. Not 
only do various authors use and define a concept such as culture 
fors differing analytical or polemical purposes, but the very 
definitions they use are employed to permit them to identify, or 
ignore, purposes and roles which, on one view, culture performs for 
social groups. The analyst's purposes are combined with and 
compounded by the purposes and functions which his conception of 
culture is held to imply. 
It does not seem to be avoidable. Moreover, for this and 
other reasons it seems that the continuing debate about the concept of 
culture is unnecessary if its objective is to define an orthodoxy, 
and to'settle' once and for all what culture really is, or what the 
proper field of enquiry for 'culture studies' ought to be. Though 
there are limits to such a view, it does seem that each writer will 
use the term in a way that fits his analytic purposes. And 
provided it is made clear what it identifies, there do not seem to 
be serious problems in proceeding, at any rate, on that assumption. 
It has already been said that? 
Fe purposes of analytic 
convenience I wish to separate the two related concepts of culture and 
ideology. Generally - though not always explicitly - they have been 
run together in inclusive and omnibus conceptions of culture. Thus 
Harris' view, though highly abstract, may be seen almost to collapse 
the two, with the result that 'culture' and 'ideology' become 
effectively interchangeable. Less abstractly, Malinowski defined 
culture as42 
the integral whole consisting of implements and 
consumers' goods, of constitutional charters for the 
various social groupings, of human ideas and crafts, 
beliefs and customs. 
42. B. Malinowski: Op. cit., p. 36. 
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W. I. Thomas in developing his classic 'theorem' of the 'definition 
of the situation' described a 'cultural situation' as one43 
in which a body of values has been accumulated and 
preserved (mainly through the instrumentality of 
language) in the form of institutions, mores and 
codes, together with a reinforcing set of attitudes or 
tendencies to act in conformity with prescribed behaviour 
patterns or norms. 
Now it is of course the case that culture and ideology 
are closely related and that their separation is only of analytic 
convenience. Clearly 'culture' is, for most theorists, the more 
inclusive concept, and an analysis of ideology "... can most usefully 
be undertaken in the context of a consideration of culture as a 
whole rather than in an isolated fashion". 
44 Making c-anything 
other than an analytic distinction between the two is like the crude 
and rather useless division of 'base' and 'superstructure' or 
'material' factors and 'ideology'. The most concise objection to 
just such a separation has been made by Gramsci, who says: 
45 
... material forces would be historically inconceivable 
without form and .... ideologies would have to be 
considered individual dabbling without material forces. 
So too with culture and ideology. Thus, bearing in mind 
these important objections and qualifications, it is necessary to 
make clear here how the concept of culture is to be used in this 
study. Implicitly, such a clarification ought also to indicate the 
meaning and use to be assigned to ideology. When Levi-Strauss refers 
to culture as "... the patterns OF and FOR behaviour prevalent among 
43. W. I. Thomas: op. cit., p. 177. 
44. Nigel Harris: Op. cit., p. 27. 
45. Antonio Gramsci: I1 Materialismo storico e la filosofia di 
Benedetto Croce, p. 49. Cited in L. Foner and E. D. Genovese (eds. ): 
Slavery in the New World, p. 244. 
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a group of human beings ...., 
46 he is providing a useful basis for 
the stipulative distinction I wish to make between culture as a mode 
OF behaviour (the 'active' side, perhaps) and 'ideology' as the 
organization of experience FOR behaviour (the 'passive' or 'pre- 
disposing' dimension). And clearly, in practice, there is a 
continuing relationship and interaction between the two. They 
represent, for analytical purposes only, different emphases along a 
more inclusive continuum of culture. If we extract the 'ideological' 
aspects from Tylor's early formulation - thus leaving his emphasis 
on customs, law, art, habits and, crucially, institutions - one 
approaches more explicitly the 'active' sense of culture which I 
take Klickhohn to mean when he refers, at one point, to culture as 
the "distinctive ways of life" of a group of people. 
47 A more 
technically complex formulation of this is that of M. G. Smith upon 
whose ideas in his seminal article on the question I have drawn 
heavily. He writes: 
48 
I hold that the core of a culture is its institutional 
system. Each institution involves set forms of 
activity, grouping, rules, ideas and values. The 
total system of institutions thus embraces three 
interdependent systems of action, of idea and value, 
and of social relations. 
Now if, for the moment, the dimension of 'idea and value' is 
separated out and treated as a distinct but related aspect of 'culture' 
in its inclusive sense, the above conception of culture can be given, 
in any situation, a quite concrete anchorage in the institutions of, 
46. As expressed by C. Kluckhohn in his Culture and Behaviour, p. 64. 
47. Ibid., p. 21. 
48. M. G. Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism", Op. cit., p. 63. 
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inter alia, marriage, family, education or socialization, 'religious' 
practices, recreation, eating habits and taboos, language, material 
culture and standardized modes of economic activity. Generally it 
seems fair to argue that such institutions cohere in a systemic 
fashion in any given culture. Further, while each institution has 
its associated set of tideas and values', these together constitute 
a broader system of ideas, beliefs, mores, predispositions etc., 
which can legitimately be referred to as the 'ideology'. To repeat, 
the relationship between the institutional system and the ideology is 
close; form is given substance in the content, and the content given 
meaning in the form. Thus in talking about 'culture' it is to these 
practices and institutions of a people that I mean to refer. 
There is, furthermore, -nothing particularly new in such an 
approach. Various 18th century and 18th century commentators on the 
Cape seem to have been pointing to just such differences between the 
European settlers and the indigenous peoples. Thus, for instance, 
Mentzel -a fairly astute observer of the Cape scene in the 1730s - 
had the following to say: 
49 
_ 
The language of the Hottentots is even more primitive 
and contains no abstract terms whereby one could give 
expression to religious ideas. It is particularly 
difficult for the same reason to grasp what their 
peculiar customs and beliefs are .... 
Despite these apparent problems of 'comprehension', Mentzel quotes 
the words of two settlers who had visited the 'Cabonas': 
50 
49. O. F. Mentzel: A Geographical and topographical description of 
the Cape of Good Hope, Vol. I1, p. 134. Hereafter designated as 
O. F. Mentzel: Description ..... 
50. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 304, citing a report to the Council of Policy 
by Roos and Marais, the leaders of an expedition in 1761/2 to 
the 'Cabonas'. 
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Their religion consists chiefly in praising and 
worshipping the new moon when it rises .... Although 
this is the limit of their religious practices, we 
have noticed that they have a kind of idea about a 
Supreme Being, whom they call Chuyn, that is. big or 
powerful. If they want to give an impression of something 
that is beyond their comprehension, they say: 'It is 
the work of Chuyn'. 
Elsewhere5l Mentzel offered quite an elaborate and, given the time 
and place, reasonably accurate account of 'Hottentot' culture. He 
covered aspects of birth, marriage and other ceremonies, weapons, 
their food and methods of cooking, fire-lighting technicues, copper- 
smelting, exogamous marriage customs, treatment of adultery, death 
and burial, their dances, musical instruments, language and hunting 
crafts. 
The Swede', Charles P. Thunberg, who visited the Cape in 1772 
gave, also, quite a detailed account of the way of life of the 
'Hottentots'. 52 He referred to their appearance, dress, economyg 
language, marriage and population control techniques (though he did 
not call it that) and their religion. He observed that men often had 
two wives and that women had a "real husband" and a "locum tenens" or 
"substitute". 53 He noted with curiosity that they rode oxen, and 
that they had "no religion". 
54 
Kolbe (whose account Mentzel considered inaccurate in 
several respects)55 was unsteady in the picture he drew of the 
'Hottentots'. "In their customs and institutions they cannot be said 
to resemble any People besides the Jews and the old Troglodytes". 
56 
51. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 266, passim. 
52. Charles P. Thunberg: Travels in Europe, Africa and Asia, made 
between the Years 1770 and 1779, Vol. II, pp. 185-198. 
53. Ibid., Vol. II, PP-42-43- 
54. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 193. 
55. "I shall also find space for the life, usages and customs of the 
Hottentots, and take the opportunity of correcting Kolbe's errors 
.... ". Ibid., Vol-I, p. 136. 
56. Peter Kolbe: The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope, p. 30. 
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Such handicaps apart, however, he noted that they57 
have no such thing as money among them. Their 
traffic, as well with one another as with strangers, 
is always of barter. There are but few of them 
that have any notion of the usefulness or the value 
of coin and those are such as live about the Cape Town ... 
Though he considered them to ".... without doubt, both in Body and 
in Mind, the laziest people under the sun ... " and "... in the matter 
of diet the filthiest people in the world.... "58 he nonetheless 
perceived certain virtues in their ".... most beautiful simplicity 
of manners .... "59 and he was impressed by the fact that: 
60 
The Hottentots know nothing of the Deceits and 
faithless acts of Europe. Their word is sacred; 
and there is hardly anything upon Earth they look 
upon as a fouler crime than Breach of engagement. 
As a witness, Kolbe cannot fully be relied upon. There is no evidence 
to support his claim that: 
61 
I know many of them who understood Dutch, French 
and Portuguese, to a Degree of perfection .... 
Nor can we really believe him that "numbers of them" told him that: 
62 
..... the vices they saw prevail among the Christians; 
their Avarice, their envy and Hatred of one another, 
their restless discontented tempers, their 
lasciviousness and injustices were the things that 
principally kept the Hottentots from hearkening to 
Christianity. 
57. Ibid., p. 260. 
58. Ibid., PP-46-47- 
59. Ibid., p 339" 
60. Ibid., p. 59. 
61. Ibid., p. 37. The question of the languages spoken at the Cape 
is dealt with later. See also M. Valkhoff: Studies in 
Portuguese and Creole, passim. 
62. Ibid., p. 339" 
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Earlier in the 18th century there are examples in various 
descriptions of the Cape of a less generous and more fiercely 
intolerant view of the way of life - and indeed the lives - of the 
Khoi. Thus Daniel Beeckman had little to say of them, other than: 
63 
You may guess that these filthy Animals (for they 
hardly deserve the name of Rational Creatures) if at 
London, would be much greater Customers to our Butchers, 
Kitchen Wenches, and Chimney-Sweepers, for their Dress 
etc., than to the Mercers, Perfumers etc. .... 
Or Commima. ry Cnoll, who travelled a short distance inland from the 
Port in 1710, concluded his remarks on the Khoi by stating that, 
"In brief, these savage people are, in all their habit, save in their 
human form, like beasts". 
64 
A few years earlier, John Maxwell in a 
letter to the Rev. Dr. Harris, had the following to report: 
65 
By all that I have seen and heard of them and other 
nations they are the most lazy and ignorant part of 
mankind, by virtue of which two most excellent 
qualifications there are no manner of arts practised 
among them, no plowing or sowing, no going to sea in 
so much as a boat, no use of iron or money, no 
notion of God, Providence or future state, no 
tradition of creation or flood, no prayers or sacrifices, 
no magical rites, nor any fine notion of any invisible 
being capable of doing them either good or harm.... 
To the Chaplain of a passing English fleet, the Hottentots66 
are the most Bestial and Sordid .... They are sunk 
even below Idolatry, and destitute both of Priest 
and Temple .... and .... have lost all kind of 
Religious Devotion. 
63. Daniel Beeckman: Extract from A Voyage to Borneo in 1714, in 
G. G. Botha (ed. ): Collectanea, p. 116. 
64. Commissary Cnoll: Journal, in C. G. Botha: Op. cit., p. 84. 
65. John Maxwell to the Rev. Dr. Harris. A Letter, dated 1708, 
in C. G. Botha: Op. cit., pp. 49-56. 
66. J. Ovington, M. A., Chaplain: Extract from his A Voyage to 
Suratt in 1689, in C. G. Botha: Op. cit., p. 102. 
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Some of these latter extracts, along with other observations 
and opinions as documented in Company records in the 17th century 
which will be examined later, are interesting for a number of reasons. 
They are illustrative of one aspect of certain kinds of group inter- 
action which Allsop, in his study of the American Hobo, identified 
with some precision: ".... establish your victim as debased and 
barely human, thereby justifying inhuman draconian treatment". 
67 
The matter need not be pursued here; it will be taken up again in a 
later chapter. It will be necessary there to examine how attitudes 
such as these developed in this culturally plural context and in the 
light of the settlers' purposes as they formed and changed over time. 
These attitudes held by Officials and settlers (or particular groups 
of them) towards the Khoi and San (or groups of them) became part of 
the ideology of the settlers as that term will be used here. But 
that is running ahead of the present argument. 
The point here is neither to explore that related area nor 
0 
to evaluate the accuracy and reliability or otherwise of these and 
other accounts. The purpose of this short excursion into these 
descriptions was to illustrate a different but associated problem 
concerning the concept of 'culture' and its usage in\this study. Given 
the purposes of this enquiry as stated in the previous chapter there 
are good reasons for using this notion to refer quite simply to 
related sets of practices and institutions, rather than employing 
one or other of the more abstract formulations which focus on culture 
as essentially conceptual and cognitive. Equally, there are persuasive 
practical reasons for treating Levi-Strauss' 'structural' approach to 
culture with a cautious (if bewildered) respect. 
67. K. Allsop: Hard Travellin'. The Hobo and His History, p. 114. 
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First, because a prime purpose is to trace the relationships 
between various cultures in the formation of the 'new society', it 
is helpful - given the problems of identifying evidence which the 
more abstract notions of culture entail - to employ a more empirically 
operational conception of culture. The notion of culture as an 
"immense series of systems of concepts", as Harris defines it, may 
have considerable theoretical potential. In practice, it is difficult 
to operationalize, as yet, in any given case study of 'culture 
contact' and 'culture conflict' precisely because of its problematic 
status in relation to the relevant evidence. Perhaps it is because 
we do not, as yet, have the kinds of analytic categories which can 
mediate between that level of theory and the data it seeks to 
organize. 
Secondly, the evidence which is available in ethnographic 
and historical accounts is of such a kind that it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to translate that into a 'higher order' 
system of concepts as culture. Thus, both ways - whether starting 
from the available evidence, or from the notion of culture as a 
system of concepts - it is difficult to relate theory to evidence. 
Thirdly, the broader analytical purpose of this enquiry 
does not require that culture be treated at such a level of abstraction. 
It is not concerned with establishing, or contributing to the form- 
ulation of "... general principles .... " or "theories .... which 
should be applicable to all societies and valid for all possible 
observers", which is what his translator claims is the major concern 
of Levi-Strauss. 
68 
The purpose is far less ambitious and considerably 
more limited than that. Now it may be that Levi-Strauss is basically 
68. Claire Jacobson: "Translator's Preface" in C. Levi-Strauss: 
Structural Anthropology, p. ix. 
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concerned with "... universals, that is, basic social and mental 
processes of which cultural institutions are the concrete external 
projections or manifestations". 
69 
But Levi-Strauss himself 
recognizes quite explicitly that the way in which the concept of 
culture may be used will differ according to the kind of questions 
being asked, the level of generality and the object of the particular 
exercise. He is worth quoting at some length on this point because, 
although the "... goal of structural analysis" is to reduce cultural 
discontinuities to "invariants" - the "universal" for the anthropologist 
is like the 'isolate' for the demographer - he recognizes that there 
will be differing aims of enquiry, and hence differing heuristic 
uses of the term. 
70 The methodological implications are apparent. 
71 
If our aim is to ascertain significant discontinuities 
between, let us say, North America and Europe, then we 
are dealing with two different cultures; but should we 
become concerned with significant discontinuities 
between New York and Chicago, we would be allowed to 
speak of these two groups as different cultural 'units'. 
Since these discontinuities can be reduced to 
invariants, which is the goal of structural analysis, 
we see that culture may, at the same time, correspond 
to an objective reality and be a function of the kind 
of research undertaken. Accordingly, the same set of 
individuals may be considered to be parts of many 
different cultural contexts: universal, continental, 
national, regional, local, etc., as well as familial, 
occupational, religious, political, etc... This is true 
as a limit; however, anthropologists usually reserve 
the term 'culture' to designate a group of discontinuities 
which is significant on several of these levels at the 
same time. That it can never be valid for all levels 
does not prevent the concept of 'culture' from being as 
fundamental for the anthropologist as that of 'isolate' 
for the demographer. Both belong to the same 
epistemological family. 
69. Ibid., loc. cit. 
70. C. Levi-Strauss: Structural Anthropology, op. cit., p. 288. 
71. Ibid., loc. cit. My emphasis. 
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Much of the difficult theoretical discussion of Levi- 
Strauss is beyond the scope (and competence) of this study and not 
directly relevant for its purposes. What is of methodological 
importance, however, and of relevance to the question of culture 
is Levi-Strauss' clear distinction between levels and aims of 
analysis. Again he is quite explicit: 
72 
Great care should be taken to distinguish between 
the observational and the experimental levels. To 
observe facts and elaborate methodological devices 
which permit the construction of models out of these 
facts is not at all the same thing as to experiment 
on the models .... This distinction is all the more 
necessary, since many discussions on social structure 
revolve around the apparent contradiction between the 
concreteness and individuality of ethnological data 
and the abstract and formal character generally 
exhibited by structural studies. This contradiction 
disappears as one comes to realise that these features 
belong to two entirely different levels, or rather 
to two stages of the same process. 
Despite the Gallic theorizing tradition, he is remarkably empiricist 
in his insistence that, on the "observational level", 
73 
.... the main - one could almost say the only - rule is that all facts should carefully be observed and 
described without allowing any theoretical pre- 
conception to decide whether some are moreimportant 
than others. 
All facts? No preconceptions or even rudimentary criteria for 
selection? Won't these necessarily be involved, given that questions 
are being asked? There are objections to that view. However, the 
'two levels' - of observation and model-building - are distinct, but 
related. "What interests the anthropologist and what belongs to the 
realm of culture, is the different modulations, if I may use the word, 
undergone in various societies and at various times, by basic 
material, which is by definition always and everywhere identical. "74 
72. Ibid., p. 272. My emphasis. 
73. Ibid. 
74. G. Charbonnier: Conversations with Claude Levi-Strauss, p. 148. 
84 
It will be one of the central arguments in the substantive 
account which follows that it is precisely these 'different 
modulations' - the institutions and practices that form the core of 
social behaviour as culture - whose content has to be carefully 
described and whose interaction and differential incorporation in a 
single society has to be analysed and explained. 
The fourth and final reason why it is useful to 
conceptualize culture in these terms can be argued with reference 
again to the extracts from the various descriptions of the Khoi and San 
mentioned earlier. Whether their accounts of the Khoisan were 
accurate or not, the Officials, expedition leaders, local settlers in 
various parts of the colony and visitors to the Cape have left a 
fairly large body of writing about what they thought and observed. 
Often their attitudes and opinions are unambiguous though ill-informed. 
At other times - particularly when Officials are reporting back to 
Amsterdam or Batavia - it is not entirely clear what they really 
think, for there are indications at different times that they are at 
pains, for various reasons, to give a favourable impressiön of the 
relationship between the colonists and Khoi. What however is clear - 
and illustrated in some of the excerpts cited above - is that, in 
general, the kinds of categories and terms in which these descriptions 
are phrased are essentially those which relate to observations of 
difference in respect of institutions and practices. The various 
diarists and commentators, in short, perceive and describe what they 
regard as differences in what we will here call culture. It is rare 
for colour, or colour alone, to be the most salient feature of their 
descriptions of the Khoisan. 
75 When colour is mentioned it is 
75. I have been referring to the Khoisan and Dutch as if they were 
each homogeneous groups; they were not. However, for the sake 
of ý.::. clarifying these broader conceptual issues that 
shorthand has been adopted. 
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usually a subordinate part of a wider picture in which the central 
parameters are cultural distinctions. I will argue that "cultural 
consciousness" preceded "colour consciousness '19 or rather that 
initially it dominated the official and settler perception of the 
indigenous people. Now it is of course the case that as the first 
century of Company 'rule' unfolded, the degree of cultural difference 
- the 'institutional discontinuities' of both Levi-Strauss and 
M. G. Smith - waned, particularly in the western districts. If colour 
came to be a crucial factor in their perception and 'consciousness', 
and if it subsequently emerged as a major basis for exclusion and 
differential incorporation, then how it happened will need to be 
explained. What, however, is important to stress here is that, 
whether or not culture may be usefully conceived of as a complex 
system of concepts for purposes of theoretical argument, (Levi- 
Strauss' 'experimental level'? ), the settlers for their part 
observed and defined the distinctions in rather more immediate and 
concrete terms. While the evidence for it is limited it may also be 
possible to infer that the Khoi, for their part,, considered - 
initially at least- European customs and institutions to be strange, 
and certainly threatening to their way of life. Moreover, it is 
necessary-a study of this kind - perhaps especially in a study of 
of this kind - to take careful account of the terms and rough 
categories of meaning which the parties to the situation themselves 
made. That may not be a sufficient condition of methodological 
completness, but it seems to be a necessary one. This does not mean 
that we have to adopt the terms of the parties in toto, or regard 
their way of describing what they saw as an adequate account of the 
complex structures of relationships growing up between and among them. 
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Clearly, it is inadequate. However, where their descriptions focus 
on the customs, habits and practices which our categories of analysis 
identify as the institutional cores of culture, there is a further 
good reason for making the best of this congruence and thus for 
using the term 'culture' in the way which should by now be clear. 
Whether "cultural institutions are the concrete external projections 
and manifestations" of "universals" (Levi-Strauss' "... unconscious 
structure underlying each institution and each custom ....? 
)76 or 
not, is therefore beside the point as far as the scope of this study 
goes. The concern is to trace and explain the causes, contours and 
consequences of the interaction of at least two'cultures', as 
defined above, and to account for the emergence of the 'new society'. 
In sum, then, I have stipulated what the concept of culture 
will be used to identify, how that usage fits the broader explanatory 
purpose and at what level of abstraction it will operate. Though its 
meaning has been effectively rehearsed above, it is now necessary to 
stipulate explicitly what sense will be given to the related concept 
of 'ideology'. 
The closeness of the concepts of culture and ideology is 
nicely illustrated by the title of Geertz's influential article: 
"Ideology as a Cultural System". 
77 This closeness - in terms of the 
bearing whicb[ these concepts have in relation to the evidence - has a 
number of dimensions, and separating them helps to demonstrate these 
and their relatedness. 
76. C. Levi-Strauss: Op. cit., p. 21. 
77. Clifford Geertz: "Ideology as a Cultural System". 
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First, and most simply, an ideology may be said to be 
constituted by a 'framework' of related ideas, values, beliefs, 
predispositions, prejudices, expectations and norms which cluster 
together in a coherent and mutually supportive way. There is 
nothing new about this usage of the term. What needs to be borne 
in mind, however, is that such frameworks, as with all ideologies, 
are neither 'free-floating', nor moored in some firm and rigid sense 
to the culture of which they are a part. They stand in a shifting 
and adapting relationship to the cluster of practices and 
institutions which constitute the culture, and the process of 
adaptation - as conceived here - does not only and always originate 
in some obvious change in culture. Not only is adaptation at least 
a two-way process, it can be and is also initiated in either 
'sector'. So that just as a cluster of institutions makes up the 
core of a culture by cohering in a more or less systemic way, so too 
a cluster of related ideas and beliefs constitute the ideology 
which meshes with that culture. 
Secondly, incorporated in the ideology are the rough, 
categories, concepts and constructs in terms of which the represent- 
atives of one cultural tradition perceive another, describe it and 
provide the basis for forming judgments about it. It does not matter 
- for the sake of this argument - whether the various descriptions 
of the Khoi (before, during or after regular interaction took place) 
were or were not 'accurate'. Nor would it matter whether the Khoi 
description of the Dutch was 'accurate' or not. The relativity of the 
very idea of 'accuracy' in this context is underlined. What does 
matter is that these rough categories - rooted in the culture of the 
perceivers and expressed in their language - were what they used to 
identify practices such as 'worship', or 'marriage' or various kinds 
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of economic activity. Such opinions, attitudes and judgments formed 
by the hutch about these practices were, thus, influenced, initially, 
by at least two broad sets of factors. The one was their prior 
knowledge, experience and expectation of the Khoi in particular, or 
'Native people' in general; the other was the extent to which 
institutional practices, which they observed and identified, deviated 
in content and form from their own equivalents, or what they believed 
to be their equivalents. To this extent the wide-ranging and 
inclusive notiong of ideology which Manners and Kaplan spell out is 
worth starting with, since it applies with equal force to both 
European settlers and Khoisan, as it would apply to any identifiably 
distinct cultural group. They say that ideology79 
includes values, norms, knowledge, themes, 
philosophies and religious beliefs, sentiments, 
ethical principles, world views, ethos and the 
like. 
But ideology, like culture, is neither as static nor goal-less as 
this seems to imply. A central feature is also purpose. Thus, 
thirdly, in the light of the above, it is necessary to build into 
the stipulation of the concept of ideology a purposive and adaptive 
dimension. The purposive aspect will help to explain, in a very 
central way, the causes and issues of conflict; the adaptive 
dimension will assist in explaining the contours of that interaction 
and give some clues to the process of modification and change in 
ideology and behaviour. Concretely, however limited the prior 
knowledge of each other, and however vague and unformed the mutual 
perceptions may have been, the processes whereby each group observed, 
reacted to and defined the others were crucially related to the 
79. David Kaplan and Robert A. Manners: Culture Theory, p. 112. 
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purposes they were pursuing or the interests they were defending. 
In his discussion of this question, Harris tends to view ideologies 
as being linked to class. 
80 I think that this is far too limiting 
a conception, but it illustrates yet again the tendency for issues 
of this kind to be treated in much of the literature as if societies 
were always more or less culturally homogeneous. Though there may 
indeed have been differences in emphasis and immediate purpose 
between sections of the settler community and the Officials at the 
Cape in the late 17th century and beyond, and though there may 
indeed have been differences in strategy and tactics for survival 
amongst different Khoi hordes, it is nonetheless quite clear that 
what these larger collectivities shared in common was much greater. 
Or, initially, at least, and for some time thereafter. Thus the 
row which developed about the behaviour of Adriaan van der Stel and 
his clique and the resistance to them by Adam Tas and others is of 
great importance. 
81 
It will be examined later. The point here, 
however, is that if, as Harris concisely argues, ideology can also be 
viewed as "... the language of the purposes of a social group .... " 
it severely constrains its usage if the conception of 'social groups' 
is limited to classes. My contention is that, at a broader level, 
and particularly in a colonial situation, ideology can be seen to be 
associated also with cultures, in the way that has been spelled out 
above. There is an interesting point, however, which arises from 
this and it can be most usefully treated here, for it relates to some 
of the earlier discussion in this and the previous chapter. Initially 
80. Nigel Harris: Op. cit., pp. 22-67. 
81. Leo Fouche (ed. ): The Diary of Adam Tas, 1705-1706. 
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the various groups - the Dutch and the Khoi societies - did not 
constitute a single 'society'. They peered warily at each other 
across an ideological divide. Intermittent and fragmentary contact 
between the societies and cultures in part defined the relationship. 
In time this gave way to more regular and sustained interaction, and 
this in turn led to the incorporation of Khoi and San in the 'new 
society'. The process of incorporation and the structure of 
relationships which organized this indeed came to constitute the 
framework of the society. Gradually, Khoi culture faded. But it 
did not happen swiftly. Moreover the economic and socio-political 
subordination of the Khoi and the emergence of the Cape Coloured 
people were not sequential: they overlapped in time and differed in 
degree over space. Even Kolbe, as was seen earlier, noticed the 
differences between 'Hottentots' at "... the Cape Town .... " and 
inland. Now even if one wanted to claim that, for the Western Cape 
district in the mid-18th century, there was - leaving aside the slave 
population - already a considerable degree of cultural continuity 
between so-called Free Blacks (and Browns), 'free' Khoi labour and 
the settler community, it would do grave injustice not only to the 
evidence, but also t'b the complexity of the situation, to consider 
that those who had been dominated and subordinated in the process of 
incorporation represented characteristically a 'class' with an 
'ideology' of its own. 'Class', culture, ethnicity and ideology 
overlapped and intertwined in an intensely complex way. A conquered 
'culture' or a differentially incorporated segment does not, in virtue 
of that, come to be simply or only a subordinate 'class'. Nor is the 
conceptualization of the situation as essentially or really one of 
class and class conflict necessarily the most useful. There is much 
more to it than that. Not only do important trace elements of their 
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prior institutions and practices remain, but also aspects of their 
ideology (perhaps in the form of religious beliefs, superstitions, 
food-taboos, etc., or the very non-acceptance of the philosophies 
and world views of the dominant) remain. Thus at all stages - 
pre-contact, initial contact, systematic interaction, during the 
speed-up interaction which results in differential incorporation and 
for a considerable time after that - it is both useful and important 
to regard the variable of ideology as separate, and to treat it with 
care while relating it constantly to its cultural referent which is, 
in turn, undergoing change and adaptation as the 'new society" 
begins to form. 
It will be necessary, as a prelude to that discussion, to 
describe major features of Dutch ideology prior to the arrival at 
the Cape of the first Officials and employees. Similarly, in 
considering the Khoisan prior to the establishment of the Dutch 
station at Table Bay, it is appropriate to try to reconstruct the 
essential features of their ideology as part of their culture. For 
both these purposes it will be assumed that it is possible to 
characterize representative central features of the ideology of 
these cultures. This assumption rests on the view that, despite 
'sub-cultures' and an indeterminate degree of regional or sub-group 
variation, it is possible to talk about the ideology of Dutch, Khoi 
and San societies, because in both cases there were dominant cultures 
and associated ideologies in the societies and not a plurality of 
cultures and world-views competing for 'hegemony'. Gramsci's notion 
of 'hegemony' usefully sums up the relatedness of culture and ideology 
in the sense which the previous sentence implies. As Williams has 
formulated it, 'hegemony' for Gramsci is: 
82 
82. Gwyn Williams: "Gramsci's Concept of Egemonia", p. 587. 
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an order in which a certain way of life and thought 
is dominant, in which one concept of reality is 
diffused throughout society in all institutional and 
private manifestations, informing with its spirit 
all taste, morality, customs, religious and political 
principles, and all social relations, particularly in 
their intellectual and moral connotations. 
Now although Gramsci developed this concept in the context of a very 
different kind of discussion about politics and radical change in 
class-based advanced industrial societies, and although Williams' 
formulation exaggerates certain features, it is a useful definitional 
peg on which to hang a discussion of this kind. The evidence will be 
looked at later. For the moment what needs to be said however is that 
in the middle of the 17th century the Dutch Republic was at the 
height of its Golden Age. Though it would be wrong to suggest that it 
was in all respects united, homogeneous and without internal tensions, 
it is nonetheless clearly the case that it was not characterized by 
major cultural or political cleavages. Indeed, as Huizinga observes, 
in contrasting the Dutch Republic with Britain: 
83 
We may safely say that Dutch culture in 1625-75 was 
at a more developed stage than its counter-part in 
England. Conflicts of the kind that split national 
life wide open and threatened cultural stability 
across the Channel, found a fairly harmonious 
solution here. 
It is not necessary to accept the notion of 'stages' in 
this to see the force of the point. And despite the limitations of 
our knowledge, there is much to suggest that, likewise, Khoi and San 
societies were characterized by an interesting degree of cultural 
continuity. Thus, in respect of these cultures it will be possible 
to talk about the ideologies they brought to the 'contact' situation, 
and in terms of which they all initially observed, defined and reacted 
to each other in the context of the purposes they pursued or the 
interests they defended. 
83" J. H. Huizinga: Dutch Civilization in the 18th Century, p. 57. 
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As the 'new society' began to form, all ideologies underwent 
changes, just as institutions and practices were affected by changes 
in perception and the adaptation and/or expansion of ideologies. 
Once again we are back with the unavoidable sense of the closeness of 
culture and ideology. Following the analogy of ideology as a two-way 
prism (as outlined in the previous chaper), it will be possible to 
analyse how the ideology of the Dutch, when confronted by alien 
cultures and their institutions, or by new problems that needed 
solving, or puzzling phenomena that needed to be 'synchronized' with 
long-held beliefs and expectations, was adapted at the Cape to cope 
with all this. Observations made of alien institutions and practices 
were expressed in terms of the categories of the ideology, which were 
then adjusted (or expanded) to take account of these observations. 
My argument will be that the implications of this for behaviour were 
considerable, especially when set against a rough schedule of 
individual purposes and collective objectives. Similarly, the 
implications of such new behavioural patterns - in respect of labour, 
or treatment of Khoi, or styles of life etc. - for ideology are crucial. 
Thus, bearing in mind that ideologies - as I mean to use the 
term here - are not only frameworks of belief, ideas and norms etc., 
but also that they embody purposes, are in a close reciprocal 
relationship with the institutions of a culture, and serve to 
"... render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful... " 
and "... to so construe them as to make it possible to act purpose- 
fully within them .... "84 it is possible to endorse Geertz's view 
that85 
84. Clifford Geertz: Op. cit., p. 64- 
85. Ibid., loc. cit. 
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Whatever else ideologies may be .... they are, most 
distinctively, maps of problematic social reality 
and matrices for the creation of collective conscience. 
It is in this sense - as expanded in the previous few pages - that 
the concept of ideology will be used. 
In the preceding pages the central interpretative 
propositions and organizing concepts which will mobilize the evidence 
have been outlined. Differential incorporation, the degrees and 
forms of pluralism, the concepts of society, culture and ideology 
have been stipulatively defined and the way they will be deployed 
in explaining the formation of the new society has been broadly 
indicated. Such an outline can do no more than sketch the main 
conceptual structure of this study. The more detailed analysis of 
that process will be left to the substantive account. While 
I. 
'differential incorporation' sums up the central process that defined 
the manner and mode by which the various cultures were drawn together 
into a peculiar structure of relationships, it does not - on its own 
- explain enough. Neither does the description of various forms of 
institutional discontinuity as between the cultures which 'interacted' 
explain the manner of interaction nor its results. The ideology - 
particularly of the dominant - will, however, provide important 
insights about the causes and contours of conflict, the nature of, 
and reasons for the steady demand for labour, the shape of economic 
activity associated with this and the social relations which developed. 
It will be argued that each of these factors, while of intrinsic 
interest in its own right, may best be analysed in terms of the 
contribution it made to the process of differential incorporation 
which instituted a structurally plural order. 
At the centre of the 'new society' there was a growing core 
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of institutional practices which defined the culture of the dominant. 
Most of these were adapted and drawn from the antecedent experiences 
and cultures of the Europeans. But as the new society developed it 
was not only 'Europeans' who participated in this culture. Nor were 
the interests of the dominant identical. There were 'free Blacks', 
and the emerging Cape Coloured people shared customs, religion and 
language with the 'Europeans'. Moreover, differences in ideal and 
material interests between, inter alia, knechte, western Cape 
agriculturalists, the townspeople of Cape Town, the veeboere, 
trekboere and the Officials of the Company need to be recognised. For 
although they participated in and shared the same culture and ideology 
in the broad senses defined earlier, and though - for some limited 
purposes - they defined themselves as a solidarity group, we need 
categories of analysis which will enable us to identify the smaller 
groups that developed within this dominant common culture. Likewise, 
as the Khoi societies began to crumble as independent entities, some 
Khoi entered the new society as so-called 'free labour', while 
others fled. A baffling mixture of collectivities which overlapped 
in terms of culture, class and colour ensued. In addition there were 
Khoi who retained distinctive elements of their culture - though this 
was fading - while being incorporated as subordinates within the 
common economic and political system of the colony. Between these 
extremes there were a series of intermediate categories. 
In order to untangle the overlapping dimensions of culture, 
colour and class it is necessary to have analytical tools that will 
enable one to do this. I have found it useful for these purposes to 
distinguish between corporate groups and categories. 
86 
86. A. Leftwich: "Classes and Corporate Groups", passim. 
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Used correctly, as H. S. Morris points out, 
87 
the word category is a term used in logic for a label 
attached to a class of objects which have some quality 
in common. Strictly speaking a category cannot 'turn' 
into a group or quasi-group, but it is convenient to 
use the word for the zero-end, so to speak, of the 
scale of social aggregates of which the fully corporate 
group is the other end. 
Now, because in the case of the Cape there were other groups, smaller 
than'cultures', it is necessary to have some means of distinguishing 
them. The distinction between category and corporate group helps. 
Thus a category identifies a collectivity which is characterized by 
the following features. The members of it have one or more 'objective' 
characteristic in common. By 'objective' characteristic I would 
include colour, culture, language, religion, a particular relation- 
ship to the means of production or access to political power. For 
this reason it is primarily an analytic construct which is of use 
largely for purposes of classification. Thus, a category is not of 
major importance in analysing social or political interaction. For 
a category does not have a common and shared consciousness of itself 
as a group. It does not act as a group. Indeed, such a collectivity 
as it is experienced (or, rather, not experienced) by its members, 
is internally divided by other more salient factors which constitute 
the basis for group consciousness and action amongst certain 'members' 
of the category, and conceivably against other 'members'. Thus, for 
example, Marx's notion of 'class in itself' would be one kind of 
category. So, more concretely, would the'free burgers' of the Cape. 
In terms of access to the sources of political power they were alike. 
But they were internally divided with respect to their relationship 
to the means of production. Thus when some farmers acted against the 
87. H. S. Morris: "Some Aspects of the Concept of the Plural Society", 
p. 182. 
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sharp practices of van der Stel and his cronies, the townspeople 
played little part in the crisis. As Fouche comments: 
88 
The townspeople - the publicans and lodging-house 
keepers, who found a parasitic livelihood in the 
embryo city that lay about the Castle - had 
neither art nor part in this movement ..... With 
the farming community they had nothing in common 
.... The well-being of the community, and the just 
rights of the colonists were nothing to them. 
As a whole the free burgers formed a category: but smaller 
collectivities amongst them - like the wine and grain farmers - 
constituted a corporate group for a particular set of purposes, and 
this example suggests a definition of such a group. There are two 
critical variables which define a corporate group: they must share 
institutions and experience a sense of corporate solidarity and 
consciousness. 
89 It may be a temporary phenomenon; it may last. 
Thus Marx's 'class for itself' is one example of such a group, but 
the concept is an inclusive one, subsuming under it, and manifesting 
itself in a variety of concrete forms, which are n exhausted by 
'class for itself'. Thus, as the 18th century wore on, there was 
emerging in the western Cape a population of so-called Brown 
'Afrikanders'. They shared institutions and practices with the so- 
called White 'Afrikanders'. In terms of these they may all be 
regarded as having constituted a category. Yet there is evidence to 
suggest that as time passed - and for reasons which will be expanded 
later - the latter began to regard themselves as somehow distinct 
88. Leo Fouche: Op. cit., p. 391. 
89. Consider the closeness of this definition derived from the 
sociological tradition to that by a psychologist, Henri Tajfel, 
who defines "a group as a category of people fulfilling two 
criteria: the first, that an individual identifies himself as 
belonging to that category; and the second, that this 
identification is to him of some emotional significance". 
H. Tajfel: "Cooperation between Human Groups", p. 78. 
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from the former. To the extent that they did, their consciousness 
of themselves identifies them as a corporate group. Colour was 
replacing culture as one of the determinants of subordinate 
incorporation; w this may have been so will be dealt with in 
subsequent chapters. And the explanation for this apparent shift 
to a definition of the situation more in terms of colour will be 
related to the ideology of the dominant group, the purposes they 
pursued, their ideal interests, their sustained demand for labour 
and the manner in which they adapted their broad objectives to the 
constraints of the local political economy. 
Thus differential incorporation does not simply describe 
the way in which different and asymmetrical cultures interacted and 
resulted in an inegalitarian plural structure. There were other 
smaller collectivities developing within the interstices of the new 
society which were accumulating particular sets of interests. How 
these interacted with each other in terms of their competing or 
conflicting purposes is central to an understanding of the development 
of the new society. Certainly, it is from that perspective - and in 
relation to the questions posed in the previous chapters - that the 
enquiry will be conducted. The pluralist terms which have been 
explored above, and the central concepts which will be used in 
analysing the processes which shaped the new society will constitute 
the analytic framework. But that framework is incomplete without 
bringing one crucial operational principle decisively into the fore- 
front here. An account of the development of Cape society which 
assumes that the interaction and conflict between the groups can be 
explained - even in part - by any general notions such as conflicts 
of "... racial heredity", as de Kiewiet in an unguarded moment does, 
90 
90. C. W. de Kiewiet: Op. cit., p. 19. 
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or as de Kock does when referring to ".... inherent and natural... " 
characteristics (of indolence) of the Khoi, 
91 
will not carry 
explanation forward. Though it is necessary to look at cultures, 
societies, ideologies, corporate groups and categories, it is also 
well to remember that these are - as with all concepts - abstractions 
from a complex web of human action. As such we can only understand 
individual or collective human agency within specific historical 
contexts. The notions of 'human nature', or 'man' or 'natural 
characteristics', or 'racial heredity', in abstract, describe and 
explain nothing, for nowhere can we locate any of these outside of 
historical contexts. As Thompson observest92 
What Marx proposed (and I am thinking of the 
theses on Feuerbach) was that all human conflicts 
are observable only within specific social contexts. 
And the bare forked creature, naked biological man, 
is not a context which we can ever observe, because 
the very notion of man ... is coincident with culture; 
man only is insofar as he is able to organize some 
parts of his experience and transmit it in 
specifically human ways. Thus to propose the 
investigation of 'man' apart from his culture (or 
his lived history) is to propose an unreal 
abstraction, the investigation of non-man. And at 
least in recent history human conflicts have found 
expression within systematized social and cultural 
contexts, so that the conflict itself finds expression 
within the terms of that context: as, for example, we 
cannot understand certain kinds of aggression 
independently of the contextual concepts of the 
ownership of property or of nationhood. 
There may indeed be more to it than that, but - at least 
this study of the Cape will proceed with that observation firmly 
in mind. 
91. Victor de Kock: Those in Bondage, P-13- 
92. E. P. Thompson: "An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski", p. 67. 
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Chapter 3 
THE EUROPEAN AND DUTCH ANTECEDENTS 
South African historiography dealing with the 17th and 
18th centuries at the Cape is very sparse when it comes to 
explaining or exploring the relationships between the metropolitan 
Dutch society and culture, and the local emergence of a new society 
at the Cape. In this chapter, the argument is about the Dutch 
background and its implications for those relationships. First, 
it will be argued, the specific organization of the economic and 
material interests of the V. O. C. were deeply rooted in Dutch 
economic and political history, and that many of its characteristics 
had direct and far reaching implications for developments later at 
the Cape. Secondly, it is argued that the central features of the 
associated European metropolitan culture, behaviour, ideology and 
normative universe, as well as other institutional devices, borrowed 
from elsewhere (like slavery), must be clearly analyzed and stated 
before one can account for the pattern of subsequent Cape interaction, 
precisely because the structure of that interaction at different 
levels cannot be explained without first describing and analyzing 
its contributory component parts. An equivalent of the Khoisan 
will have to follow. 
Three main themes run through this chapter, as they do 
throughout the study. They derive from the principal assumptions 
which underpin the organization of the evidence and the argument 
in relation to the history of the Netherlands, prior to but also 
during the colonial contact at the Cape. The first is that the broad 
material interests and the associated organization of technological 
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capacities of groups in any given situation both generate certain 
imperatives for them, and also set limits, broadly speaking, to what 
such groups can do to achieve them. Secondly, there is a complex 
relationship between any such mode of production, on the one hand, 
and the associated political institutions, culture and ideology which, 
on the other hand, express, influence and sustain it. 
1 The analysis 
of that relationship historically is difficult enough where there is, 
comparatively speaking, a common culture and a prevailing ideology. 
The problems for analysis are, however, compounded when there are at 
least two cultures present in a 'plural society', meeting in a 
distant colonial situation. Thirdly, this interaction in the 
colonial context can only be plausibly and instructively analyzed 
diachronically, that is through the medium of historical time. The 
analytical and organizational problem is to do justice to the 
evidence and the chronological sequences while at the same time 
analyzing and expanding upon the structural characteristics. 
The concern with these themes about a complex interaction 
taking place at the related levels of material interests, cultural 
incompatabilities and ideology, needs to be defended by demonstrating 
not only that there were differences (in this case between the 
Khoisan and the Dutch and also between both them and the imported 
slaves) but that they were significant, had formative histories and 
hence enduring legacies. It is these latter aspects which were crucial 
1. The simplistic and deterministic notion of 'base' determining 
'superstructure' which emerges from Marx's "Preface to The 
Critique of Political Economy" is not one which social scientists 
or theoretically interested historians can easily accept. 
However, in his emphasis on praxis , men making their own 
histories, within certain constraints, there is a sounder way of 
rescuing what "... is meaningful in his thought", rather than 
quibbling over what he 'really' meant. See E. D. Genovese: 
"Marxian interpretations of the Slave South", p. 96. 
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in the formation of the plural society. For what 'arrived' at 
the Cape during the second half of the 17th century was not simply 
a group of men and women. It was a group which embodied some 
significant and representative aspects of the popular culture and 
values of the Dutch Republic in the mid-17th century. 
2 They had 
joined the V. O. C. with certain objectives in mind and yet their 
lives were subjected to its rigorous control. The congeries of 
collective and mutually re-enforcing behaviours, beliefs, pre- 
dispositions, interests, perceptions and institutions can best be 
described by deriving a modal type or representative figure of the 
Y. O. C. employee in the second half of the 17th century. 
He was a male Protestant, possibly a Calvinist, who had 
joined the Y. O. C. (or been press-ganged into it by the zielverkoopers) 
in order to get to the Indies. He would have been a youngish man, 
either drawn from the considerable pool of unemployed (de grauw) of 
the United Netherlands, or who had migrated there from other parts 
of Protestant Europe, notably Germany. His ambition would have been 
to reach the Indies where it was believed that the possibilities for 
making a rapid and substantial fortune were considerable. He would 
not have been thinking seriously of settling there, and certainly 
not at the Cape. He would have intended to return homq and there is, 
at least, a 50/50 chance that he would have been literate. His 
Protestantism would in practice have been surprisingly nominal, and, 
if Calvinist, would have entailed no explicit implications for his 
behaviour towards people of colour, though as a part of his ideology 
2. It will be apparent that the view taken here is different from 
that which regards them as unrepresentative and only an 
"inferior, partial selection" from Dutch society. L. M. Thompson: 
"The South African Dilemma", p. 103. The regents or senior 
burghers of Holland were certainly no more representative, nor 
were the Professors or Divines or artists. 
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it would have combined a belief in the superiority of his culture, 
world-view and general patterns of life vis a vis that of the Khoi, 
for example, with a deep-seated national hostility towards Iberian 
Catholicism (and its allies) which he would have defined as a major 
enemy in the struggle for mercantile supremacy in the wider world. 
He would have believed, moreover, that the use of, and trade in 
foreign and alien slaves was no less legitimate than the buying and 
selling of silk or cloves, or the conduct of warfare to promote such 
ends. Underpinning this belief would have been an unambiguous 
assumption that trade and the pursuit of profit were the central and 
universal principles of civilised economic life to which his country 
and the Company were dedicated. Were he an educated man - and some 
of the higher officials were - he would possibly have been aware of 
the defence of war and the legitimacy of slavery as offered by 
Grotius. 3 But, even if he had not heard those views, the ideology 
of the Republic and the terms of public debate would have made such 
operational premises both widespread and largely unchallenged. It 
is most improbable that he would have thought that Blacks were 
inferior beings or the descendants of the Children of Ham, for he 
would not have previously been exposed systematically to any such 
ideas in the Netherlands. Nor were such views at all common in 
either of the two areas and cultures with which he might have had 
contact: the Iberian peninsula or England. The Church of which he 
was a member, though probably a nominal one, had not taught that 
Blacks were either of those two things. But he would have been 
suspicious of, and aggressive towards, alien and particularly "heathen' 
cultures and peoples, for in the 16th and 17th centuries the notion 
3. H. Grotius: De Jure Belli et Pacis, III, pp. 128-138. 
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of 'heathendom' was still soaked in complex and hostile meanings and 
implications. 4 But where the chance occurred locally at the Cape, 
given the shortage of Dutch women, he cohabitted with and married 
local Khoi women and, with more regularity and ehthusiasm, slavesses 
from the East. [The word 'slavess' is a direct translation from the 
Dutch/Afrika_ans. word slavin. It's very useful]. He would have 
preferred that such women adopt Dutch ways, and this tended to happen. 
Their baptism and formal admission to the Church would have been 
welcomed. Later, in the 18th century, those immigrants who took 
slavesses as concubines and mistresses would often have had them 
manumitted, baptised and admitted to the Church, prior to marrying 
them, though sometimes this happened after marriage. 
5 He would 
also have grudgingly accepted the rigid discipline and monopolistic 
policy of the V. O. C. At the Cape he might have begun by entertaining 
thoughts of desertion, or contravention of the regulations which 
prohibited independent cattle barter with Khoi bands and other forms 
of 'free' trade, and not infrequently he would have broken them. 
4. See the Oxford English Dictionary 
_, 
Vol V. p. 171. for a discussion 
of the meaning of the word 'heathen' and its historical 
associations. For the meanings and associations in Dutch for 
the word 'heiden' (beastly, atrocious, and abominable) see 
H. Jansonius: Groot Nederlands-Engels Woordenboek, Deel I, p. 611. 
5. Amongst the 4000 brief biographies of Germans at the Cape which 
have been collated by Hoge are the following: Johan Paul 
Gottfried Fabitus, originally of Magdeburg in Germany was a 
soldier in the employ of the Y. O. C. from 1765-1782. In 1783 he 
married Rosina of the Cape, his slavess (female slave) whom he 
then manumitted in 1785. Or the similar case of Matthias Greef (also of Magdeburg). He was a burger in 1680. On the 12th 
November that year he married Susanna Claasen of the Cape, who 
was confirmed 6 years later at Stellenbosch on the 27th October, 
1690. Hoge: Personalia of the Germans at the Cane, p. 93 and 
p. 120. 
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It is not possible to construct this representative type 
on the basis of the secondary historical literature on the Cape. 
For that literature gives one, in general, a rather flat and 
relatively lifeless picture of the early 'settlers', and the image 
which is sytematically cultivated is of a group of men whose world 
view was clamped within the grim and bleak pessimism of 'primitive 
Calvinism'. Moreover, explanations for what transpired at the Cape 
in the 135 years after 1652, often attribute considerable influence 
to Calvinism, as if it were a spirit that uniformly gripped the 
minds, and influenced the behaviours of Professorial Divines at 
Dort in 1618/19, as well as the drunken and debauched soldiers, 
sailors and whores who peopled the kroegen (pubs) of Dutch dockland. 
This 'idealist' tradition in much South African historiography 
would have one believe that the Calvinism of the Dort elite can 
somehow be held to be causally responsible for the development of 
'race relations' and 'race attitudes' because of its sombre 
predicitions about predestination and 'damnation', which were 
attached to people of colour. 
6 
I contest this view on two grounds 
in the course of this and later chapters: first, by raising 
theoretical objections to the 'idealist' interpretation; and 
secondly, on empirical grounds by examining here some of the evidence 
about Calvinism, and'other possible metropolitan sources for such 
'race attitudes', or behaviours. 
6. By 'idealist' in this context I mean that view which holds that 
ideas and beliefs - disconnected from, and disembodied of, 
material interests and customary behaviours - have causal primacy in the shaping of individual behaviour and social structure. 
This position is influenced by the superb essay on a related 
theme by Genovese: "Materialism and Idealism in the History of 
Negro Slavery in the Americas", and his "Class and Race" in 
The World the Slave-holders Made. 
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The representative type is also a starting point. It 
adumbrates the behavioural, ideological and institutional features 
which are of crucial importance in understanding the subsequent 
relationship and interaction between the Dutch, Khoisan and slaves. 
Generally speaking the historians have started out with a very 
different kind of chronological and linear conception which has 
substantially different implications for their analysis of subsequent 
developments. Thus it is necessary here to show that these features 
of Dutch society, which were exported by the V. O. C., had roots deep 
within the history of the United Netherlands, in its political 
economy, social structure, culture and ideology at the height of 
the Golden Age. And the history of the Dutch Republic provides 
ample evidence to support that description of what constituted 'the 
fragment' that arrived at the Cape. Later, in contrasting this with 
the essential features of Khoisan culture, and antecedent historical 
and structural bases of at least two parts of the plural society 
can be established, and the analytical usefulness of that conceptual- 
ization and approach can be underlined. Before proceeding to look at 
that history, one final introductory general statement must be made. 
The people who arrived at the Cape from Europe were not 
free to do as they wished within the environmental and material 
constraints of their situation. They were limited and controlled by 
the dictates of V. O. C. policy, as formulated in the interests of the 
shareholders in the Netherlands by the Heeren (or Batavia), and as 
interpreted by local officials at the Cape. 'There was, in short, a 
chain of downward political and economic pressures and dictates which 
linked the interests of the Heeren to the fate of the Khoisan. There 
is an illuminating analogy to be drawn from the theories of the modern 
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'underdevelopment' school of economists, like A. G. Frank and Samir 
Amin. 7 They argue that contemporary 'third world' countries have 
limited prospects for escaping from their dependency. They suggest 
that the long and complex historical chain of dependence, between 
the corporate industrial giants and industrialized powers at one 
end (today), and the peasant or tribal cultivators at the other end, 
represents a process of accumulation on a world scale and the 
generation and transfer of wealth which has significantly structured 
and tilted the balance of wealth, resources and power against the 
peasants or tribesmen. Moreover, according to them, this historical 
process decisively accounts for the 'underdeveloped' condition of 
third world economies. This notion, taken with the previous argument 
about radical cultural differences, is instructive (when suitably 
modified) for explaining the complex relations between the 
Netherlands and the Cape Khoisan societies. If one conceives of a 
similar, but less sophisticated, chain which connected the 17th 
century 'corporate giant' - the V. O. C. - to the Khoisan herders and 
hunters, some of the pressures and processes which acted to shape 
Cape society become more intelligible: a long and apparently jumbled 
set of sequences emerge with a more coherent underlying causal thrust. 
Pressure from the shareholders and the State on the V. O. C. (and 
vice-versa), the insistence of the latter on the adherence throughout 
the empire to a strict monopolistic policy, the constraints imposed 
by local Cape officials on any entrepreneurial ambitions of the 
vryburgers and employees alike, and the latter thus necessarily 
7. A. G. Frank: Capitalism and underdevelibpment in Latin America, 
and Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution; 
Saiiir Amin: "Accumulation and Development. A Theoretical Model" 
and his Accumulation on a World scale. Their arguments are 
complex; and I probably simplify them. 
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encroaching on, and squeezing the Khoi (while simultaneously demanding 
more slaves) - all this suggests an economic, mercantile and 
organizational chain which connected the fate of the Khoisan to the 
pressures from Amsterdam. And it helps to explain the constraints 
on the early settlers which converged with, and underpinned their 
already negative and, in some respects, hostile attitudes to the 
Khoi. It also suggests a pervasive material dimension of the bases 
for inclusion and exclusion in the 'colonial society' and the arrange- 
ments for and maintenance of the division of labour which acted also 
to define the political economy of Cape society. 
Thus, alongside and interwoven with the cultural and 
ideological difference and the clash of material interests, there was 
a series of political and economic constraints on the local officials 
and settlers against which, in time, they (the settlers) were to 
rebel. But, while the constraints held fast, they had little 
alternative (or desire) but to extract surplus and unequal exchange 
from the slaves whom they owned, and from the Khoi, whose steady 
decline into dependence compelled them to work for the settlers. 
In short, the downward chain of increasingly tight economic 
and organizational pressures worked its way through, and was 
expressed locally at the Cape in the relationships between initially 
distinct corporate cultural groups. Alternatively stated - that is, 
expressing this historical and analytic nexus the other way round - 
the cultural diversity and institutional discontinuity between the 
groups acted crucially to establish the contours along which the 
downward imperial economic pressures flowed. Hence they also partly 
defined the form which conflict and interaction took, and thus the 
shape of the society which emerged. The essence of this study is an 
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analysis and interpretation of that historical process and ultimately 
its structural outcome in economic, political and social terms at the 
Cape. 
********** 
How does the evidence justify the picture of the 
representative type presented earlier? What evidence supports the 
wider arguments involved, and what conceptual orientations identify 
and locate that evidence? It is analytically convenient to divide 
the argument here into a number of more specific but related 
questions. Nettl's problem of simultaneity precludes any lucid 
description and explanation of the 'seamless' historical web. The 
following factors are therefore treated separately and their inter- 
connections emerge cumulatively, and are highlighted at the end. 
1. What is the relevance of Dutch economic history as back- 
grounJin the formation of the V. O. C.? t 
- 2. How did this affect the associated socio-political structure, 
and the cultural and ideological features of Dutch society and their 
concentration in the organization and ethic of the V. O. C.? 
3. What role did Calvinism play in the ideology of the 
Republic, and, more specifically, what were its implications for 
attitudes and behaviours to 'heathens' and/or people of colour? 
4. What evidence is there about 'colourism' in the Dutch 
Republic? 
5. How did the Dutch come to adopt slavery when the institution 
was long dead in the Netherlands? What were the differences between 
the old and almost timeless features of slavery and the 'new' slave 
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systems brought about in the new colonial situations where the masters 
were in the minority (generally) and not the slaves, and where - 
unlike the Mediterranean tradition -a series of negative stereotypes 
and disadvantaged roles accumulated on top of each other in the 
person and status of the slave? 
The economic history of the Netherlands from the Middle 
Ages through to the late 16th century provided the people of the Low 
Countries with a set of skills and material interests, and the 
organizational capacities which gave them a decisive advantage 
when, first, the centre of European economic life swung away from 
the Mediterranean towards the northwest and when, secondly, the 
political, religious and economic rift with Spain initiated the 
80 Years' War of Independence - 1568/1648 - and necessitated that they 
go it alone. 
8 The technological basis of later Dutch maritime and 
mercantile strength was founded upon the fishing industry which was 
and decisive in the economies of Holland/ Zealand particularly, which it 
8. For much of what follows I am relying mainly on the following: 
P. J. Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands; Jan de Vries: 
The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700; 
Henri Pirenne: Democracy in the Low Countries; J. H. Huizinga: 
Dutch Civilization in the 17th Century; D. C. North and R. P. Thomas: 
The Rise of the Western World; George Masselman: The Cradle of 
Colonialism; Paul Zumthor: Daily Life in Rembrandt's Holland; 
K. H. D. Haley: The Dutch in the Seventeenth Century; 
C. R. Boxer: The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800; C. Ch. Goslinga: 
The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast; Denys Hay: 
Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries; David W. Davies: 
The World of the Elseviers, and A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth 
Century Overseas Trade; John J. Niurray: Amsterdam in the Age of 
Rembrandt; Pieter Geyl: The Netherlands in the 17th Century; 
A.. Keller: Colonization; S. T. Bindoff: The Scheldt Question; 
H. A. L. Fisher: A History of Europe; Violet Barbour: Capitalism 
in Amsterdam in the 17th Century; Albert Hyma: A History of 
the Dutch in the Far East; Henri See: Modern Capitalism; 
A. van Dantzig: Het Nederlandse aandeel in de Slawehandel. 
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dominated from the middle of the 14th century. 
9 The number and 
kind of craft which were used in this industry, and the number of 
people who were involved in its various aspects - catching, salting 
and distributing, etc. - were crucial for later developments. "It 
is no exaggeration to say that the Great Fishery provided the 
experience and the means which later enabled the Dutch to become a 
maritime power of the first magnitude. By trial and error they 
learned the art of seamanship and navigation, experimenting with 
hulls and rigging to build the best vessels for each particular 
purpose". 
10 By 1562 there were at least 700 fishing smacks and 20,000 
men involved in the herring industry, while the merchant fleet was, 
at the same time, about 800-1,000 in strength with some 30,000 
sailors. 
11 By 1609 there were some 60,000 men involved in one way 
or another with fishing and another 10,000 sailing round the world. 
12 
And by the middle of the 17th century, de la Court estimated that 
some 450,000 people were directly and indirectly involved in the 
fishing industry, compared with 200,000 on agriculture and about 
650,000 in other industries, which is remarkable for a population 
of between 1J-2 million. 
13 
The basis of the Dutch navy and merchant fleet established 
in this way enabled them to become, in the course of the 16th century, 
the major European middlemen and transporters. Not only their skills 
9. Blok: op. cit., II, p. 333. 
10. Masselman: Op. cit., P-13- 
11. Goslinga: 0_p-cit., p. 47. This was double the English'figures 
for thgt time. 
12. Ibid., p. 117. 
13. Boxer: Op. cit., p. 48 and pp. 303-4. 
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but also their needs meant that initially the Dutch imported food 
and other goods, the Low Countries produced very little. Thus they 
had to import grain, wood, wine, dyes, coal and industrial materials, 
like metal, wool, hemp, ship-timber and salt for the shipping and 
herring industry. 14 From trading and transporting on their own 
behalf, the ship-merchants were able to expand their activities and 
become the major maritime carriers of goods. They ferried goods 
between the Baltic and Iberian ports, and lived - because they had to 
- as traders. 
15 
This maritime and trading basis to the expanding 
Dutch economy converged with the long history of independent trading 
towns which dotted the Low Countries from deep within the medieval 
14. Masselman: Op. cit., p. 8. See: Op. cit., p. 62; Zumthor: Op. cit., 
p. 277. Items like hemp, tar, pitch, timber, wax and tallow were 
imported from Danzig, Konigsberg and Riga. Many of these items 
were essential for ship-building: it was a business which 
prospered round the Ij at Amsterdam. D. W. Davies: A Primer, p. 9. 
They got grain from the North and salt from the South. 
Masselman: Op. cit., pp. 20-21. They shipped herrings and 
textiles to France and Portugal, from where they got the salt. 
J. G. van Dillen: "Amsterdam's role in Seventeenth Century Dutch 
Politics and its Economic background", p. 134; and they re- 
exported flax, hemp, wax, cloth, cheese and hides. 
Davies: Op. cit., pp. 14-24" 
15. Keller: Op. cit., p. 376; Blok: Op. cit., II, p. 343, makes the 
point that early in the 16th century Netherlands ships and 
sailors were quite used to Spanish and Portuguese ports, a 
point which has relevance later again for the question of the 
possible sources of ideas or images of Black people. Hollanders 
and Zealanders and Frieslanders had signed on Spanish and 
Portuguese ships bound for Africa, Brazil and the East, long 
before the Revolt. Goslinga: Op. cit., pp. 23-24. 
The volume of Dutch shipping in the Baltic steadily increased 
from 1497 to the mid 17th century. In 1497 the record of shipping 
through the Oresund showed that of the 400 ships that passed 
into the Baltic, 280 were Dutch in origin. In mid-1650, of the 
1035 ships that went through, 986 came from the Netherlands. 
Masselman: Op. cit., p. 18 and D. W. Davies: A Primer, p. 9. 
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period, and was aided by the lattice-work of rivers and canals which 
entered the sea in the Netherlands and gave them access to internal 
markets in Europe. 
16 Major rivers - the Scheldt, the Maas and the 
Rhine - drained through the Low Countries and the rural economy was 
deeply implicated in the practice and ethic of trade. "North of the 
Ij, where the dense network of waterways placed almost every village 
in direct communication with the sea, ocean sailing and fishing 
assumed a central role in the rural economy. "17 Most households in 
the country areas divided their time between ".... dairying, peat- 
digging, seafaring, spinning, dike and ditch labour and a wide 
variety of household activities". 
18 
When the 80 Years War began with the abortive uprising in 1568 
against the centralizing and intolerant policies of Philip it was 
soon clear that the economic survival of the Netherlands was at 
stake, especially when the first of their ships were 'arrested' in 
1585 in Portuguese harbours. It became essential that, instead of 
relying on the carriage of goods that were brought to Europe by the 
Iberians, they themselves would have to spread out to the source of 
these riches, particularly after the fall of Antwerp to the Spanish in 
1585.19 Moreover, among the 100 ships arrested that year in Portugal, 
16. See: Op. cit., p. 62. In the 13th century they traded with Germany 
via the Rhine. Earlier still, in the 8th century, "... Frisians 
had gone to London for wool and slaves". Masselman: Op. cit., 
p. 8. On the fortunate conjunction of geography, skills and the 
capacity of a 'progressive sector' to exploit that combination, 
see North and Thomas on the low countries from the piddle Ages. 
North and Thomas: Op. cit., p. 132. 
17. de Vries: Op. cit., p. 68. 
18. Ibid., p. 72. In the 13th century, and into the 15th century, 
Bruges had been the main port till the Zwin silted up. Trading 
fleets from Venice came up to the town. And other centres like 
Ghent, Liege, Ypres and Brussels, as well as towns in Flanders 
and Brabant were crucial in the system of commerce. Blok: Op. cit., 
I., p. 249 and II, p. 328. Also, Pirenne: Op. cit., p. 206. 
19. See next page. 
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were 30 salt carriers, since most salt came from Setubal for the 
herring industry. The Dutch were thus compelled to go elsewhere 
for this vital resource. They turned initially to the Cape Verdes, 
where a Zealand fleet had first called in 1528, from where good 
quality salt was available, and then across the Atlantic to the 
Caribbean and along the Venezuelan coast, especially at Punta de 
Arya. 20 The closure of the Iberian ports moreover meant that the 
bullion and luxury goods which had made their way to the markets and 
trading centres of the Netherlands no longer flowed in. 
21 Yet 
despite the importance of the colonial ventures, neither the slave 
trade which soon became the centre of the W. I. C., nor any other 
19. From this time on the centre of commercial activity and capital 
accumulation shifted north to Amsterdam. By, the 16th century 
Antwerp had taken over from Bruges as the main centre, and the 
Portuguese crown maintained an agency there. It was the main 
central point for the distribution of spices from the East. 
Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, p. 61. Parry: The Age 
of Reconnaissance, p. 47, and E. E. Rich: "Colonial Settlement 
and its Labour Problems", P-331- Venetian galleys had travelled 
up the Scheldt from the 13th century to Antwerp. Often some 
seagoing craft could not get up-stream and their goods were 
transferred to fleets of smaller craft. Bindoff: The Scheldt 
Question, p. 16. 
20. Goslinga: Op. cit., pp. 117 ff. and P-47- 
21. It has been argued that one of the main items which came from 
Seville in Spain in the 16th century was bullion. R. Trevor 
Davis: The Golden Century in Spain, 1501-1621, p. 153. The 
same city was remarkable for its cosmopolitanism and slave and 
free population. Dutch seamen there could not hafte missed 
seeing any of this. R. Pike: "Sevillian society in the sixteenth 
century: Slaves and Freedmen", passim. The role of bullion in 
the Dutch economy was crucial. de la Court wrote that: "The 
inhabitants of Holland can trade in no countries but by carrying 
goods thither, which having sold and turned into money, they 
convert it into other goods they find there, or failing that, 
return this money into Holland by exchange; but if such foreign 
lands have little or no occasion for our goods, but afford rich 
commodities (to us) then is it not self-evident that we cannot 
trade with them to any purpose, unless we carry thither gold and 
silver in coin or in bullion? And since in consequence everyone 
knows that Norway, the East Germany, Smyrna, India, China, etc., 
do afford us infinitely more merchandise than they take of us, we 
cannot trade with them except by gold or silver". Cited in C. H. 
Wilson: "Trade, society and the State", pp. 510-511. 
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imperial activity ever surpassed the Baltic grain trade. More 
capital was employed on that commodity in the mid-17th century in 
the Amsterdam bourse than any other. 
22 
The expansion of economic activity in the colonial and 
slave trade which occurred in the first half of the 17th century was 
aided crucially by the inflow of capital and entrepreneurial skills 
to Amsterdam in particular, following the fall of Antwerp in 1585 
when the centre of commercial and speculative activity shifted from 
there to the United Netherlands. Financiers like Fugger and Weiser 
of Germany, and Gualterotti and Buonvisi of Italy had branches or 
agents in Antwerp, as did bankers and speculators from Florence, 
Genoa and Spain. 
23 Small and medium-sized joint stock companies had 
been formed in Antwerp where foreign capital and local seamanship 
skills combined and set a precedent of operational use in Amsterdam 
later. This in turn generated insurance broking and by 1564 there 
were some 600 people in the insurance business there. 
24 
After the fall of Antwerp, the Protestants were given a 
few years to get out, and they left (as did others) taking capital 
and skills with them to the north. Some 20,000 refugees from the 
south went north: many were merchants, some were Marranos, and there 
22. D. W. Davies: A Primer, Op. cit., pp. 10-11; van Dillen: Op. cit., 
PP"133-4. Violet Barbour puts a figure on it: she estimates 
that 4 of the capital active on the Bourse was in the Baltic 
trade. Barbour: Op. cit., pp. 26-27, and p. 28. In general the 
East India or West India trade was never equal to the Mediterranean 
or Baltic 'mother trade', but it was nonetheless very important. 
K. D. Haley: Op. cit., p. 26, ff. 
23. Pirenne: Op. cit., p. 204. Masselman: Op. cit., p. 19; Blok: 
Op. cit., II, p. 330. Its reputation was such that 5,000 merchants 
were daily at the Bourse. Blok: Ibid., p. 330, and Keller: 0p. 
cit., P-375- 
24. See: Op. cit., p. 31. "A society in which speculation had developed 
is also likely to be characterized by a taste for gambling in all 
its forms .... In the feverish atmosphere of Antwerp in the 
sixteenth century a whole world of promoters of more of less 
chimerical projects appeared - purveyors of advice, men with many irons in the fire, and also inventors and engineers". Ibid., p. 32. 
It was, like Amsterdam later, not without its crooks either. 
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were also exiles from Poland, Germany, Spain, Portugal, France and 
England. 25 But these external factors did not create the commercial, 
financial and maritime strength that had been growing in Holland and 
Zealand. The City of Amsterdam had careful marchant-oligarch rulers 
who were sensitive to the economic needs of the United Provinces. The 
institutions which could attract and regulate the search for profit 
were quickly set up. A Chamber of Insurance was established in 
1598. The V. O. C. was fashioned in 1602 out of the anarchy of 
shipping companies which included the most prominent - De Compagnie 
van Verre (Distant Lands Company). A Bourse was opened in 1608 by 
the Town Council, and its early dealings were in the Town Hall. 
26 
In the following year an exchange bank was opened and in 1614 a 
lending bank was set up. 
27 
These institutions and the finance that kept them going 
and fuelled the economic expansion that rapidly ensued flourished in 
a climate which had for long been hospitable to speculation and 
commercial activity. A tradition of one-off investment ventures - 
known as bodemerii (derived from the English, bottomry) - developed 
25. Barbour: Op. cit., pp. 38-9, and p. 15. Herbert Bloom: The 
Economic Activity of the Jews in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, p. 4. Marranos were Jews who had 
publicly embraced Christianity but who practised Judaism in 
private. Though most people left Antwerp for religious reasons 
there were many businessmen who saw better prospects in the North. 
Goslinga: Op. cit., pp. 26-7. 
26. See: Op. cit., p. 64- 
27. Barbour: Op. cit., p. 17. 
\ 
The exchange bank was the "most 
famous instrument of Amsterdam capitalism". From 708 depositors 
in 1609-11 more than half came from the southern provinces, 
while a third of the wealthiest Amsterdammers were also of 
Southern origin". Ibid., p. 45 and p. 24. See also van Dantzig: 
op. cit., p. 15. 
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into the more extensive joint enterprises (rederi ) which took 
place on the basis of limited liability. Even people of very small 
means could participate in shipping ventures and they became known 
as "ventures on parts". Some 'parts' were as small as 1/192. 
A group of reders (ship-owners, literally) would "... combine for 
a purpose limited as to scope or as to time .... " and they might 
participate in "... building, buying, chartering or freighting a 
ship .... 
(or) 
.... take shares in .... a mill, a train-cookery, a 
lighter, an anchor-smithy, a rope walk, a lime-kiln or a starch- 
factory". 28 When the first ships returned from the East at the 
end of the 16th century and the V. O. C. was formed, Netherlanders must 
have thought that the hitherto deam of limitless riches was coming 
true. Small investors were encouraged to participate in the Company, 
and it was also seen as a national and united front against the 
Iberians. There was a rush of such investors. "Small tradesmen, 
artisans, and men of all walks of life contacted someone who knew a 
director, no matter how tenuous the connection might be. An 
Amsterdam merchant is recorded as having acted for his wife's 
seamstress and laundry woman. "29 
28. Barbour: Op. cit., P-141. All this helped to establish the 
tradition and habit of saving (and gambling) to invest in some 
enterprise or another. Ibid., pp. 28-9. When the Cape burgers 
later repeatedly asked for permission engage in free trade 
along the east coast it was thus quite in line with a strong 
tradition and practice in Durch economic history and behaviour. 
29. Masselman: OP-cit., P. 172. 
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By the middle of the 17th century, the ".... primacy of 
the city (Amsterdam) was threefold: as a shipping centre, as a 
commodity market and as a market for capital . 966"030 The city 
dealt in timber, fisheries, wine, grain, sugar, tobacco, English tin, 
coals, Swedish copper, Spanish wool, Bordeaux wine and even Portuguese 
salt. Foreign governments and princes came to Amsterdam to raise 
loans, and Dutch capital was invested and deployed abroad. The 
merchants and financiers of the City traded in knowledge, provided 
brokerage, credit, insurance and exchange facilities. 
31 
The accumulation of capital and the availability of skills 
meant that the United Netherlands were not entirely without 
industrial output. Ship-building boomed on the banks of the Ij and 
the Zaan. 32 With windmills for power, peat for fuel, inland waterways 
for transport, cheap labour on tap, the industrial production of the 
Republic climbed through the 17th century. It involved textiles, 
woollens, linens, brick-works, lumber-sawing, oil-pressing, paper- 
making and of course the printing industry: the majority of English 
books were printed in the Netherlands in the 17th century; Oxford 
University Press got its oriental type-faces from Holland, and 
thousands of volumes and pamphlets in German, Latin, French, Spanish, 
Hebrew, Syrian, Bohemian, Danish and Dutch flew off the presses. 
33 
30. Barbour: Op. cit., p. 18. "For their shipping, trafficke and 
Commerce by sea I conceave No place in the world comes Near itt, 
there being att once come into the Texel att my being there 26 
shippes, viz From E India 8, From W India 9, and 9 from Guinny 
etts., ". Peter Mundy: The Travels of Peter Mundy, IV, p. 71. He described: "... corne, pitch, tarre, flax, hempe, etts. From 
Dantzicke, Cuningsberg, etts., in the Baltic Sea; Masts, timber, 
Fish, etts., From Norway: From Denmarck, Cattle; 1nd From any 
part off the world besides, either in Europe, Asia, Affricke or America, where any trade is.... with which supplying other Countries they More and More enrich their owns". Ibid., p. 72. 
31. Barbour: OP-cit., p. 21 and PP-88-94- 
32. van Dantzig: Op. cit., p. 16. Spanish, Venetian, English, Danish 
and Swedish governments had ships built there. 
33" De Vries: Op. cit., pp. 240-244; D. W. Davies (Elseviers): Op cit_, 
PP"130-4; Barbour: Op. cit., pp. 60-65; Murray: Op. cit., PP-83-4- 
119 
The centre of the industrial activity was not Amsterdam but Haarlem, 
and Leiden, and the effects and impact of this atmosphere and ethos 
spread out into most areas of the country. The trading and maritime 
activities had, from the 16th century and before, influenced the 
ideology and culture of the entire society. The smallness of the 
country, the relative density of the population and the proximity of 
the towns to the rural areas accentuated this. 
34 I return to this 
question shortly. 
What socio-political structure was associated with, and 
made possible this extraordinary explosion of commercial and economic 
activity? The explanation lies partly in the history of the social 
structure of the Netherlands after the decay of weak old feudal 
relations and partly in the contingent factors forced upon the 
merchant-oligarchs by the war with Spain. The relevance of this 
for the kind of people and the dominant values and assumptions of 
the men who joined and manned the V. O. C. will be apparent. After 
the 13th century, slavery hardly existed in the Low countries, and 
unfree labour was all but gone by the 16th century. 
35 A careful 
sketch of the main features of Dutch rural society in the early 16th 
century has been given by de Vries. They included a substantially 
free and land-holding peasantry; involved in buying and selling 
land or - if not the land - owning the houses which stood on it. 
34" One authority notes that "...... peasants whose land lay near a town were more aware of the advantages of capitalism. Having 
realised that the provisioning of the townspeople depended 
largely upon themselves, they exploited the situation and, as a 
result, there was a great degree of prosperity among them than in more rural provinces". Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 246. The notion 
of an all-pervasive and 'hegemonic' ideology in the Netherlands 
in the 17th century is sustained by all this evidence. 
35" Blok: Op. cit., I, p. 206; Huizinga: OP-cit., p. 17 and p. 207. See also de Vries: Op. cit., pp. 23-26 and pp. 50-55; Pirenne: OP-cit., p. 107. 
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The bulk of the northern districts of Friesland, West Friesland and 
Groningen were enfranchised and seigneuries were non-existent. "In 
a society with a weak privileged class, without feudal tenure, 
without open fields and nucleated villages, any description of 
peasant society must stress individualism rather than a communal 
spirit. The customary portrait of rural society in Europe, showing 
it to be legally divided but socially cohesive, is misleading in many 
instances but is certainly wrong in the northern Netherlands". 
36 
The northern Netherlands (which became the Republic) had 
few noble landholdings; there was no important traditional aristocracy, 
with lateral links to the Church, as elsewhere in Europe. Only in 
Utrecht was there any significant alliance between the 'hoofdelingen' 
(noblemen) and monasteries. 
37 Moreover, the clergy"... as an estate, 
had ceased to exist with the victory of the new faith; in fact, 
Calvinism could not have spread so quickly had the clerical estate 
been more firmly rooted in the first place". 
38 Thus neither the 
Reformation nor the Revolt had any serious opposition from abbeys or 
prelates. The Church in the Netherlands enjoyed nothing like the 
ownership of land that was elsewhere the case. (It owned between 1/5 
and 1/3 of all landed property in Western Europe). 
39 
36. De Vries: Op. cit., p. 55. My emphases, A. L. 
37. Ibid., p. 26 and pp. 38-43" "Feudalism was dead. Noble and 
priest had given way to the urban middle class. A burgher 
aristocracy ruled the cities and the cities ruled the common- 
wealth". Fisher: Op. cit., p. 596. De Vries says that in Holland 
there were only 12 families belonging to the 'accredited' noble 
class. de Vries: Ibid., p. 35. 
38. Huizinga: Op. cit., p. 19. See also D. J. Roorda: "The ruling 
Classes in Holand in the Seventeenth Century", passim. 
39. Albert Hyma: Christianity, Capitalism and Communism, p. 12. 
Sir William Temple, in his Observations Upon the United Provinces 
of the Netherlands wrote: "For whereas in most, if not all other 
parts of Christendom, the clergy composed one of the Three Estates 
of the Country, And thereby shard with the Nobles and Commons in 
the Influence upon the Government; That order never made any part 
of the Estates in Holland, nor had any Vote in their assembly, which 
consisted only of the Robles and the Cities .... ". P-103- 
With this kind of rural background and social structure, 
at the middle point of the 16th century, it is not surprising that the 
distinctly bourgeois and fundamentally urban society which grew up 
in the Netherlands in the period of the revolt was one in which 
individualistic and acquisitive values, rooted in trade and exchange, 
profit and interest rates, dominated. The main events of the Revolt 
are well known; they need only be used here to account for the 
political structure which emerged and which was reflected in the 
organization of the V. O. C. The Revolt had its roots deep in the - 
16th century and had a complex mixture of causes and conditions which 
linked economic grievances to some emergent religious differences and 
political ambitions. Opposition to the centralising policies of Philip, 
resistance to the relentless extraction of revenues from the 
Netherlands for Imperial purposes, the presence of Spanish troops, 
the ugly persecutions of the Inquisition (which had been introduced 
by Charles V in 1522), the infringement of jealously guarded urban 
autonomies and the general disruption and interruption of peaceful 
trade which this all entailed, turned to active revolt in the 1560s. 
It is important to remember that at this time and for long to come 
the vast majority of the people of all the Netherlands were still 
Catholics and that Calvinists were a minority, though a sharp and 
active one. The general support for the revolt, even by Catholics, 
perhaps reflected an increasingly protestant and 'nationalist' 
definition of the situation vis-a-vis Spain. The dramatic events of 
1568-1572, culminated with the capture of Brill by the Sea-Beggars; 
then all the provinces of the Low Countries agreed to resist together 
according to the Pacification of Ghent in 1576. The alliance did not 
hold, and Spanish power was able to detach the Southern provinces from 
the seven northern provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Gelderland, 
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Overijsel, Groningen and Friesland. These latter provinces came 
together in the Union of Utrecht in 1579. It was a cautious, loose, 
defensive military alliance of supposedly independent and autonomous 
States. Each town council sent members to its provincial States to 
represent them, and the Union of Utrecht brought them together in 
the States General. Though initially more of a .... meeting of 
allies rather than a parliamentary assembly.... " its power grew in 
time. 40 Rather, because the contribution of Holland and Zealand to 
Republican revenues was so great, their influence was powerful at 
the centre. The position of Holland in the political economy of the 
Netherlands is worth underlining here if only because Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Delft, Dordrecht, Leyden and the Hague - all major towns - 
were in Holland. 
41 By 1581, through the Act of Abjuration, the 
United Netherlands embarked upon a policy that could not be easily 
reversed, and the war generated its own momentum of hostilities and 
hates. A twelve-year truce from 1609 allowed the Dutch to make fast 
certain gains, though it also revealed deep political differences 
amongst the elite about war and politics and theology and the attitude 
to Spain, which culminated in the execution of the liberal leader 
Oldenbarneveldt and the stiff conservative pronouncements of the 
Synod of Dort. The truce ended in 1621 and the war with the Iberians 
40. Haley: Op. cit., p. 67. On the government and history of this 
aspect of the Netherlands see Blok: Op. cit., III, ch. XII; Pirenne: 
Op. cit., pp. 222-238; Huizinga: Op. cit., p. 28. For a 
contemporary account, see O. F. Mentzel.: A Description ..., I, 
pp"43-50. 
41. The Republic's revenue was raised by quota from each province. 
Amsterdam contributed 58.5% of the total. J. G. van Dillen: 0p. 
cit., p. 141, and Boxer: Op. cit., pp. 13-14. It was at the urging 
of the State of Holland that the V. O. C. was formed from the cut- 
throat competition between at least 10 different Companies 
operating in the East before 1602. The activity and ferocity of 
the competition was fierce, and before the V. O. C. was formed the 
Eastern trade was known as "de wilde vaart". 
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commenced again, fought first in the East Indies and then the West 
Indies, down the African coast and across the Atlantic. All 
means were used: ruthless commercial rivalry, buccaneering, 
piracy and the more conventional methods. Finally, in 1648 the 
war was brought to a formal end by Spain's recognition of Dutch 
independence at the Treaty of Münster in 1648. Four years later 
van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape. 
42 
The institutional structure of the United Netherlands 
remained much the same as laid down in the Union of Utrecht, though 
real political power in the towns, States and the States-General 
stemmed from two related sources. On the one hand there was the 
well-established power, mutually respected autonomy and considerable 
authority of the town councils. Municipal life had been active in 
the Middle Ages and had been related to a thriving commercial 
involvement, and continued to be so in the 17th century. 
43 On the 
other hand, power was, in general, concentrated in the hands of the 
relatively few members of the urban patriciate - the regents or 
oligarchs - who had been and still were dominant in the commercial 
life. Masselman has given a useful account of the history and 
42. Classically, as in the case with most nationalisms, the conflict 
with Spain united temporarily different classes, groups and 
even religions against a common enemy. Many Catholic 
'politiques' were active in Zealand and Holland in the 1560s. 
Also "... the act by which the rebellious provinces abjured 
King Philip II in 1581 alleged no religious reasons or justif- 
ication". J. W. Smit: "The Present position regarding the Revolt 
of the Netherlands", p. 13. Huizinga points out that Alva's 
taxation plans were particularly resented in the North because 
they infringed local communal and fiscal traditions of 
independence and provincial autonomy and authority. See also 
Masselman: Op. cit., passim. Sir William Temple, who was 
British Ambassador to the Hague from 1668-70, gave a generally 
similar - and balanced - explanation of the revolt. Temple: 
Op. cit., pp. 17-18. E. P. Thompson has pointed out how religious 
sentiment and political hostilities can become fused amongst all 
classes in nationalist fervour. See The Making of the English 
Working Class, especially chapter 11. 
43" Blok: Op. cit., I, pp. 216-232; Pirenne: Op. cit., pass ; de 
Vries: Op. cit., pp"25-27. 
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structure of town politics in Amsterdam, with the Vroedschap 
(board of regents) of 36 Burghers running the city, with the right 
to co-opt. And Murray reports Burgomaster Hooft of Amsterdam as 
saying in 1615 that the "... government consisted entirely of 
either merchants or persons who at one time engaged in trade. The 
Vroedschap came from trade and ruled a city dedicated to it". 
44 
Power in Dutch cities, derived from success in, and command over, 
commerce, placed authority "... in the hands of a few people drawn 
from a small group closely knit by intermarriage" and they "... 
constituted a strict oligarchy... ". 
45 These town councils were thus 
the locus of political and economic power. The franchise was 
limited - some councils were self-appointing - but it varied from 
town to town and province to province. 
46 
This cautious confederacy that defined the political 
structure of the United Netherlands and which brought together a 
series of centres of power was a rough model upon which the 1602 
constitution of the V. O. C. was based. 
47 
Run too by an oligarchy - 
and dominated by the province of Holland - it was strict in terms of 
discipline and committed without reservation to the pursuit of profit 
44. Masselman: Op. cit., passim: John H. Murray: Op. cit., p. 45. 
Also Zumthor: 0p. cit., pp. 228-233. And Temple: Op. cit., 
PP-53 ff; Roorda: Op. cit., passim. 
45. Huizinga: Op. cit., pp. 49-52 and pp. 67-72; Zunmthor: Op. cit., 
pp. 232-3" 
46. In Friesland, for example, the system of government was based 
on the voting rights of the farmers who owned land. de Vries: 
Op. cit., p. 26. See also J. G. Renier: The Dutch Nation, p. 17, 
where he describes how early representative forms of govern- 
ment gave way to oligarchies. 
47. Keller: Colonization, p. 391 ff; Leo Fouche: "The Origins 
and Early History of'the Dutch East India Company", pp-447-50- 
Again, Amsterdam subscribed half the initial capital for the 
V. O. C. 
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through trade by the ruthless application of the principle of 
monopoly, despite Grotius' defence of the freedom of the seas. 
48 
In ideological terms the V. O. C. mixed ferocity of principle with 
the pragmatic adoption of tactics designed to achieve its main ends. 
Within its domain no independent entrepreneurial activity was 
permitted apart from the grudging right which was permitted to 
employees to return from the East with some booty in their sea- 
chests. Like the United Netherlands, the V. O. C. was a careful 
hierarchy of power, wealth and status. In the end these rigid 
principles and procedures of mercantilism constricted the emergence 
of a domestic industrial economy, but the accumulation of wealth, 
which was available for loan, was a decisive factor influencing 
the 
industrial development of England. 
49 In short, the V. O. C. was a 
concentrated distillate of some of the harsher and more relentless 
material values of Dutch society: it sought profit, it applied a 
monopoly and it gave no quarter in its pursuit of these ends; The 
men who joined the Company, indeed who were the Company, reflected 
all this. They were in general, ruthless, greedy, usually uncouth 
and rough, yet, strangely, the evidence suggests that a relatively 
high proportion of them were literate. 
What were the features of social structure, culture and 
ideology in the Netherlands in the 17th century that permits that 
generalization? It is important to underline this: for the men who 
went to the Cape came from that society or via that Company, even if 
48. See Boxer: OOp. cit., and especially chapter 4, "Mare Liberum 
and Mare Clausum". 
49. E. J. Hobsbawm: "The Crisis in the Seventeenth Century", pp. 42-7. 
126 
one third of them were from other parts of Protestant Europe. 
The political and social structure, as outlined above, was a 
mixture of horizontal federalism and a highly stratified hierarchy 
both within each Province and the Republic as a whole. Yet 
Dutchmen - and others - aspired to be merchants: . 
"Any man could 
try to enter this class. Any man might, by careful planning, 
audacity, and luck, become one of the greatest merchants to whom the 
highest magisterial offices of the town were available. "50 The 
first and most pervasive factor that needs to be underlined is that 
Dutch society generated and expressed a highly urban-' - and 
necessarily literate - culture. By the 15th century, Holland was 
predominantly urban and so, to a lesser extent, were Zealand and 
Utrecht. 51 By 1662 some 60% of the people of Holland were towns- 
people. 
52 There was great poverty amongst many of the urban 
dwellers, and Leyden textile workers lived in hovels. Child labour 
was exploited in the early 17th century and a limit of 14 hours per 
day was placed on the working hours of children in that town in 1646. 
Against these depressing features of the urban life there must be set 
the remarkable reputation of the Dutch (and Amsterdam in particular) 
for their provision of alms-houses, poorhouses and workhouses, as well as 
orphanages and reception centres for vagabonds and tramps. 
53 
50. Masseln4an: Op. cit., p. 60. Few can have succeeded though, for the 
oligarchies closed in on themselves - yet many no doubt aspired. 
51. Huizinga: Op. cit., P-17- 
52. North and Thomas: Op. cit., p. 105; Haley: Op. cit., p. 49. 
The population of Amsterdam is indicative. It grew from about 
30,000 in 1567 to 100,000 in 1600, to 115,000 in 1630, to 170,000 
in 1652 and reached 200,000 in 1670. Antwerp's population had 
fallen from the high of 100,000 in 1550 to 50,000 in 1600. 
Figures from Zumthor, Barbour, Haley, Geyl, Bloom and D. W. Davies. 
53. Boxer: Op. cit., p. 60 and chapter 3 in general; Zumthor: Op. cit., 
pp. 237 ff; Haley: Op. cit., p. 45. Peter Mundy enthused in 1639 
about the orphanagýeýs, hospitals and social welfare provisions. 
Mundy: Op. cit., IY, P-73- Sir John Evelyn also noted this in 
The Diary of Sir John Evelyn, II, PP-45-6 and I, PP-32-3- He was 
there in 1641- 
The 'swarming proletariat' of the towns and particularly 
the sea-towns had developed no political response to their condition: 
there was remarkably little protest against the conditions that they 
lived in. 
54 
On the contrary, despite the squalor of their lives, 
the trading and material ideology appears to have been pervasive and 
hegemonic. "It is a fact, nevertheless, that numerous witnesses 
hailing from the Catholic countries of Europe were shocked to find 
that greed of gain seemed the prime motive power, not only for the 
leading class, but of the entire community". 
55 The ordinary man was 
said to be "... terribly grasping, and the prospects of immediate 
profit would set an entire working-class district in an uproar of 
excitement. Inn-keepers, coach-men, porters, hawkers, all had a 
single instinct when confronted with an unknown customer - to fleece 
him as thoroughly as possible, without regard for established 
tariffs". 56 The norm of making a profit influenced all classes in 
the society deeply in all forms and particulars. 
One ought not to be surprised that social behaviour in such 
a highly urban society - and one through which there flowed thousands 
of soldiers and sailors - was like this. In the paintings of the 
54. Geyl: Op. cit., I, pp. 163-4; Haley: Op. cit., p. 45; 
O. C. Cox: The Foundations of Capitalism, p. 216. Cox is contemp- 
tuous of the way in which the Dutch proletariat participated in 
the foreign exploitation of other peoples. 
55" Geyl: Op. cit., I, p. 249- 
56. Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 237. Later, similar views were commonly 
expressed about Cape Town burgers. See, for instance, Robert 
Percival: An Account of the Cape of Good Hope. He was also in 
the Netherlands before going to the Cape and thus his comparative 
comments on this point are relevant. 
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Dutch masters there are acres of 'tavern' scenes, and pictures 
depicting 'The Procuress', or the baudy, puking, lecherous, drunken 
and splendidly debauched figures represented by Adriaen Brouwer (or 
Jan Steen's 'The Joyous Return'), which are in stark contrast to 
the stolid, staid and dark figures depicted for example in Rembrandt's 
'Syndics' or his 'Nightwatch'. 
57 Sir William Temple found Dutch 
mariners to be "plain .... rougher people .... surly and 
ill-mannered", 
and though people were frugal and 'passions cooler', "Avarice may be 
expected". There was much drinking. 
58 William Carr, another English 
57. On Brouwer, see G. Knuttel: Adriaen Brouwer. The Collections 
of Rubens and Rembrandt are many. I found the following very 
useful. Rubens: Des Meisters Gemalde; Lawrence Gowring: 
Vermeer; Seymour Slive: Frans Hals; Arthur M. Hind: A Catalogue 
of Rembrandt's Etchings, and Otto Benesch: The Drawings of 
Rembrandt. I am grateful to Richard Verdi who spared time to 
point out some interesting aspects of the Dutch masters, and who 
steered me in the direction of some valuable sources for them. 
58. Temple: Op. cit., pp. 82-90. Renier suggests that there was a 
two-tiered proletariat - the rabble 
('het grauw') which inspired 
everyone with fear and horror, and "... the orderly proletariat, 
the hard-working manual labourer, the farmhand, the man in the 
dockyard, the sailor, the domestic servant, all the people whose 
employment was fairly regular and who shared in the prosperity 
of the country". Renier: Op. cit., pp. 101-2. 
A roughly similar distinction is still made in the North of 
England, for instance, where the aspirant members of the working 
class are referred to as "clean working class". The 
distinction is not so much based on the type of work done, but 
the endorsement of middle-class values and behaviours. 
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observer of the Low countries in the late 17th century , described 
in detail the licensed brothel in Amsterdam he came across - called 
'The Long Seller'. "This exchange is open from six a clock in the 
evening until nine at night; every Whore must pay three stivers at 
the Door for her entrance or admission ..... I have heard some 
(people) plead for toleration (though Ministers preached against it - 
A. L. ) of these wicked Meetings, upon pretext, that when the East- 
India Fleets come home, the seamen are so mad for women that if they 
04. 
had not such Houses to bait in, they would forcetý very Citizens' 
Wives and Daughters .... ". 
59 Whatever may have been the degree of 
commitment to Calvinism and the Reformed Church, the notiont-of a 
puritan, pious and restrained life in which men accumulated their 
wealth in response to some inner calling and devotion to work, and 
lived dry and devout lives makes no sense as a generalization about 
urban Dutch culture and ideology in the 17th century. 
As one might expect in a highly urban society hinging on an 
economy devoted to that kind of trade and exchange, the level of 
literacy was high. In the middle of the 16th century, the Italian 
observer Guicciardini noted that ".... the common people have mostly 
a beginning knowledge of grammar and just about all of them, yes, even 
the farmers and the country folk, know at least reading and writing". 
A century later, the literacy of grooms married in Amsterdam with 
the occupation of"seafarer, born abroad, was 41%; of thoseborn in 
Amsterdam the percentage was 55% and of those born in the smaller 
towns around the percentage was 59%. In all, the percentage of 
59" William Carr: An Accurate Description of the United Netherlands, 
pp. 70-71. He claimed that at that time the V. O. C. alone 
employed about 30,000 men "in constant pay". Ibid., p. 34. 
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literate grooms in Amsterdam in 1630 was 57%, in 1660 it was 64ö 
and in 1680 it was 7p. 
60 
In a society devoted to trade the skills 
of literacy were crucial and the Dutch thus socialized their young 
accordingly. Educational institutions - from infant schools to 
universities or the so-called 'illustrious schools' - were wide- 
spread. There were five universities by the mid-17th century: 
Leiden (1575), Franeker (1585), Groningen (1614), Utrecht (1636) and 
Hardewijk (1648). 
The book and publishing trade flourished, and not simply on 
the export market. The high literacy rate helps to explain the 
volume of chap-books and travel books that were published in Dutch. 
After the Bible, the many travel accounts which were published in 
those days were most popular. 
61 
Printed newsletters - corantos - 
were a feature of the Republic, dating from 1618, and were a major 
means of distributing news. 
62 
People were well informed. 
Visitors, like Sir John Evelyn and Peter Mundy, commented on 
cr, 
the number of paintings and painters, and the common custom of buying 
pictures at fairs. Houses and shops were well decorated with them, 
though the artists did not fare at all well, for there was no court 
or Church which could or would patronize them, and the market was 
glutted. 
63 
60. Zumthor citing Guicciardiniý and de Vries: Op. cit., p. 212. Later 
at the Cape, there is evidence to show that Dutchmen who arrived 
in the 17th century and Germans who filtered into the burger 
population after 1717, were not all illiterate. Many could sign 
their names, and did. See Hoge: Bydraes and Personalia of the 
Germans, passim. The percentage amongst the Germans was probably 
ig er, but an accurate count should be done to establish the point. 
61. van Dantzig: Op. cit., p. 20. Perhaps the most popular was that of 
Ysbrand Bontekoe: Memorable Description of the East India Voyages 
1616-1625. It had 50 editions between 1646 and 1756. Boxer: 0p. 
cit., p. 181. See also D. W. Davies: The World of the Elseviers, passim. 
62. Haley: Op. cit., p. 73; Murray: Op. cit., p. 116. 
63. The Diary of Sir John Evelyn, Op. cit., II, p. 39 and I, p. 29; Peter 
Mundy, Op. cit., IV, p. 70. The latter saw pictures in the shops of 
butchers, bakers, blacksmiths and cobblers. Also Geyl: Op. cit., I, 
p. 223 and Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 195" 
It was from this society (or through it in the case of 
foreigners) and steeped in that extraordinary culture and ideology 
of gain, that the men who joined the V. 0-C. came. Some 3-400 men 
annually went East with the fleets. 
64 
Amsterdam was the major 
centre for the recruitment of employees, whether Dutchmen or 
foreigners. 
65 
There were sometimes problems in getting enough men 
to go East, but this was offset by the wild enthusiasm with which 
some men viewed the prospects of getting East and the competition to 
enlist was stiff. Mentzel described a scene on recruitment day at 
the Fast India House. "I myself have seen men scramble up to the 
window of the second storey, above the door, and wait there, hanging 
on to the iron grating, until the door was open; then immediately 
let go, fall on the heads of the men standing round the door and in 
this way get carried into the (recruiting) house". 
66 
Though Catholics 
were not allowed to join, there were Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians, 
Frenchmen, Irishmen, Scandinavians and Germans in the employ of the 
Company and it kept recruiting agents in Bremen and Hamburg. 
67 
64. Geyl: Op. cit., II, p. 182. During the 17th century, that is. 
According to Boxer, some 578 ships left the Netherlands for the 
East between 1611 and 1651. Boxer: Op. cit., P-314. Nieuwenhuis 
gives a slightly higher annual average of about 30 per annum. 
Rob Nieuwenhuis: Oost-Indishe Spiegel, p. 32. Given a ship's 
complement of about 200 men, something like 115,000 men visited 
the Indies in that 40 year period alone. Even allowing for the 
high mortality rate on board and for men doing second or third 
voyages, the number is impressive. Consider the quite explicit 
reasons for joining the V. O. C. as given by Volkert Evertz who 
had worked as a bookbinder in Amsterdam, and "... had several 
times heard from those who had journeyed to the East Indies and 
were once again come back home, what an excellent land this was 
.... and how also they had brought back a good fistful of money. 
I also became wishful to see these lands; and knowing no other 
means thereto than to abandon my trade (which brought mein little), 
I resolved to take service with the Proprietors of the East India 
Company. To this end I had myself signed on at Amsterdam as a 
Cadet. R. Raven-Hart: Cape Good Hope, It p. 45" 
65" C. R. Boxer: "The Dutch East Indiamen: their Sailors, their 
navigators, and life on Board, 1602-1795", p. 85. 
66. O. F. Mentzel: Life at the Cape, p. 7. 
67. See next page 
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From "all corners of Protestant Germany (came men) eager 
for adventure and gain", and Flemings, Walloons, Scandinavians and 
Germans "swarmed" to Amsterdam in search of fortunes. It was from 
amongst ".. the poorer classes" both urban and rural that men joined 
the V. O. C. hoping to get East, to make their fortunes and return 
home. 
68 
For them, as with the officials, and the Heeren and the 
investors "... the polestar was profit, its lodestone greed". 
69 
Internal corruption bit deeply into the efficiency of the V. O. C., so 
that when finally the Company collapsed the initials were said to 
mean 'vergaan onder corruptie' (perished through corruption). 
70 
Not all recruits however appear to have been anxious to 
get East: and there was an active press-ganging business conducted 
by the zielverkopers, the crimps. 
71 Men were sought in pubs, 
67. Masselman: Op. cit., pp. 243-4; Boxer: Op. cit., pp. 82-9, and 
The Dutch Seaborne Empire, pp-55-6; Geyl: 0p. cit., II, p. 182. 
Not all the men in the Y. O. C. service at the Cape were Calvinists. 
There were various creeds of Protestants and probably a few 
Catholics. Certainly there were Lutherans and sympathisers: 
see B. Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms, passim. The first Jew in 
South Africa was David Heylbron, a German, who was baptized at 
the Cape though he arrived as a soldier in 1671. He was the 
cattle-herd at Hout Bay. He signed his name in Hebrew. 
Hoge: Personalia, P-159- 
68. Geyl: Op. cit., II, p. 182; Vlekke: Op. cit., p. 185 and Boxer, 
Op. cit., pp. 63-4. 
69. J. S. Furnivall: Netherlands India, p. 34. 
70. Ibid., pp. 48-9. 
71. J. De Hullu: "De Matrozen en soldaten op de schepen Der Oost- 
Indische Compagnie", passim. He gives a vivid and detailed 
account of the practice. 
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promised the earth and then compelled to sign over a portion of 
their future wages in return for being found a place on a ship. 
Some men found themselves going East when they'd hoped to travel 
to the West Indies, and youngsters were pressed into service. For 
this reason alone, it is no wonder that desertion rates were high. 
De Hullu estimates that the non-national element constituted about 
a third of the ships' companies. Once sailors and soldiers 
completed their 3 to 5-year contract and returned from the East they 
were reputed often to have immediately squandered their earnings - or 
what was left after the crimps had taken their commission, in a six- 
week orgy of pub crawling: hence the name, 'Lord of Six Weeks'. 
What stories they told can only be imagined, and then with difficulty, 
but presumably their tales fired the imaginations of those who were 
already interested in, or predisposed to go East. And so the flow 
of men turned the wheel of the Y. O. C. 
While outwardly proper and respectable in appearance and 
behaviour, the ruling classes nonetheless promoted their international 
interests - through the W. I. C., the Y. O. C. and a variety of other 
ventures - with systematic dedication and ruthlessness. These 
values and goals were endorsed by both the 'respectable' working 
class and 'het grauw', who saw in the work of the two great Companies 
- whose wealth they aspired to share - the combination of two related 
objectives. The one was the defeat of the Portuguese and Spanish, 
and the other was the victory of Calvinism over the corrupt affluence 
of the Church of Rome, under which they had come to see themselves as 
suffering. The role of the Dutch Reformed Church and Calvinism in 
providing the ideological articulation for certain secular and national 
objectives will be examined shortly. What needs to be stressed here 
is that the representative figure sketched earlier - of a generally 
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uncouth, rough, grasping, materialistic and chauvinistic 
representative employee of the Y. O. C. - was identified later at the 
Cape by many, including Grevenbroek. Not only Dutchmen, but ".... 
all the criminals and rascals who flee into Holland by land, or down 
the Scheldt, the Haas, the Waal, the Rhine, the Canal of Drusus, the 
Ems .... most of these intend to serve under the flag of our Company. 
Their virtue is to triumph over the restraints all other men obey; 
no place is left in their breasts for any honest hope". 
72 Many 
observers at the Cape in the 17th and 18th century identified these 
characteristics in the inhabitants of the town, both Official and 
burger, so that it cannot be said that the general norms and 
behaviours of Y. O. C. Officials and employees (and free burgers who 
were drawn from them in the main) at the Cape were radically different 
from the prevailing patterns outlined here for the urban life of the 
seaports of the Netherlands. 
If robust materialism and roughness, ambition and greed 
emerged from and sustained the socio=economic life and the political 
ambience of the Republic by the time the settlement was established at 
the Cape, what role did Calvinism play in all this and especially in 
the ideology of the people? What, if any, were its implications for 
attitudes and behaviours towards 'heathens' and/or people of colour? 
The point must be dealt with here because it is a common assumption 
of much South African historiography that Calvinism can in some way 
be held causally responsible for many aspects of the attitudes and 
72. J. G. Grevenbroek: "A Short Account of the Cape of Good Hope", p. 237. 
During the first decade at the Cape some of the convictions 
reveal something of the character of the men. Offences included 
insulting and/striking the Commander and/or visiting Captains; 
brawling with knives when drunk; desertion or attempted 
desertion; theft; assisting the 'Hottentots' to steal vegetables; 
blaspheming in public against the Commander's wife and other 
women. See "Abstract of Convictions", Moodie: The Record, I, 
pp. 251-4. 
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behaviours of Dutchmen at the Cape. Some examples will illustrate 
the point, and underline the earlier argument about the hegemony of 
'idealism' in the historiography, from which one is left sometimes with 
the impression of a bleak, gloomy and orderly Dutch society, rigid and 
repressed by the nightmare of Calvinism and devout in most forms and 
particulars. Freda Troup, following Walker, comments: "The basic 
factor in the evolution of the Afrikaner Volk was their deep rooting 
in seventeenth century Calvinism. The original settlers emigrated 
from a Netherlands which had been nourished on this stern doctrine 
for a hundred years". 
73 In his account of later 19th century 
developments, Professor Walker insists that "... starting with an 
endowment of late 17th century Calvinism and brought up for genera- 
tions among slaves or Bushmen and Hottentot serfs and latterly Bantu 
barbarians, the Trekkers held as firmly as any politician in the 
Carolinas that there was a divinely appointed gulf between themselves 
and such as these". 
74 F. A. van Jaarsveld alludes to the heritage 
of the "... Calvinist religious doctrine" as one of the factors in 
the conception and formation of the Afrikaner nation. 
75 Sheila 
Patterson suggests that the doctrine which the Boers took with them 
through the slow trek of the 18th century and beyond was that "... 
of sixteenth century Calvinism .... Chief among these doctrines were 
that of the 'elect' and that of 'predestination ". 
76 And C. F. J. 
Muller opines that inspiration "... of a Calvinistic trust in God" 
influenced Afrikaners to spread Christian civilization in Africa. 
77 
73. Freda Troup: South Africa, p. 50. 
74. Eric Walker: "The Formation of New States", p. 325. 
75. F. A. van Jaarsveld: The Awakening of Afrikaner Nationalism, p. 9. 
76. Sheila Patterson: The Last Trek, P-177- 
77. C. F. J. Muller: "Factors which shaped South African History", p. 424. 
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Spilhaus says that "... the Calvinist best of them trusted in 
Jehovah with all the faith of the Israelites, and many believed that 
the footsteps of the Israelites had preceded them". 
78 L. M. Thompson 
argues that "... primitive Calvinism", expressed in the Heidelburg 
catachism and the decrees of Dort ".. with its emphasis on predest- 
ination ... " were "peculiarly suited to the taste 
of the white 
community ... " which was accustomed from birth to treating non-white 
peoples as slaves or serfs or enemies ... ". 
79 And, as pointed out 
in chapter 1, Nason suggests that the'Calvinistic religion' was of 
crucial causal primacy in the development of Cape 'race relations'. 
80 
Katzen takes a similar view. 
81 Even radical and marxist scholars are 
drawn into the tempting explanatory box. Jordaan talks of the 
trekkers as "... armed with the doctrine of predestination... ", and 
Legassick, stressing the Calvinist "... two-class conception of man... " 
with its roots in its Dutch bourgeois history, suggests that it had 
"... greater inherent tendencies towards rigid racial definitions... ". 
82 
It seems clearly to be the case that this kind of view, and 
the tone with which it is relayed, is one of the many South African 
historical myths. Certainly if one starts one's enquiries in the 
metropolitan Dutch context, there is simply no serious basis for these 
sweeping explanatory positions. Moreover, as will emerge in later chapters, 
78.. M. W. Spilhaus: South Africa in the Making, pp. 91-2. 
79" L. M. Thompson: "The South African Dilemma", p. 187. 
80. P. Mason: Patterns of Dominance, p. 198. 
81. May Katzen: "White Settlers and the Origins of a New 
Society", p. 229. 
82. Kenny Jordaan: "The Origins of the Afrikaners and their 
Language 1652-1720", p. 491, and M. Legassick: "The Frontier 
Tradition ... ", p. 9. 
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there is precious little evidence, from the trekkers in the 18th 
century themselves, that they saw themselves as 'Israelites', or 
that they trusted in Jehovah and were guided in their social and 
economic policies of inclusion and exclusion by the high principles 
of predestination identifying the 'Elect' and damned. Nor is it 
strictly-speaking true that they treated and regarded all 'non- 
whites' as serfs or slaves: they cohabitted with them, slept with 
them, married them, hunted with them, fought side by side on 
commando parties with them, gambled with them and got drunk with them, 
and in general crossed the supposed divided between the Damned and 
the Elect a lot more often than can, generally speaking, have been 
to their ultimate Eternal credit. Moreover the view that Calvinism 
was causally responsible for a variety of Cape developments is never 
supported by an analysis of the mechanism of that process. If it is 
argued that dichotomous Calvinist ideas were widely held in the Dutch 
Republic - which is contested below on other grounds - and then 
exported to the Cape, how did they structure and influence behaviour 
and 'race relations' there? What evidence endorses such a view and 
what socio-ppychological mechani. C transformed such ideas into 
practice? The onus is on those who make the claim to illustrate the 
process. There is however little evidence, and seldom are examples 
given for the 17th and 18th centuries, and one is left largely with 
generalized statements of a speculative kind that the 'negative' 
aspects of Calvinism, its stress on predestination, the idea of the 
elect and its exclusivity "... were all perfectly adapted to the 
interracial situation on the frontier., 
83 But even that kind of 
view becomes untenable if one argues - as has been recently done with 
83. MacCrone: Op. cit., p. 129 and Note 3 on that page. 
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great force - that there was no 'racial' frontier in that sense 
of ingroups and outgroups, as MacCrone's formulation requires. 
On the contrary, the 'frontier' early on "involved inclusion as 
well as exclusion: in whatever capacity, non-whites became parts 
of the total society". 
84 
But here it is necessary to look at the extent and role of 
Calvinism in the United Provinces before the settlement took place. 
Who articulated the Calvinist position? What was it in relation to 
aliens and heathens? Did it influence behaviour in the Netherlands, 
and whose? Was it exclusively a religious and theological phenomenon, 
or did it become deeply implicated in a nationalist definition of the 
situation of the Netherlands vis-a-vis Spain? In any event how 
widespread was it, -and how many Calvinists were there? Huizinga 
writes thus: 
85 
The stranger interested in our history generally has 
the idea that the Republic was a wholly Calvinistic 
state. We ourselves know better than that. The Dutch 
Reformed Church, our particular brand of Calvinism, 
prevailed in the form laid down by the Synod of Dort. 
This does not mean that the country, people and culture 
were completely moulded in the Calvinist stamp .... Before 1600 many a serious man, particularly among the 
educated classes had yet to make a final choice between 
Catholicism and the new Faith ..... Everywhere large 
minorities continued to adhere to Rome, even in Zealand, 
the Protestant stronghold. It is proof positive of the 
lack of proselytizing fervour among the Reformers that 
round the foci of the Revolt - round Alkmaar and Leyden 
- most of the villages remained predominantly Catholic. 
.... The victory of 1618 
(Dort, A. L. ) barely deserves 
the name. For however orthodox the Protestant majority 
had grown since the crisis, it would be untrue to say 
that Dutch life and culture, seen as a whole, was-, 
dominated by the spirit of the Synod of Dort. How 
quickly were the Remonstrants rehabilitated! 
84. Legassick: Op. cit., p. 12. 
85. Huizinga: Op. cit., pp. 48-52. Huizinga elsewhere emphasises the 'bourgeois' conception of life shared by all classes. "The 
Spirit of the Netherlands", p. 112. He means it in its classic 
urban sense. 
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A careful reading of the literature, and the observations 
of contemporaries, reveals a number of closely related features of 
religion and Calvinism in the Netherlands in the 17th century. 
First, it is not clear that even by 1670 a majority of the people 
of the Netherlands were Calvinist. Secondly, there is abundant 
evidence - implicit in some of what has gone before, above, and in 
the art, literature and observations of visitors - that the grim 
injunctions of Dort and the anti-capitalist preaching of the 
ministers were in no way representative of the beliefs or behaviours 
of the mass of the people. Thirdly, Geyl's claim that the Synod of 
Dort had declared the Church to be the community of the elect and 
that Blacks were doomed to slavery, as the sons of Ham, has little 
foundation in the specific formulations of the Dort Synod, or later 
Synods. Fourthly, the most important role of Calvinism in the 
Republic as it emerged in the course of the Revolt was to help in 
the formulation and articulation of a more secular, national 
ideology and crusade against the Iberians and Rome in the global 
struggle for a trading supremacy. It also helped to define more 
sharply the perspective and identity of Dutchmen abroad in that it 
acted to establish a more or less clear consciousness amongst them 
of the ideological, cultural and behavioural differences between 
them, on the one hand, and the 'heathen' peoples they encountered on 
the other hand. Cultural consciousness of that rounded, multi- 
dimensional form, preceded colour consciousness. The evidence which 
supports these propositions is abundant. 
In Holland in 1587 about 9Cjö of the population were Roman 
Catholic, and Geyl says that in the Province only about 50ö of the 
population by mid-17th century "... belonged to the Church which at 
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Dort had purged herself so very completely". 
86 A French official 
declared in 1672 that only a third of the total population were 
Calvinists, that another third were still Catholic and the remainder 
belonged to various Protestant groups. 
87 "A Calvinist surveying society 
during the Years of the Truce could be little satisfied even with 
the literature ..... The Calvinist in the North saw a vigorous and 
colourful society, a surging of desires and opinions, an irresistible 
effervescing of forces which cared neither for election nor for 
predestination... " 
88 
Moreover it was a relatively tolerant society, despite the 
official pronouncements from Dort. Mundy wrote ehthusiastically that 
It.... every one goes to what Church he pleases, there being only 8 
or 9 public churches beesides the English, French, Lutheran, 
Anabaptists, etts., and Jewish Sinagogues .... " in Amsterdam. 
89 
Grotius was an Arminian, Rembrandt a liberal and Vondel became a 
Catholic when he was 54 in 1641.90 And the last major witch trial 
took place in Utrecht in 1595, when that province was the centre of 
strict Calvinism. 
91 
Nonetheless, there were periods when Catholics 
did bear the brunt of harrassment and persecution, particularly at times 
of internal political strife and when their position and faith was seen 
as indicating sympathy with the enemy, Spain. 
92 
86. Renier: Op. cit., p. 80; Geyl: Op. cit., I, p. 210. 
87. Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 89. Boxer reckons that a 'bare majority' of 
the population in 1650 was Protestant. Boxer: OP-cite, p. 140. 
Hyma insists that between 1560 and 1625 barely of the total 
population was Calvinist. A. Hyma: Christianity, Capitalism and 
Calvinism, p. 144. And Blok argues that a strong residual 3 ýo 
of the population of the Netherlands in 1640 were Catholic. 
Blok: Op. cit., IV, p. 124. 
88. Deyl: Op. cit., Ibid., I, p. 64. (My emphasis, A. L. ) 
89. Mundy: Op. cit., IV, p. 86. There were public synagogues for Jews 
in Amsterdam from 1597, though they only got full citizenship in 
1796. Haley: Op. cit., p. 96; Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 90. 
90. Hyena: Op. cit., p. 144: Boxer: Op. cit., p. 128: Geyl: Op. cit., I, p. 211; 
Huizinga: Op. cit., p. 61. 
91. Huizinga: Op. cit., p. 59. 
92. Boxer: Op. cit., p. 59. 
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The high-point of official Dutch Calvinist orthodoxy was 
in 1618-1619, and for some years after, consequent upon the Synod 
of Dort. Its main findings on abstruse theological points are of 
no more relevance to us here than they were to the man in the street. 
But Dutch Calvinism must be seen as an integral part of the history 
and development of the society and its ideology in the process of 
self-definition and conflict with Spain. 
93 
Protestantism had 
first entered the Low Countries by way of the South via France in 
the form of Luteranism in the second decade of the 16th century. It 
achieved a following in Antwerp and other towns and ports. There are 
two contrasting ways in which this support for-the movement may be 
explained. Pirenne says that ".... it triumphed where the worker 
was reduced to a precarious existence, and where his sufferings drove 
him to catch at every novelty. Discontent, the spirit of revolt, and 
the hope of bettering his lot, worked without exception in favour of 
Calvinism". A different view of this te of urban response has been 
offered by E. P. Thompson in his account of the role of non-conformism 
in the English working class. Methodism, like Calvinism in the Dutch 
Republic, offered many things. It offered a community and structure 
of ties for people whom Industrial revolution had uprooted, and gave 
them a place in an otherwise ugly world. In some areas and at some 
times it merged with fierce hostility to Napoleon, the Beast, and in 
the emphasis it placed on the after life, it was "... the chiliasm of 
93. 
11V ---- -, b L' I,, 1-LC; tint -1C J ýJli 1Vuj. k, -P-L -, c%-L-Lbw is as t o11ows: 
R. H. Tawney: Religion and the Rise of Capitalism; A. Fanfani: 
Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism; H. M. Robertson: 
Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism; Ernst Troeltsch: 
The Social Teaching of the Churches. A most useful single short 
account of this debate and the main issues is in Hyma: Op. cit., 
and his lucid and tough historical argument in "Oalvinism and 
Capitalism in the Netherlands, 1555-1799", Journal of Modern 
History, X, No 3, September, 1938" 
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The relationship of Calvinism and Protestantism in general to 
capitalism, historically, as part of the post-Weber debate is 
not a concern here. The main literature around Weber's 
Dr-+--a--a ýiý: ý --a ; wem 0-4-44. -r fl--44-14-- '- 
the defeated and the hopeless". This latter point is strengthened 
by the observation that chiliasm has often accompanied 'revolutionary 
outbursts", and in its 'popular rhetoric', Dissent had two main 
enemies - Sin and the Pope. Though time and place are different, 
the central features of Calvinism and Methodism in the two countries 
seem to have enough in common to treat Thompson's explanation as 
relevant (and richer) for both. Moreover the impermanence - and 
hence the subsequent gradual growth of Calvinism in the Netherlands, 
by means of a surging forward and then a falling back - makes sense 
of the apparently strong Calvinist moments, followed by a quiet 
settling back of people into their lives, dominated by trade and 
imperial activities. 
94 The blending of Calvinism with the anti- 
Iberian crusade also acted, moreover, to contain its radical potential. 
While the regents and merchants of the late 16th century 
were not committed to the new faith, they had resented the Spanish 
interference with, and limitations on, their autonomy in the towns. 
95 
Not being fanatical Calvinists (the Brussels 'rising' of 1576 had 
been headed by the 'leading classes', who were largely Catholic) 
there can be little substance to the argument that religious differences 
94. Pirenne: Op. cit., pp. 225-6, and E. P. Thompson: Op. cit., pp. 416-440. 
Protestantism had come to the Low countries a half century later 
than in England. It began from below, was forced on the central 
government and then emerged in a presbyterian not episcopalian 
form of organization. For a useful discussion, see I. Schoffer: 
"Protestantism in Flux during the Revolt in the Netherlands", 
pp. 67-8. 
95. Haley: Op. cit., p. 91; Boxer: Op. cit., p. 125 ff, and 
Geyl: "The Sixteenth Century Split of the Netherlands and 
Modern Dutch and Belgian Historians", passim. The latter is a 
crisp statement of Geyl's contraversial views on the Revolt and 
the causes of its result. Also, J. W. Smit: "The present position 
Regarding the Revolt of the Netherlands", passim. He deals with 
Calvinism and the middle class. 
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were the cause and central feature of the rift with Spain. There 
was, in the early 17th century, much tension between regents and 
merchants (many of whom were still Catholic), and the Calvinist 
leaders who were puritanical, and hostile to the accumulation of 
wealth, the charging of high interest rates and acquisitive 
mercantile norms in general. 
96 Yet in the early stages of the Revolt 
one must perhaps conceive of this group hesitating between chosing 
for the Beggars (whose Calvinist fanaticism they feared and 
repudiated) and hence against Spain; or for Spain (and hence 
'reactionary' Catholicism, the Inquisition, political centralization 
and the gnawing away at Netherlands wealth), and against the Beggars. 
"Oh, you Spaniards, you Spaniards, you will make us all Beggars", 
cried a Dutch Catholic priest. 
97 
The generally depressed urban conditions of the 1560s are 
the background to the appeal of the Calvinist preachers and hence the 
initial urban phases and bases of the Revolt, symbolized perhaps in 
the Breaking of the Images in 1566. "Poverty, unemployment, inflation, 
taxes, corruption, all seemed to have something to do with the clergy 
and the church". 
98 This is a phenomenon not uncommon in the 
psychology and sociology of violent mass movements, where one 
particular outstanding symbol is attacked. 
99 The Sea-Beggars who 
96. Hyma: Op. cit., passim: C. H. Wilson: Op. cit., PP. 488-490. 
97" Goslinga: Op. cit., p. 6. Protestantism in general gave an 
edge to nationalism in that it denied the authority of Rome. 
R. H. Bainton: "Changing Ideas and Ideals in the Sixteenth 
Century", passim. 
98. I. Schoffer: Op. cit., p. 70. His analysis is sensitive. "The 
numbers of riots increased, mobs freed heretics out of prisons 
and even snatched them from the hands of the hangman, images in 
churches and chapels were besmirched and mutilated". Ibid., p. 71. 
99. The literature on these questions is usefully surveyed by 
Henry Bienen: Violence and Social Change, passim. 
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took Brill in 1572 and whose followers rampaged in the years there- 
after were no more representative than the middle and upper strata 
of Dutch society in the North which did not go along with the 
Beggars' bitter intolerance. Indeed there were towns in the North, 
like Amsterdam and Haarlem, which became refuges for Catholics 
fleeing from the Beggars, and it is Geyl's view that 'minority 
dictatorships' were at first forced upon Holland and Zealand towns 
in the 1570s. 100 With the outcome of the Revolt in doubt for at 
least 20 years, one must assume that shrewd merchants, their liveli- 
hood dependant upon trade and commerce, weighed their outward, overt 
and expedient support for the initially extreme Calvinist authorities 
against a concern for peach which was the primary condition for the 
pursuit of their interests. 
101 
But by the end of the 16th century the 'national' dimension 
of the revolt rubbed the edge off its Calvinist definition. Dutch 
ships had begun to challenge the Portuguese in West Africa and the 
East, and they were active in the Mediterranean. As the economic, 
political and religious dimensions of the conflict between the 
Netherlands and the Iberians overlapped, the different foci of the 
revolt complemented each other and diluted the specifically Calvinist 
aspect of it. 
101a 
Within the Church - though not everywhere in the 
society - the Calvinists had the advantages of being organized and 
disciplined, and all the short-term benefits of 'vanguardism' in 
100. P. Geyl: "The Sixteenth Century Split ... ", p. 10 and "Nr Carr's 
Theory of History - the Protestantization of the Northern 
Netherlands", PP. 34-7. 
101. I. Schoffer: Op. cit., pp. 74-6. 
101a. J. W. Smit suggests persuasively that the Revolt should be seen not 
as a bloc, but that there "... were a number of revolts, repres- 
enting the interests and the ideals of various social, economic 
and ideological groups: revolts which sometimes run parallel, 
sometimes conflict with one another, and at other times coalesce 
into a single movement. " J. W. Smit: "The'Present Position 
Regarding the Revolt of the Netherlands", p. 28. 
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politics accrued to them. But they did not dominate or define the 
contours of social life or determine the conditions of economic 
activity. As we shall see, not only did they lose touch with the 
cultural and ideological centres of gravity of Dutch life, but 
there also were not very many Calvinist ministers. There had only 
been two in Amsterdam in 1578; there were six in 1600 and 14 in 
1622.102 "In 1593 a commission, appointed by the States of Utrecht 
..... made a tour of the province, questioning the newly installed 
ministers as well as former priests. Their report gives a vivid 
picture of the motley and sometimes extraordinary conditions 
prevailing. In the large majority of villages the old priests were 
still functioning. Many .... declared their willingness to comply; 
but some were still obviously hankering after the accustomed usage; 
others had come over part of the way, but had failed, whether 
through ignorance or through obstinacy, on some particular point". 
1O3 
The colonial question became mixed up in the debate too: there were 
those who favoured the Truce because it would be good for trade and 
commerce and there were those who saw such a view as constituting 
a treasonable compromise with Spain and Catholicism. During the Truce, 
the religious and political disputes - between predestination and 
war, on the one hand, and less dogmatism and peace on the other hand - 
were thrashed out amongst the politicians and the clerical elites. 
And though the orthodoxy - the Contra-Remonstrants - triumphed at 
102. Haley: Op. cit., p. 91. 
103. Geyl: "The Sixteenth Century Split .... ", p. 39. Boxer comments that "... many of the wealthy burghers who elected town councillors 
conformed to the new state of things lest worse befall". 
Boxer: Op. cit., p. 9. Most Calvinist. - ministers were from lower 
middle-class and working class origins, puritan in outlook and 
hostile to the materialism of the merchants. Ibid., pp. 126-7. 
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Dort in 1618/19, it was a Pyrrhic victory: it did not affect the 
commercial policy or the cultural and ideological tone of the society. 
Apart from the Divines, the general calibre and intellectual level of 
the predikanten was low; moreover, it is reckoned that there were 
fewer than 2,000 in all over the period 1600-1800, while only 1,000 
served abroad, and many returned home again after a few years. 
104 
"Calvinism had to combat a native and strongly humanistic 
movement, critical of Roman sacramentalism, hostile to dogmatic 
confessionalism, distrustful of any binding authority in the church 
save that of the bible, evangelical and tolerant". 
105 Not only did 
it have to combat that tradition in religious matters, but it also 
was up against the full momentum of the bustle and drive of a 
commercially-oriented society, deeply implicated in trade and trans- 
actions of money, with a keen eye for the profit margin which had 
characterized and defined Dutch bourgeois society and urban life, and 
had done for centuries. The explosive maritime thrust of the 
Netherlands in the 16th and 17th centuries added to that. So the 
Calvinist divines and predikanten became more and more cut off from 
the tone and drive of social, political and economic life. In the 
1570s the Synod of South Holland had cautioned against permitting a 
banker to partake of the Holy Supper; theological faculties at 
104. Boxer: Op. cit., pp. 128-9; Zumthor: Op. cit., P-85- 
105. D. Nobbs: Theocracy and Toleration, p. x. In this and in what 
follows on religion in general and Dort in particular, I am 
relying for general background on A. W. Harrison: The Beginnings 
of Arminianism; G. Brandt: The History of The Reformation; 
R. N. Tyacke: Arminianism in England in Religion and Politics. 
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Utrecht advised an Enkhuizen Church not to allow a widow to become 
a member because she owned shares in a 'Lombard's bank'. Yet by 
the 1650s the North Holland Synod gave permission for a 'loan' bank 
clerk to attend communion. So things were changing. At Dort, the 
Revd. Udemans - the Zealand delegate - denounced usury to be the 
"..... filthy and dishonest profit that a person obtained by lending 
his own money or goods against the law of love and equity". And 
while the predikanten thundered against dancing, long hair for men, 
tobacco, coffee, taking walks or doing business on Sundays and a 
host of activities which were central to the operation of capitalism 
- charging high interest rates, the accumulation of capital through 
and for speculative ventures, etc. - the people went on very much in 
their accustomed ways. English puritans were ".... sometimes 
scandalized by the lax observance of the Sabbath that they found in 
Dutch cities ..... 
(where) 
.... many shops were open, markets held 
and ships unloaded and loaded .... ". 
106 Mundy noted that there were 
few holidays kept, ".... Christmas, Easter, Whitsontide and Sondaies 
excepted; the latter butt badly kept 0.. "0107 
Can this be the bleak Calvinism with its grim implications 
for social relations that emerges when looked at from the dominant 
perspective in the historiography on South Africa? It seems that 
one is bound to fail if one tries to read back into Dutch culture and 
ideology the doctrines of Dort. The evidence of a bustling, active, 
106. Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 85; Hyma: "Calvinism and Christianity ... ", 
P"157 and passim; Wilson: Op. cit., p. 488, ff; Haley: Op. cit., p. 91. 
107. Mundy: Op. cit., IV, p. 68. 
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mercantile society, and its associated culture and ideology is more 
persuasive. Artistic, literary, commercial and everyday life - 
though of course it had its religious dimensions - were imbued by 
forces "... which worked to a large extent independently of, and 
indeed hostile to, that religious regime which, nevertheless, in 
1618-19 obtained in Holland". 
108 And Schoffer's conclusion about the 
relationship of orthodox Calvinism to the culture of the society 
seems worth citing in full: 
109 
The Calvinised Church seemed to be settling on too 
small a foundation to become a really representative 
Church of the whole community of the Republic. The 
original roots of humanism, from which Calvinism too 
had drawn its sap, had dried up. Contacts with the 
educated governing classes withered away. When the 
forces of nationalism, of the 'scientific revolution' 
and finally the Enlightenment began to work in the 
Republic, the Church (generally speaking) lived outside 
of the mainstream of culture. A dreary stream of 
internal squabbles about Bible texts, about the Sabbath, 
about Supralapsarianism spoilt the tone of the Church. 
And so the official Protestant Church, while finally 
winning the majority of the population, did not succeed 
in becoming the cultural centre of the Dutch Golden Age. 
In the hard struggle of revolt and expansion the Church 
seemed to have spilt its best forces. 
Against this background of a culture in which profit and 
successful trade were pervasive norms, in which literacy was wide- 
spread, in which - despite monogamous marriage, the nuclear family and 
formal worship - the seaports were filled with rough and raucous men, 
in which the pursuit of all kinds of temporal pleasures was widespread 
(if formally frowned upon), in which a remarkable artistic school 
flourished, and in which men sought advancement and prosperity by hook 
108. Geyl: The Netherlands, I, p. 63- 
109. I. Schoffer: Omit., pp. 82-3. My emphases, A. L. In some 
respects this is comparable to the history of the D. R. C. in 
South Africa during the 20th century. 
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or by crook - at home and abroad - no conception of a clanking, 
iron-clad Calvinism structuring behaviour and attitudes can be 
sustained. This being so, the influence of the 'stern doctrine', 
or "seventeenth century Calvinism", and the rest, must be called 
seriously into question. In later chapters, much more immediate, 
direct and certainly more mundane factors are pointed to as being 
more plausible in explaining some of the developments at the Cape: 
there is no need to point back to 16th and 17th century theology 
and religion in the Netherlands to find some fatal causal flaw in 
the chain which ended up with the emergence of narrow, exclusive 
social and economic policies at the Cape. 
110 
But if the cultural and social life of the Netherlands 
at the time when the V. O. C. rose to power and settled at the Cape was 
not one which nourished in theory, or institutionalized in practice, 
the 'stern' doctrines of Calvinism, what was decided at Dort? And 
what had been decided particularly in respect of 'heathens' and their 
relationship to the Church? It is not necessary to outline here the 
whole complex of issues and politicking that culminated in Dort. It 
is sufficient to note the context. The two primary antagonists in the 
long debate that had preceded the Synod were Arminius, the 'liberal', 
and Gomarus, the 'dogmatist'. Questions relating to the Church/state 
relationships and the question of the 'Elect' and 'damned' stemmed 
from and gave sharpness to the disputes amongst their followers which 
spilled over into wider commercial, diplomatic and political questions, 
which ended not only with the victory of the orthodox but also the 
110. A recent study on the rise of Afrikanerdom locates the Calvinist 
definition of the political and 'racial' situation (stemming 
largely from Paul Kruger it seems) in the second half of the 
19th century. See Dunbar T. Moodie: The Rise of Afrikanerdom, 
chapters I and II especially. 
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execution of Oldenbarneveldt. Arminius argued for toleration, that 
other churches should be allowed, and that the merciless line on 
predestination should be moderated. Gomarus had insisted on the 
total autonomy of the Church and intoned an aweful interpretation 
of predestination. "Gomarus was the only person who had the courage 
to assert the extreme doctrine that God had chosen certain individuals 
for eternal life, and decreed eternal death for others even before 
the Fall of Man". 
ill The followers of Arminius (who had died in 
1609) were trounced and the Synod found in favour of the position 
and line of the Contra-Remonstrants. The 105 deputies, ministers, 
elders, professors and theologians from abroad - who conducted their 
discussion in Latin - declared that even ".... if the reprobate 
should have truly performed all the works of the saints, nothing can 
help towards their salvation; that by the same doctrine it is 
taught by God, by the single and mere pleasure of his Will, without 
any respect or regard to sin, has predestined and created for eternal 
condemnation the majority of mankind.... ". 
112 
Now Geyl has declared that "The Synod of Dort had made the 
Church, the Community of the elect. The blacks, the sons of Ham, 
doomed to slavery, born in heathendom, lacked all marks of election 
and it was not allowed - this had been explicitly laid down by the 
Synod - to baptize them without special guarantees". 
113 Apart from 
the fact that Geyl is wrong about Dort, the kind of view he expresses 
with such force and conviction has found its way into many inter- 
pretations of South African history in the 17th and 18th centuries - 
particularly in respect of the origins and growth of 'colourism' and 
111. Harrison: Op. cit., p. 342. My emphasis, A. L. 
112. Ibid., PP"375-6. 
113. P. Geyl: The Netherlands, II, p. 188. 
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the principles of exclusion and inclusion. It is part of that 
'idealist' interpretation of historical process and the shaping of 
structures which has been mentioned above. 
114 
But the question of 'Ham' and people of colour did not 
crop up at Dort at all in the way that he implies. 
115 
Moreover, when 
taken with other evidence about general attitudes to alien peoples 
and heathen cultures in the wider world in the Netherlands and else- 
where, the question seems not to have been one concerning either the 
origins of people of colour, or any implied prescriptions for their 
status, but rather more practical questions about the relationship of 
'heathens' to the Church and the obligations of Churchmen towards 
them. It was their alleged heathendom which was at issue, not their 
colour. The manner in which the question was raised at Dort confirms 
this: it was about evangelism, and, crucially, the issue of baptism. 
Two preliminary points need be made: first, the pronouncements of 
Dort were to be binding on predikanten at home and abroad, and they 
were referred to later for authoritative interpretation. Secondly, 
the process whereby, in various colonial situations, the practice 
drifted away from the central metropolitan line -a process which is 
termed 'colonial drift' in a later chapter - is what has to be 
explained in and for each colonial context. 
At the 17th session of the Great Synod, on the 30th 
November, 1618, the delegates of North Holland ".... proposed another 
114. See also F. A. van Jaarsveld: The Afrikaner Interpretation of South 
African History, p. 9 and passim; P. L. van den Berghe is quite 
explicit: "Africans, so the argument runs, are descendants from 
Ham, who was cursed by Noah, and are destined by God to be 
servants of servants, hewers of wood and drawers of water". 
South Africa. A Study in Conflict, p. 15. It is not clear from 
the context whose argument it was, nor when or where it was used, by whom and in relation to whom. I return to this question again in chapters VII and VIII, in the Cape context. 
115. See next page. 
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question about the children of the Indians (the general term to 
refer to indigenous peoples of the Indies and elsewhere), praying a 
speedy Answer because the ships bound to the East-Indies were just 
ready to sail with the first fair wind. The Question was: 'Whether 
Children who were born of Heathen parents, taken into Christian 
families for Servants might be admitted to Baptism, in case those who 
brought them thither should promise to see them educated in the 
Christian Religion? "'. 
116 The discussion rambled on over a few 
sessions - but was secondary 
(and probably distracting) to the main 
issues which the Synod was thrashing out. There were some precedents 
which the Synod could refer to. Between 1580 and 1620, for instance, 
the general line of various regional synods had been this: provided 
they were not ".... the children of Jews, Turks, etc.... ", 'heathens', 
'gypsies', or the children of 'goddelose' (without god, but in this 
context meaning more without a God) parents, should be baptised, 
providing the parents (if Christian) or the guardians promised to 
bring them up in a Christian manner. There was no sustained linking 
or reference to either Ham or 'zwarte' (Blacks). 
117 Moreover, it is 
the view of an authority on this question that though the 'myth of 
115. In much of what follows I am relying on the views of scholars who 
have devoted careful attention to these and related questions 
though not coming at the problems from the angle adopted in this 
study. I am particularly grateful to Alistair Duke of Southampton 
University who provided me with useful advice and suggested some 
other people who might help. He referred me also to J. Heitsma 
and S. D. van Veen (eds. ): Acta der Provinciale en partikuliere 
synoden. Other sympathetic advice and assistance was given by 
Dr W. Balke of Bodegraven, Dr Johannes Postma of Mankato State 
College and Dr J. M. van der Linde of the Rijksuniversiteit Te 
Utrecht. Also, the invaluable Brandt: The History of the 
Reformation and C. Spoelstra: Bouwstoffen .... Op. cit., passim. 
116. Brandt: Op. cit., III, p. 34. 
117. This is a distillation from the Synods of South Holland, 
Hardewijk and Zealand. 
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Ham' (as he calls it) was known, it was neither articulated in any 
systematic fashion nor rationalised. Moreover, it is his view that 
there were too many good theologians and professorial Divines at 
Dort for them to cling to such a myth. And they didn't need it 
anyway. In the 17th century, the 'myth' was not at all strong or 
persuasive, though it emerged in the 18th century more forcefully 
in the colonies, and apparently in Surinam especially. Since the 
question is linked to 'colourism'i, it will be discussed again shortly. 
118 
As the discussion at Dort proceeded, additional issues were 
fed into the debate. What of children who were slaves? Or the 
children of slaves? There was a majority view - never voted on, it 
turns out - that such children ought not to be baptized however they 
had been taken, in war or otherwise. But in the end, a formal, 
compromise7solution was agreed and the position established at Dort 
became definitive. It was later quoted at length to Ds. Overney at 
the Cape by the Amsterdam classis, when he had sought guidance on a 
related point. The resolution was as follows: 
119 
In this session there was read out aloud the answers of 
both foreign and home (Inlandse) Theologians to the 
written questions posed about the baptism of the children 
of Heathens; and having heard all the advice it was 
unanimously decreed: that those who have reached an age 
and are able to comprehend instruction, should not be 
admitted to Holy Baptism unless they have before been 
instructed somewhat in the fundamentals of the Christian 
religion, profess their belief and are able to give some 
118. Personal communication from Dr van der Linde via Dr Balke. 
119. C. Spoelstra: Op. cit., Part 2, pp. 9-10, Document 169. My emphases, 
A. L. In none of the historical literature on South Africa have 
I seen this text quoted in English, or fully or accurately 
summarised. I am indebted to Vernie February (and he to his 
collection of dictionaries) who helped me to wrestle with the 
17th century Dutch and render this in fair English. 
154 
account thereof, desire baptism themselves, with 
reliable witnesses present, who promise to instruct them 
further in the Christian religion. Those who are now 
baptized ought to enjoy the self same right of freedom 
as other Christians and ought not to be handed over to the 
power of the Heathens, either through sale or alienation 
from the Christian masters or the Hon. Gentlemen (Heeren 
van de Compagnie). 
Of the children of the Heathens also, who, on account of 
their youth or their inability to understand the language 
couldn't be instructed by the Christians, it is also 
judged by a majority of votes that they ought not to be 
baptized until they reach those years at which they are 
capable of being instructed in the first principles of the 
Christian religion and can comprehend these, and until 
this really happened. Also that reliable witnesses should 
diligently promise that they would instruct these more 
fully and deeply in the Christian belief, and will not 
permit them, in so far as this is possible to them, to be 
once more estranged from the family or community of 
Christians. 
Three points emerge decisively from all this. First, the 
deceptive formulation in much secondary literature is not supported 
by the specific content, meanings or intent of the Dort decision. 
Nowhere there are 'the children of Ham' mentioned in specific or even 
implied terms anyway. Secondly, with this official position in the 
metropolitan Church clearly stated, it provides the base and starting 
point for the later examination of the way in which practice came to 
veer away from the initial principle, and in so doing shifts the 
locus for, and explanation of local deviations in the material and 
ideal conditions prevailing at the Cape or in other colonial 
situations. And thirdly, there are only the most speculative of 
grounds for arguing that the Calvinist orthodoxy at Dort was causally 
responsible for subsequent attitudes and/or behaviours at the Cape, 
though much later there may be grounds for arguing that aspects of the 
Calvinist vision were re-interpreted as a post-hoc legitimating 
ideology. But there is little evidence - even later at the Cape - 
that either the 'Ham ideology' or any other aspects of the Dort 
orthodoxy were actually used to shape or enjoin policies of exclusion, 
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as opposed to inclusion, though later justifications may have emerged. 
Finally, before turning to look at the possible sources for, 
and actual perceptions of, alien cultures and colours in the Dutch 
Republic before systematic contact was established at the Cape, it 
is worth making a few comparative points which qualify and broaden 
the discussion thus far. As a perspective, justificatory or explan- 
atory set of ideas, the 'children of Ham' argument was a very weak 
one in the Dutch experience in the 16th and 17th centuries and did 
not emerge decisively in any way whatsoever within the 17th century 
Calvinist orthodoxy. As will shortly be shown it did not figure 
either in any serious way in the experience of either the English or 
Iberians, and had virtually no implied prescriptions for behaviour 
or social relations where it did emerge. The travel literature, as 
will be argued next, rarely explained the differences which were 
observed in Biblical or scriptural or theological terms, though there 
were a few exceptions. Jan Heinz Jahn refers to a Dutch theologian 
whose work, Patriarchengeschichte, was published between 1667-71. 
The theologian, Johan Heinrich Heidegger wrote: "At the moment Noah 
pronounced his curse Canaan's hair became little coils and his face 
became completely black". As a result, Heidegger concluded, the 
Negro was the son of Canaan and was "... doomed forever to remain 
in servitude". 
120 Later, in the middle of the 18th century a 
120. Jan Heinz Jahn: Wir Nannten Sie Wilde, p. 8. This had been 
the view of George Best, the Englishman, in 1578. "God would 
a sonne should bee borne whose name was Chus, who not only it 
selfe, but all his posteritie after him should be blacke and 
lothsome, that it might remaine a spectacle of disobedience 
to all the world. And of this blacke and cursed Chus came all 
the blacke Moores which are in Africa .... being perhaps a 
cursed, dry, sandy and unfruitful ground, fit for such a 
generation to inhabite in". G. Best: Discourse in R. Hakluyt: 
The Principal Navigations, Vol. III, pp. 262-4. 
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Brazilian slave-owner defended slavery on the following grounds" 
"For we are whites descended from Adam, and the Negroes are descended 
from Cain who was black, and who died cursed by God himself, as the 
Scripture relates". This view was received in amazement by a 
lawyer from Lisbon who heard it, and who disputed the point. 
121 The 
theological or religious or scriptural basis for behaviours and 
beliefs, as well as the justification for maintaining slavery were 
both unnecessary in the 17th and 18th centuries and also very rarely 
used. And even later, even amongst the pro-slavers, at the height 
of the English abolitionist debate, the view' that Blacks were ".... a 
distinct, inferior species were shared by virtually none". 
122 Later, 
one American certainly didn't take the 'Ham argument' seriously either, 
saying: "I doubt it in the first place, because Ham's mother and 
father were both white folks. And I doubt it in the second place 
because I don't believe God would a sprung such a joke as that on the 
community". 
123 f 
Whatever the wider European theories and views on the matter, 
and whatever the subsequent terms of the slavery and anti-slavery 
debate, one thing seems clear: there was not, within the formulations 
or preoccupations of Dutch Calvinism in the 16th and 17th century, the 
ideological injunctions, explanatory of normative categories, or 
justificatory propositions for either regarding or treating people of 
colour, qua their colour, as inferior or as legitimate candidates for 
121. The details are in Boxer: Race Relations in the Portuguese 
Colonial Empire, pp-104 ff. There is need of a similar kind of 
work on the Dutch empire. 
122. A. J. Barker: British Attitudes to the Negro in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries, p. 146. Barker's tight survey of the 
literature and his argument drives rather a large hole through 
aspects of Walvin's stimulating arguments. See James Walvin: 
The Black Presence and B1-ck and White.. 
123. Cited in C. Duncan Rice: The Rise and Fall of Black Slavery, p. 14. 
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slavery. If and when those developments occurred they emerged in 
the context of the particular structure of economic, political and 
social relations in the specific colonial situations, and within the 
international context of slavery and the slave-trade into which the 
Dutch expanded, as they did in respect of cloves and spices. That 
last question is dealt with more fully shortly. 
It has been argued thus far that the immediate and rich 
urban and commercial political economy of the Netherlands gave rise 
to and sustained a bustling and secular cultural life and an ideology 
in which the pursuit of trade and profit were paramount. Also, it 
has been argued above that not only is there much doubt about the 
degree to which the Netherlands of the 17th century were saturated 
in the grim doctrines of Calvinism, but that even its official 
doctrines - stemming from Dort - had few explicit or implicit injunctions 
for policy in respect of the treatment of people of colour, though it 
was concerned with 'heathens', and the question of their admission 
to the Church. The fact that, in practice, most 'heathens' were 
people of colour is not particularly relevant. In the 16th and 17th 
centuries the fatal identification of colour with slavery and with 
heathendom had not yet taken root, and even later, at the peak of 
slavery, it was the exception to find (in English thought and 
literature, at least) it justified in terms of some inherent immutable 
inferiority or difference of people of colour. 
124 It is in the light 
of these antecedent characteristics of Dutch culture and ideology that 
124. Barker: Op. cit., passim; and also the superb accounts by 
D. B. Davis: The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, passim; 
and Winthrop Jordan: White over Black, passim. My argument 
opposes Jordan on this point. 
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the interaction at the Cape later will be analyzed. The explanation 
" 
for developments there must be offered in terms that metropolitan 
background and the constraints and opportunities at the Cape, against 
which and in terms of which the goals, norms and emergent interests 
of the settlers and the officials were pursued, and in terms of the 
contrasts and discontinuities between these and the political 
economies of the Khoisan and their cultures and normative universes, 
which are examined in the next chapter. 
Before proceeding to look at that, two final questions 
remain. First, what might have been the kinds of images and 
perceptions which a representative Dutchman had of alien cultures 
and colours in the wider world during the first half of the 17th 
century? Ideas and images filtered through from the Iberians and 
the English. Moreover, Dutchmen themselves were going south down 
the African coast, at first on the ships of other nations and then 
on their own. Diaries and journals were kept, stories were told by 
sailors and handed on in the sea-ports. Some re-cycling of ideas and 
perceptions will have been taking place from the Indies, to the 
metropolis and back again. Despite these problems it is possible 
to suggest some major features of Dutch perceptions of the wider 
world, though their particular images and impressions need to be 
located in a broader European context. Are there any grounds for 
asserting furthermore that the "... essential matrix of ideas from 
which institutionalized racism grew, already existed in Europe - and 
perhaps more prevalently in Protestant Anglo-saxon Europe .... "? 
125 
125. Legassick: Op. cit., p. 4. It is one thing to discuss European 
attitudes to 'Blacks' in Europe, and another thing altogether 
to consider European perceptions of Africans in Africa on the 
other hand. The distinction is elaborated below. 
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What related attitudes accompanied the broad perceptions? The 
second and final question from the original slate (p. 110) is how 
did the Dutch come to adopt slavery in their empire when the 
institution was long dead and banned in the Netherlands? Are there 
any major problems to be overcome in explaining this dualism in 
theory and practice? 
First, what is the evidence about 'colourism' or the 
predisposing matrix of ideas in the Netherlands? In answering that 
question one must first locate the position of the Netherlands in a 
wider European comparative and historical context. Unlike the 
position for England, there is very little work done specifically 
on that question for the Netherlands. 
126 Yet for subsequent 
explanatory purposes it is necessary to be as clear as possible about 
prior Dutch attitudes towards, and perceptions of, Blacks before they 
encountered and interacted with them systematically in the colonial 
context. 
The central conceptual strands in the argument are, 
however, also relevant in respect of the English and the Iberian 
experiences. Also it is vital to remember that it was from those 
two regions that the Dutch are most likely to have picked up and 
learnt things about the extra-European world, because of either recent 
close or historically longstanding connections between them, 
126. W. Jordan: Op. cit.; James Walvin's two books mentioned above; 
there is also the Barker thesis, and Eldred Jones: Othello's 
Countrymen; K. L. Little: Negroes in Britain; C. R. Boxer's 
Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415-1825 
provides a helpful introduction to that enormous area and its 
problems. 
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I. 
especially in the case of the Iberian peninsular. There are two 
major strands in the argument which identify the evidence and under- 
pin its organization. The first - which crops again in the analysis 
of the Cape situation later - is that colour or 'race' (in the 
colourist sense) has no behavioural correlates whatsoever. Therefore 
before any enduring kind of historical and societal association 
between 'colour' and certain roles, occupations, and statuses 
emerged, there simply were no historical grounds or structural bases 
or psychological orientations for the emergence of 'colourism'. For 
example, the variety of nationalities and colours from which Greek and 
Roman slaves had come, as with later Tuscan slaves, and the fact that 
Christians were amongst those made slaves in North Africa, all had 
prevented the identification of colour with servitude, and had also 
suppressed the emergence of a negative stereotype built up from a 
cluster of associated roles and statuses or characteristics which 
converged on the Black or the Negro. 
127 So that in Europe, prior to 
127. D. B. Davis: The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture; 
H. J. Nieboer: Slavery as an industrial system; George MacMunn: 
Slavery Through the Ages; Rice: Op. cit.; Mary L. Gordon: "The 
Nationality of Slaves under the Early Roman Empire"; F. Snowden: 
Blacks in Antiquity, and his "The Negro in Ancient Greece" and 
"The Negro in Classical Italy"; Iris Origo: "The Domestic 
Enemy.: The Early Slaves in Tuscany .... "; I. G. Detweiler: "The 
Rise of Modern Race Antagonisms"; Donald Wood: "Some Greek 
Stereotypes of other People"; Hannah Arendt: "Race thinking 
before Racism"; Philip Mason: ".... but 0! My Soul is White"; 
G. R. Dunstan: "A Note on Early Ingredients of Racial Prejudice 
in Western Europe". All over the Islamic Middle East and North 
Africa the range of colours and somatic types is obvious to even 
a contemporary observer. There is little evidence of any kind 
of sustained 'racial' hostility within those cultures and 
societies. They have had long connections with Africa south of 
the Sahara, via the slave trade. See Denys Hay: Europe in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, pp. 374-5; N. R. Bennet: 
"Christian and Negro Slavery in Eighteenth Century North Africa" 
who claims that Negro slaves serving in the armies of 'Berbery' 
are recorded as far back as the 9th century, p. 70; and Nehemiah 
Levtzion: "The Early States of the Western Sudan to 1500", p. 151 
and passim. 
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the imperial expansion which commenced at the end of the Middle Ages 
there were no traditions or prejudices in respect of people of colour, 
qua that colour. Furthermore, the incredible tales and fantasy 
stories - about Prester John, for instance, or Monomotapa - which 
gripped the imagination of both literate and illiterate peoples and 
which were widespread and popular from the Middle Ages, will have led 
Europeans to believe that not only were there Black Christian Kings 
and Empires, but also that there were civilizations of enormous 
wealth and power presided over and lived in by Black 
(often rendered 
as 'Ethiopian') people. In addition to Prester John, there were 
Mandeville's Travels and the reports of Carpini, Polo and others. 
128 
And it is of importance to note too that a great volume of the 
early travel literature in many languages was printed in the Low 
Countries. 129 
128. Henri Baudet: Paradise on Earth; A. P. Newton: "The Conception 
of the world in the Middle Ages"; Claude Jenkins: "Christian 
Pilgrimages, AD 500-800"; Eileen Power: "The Opening of the 
Trade Routes to Cathay"; B. Penrose: Travel and Discovery in 
the Renaissance; A. P. Newton: "Travellers' Tales of Wonder 
and Imagination"; Malcolm Letts: Sir John Mandeville. The 
Man and His Book; F. M. Rogers: The Search for Eastern Christians; 
A. P. Newton: "European Travellers in Africa in the Middle Ages"; 
Edgar Prestage: "The Search for the Searoute to India, 1415- 
1460"; Sir Denison Ross: "Prester John and the Empire of 
Ethiopia". 
129. See the "List of Early Printed Books, 1467-1546" in Rogers: 
Op. cit., pp. 185-193. Antwerp was a major printing and 
publishing centre, and then Amsterdam. See D. W. Davies: Op. cit. 
(Elseviers), passim. The problem of why some people were bläck 
and others not was rarely explained in terms of the biblical 
notion of Ham and his children. Some geographical explanations 
were used, certainly by the Greeks, who considered themselves 
in contrast not only with the 'Ethiopians' but also. the fair 
skinned Scythians. Menander wrote: 
"The man whose natural bent is good, 
He, mother, he, though Aethiop, is nobly born, 
'A Scyth', you say? Pest! Anacharsis was a Scyth! ". 
F. M. Snowden: Op. cit., p: 176. 
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The second and related point is this. An examination of 
the Iberian, English and Dutch travel literature of the days of 
reconnaisance and discovery reveals a regularity which is worth 
stressing immediately and forcefully. It is an elementary but 
crucial point which has, I think, generally been missed, but which 
emerges from the material. In general, the characteristic perception 
of 'Negroes' (and I am thinking primarily of Africa, obviously, but 
it holds good too in respect of dark peoples in 'the Indies' for 
instance) fragments from the 15th century into two broad categories. 
In Europe, Negroes were Blacks, while in Africa they were Africans. 
That is, the characteristicficnrs and manner in terms of which Negroes 
in Europe were perceived in Europe - turned on, and was largely 
concerned with the obviousness of their colour and other physical 
features. In Europe, in short, the manner in which Negroes were 
described and probably perceived, emphasised their distinctive somatic 
features. By contrast - and the contrast is marked - the travel 
literature shows a remarkable uniformity in describing in largely 
cultural, contextual and behavioural terms the peoples and societies 
the diarists met. So in Africa Negores were perceived in broader 
cultural terms and en masse. I believe the implications of this point 
are important: they recur and ramify in later chapters. They need to 
be incorporated into the descriptions and analyses of both prior 
attitudes and predispositions of Europeans before they interacted in 
the colonies or factories with Blacks and slaves, and also brought into 
any explanation for the emergence of 'colourism' in the colonies, 
though the latter point needs to be supplemented clearly by an 
analysis of the political economy of each colonial situation, which 
involved also an account of the role of slavery in it. 
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What is striking is that the descriptions and recorded 
perceptions by Europeans of Africans in Africa in large numbers, 
often more or less naked, manifestly godless and without churches or 
temples, speaking in strange tongues, behaving in decidedly un- 
European ways, having many wives, inhabiting jungles and swamps or 
arid deserts or tropical regions, along with terrifying animals and 
so on, are essentially cultural and contextual. The colour of the 
people is only one factor - and a minor one. What frightened, 
worried, puzzled, fascinated or repelled the Europeans was a complex 
of strange behaviours and observed institutions. The evidence is 
there in the English journals and diaries, and the Iberian ones, and 
is replicated in the Dutch ones. 
In the accounts of the early Iberian explorations down the 
coast of Africa - and even e4rlier - the impression emerges. 
130 For 
instance, Lully, describing the country of 'the Nile' talked about 
'negroes' who were idolaters, leading merry 'but just' lives, holding 
goods communally, where there were kings and princes who worshipped 
the sun, stars, birds and beasts. "They are of great stature and are 
negroes". 
131 Pereira, who was involved in setting'up the Elmina 
Castle, commented about the people round Axim that they were 'Negroes' 
130. Leo Africanus: Observations of Africa, in Purchas His Pilgrims, 
V; Zurards Chronicle of Guinea in Hakluyt; Duarte Pacheco 
Pereira: Esmeraldo de situ orbis in J. W. Blake 4d. ): Europeans 
in West Africa 1450-1650; de Barros: Asia (Hakluyt); 
C. R. Boxer: RaceRelations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 
1415-1825. Indeed as early as the 13th century the image is 
there in Raymond Lully's Blanquera, cited in A. P. Newton: 
"European Travellers ..... ", taken 
from M. Ch. de la Ronciere: 
La Decouverte de l'Afrique au Moyen Age (Cairo, 1924-5). 
And Antonie Galvanos: Book of the Discoveries of the World 
(in Purchas, X); and Freda Wolfson: Pageant of Ghana. 
131. Newton: Op. cit., p. 169. 
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and lived "... on millet, fish, yams, together with a little meat; 
they are naked from the waist up, and uncircumcized and heathen, but, 
God willing, they will soon become Christians. .. ". 
132 Leo Africanus 
told of 15 great Negro Kingdoms and named them, and also discussed 
Prester John. 133 The contrast with the hostile, later typically 
'racist' attitudes, to which Boxer refers, is interesting. 
134 
But the main burden of Boxer's evidence about the unpleasant record 
of Portuguese 'race relations' must be seen in the light of two 
important qualifications. First, the attitudes emerged in 
(and are 
quoted from) colonial situations - not simply contact and/or factory 
contexts, and decidedly not from the metropolitan centre itself. And 
secondly, the overwhelming weight of evidence from thou situations 
relates not to the 15th or even 16th centuries but to the mid-17th 
and, decisively, 18th centuries. The point is important: there are 
a few instances of those kinds of attitudes and prejudices expressed - 
even in the modern period - in metropolitan Portugal, though 
'racism' 
and discriminatory practices were widespread in the Portuguese 
colonies in Africa. 
135 
132. Pereira: Op. cit., Cited in Wolfson, p. 45. The cultural and 
total contrast is striking, as it is in Ten Rhyne's "A Short 
Account of the Cape of Good Hope", pp. 81-105. 
133. Leo Africanus: Op. cit., in Purchas, V, pp. 310-2. 
134. C. R. Boxer: Race Relations ..... Op. cit., passim. 
135" See E. Mondlane: The Struggle for Mozambique; D. M. Abshire and 
M. A. Samuels (eds. ) Portuguese Africa; Henry A Nevinson: A 
Modern Slavery, and Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire. 
The accumulation of comparative evidence about unpleasant 'race 
relations' in'the colonies of both Catholic and Protestant 
powers, and the colonies linked to both 'feudal' and 'bourgeois' 
political economies in the metropoles suggests strongly that the 
explanation for these developments have to be located in-the 
colonial situation and attention given to specific local 
demographic, economic and political relationships in the light 
of - rather than in terms of - the European antecedents 
in 
culture and ideology. 
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In general, the journals of the English navigations reflect 
the same reaction to, and impression of, a total societal and cultural 
contrast in terms of culture, economy, environment and habitat. 
136 
What stands out in the reports of men like Best, Towrson, Barnes, 
James Welsh, Hawkins and John Lok is that in addition to the 
unflattering things said about Blacks, or 'Aethiopes', 'Nigritaes', 
'Moores', 'Moorens' or Negroes', they all underlined the "... radically 
contrasting qualities of colour, religion, and style of life, as well 
as animality and a peculiarly potent sexuality". 
137 
Likewise, the classic and full statement by Pieter de Marees 
about the Gold Coast reflects the same impression. He was a Dutchman 
who lived there and wrote in detail about the area in 1602. As with 
many of the English and Iberian accounts his report was a mixture of 
perceived fact, fictitious explanation and snap judgements. The 
people were described in the usual terms as "greedy", "savage", 
"idolatrous", "lecherous" and so on, though there was also some useful 
136. Hakluyt: The Principal Navigations; Blake: Op. cit., Purchas 
His Pilgrims; F. M. Rogers: Op. cit.; B. Penrose: Op. cit.; 
A. P. Newton: "The Conception of the World in the Middle Ages"; 
Henry S. Burrage: Early English and French Voyages, 1534-1605. 
137. Jordan: Op. cit., p. 43. "None of these blacks seemed to behave 
like Englishmen", Ibid., p. 25. What Jordan and others do not 
note is that this cumulative perception of African life styles 
and differences were clearly not revealed or observable in 
Europe when individual Blacks came there. Barker has clearly 
shown that though there were - few - speculations about the 
relationship of some people to the animals, the main and over- 
whelming impression created in the English accounts does not 
question their humanity, but is hostile to their culture. 
Barker: Op. cit., and especially his conclusions. Theories 
relative to the 'great chain of being' were far and few between. 
See Arthur O. Lovejoy: The Great Chain of Being. The Khoi - as 
we shall see - figure in some few accounts relative to this. 
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information for later travellers. 138 A century later, a similar 
account by William Bosman, who had been chief factor on the Guinea 
Coast was published. 
139 
Between these dates the main pre-1650 Dutch 
accounts of the Khoi were written, and they repeated much of what 
Iberians and English had said of them, as will shortly emerge. 
A final and closely related point about the travel 
literature needs to be made before looking at other kinds of evidence 
about the Netherlands specifically. It is extremely rare to come 
across explanations for the colour of Africans which are couched in 
terms of the 'children of Ham' argument. Jordan, Davis and Walvin 
tend to overstate this. 
14° The actual number of reports in which 
138. It was translated into English and incorporated in Purchas VI, 
pp. 247-366. Also summarised in Wolfson: Op. cit., pp. 4-6. It's 
full title is "A Description and Historical Declaration of the 
Golden Kingdom of Guinea, otherwise called the Golden Coast of 
Myna". Other people and places - like Benin, for instance - 
were reported on by de r. Iarees with great awe and wonderment, 
describing Kings with many wives, soldiers and slaves. Purchas, 
IV, pp. 263-41. The popular travel stories in volkstaal were 
in heavy demand and were distinct from the sophisticated Latin 
or Dutch literature. They were more like chap-books. They 
appealed in the 17th and 18th centuries to a mass readership 
looking for shock-details such as de Graaf's description of 
the impalement of a slave, or adventures fighting "inboorlingen 
of Portugezen". W. Y. Bontekoe's Memorable Description of the 
East Indian Voyage 1616-1625, was first published in 1645. 
"It became the most widely read chapbook (volksboek) in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. " Before 1800 it was 
published 70 times. See Rob Nieuwenhuis: Oost-Indishe Spiegel, 
pp. 21-28. 
139. William Bosman: A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of 
Guinea, (1705). The sub-title, carrying the pragmatic merchant's 
concern indicates the slave, gold and ivory coasts and a map 
points them out. 
140. See Jordan: Op. cit., p. 56. He says "Englishmen did possess a 
concept of slavery formed by the clustering of several rough but 
not illogical equations. The slave was treated like a beast. 
Slavery was inseparable from the devil in men; it was God's 
punishment upon Ham's prurient disobedience. Enslavement was 
captivity, the loser's lot in a contest of power. Slaves were 
infidels or heathens. On every count, Negroes qualified. " 
I think this drastically overstates the case and mixes contexts. 
There is no evidence that this was a representative view, nor that 
the accumulation of such equations was widespread. 
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the argument figures and in which the 'children of Ham' were 
identified in the persons of the Negroes were very few if one 
considers the hundreds of journals and diaries and reports that 
emerged from the period. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, the 
argument simply did not surface in the Iberian debates. The dispute 
between Las Casas and Sepulveda, for instance, over the question of 
slavery, turned more on the interpretation of Aristotle than it did 
on complicated biblical exegesis, and the authorities who have 
worked in the field adduce no evidence about the 'Ham' argument. 
141 
Although the common cultural perception of Blacks in Africa 
may be found in the travel literature, there are some interesting 
differences in respect of the perception of Blacks in the metropol- 
itan countries. Walvin has argued that from the 17th century there 
i 
was an increasing number of Blacks (and latterly, slaves) in England. 
They were a source of 'curiosity and appendage value' in England. 
It became fashionable to employ them as servants, minstrels and 
menials. 
142 
He suggests 'racialism' was there from an early date, 
though Barker has contested that by making some fine and important 
distinctions in the argument. What is critically important to 
recognize is that Blacks must have been of greater curiosity value 
amongst an insular people like the English, as compared with the 
Europeans and especially the Iberian and Mediterranean countries 
whose contact with Africa, via north Africa, was far longer and more 
141. Lewis Hanke: Aristotle and the American Indians, and Bernice 
Hamilton: Political Thought in 16th Century Spain. 
Also Rice: Op. cit., PP-39-43- 
142. Walvin: Black and White, p. 11. 
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sustained. But in England - and indeed in north-west Europe in 
general - one can see how it would have been only 
(or largely) 
their colour and related somatic features that would have been 
remarked upon. For, in the towns and seaports, the presence of 
Blacks there could not have been accompanied, obviously, by a wider 
visible context and complex of cultural, religious, familial, 
climatic, behavioural or economic characteristics which so centrally 
defined the lives of African peoples in Africa, and the European 
perception of it. Colour, having no automatic behavioural correlates, 
did not bring any associated cultural or environmental facets with 
it. In short, Africans in England were plain 'Blacks', but Africans 
in Africa were, in the words of Sir George Barnes "... Moores, 
Moorens, or Negroes, a people of beastly living, without a God, lawe, 
religions or common wealth, and so scorched and vexed with the heat 
of the sunne, that in many places they curse it when it riseth ... ". 
143 
As for the Iberian peninsula, there is remarkably little 
evidence about 'racial' attitudes and social hostilities in Portugal 
or Spain on grounds of colour. Yet there were large numbers of Blacks 
(and slaves of other nationalities and colours, which may be the key 
to the explanation as suggested earlier) there. In the 16th century 
Spain imported up to 10,000 slaves per annum from the Portuguese 
143. "The Second Voyage to Guinea set out by Sir George Barnes .... 
in the yere 1554. The Captain whereof was M. John Lok", in 
Hakluyt, IV, p. 57. Not all accounts were so negative as was 
mentioned earlier in connection with de Narees. But all emphasised 
the cultural, ecological and demographic contrasts, not solely 
or significantly the colour. Later, as Barker has skillfully 
shown "... all the most extreme theories about racial, as 
opposed to cultural, inferiority, came from a small group 
scarcely representative of even their own slave-owning class 
and certainly at odds with the main currents of British 
opinion". Barker: Op. cit., p. 46. 
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possessions. 
144 
And, as the Moors were expelled from the Iberian 
peninsula a population vacuum had resulted in certain areas. "In 
the sixteenth century Negro slaves were brought from Africa to help 
correct the disproportion ..... " in Portugal. 
145 That slavery was 
still flourishing well into the late 18th century in Portugal is 
evident from the attempts by the Portuguese dictator, Pombal, to 
abolish it at home. 
146 
Yet there is little evidence to indicate that 
this was accompanied by colourism or exclusivity in the metropolis or 
any popular beliefs about the inferiority of Blacks, as has been 
shown was similarly the case in England by Barker. And it was 
pointed out earlier that those kinds of attitudes - calling on 
Biblical or other kinds of exegesis for support - were regarded with 
some amazement by metropolitan Portuguese who encountered them 
abroad, as in the Brazilian defence of slavery. 
In general (though this is another argument that needs 
detailed comparative attention elsewhere) the historical and contemp- 
orary evidence suggests that 'racist' or colourist attitudes and 
policies as we understand them today did not originate in the 
144. R. Trevor Davies: The Golden Century of Spain, 1501-1621, 
pp. 188-9; the question of Blacks in Spain, both slave and free, 
is ®. refully treated by Ruth Pike: "Seville Society in the 
Sixteenth Century: slave and freedman", passim. 
145. William C. Atkinson: "Institutions and the Law" in H. Y. 
Livermore (eds. ): Portugal and Brazil, p. 89. 
146. Abshire and Samuels (eck ): Op. cit., p. 97 and p. 105. 
Also Boxer: The Portuguese Seaborne Empire. Negro slaves 
were still imported into Portuguese mines in the 1780s. 
See D. B. Davis: Op. cit., p. 45" 
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metropolitan countries, nor were there the matrices of ideas which 
were especially suited to their emergence elsewhere. On the 
contrary the ubiquity of differing forms and degrees and emphases 
of those ideas and policies emerged and took shape in the constitution 
of the political economies and social structures of the colonial 
situations. Then, later, through a complex process of re-cycling, 
migrations and further colonialisms and communication speed-ups etc., 
they came to be reflected in the literature, idioms, ideology and 
even sometimes the vocabularies of the metropolitan countries, but 
not always, as Portugal and Spain and the Netherlands may indicate. 
That is, until new plural colonial societies were actually formed by 
the interaction and subordination of one or more culture to another, 
Portuguese (and other Europeans) and different African groups peered 
at each other across initially limited trading frontiers constituted 
also by massive cultural and contextual contrasts. So far as we can 
tell neither side initially perceived or regarded the other simply 
as 'masters' or 'slaves', or as 'Hamites' or white men. Such simple 
categories of status or perception are rare in the evidence. They 
may have emerged later in the structures and relationships which 
constituted the new societies formed by colonialism. If that was the 
case, then colourism might be regarded as something of a shorthand - 
and colour a signal for it - which emerged at the end, so to speak, 
of a long, complex, socio-historical and psychological process. 
147 
However, in the case of Portugal and Spain, their long- 
standing historical connections with Africa via the Mediterranean may 
also have accounted for the relatively low curiosity value of Blacks 
in the towns and seaports of the Iberian peninsula, though many of 
the country districts were isolated. 
147. This is a point which emerges again later. 
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Though the argument must be qualified by some caution, 
it seems to be the case that, as with the Iberians and English, 
cultural consciousness of alien peoples preceded and precluded 
colour consciousness in the Netherlands. The position of the Dutch 
Republic must be seen in the wider context sketched above. Long- 
standing connections with the Spanish, the Portuguese and the 
Mediterranean meant that Dutch traders and seafarers would have 
seen people of colour in those areas, and hence will have picked up 
images, stories and reports of the contacts between those countries 
and Africa. Merchants and their agents from the Low Countries were 
active in major Italian cities in the early 16th century. 
148 Ships 
from Italy had tied up at Bruges and Antwerp from the 14th century, 
and some were galleys which were manned and rowed by 'Moorish' and 
Negro slaves. 
149 Dutch merchants had been involved in the Mediterran- 
can slave trade with 'Berbery'. 
15° As the Portuguese West African 
penetration and trade developed in the second half of the 16th 
century, merchants from the Low Countries were involved too, and 
prosperous Flanders merchants instructed their Andalusian agents 
".... to make enquiries about prospects, to assemble suitable cargoes 
and to hire Castillian pilots who were to take their caravels to 
Guinea in return for Flemish gold". 
151 And, as was shown earlier, 
148. David W. Davies: A Primer of Dutch Seventeenth Century Overseas 
Trade, p. 36. At Livorno a 'Via degli Scali Olandesi' (street 
of Dutch wharves) still exists. 
149. Origo: Op. cit., p. 355; Davis: Op. cit., P-41- 
150. Davies: Op. cit., PP. 44-5. Hay claims that there were some- 
thing like 7-10,000 slaves in Genoa in 1380 and that the 
majority were 'Moors' from North Africa, or Negroes via 
'Berbery'. Hay: Op. cit., PP-374-5- 
151. William Blake: Op. cit., I, pp. 185-246. 
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the rise of Antwerp coincided with the shift in the centre of trade 
from the Mediterranean to the northwest, and when the Iberian ports 
were closed to the Republic, individual Dutchmen went there and got 
jobs on the Portuguese ships, before theindigenous mercantile 
expansion of the Netherlands to the East. Foremost amongst these 
individuals was Jan van Linschoten. First he learnt Spanish and 
then moved to Lisbon where he joined a fleet which went East in 
1583, returning in 1598. When it came out, his Itinerario was 
enormously popular and was reprinted many times. 
152 After it 
appeared, there were hundreds of later accounts, for each ship of the 
Y. O. C. had its own journal and often there was more than one amateur 
diarist. 153 But the Itinerario set the tone. 
154 He distinguished 
between Madagascar and 'Mosambique' and their peoples; he compared 
different 'nations', their manners, customs and speech; he told of 
Prester John's land - ".... the country of Abexynes"; he informed 
his readers of the fascinating customs of the 'Peguans' - who 
offered their visitors 'many maides'; he described the Portuguese 
in the Indies, their slave trade and the beauty of the slavesses, 
and he was fascinated by Eastern "... customes and superstitions in 
Religion" as well as Armenians, Arabians, Persians and 'Moors'. He 
also made barbed comments about the materialistic "... thirsty and 
insatiable desires" of the Jesuits. 
155 
152. Rob Nieuwenhuis: Op. cit., pp. 21-2. An English edition was 
published in 1598- 
153. R. Raven-Hart: Before van Riebeeck. For instance, the various 
accounts of Houtman's later expedition is explained by this 
practice of more than one Journal being kept. 
154. Jan Huygens van Linschoten: The Voyages of Jan H. van 
Linschoten to the East Indies, 2 Vols. (Based on the 1598 edition). 
155. Ibid., I, passim. Africa was not perceived or described as one 
monolithic bloc without differences. This is clear from 
Linschoten and Houtman. 
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Such was the general tone of his Voyages and the 
Itinerario. The journey by Houtman (who had first been sent to 
Portugal as "een soort spion" -a kind of spy156 - to the Indies 
netted a number of reports and accounts, one of which contained 
an interesting early observation of the Khoi, as we shall see. 
157 
In this description, as with the description of other peoples and 
places, the impression given is one in which total context and 
cultural distinctiveness is the dominant one, not colour per se and 
that was the theme of accounts - along with adventure stories and 
drama - which defined the subsequent reports in the 17th century. 
158 
156. Nieuwenhuis: Op. cit., p. 23. 
157. Raven-Hart: Op. cit., and (a) J. C. Mollema (ed. ): De Eerste 
Schipvaart der Nederlanders Naar Oost-Indie onder Cornelius 
Houtman, 1, which is based on Lodewijks, and (b) 
J. C. Mollema (ed. ): De Eerste Schipvaart der Hollanders naar 
Oost-Indie, 1595-7. The title page of Houtman's journal read: 
"Journal of the Journey of Holland ships undertaken in the 
East Indies. Their course and orientation, and the strange 
adventures that befell them. All very industriously written 
down from time to time, as well as historical reports about 
the people, lands and towns which were visited. Where money 
is, where there is profit to be made and what business can be 
done there. How a very profitable and satisfying living can 
be had, and also certain experiences and places and marked 
names of use to seafarers. Also the vocabulary and the chief 
Javanish words, all illustrated with maps and figures. The 
book is printed through the desire and wishes of certain 
merchants, and one may find it for sale at Barent Langenes, 
Bookseller, Middelburgh, 1598. " 
This reveals concisely the preoccupations of Dutchmen in the 
international trade and the dominant values and interest. 
158. Nieuwenhuis: Op. cit., aP ssim, and Boxer: Op. cit., p. 181. 
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Thus, as the Dutch expanded into the wider world they 
brought home images and stories which underlined those that would 
have been circulating by word of mouth in their ports and in books 
and printed accounts amongst the literate, which had been derived 
from their Iberian (and English) connections. Thereafter there was 
a Dutch empire which provided the sources and resources for their 
images and perceptions and writings and the slow re-cycling process 
began. But from the late 16th century there had also been a close 
political contact with the English, supplementing the longstanding 
trading connections, and Dutch sailors and soldiers would also have 
picked up stories about Africa and the wider world from them. 
159 
Further external sources of stories and images will have been the 
foreign students in the Netherlands, particularly at Leyden. 
Between 1625-1651, for example, of the 11,076 students studying there, 
52% were from abroad, including Spain, the Turkish Empire, North 
Africa and Persia, 
16o 
By contrast, however, with England (and the Iberian 
peninsula) there are grounds for arguing that there were comparat- 
ively few Blacks in the Netherlands. Walvin, Little and others 
have shown that in the 17th and 18th centuries there were significant 
numbers of Blacks (as slaves and freemen) in English cities, and also 
that there was a demand for Black servants. Runaway slaves were 
reported in the newspapers. 
161 There is support - in the papers, 
159. On the ship crossing to the Netherlands in March 1639, Mundy 
noticed . "..... certaine English soldiers passing over to 
serve the States". against Spain. Mundy: Op. cit., IV, p. 54. 
160. D. W. Davies: Op. cit., (Elseviers), pp. 12-14; and Boxer: 0p. 
cit., P-177- 
161. Walvin: Black and White, pp-7-11. 
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and also in the portraits of families and aristocratic ladies and 
gentlemen with their black servants - that this is so. Hence there 
are grounds for believing that blackness may have had an early 
identification with servitude. Negative connotations became 
associated, in words, with blackness, and Walvin suggests that in 
this negative way Blackness ".... expressed distinct English 
cultural values". 
162 Words and phrases like black looks, blacklist, 
blackball, blackguard, blackleg, blackmail and blackmark are, he 
argues, illustrative of this. 
163 
In the Netherlands, however, in the 17th century, there 
do not seem to have been any comparable developments. First, at the 
end of the 16th century, there was a Rotterdam ruling that a Negro 
slave landed there would be automatically freed, thus reducing the 
incentive for Dutchmen to bring home Black slaves for service. A 
similar ban was issued in the Indies in 1636, and other, related, 
prohibitions repeated in 1650 and 1713: these long pre-dated the 
English policy on this question. 
164 While there must have been 
162. Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
163. The actual dates when the words became current does not altog- 
ether support Walvin's point about timing, but the general 
hunch is an interesting one. Blacklist (1692); blackball (1770); 
blackguard (1532); blackleg (1771 for its meaning as a race- 
course swindler, and 1865 for its strikebreaking associations); 
blackmail (1552) and blackmark (1845). Blackamore is founU from 
1547; Black art from 1590 and black book from 1479. Shorter 
Oxford Dictionary, passim. 
164. Goslinga: Op. cit., p. 55; van der Chijs: Nederlandsch-Indisch 
Plakaatboek, 1602-1811, Vol II, pp. 409-410; Boxer: Op. cit., p. 243. 
The contrast with, say, Seville, could not be more sharp. Not 
only were slaves kept there and brought to the town, but Black 
freedmen emigrated to the New World and returned after some 
years. Blacks from south of the Sahara were common in Seville 
from at least the 13th century. By the 16th century, the city 
had become the second most important slave centre in western 
Europe. Lisbon was the. first. The Blacks were welcomed into the 
Church and within 2 or 3 generations were firmly part of 
Christianity and Spanish culture. "As a result they were 
eventually incorporated into the economic, social and religious 
life of the city". Pike: Op. cit., p. 359 and passim. 
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Blacks in the Netherlands in virtue of the long Iberian and trade 
connections, it may well be that during the 80 Years War this tailed 
off, though it would be wrong to conceive of a hermetically sealed 
border between the Republic and the Netherlands at that time. 
Zumthor claims that ".... in the larger Dutch towns it was not so 
unusual to come across such freed slaves among the domestic house- 
holds of wealthy families". 
165 But where would they have come from, 
and in what numbers, given the bans and the strict controls which 
both the V. O. C. and W. I. C. endeavoured to impose? 
Secondly, there is the evidence from the art of the period. 
Though it cannot bear too much explanatory weight, one thing is 
clear: the Dutch artists of the period, by contrast with the English, 
painted few Blacks. 
166 If one excludes the representations of 
Blacks in classical and Biblical paintings - part of a long 
pictorial tradition - there are only a handful of more or less well- 
known African negroid figures, as opposed to the relatively more 
plentiful Moorish figures, easily identified by darker features, 
dress and curled turbans. The most famous, perhaps, are the 'Four 
Negro Heads' by Rubens 167 The same heads were used also by van Dyck 
and may suggest something of a scarcity of models. Like the Greek 
artists of the ancient world, it appears that Rubens and van Dyck 
were fascinated by the artistic possibilities of the colour and 
165. Zumthor: Op. cit., p. 301. But he confirms that slaves landed 
in the Netherlands were automatically freed. He is the only 
author I have come across who makes the point about the presence 
of freed slaves in Dutch towns, but he cites no evidence. 
166. I am grateful to Richard Verdi who discussed the implications of 
some of this with me and who checked some wilder inferences by 
his careful knowledge of the painters and their contexts. The 
point about the few Blacks in Dutch paintings has been confirmed 
by Seymour Slive - personal communication. 
167. P. R. Rubens: Des Meisters Gemalde, p. 146. 
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contrasting features of the 'Ethiopians' . 
168 There may be other 
interpretations for the scarcity of such figures in the Dutch 
paintings. One could be that so many of the Dutch school - in order 
to eat - had to paint for particular kinds of clients who wanted 
particular kinds of pictures of themselves and their life-styles in 
which the painters specialized, and also that there are unlikely to 
have been many Negroes in that class, if they were in the Netherlands 
at all. That leads on to two additional possible explanations: 
either that Negroes were poor (which would confirm the servant-role 
hypothesis) or that there weren't'many in the country anyway. Another 
etching by Rembrandt - 'Negress Lying Down' has been said not to be 
a Negress anyway. 
169 There is the very rare example - unlike English 
art in the 17th century - of the portrait of 'Elena Cattaneo with 
Negro Attendant', also by Rembrandt. 
17° And there is the famous 
(and puzzling) Frans Hals picture of 'Family Group in a Landscape', 
with a young Negro boy who might be an attendant, or might be a 
member of the family in the form of an adopted son, since he was 
dressed identically to the male child in the painting, and is in no 
way distinct except by his colour. 
171 In Hals there is also the 
darkish, southern 'Preeckelhaering' (mountebank, clownish) figure 
which is referred to ambiguously - and perhaps intentionally so - by 
Slive as the 'so-called Mulatto'. In any event, the same joking, 
mocking and drunken figures appear in Dirck Hals and Jan Steen too, 
168. F. M. Snowden: Blacks in Antiquity, pp. 181-2. He refers to Terra 
Cotta figures, bronze and marble statues and so on. 
169. A. M. Hind: A Catalogue of Rembrandt's Etchings, plate 299. 
170. C. J. Holmes: Notes on the Art of Rembrandt, P-177- 
171. Seymour Slive: Frans Hals, II, plate 279. Professor Slive says 
that it is not at all clear what the status of the Black boy 
was. (Personal communication). 
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but tell nothing about Africans and/or attitudes towards people of 
colour as such. And there are the 'Two Negroes' by Rembrandt. 
172 
There is Jan Mytens' 'Queen Henrietta of England with a Negro 
servant'. 
173 There are two pictures by Albert Eeckhout - 'Negro 
from the Congo with Elephant's Tusk' and 'Brazilian Mulatto', both 
either painted during, or based on, his visit to Brazil. 
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Though the evidence is not conclusive or representative - 
even if one looks at the background paintings on the walls of rooms 
depicted in other paintings - the pictures provide some confirmation 
that, relative to England and the southern European cities and sea- 
ports, there were probably very few Blacks and Africans in the 
Republic. But, despite the ban on their importation - "... free or 
unfree .... " - given the automatic manumission entailed if they 
arrived there, and given the very few African figures represented in 
the art, the question must necessarily remain an open one. But where 
they are represented, it appears as if they were enjoyed by the 
artists for their colour and somatic contrasts, as they had been for 
the Greeks. There is no impression of savage or heathen qualities, 
nor any uniformly negative attributes or subordinate stereotype or 
associated role. Their pictures suggest something of a loneliness, 
a degree of alienation and an outsider-like quality. But that is as 
much in the eye of the painter as the subject. 
What this all suggests is that there were few Blacks from 
Africa in the Netherlands; that while they were perceived as Blacks 
172. Kitson: Rembrandt, plate 46. 
173. W. Bernt: The Netherlands Painters of the 17th_Century, Il, p. 822. 
174. Bernt: Op. cit., I, p. 354 and P"353" He was in Brazil for some 
years after 1637. 
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they were not identified with the savage or heathen or culturally 
distinct and fascinating images contained in the travel literature; 
that where they were present they were likely to have been poor, and 
- of central importance - their blackness 
(as perceived by the 
painters) was not associated with evil, godlessness, extraordinary 
or bestial cultures, verdant jungles, rivers flowing with pearls the 
size of pears or with any of the other atibutes that became 
identified in the travel literature, more or less, with the peoples 
of Africa or the Indies in Africa or the Indies. In short, Negroes 
were Africans or 'Moors' in Africa, and Blacks in Europe for the 
Netherlands too. 
Finally, there is the question of language and phrases. 
Though 'zwart' (i. e. black) was sometimes used as synonomous with 
slaves in the Indies, and sometimes implied negative attributes, 
systematic identification of 'black' with negative or hostile 
behaviours or qualities does not appear to have found its way so 
widely into the idioms or phrases of Dutch (or, interestingly, 
Afrikaans), apart from in the literal sense where, for example, 
'blacklist' was translated as zwarte lijst. But 'blackball' is 
'deballoteren', a blackguard is 'deugniet', blackleg is an 
'onderkruiper'or 'oplichter', and blackmail is afpersing - none of 
which imply or entail-anything about colour. A 'Blackamore' (first 
used in English in about 1547 - joining of Black and Moor, presumably) 
translated directly as Moriaan or Neger (Moor or Negro). And in 
the 18th century (in 1742) there was published in Amsterdam and Leyden 
the thesis by Jacobus Johannes Capiteyn on "De Slaverny, als niet 
strydig tegen de Christelyke Vryheid" ("On slavery, which is not 
contrary to the Christian Freedom"). Capiteyn was a 'Moor uyt Afrika' 
180 
who defended slavery in Biblical terms arguing that it was not 
incompatible with 'spiritual freedom'. He was referred to descript- 
ively and it seems without prejudice or any dirrectly hostile 
meanings as 'Swarte Jacobus Capiteyn'. 
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Thus, the employee of the Y. O. C. during the first half of 
the 17th century, is unlikely to have had a 'colourist' outlook, for 
he would not have been exposed systematically at home, or via contacts 
either with the Iberians or English, to any such ideology, for there 
was no structure or historical basis for it. If colourism later 
emerged, it emerged in the colonies of the Republic - as it did in 
those of Iberia and Britain - and has to be explained in those 
contexts. 
176 But there is no evidence which compellingly suggests 
that it had developed in anything like the strength that would have 
been necessary for it to be re-cycled back to the Netherlands and then 
175. A. Van Dantzig: Het Nederlandse aandeel in de Slavenhandel, 
PP"114-116. This whole question of the associated meanings and 
echoes of words is extraordinarily difficult to be precise about. 
What, for instance, does one make of the common practice in 
South Africa to give the nickname 'Blackie' to people (usually 
men) whose surname is Swart, without any negative connotation 
being meant or taken? 
176. N. van de- Graaf had some very unflattering things to say about 
both the Dutch women and children of 'mixed' parentage in the 
East Indies, and he described them as 'ongebleekte dongris' 
(unbleached, rough cotton of an inferior kind). Reisen van 
Nicolaus de Graaf, 1639-1687, pp. 13-14. He was blunt in his 
denunciation of uncouth behaviour in the Indies, but his 
comments about the people there - especially the women - were 
not what we would call 'racist'. Rather they reflect his 
contempt for the idle lives and associated immorality which 
he observed amongst settlers living off the backs of a slave 
population and considered such behaviour fundamentally un- 
Christian. See also P. D. Milone: "Indische culture and its 
relationship to urban life", passim. 
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out again via the men who drove the engine of the V. O. C. in the 17th 
century. But the Dutchman - or German or Protestant employee of the 
Company - will have had some idea of what lay in store for him, and 
if he had no clue at all his more experienced shipmates are sure to 
have told him. The images and perceptions that would have been 
percolating amongst the 'Heeren van ses weken' in the seaports and 
urban centres of the Netherlands will have emphasised cultural and 
behavioural and contextual distinctions and wonders - some attractive 
and some repelling, some frightening and some fascinating. The 
question of colour per se would have been secondary. 
This is nowhere better illustrated than in the monumentally 
negative, yet ultimately non-colourist image which the Khoi had in 
European eyes from the first contact with them, and which was 
repeated - often plagiarised - in the Dutch accounts of them, right 
up to and beyond the settlement at the Cape. From the first 
Portuguese accounts, at the end of the 15th century, right down to 
van Riebeeck, the stereotype is depressingly consistent and - for the 
time and context - not entirely without foundation. Thus Pereira 
(who, so far as is known, did not visit the Cape) described them in 
the following terms, no doubt picking up reports from the da Gama 
expedition: 
177 
The Negroes (sic) of this region are heathen, bestial 
people, and they wear skins and sandals of raw hide; 
they are not as black as the Negroes of Jalofo and 
Mandingua and other parts of Guinea. There is no trade 
here but there are many cows, goats and sheep and there 
is plenty of fish. At this promontary Africa comes to 
an end in the ocean ...... 
177. J. H. Parry: The European Reconnaissance. Selected Documents, 
Pp. 63-65. 
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This general picture is repeated over and over again by other 
Portuguese, English and Dutch visitors at the Cape. 
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From the 
wealth of reports and opinions on the Khoi one may extract the 
following list of features in terms of which they were characterist- 
ically perceived and described for some 150 years prior to the 
settlement at the Cape in 1652. They were - shortish/brown/yellowy/ 
tawny/black, stinking, they clucked and talked like the sound of a 
turkey (hence one explanation for the name 'Hottentot'), the male 
child's right testicle was removed at birth (a common explanation was 
that it enabled them to run faster), they had woolly tufts of hair 
on their heads, they smeared themselves with grease, wore a pouch 
round their necks for pipes and tobacco, and arm-bracelets in ivory 
or copper, they carried sticks or clubs, they were swift runners, 
they were nomadic and had no industry or commerce or agriculture, nor 
did they know anything of gold or silver, they had no faith and were 
godless though they were thought to worship the moon, the women had 
long and pendulant breasts, they all wore guts or intestines round 
their necks or legs, they ate raw entrails, women had to cut off the 
top joint of their little finger at marriage or widowhood, they had 
neither government nor kings, but only chiefs whose power was based 
on their wealth in cattle, they were polygamous and in general 
bestial, sordid, horrible, savage, sickening and barely human. But 
they were humans: about that there was no doubt, though their 
origins perplexed visitors, and now and again - though generally an 
exception - they were likened to animals. This raises a point which 
is worth spelling out a little more fully. 
178. The material is usefully brought together in R. Raven-Harts 
Before van Riebeeck, passim. See also Barker: Op. cit., 
chapter III. This is a weak chapter in his usually good argument, 
but at least the English evidence is helpfully collected in one 
place, He claims that the 'clucking turkey' imago originated 
with Dapper. It is in fact much earlier and can be found in 
Lodewijks' account of the Houtman voyage. See Mollema (ed. ) 
De Ferste Schipvaart der Hollanders ..... 0_ p. oit., p. 140. 
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While the image of the Khoi prior to 1652 was systematically 
negative and hostile in terms of their culture, behaviour, language 
and general appearance, it was never seriously or consistently 
questioned that they were human, though the descriptions of them and 
the revulsion they generated came close to that and were not 
flattering. Nollema summarises the unambiguous view of the early 
Dutch diarists: 
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If the Dutch sailor felt himself to be a kindly master, 
highly superior to these foul-smelling, sods of brown 
apes with their flat faces and prouding backsides 
around them which he could have knocked down with one 
fist-blow and with a kick of his boot, laughing about 
the care they took to conceal their 'little women' 
(derogatory, A. L. ), to hide them between the bushes, 
then his further journey to Madagascar must have quickly 
given him a different impression. Those were well- 
proportioned brave men with thick bunches of hair, broad 
in the shoulders, narrow in the hips with whom you 
couldn't play. 
Later diarists - as indicated above in the list of features 
identified in their reports - continued to regard the Khoi as 
bestial 
and godless, utterly alien in culture and norms. Yet they, and 
subsequently the settlers and colonists at the Cape, never questioned 
that the Khoi were humans. What emerges clearly in this respect is 
that where explicit considerations of their inhumanity were raised, 
the people who did so had either never visited the Cape or had been 
there only fleetingly, though some Dutchmen - like Ten Rhyne and 
Grevenbroek - speculated about the origins and history of the Khoi. 
179. Mollema: Op. cit., loc. cit.. The description of their speech 
was "Their speech resembles the stuttering clucking of angry 
male turkeys. They speak with an impediment, like those people 
who live round the Kempten and the Alps whom one calls Juliae 
(S. W. Beieren, i. e. Bavaria and the Julian Alps) and who, 
through the hardness of the snow-water have developed goitre". 
Ibid., loc. cit.. This appears to be the origin, of the 'turkey' 
image which became common in later accounts. While this was 
the dominant image of the Khoi, there were some less harsh 
descriptions, such as that in the Remonstrance of Jansz and 
Picot. See Moodie: 0p. cit., I, PP. 1-4. 
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While the Dutch at the Cape perceived them as lawless, having 
extraordinary customs, being deficient in entrepreneurial or 
industial skills and as being culturally alien, this did not entail 
a belief in their hon-humanity. Ineed it did not prevent the Dutch 
at the Cape from seeing and playing off the tactical and commercial 
possibilities of the situation. Nor did it stop them from taking 
Khoi women as mistresses or concubines, marrying them, living in 
close quarters with Khoi families, fighting alongside them on 
commando attacks against the Khoisan resisters and even - with 
little enthusiasm, however - trying to educate and convert them 
in a non-racial though culturally plural society. So that it was 
not from amongst the officials or settlers at the Cape that the 
question of the place of the Khoi in some universal hierarchy of 
species was raised. 
It was people like Rev John Ovington (who made a fleeting 
visit to the Cape in 1689 on his way East) who speculated that the 
Khoi were the 'very reverse of Human kind' and that "... if there's 
any medium between a Rational animal and a Beast, the Hotentot lay 
fairest claim to that species". 
180 Sir William Petty raised a 
similar such racist question in the mid-17th century, 
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and the 
authors of The Lay Monastery - who'd never been near the Cape - 
suggested links between the Apes and Monkeys and the 'savage Hotentot', 
as well as the ".... stupid native of Nova Zembla .... ". 
182 At the 
end of the 18th century the great chain of being theory emerged more 
forcefully and was expressed in the writings of people like Soames 
180. J. Ovington: "Albyage to Suratt in 1689", in Collectanea, p. 102. 
181. Jordan: Op. cit., pp. 221-5. 'Racist', because attributed to 
immutable physical correlates, not to changeable cultural forms. 
182. A. O. Lovejoy: The Great Chain of Being, p. 234" 
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Jenyns in his Disquisitions on Several Subjects in which the Khoi 
were said to have been at the lower end of the chain. 
182a 
In 1774, 
in his History of Jamaica, Edward Long claimed that he did not 
think that "... an oran-4outang husband would be a. dishonour to an 
Hotentot female .... ". 
183 What needs to be stressed is that such 
views were foreign to the Cape and there is nothing to indicate that 
such speculations were ever entertained by colonists or officials, 
who - after all - married Khoi women, took them as mistresses, 
cooperated with them in defence and attack and sought their labour, 
as we shall see. 
While Ten Rhyne (1686) wondered whether the Khoi had 
originated from Ham (though given its context, none of the negative 
connotations were implied), and while Grevenbroek (1695) suggested 
thqt it was from the Israelites that they'd learnt their 
".... sacerdotal and sacrificial rites", neither of them - or later 
writers on the Khoisan at the Cape - ever seriously thought of the 
Khoi in those terms, though the sense of cultural distance and the 
perception of somatic difference may have remained strong, as indeed 
it was. 
184 In fact, apart from Ten Rhyne's early speculation about 
the origin of the Khoi, the question of their status as 'the children 
of Ham' did not surface in those terms in the 17th century at all. 
Moreover, its usage in the 18th century appears to be very sparse 
indeed; the evidence is negligible. There is one reference in the 
182a. Ibid., P-197- 
183- Cited in Barker: Op. cit., p. 130 from E. Long: History of Jamaica, 
III, PP-364-5- 
184. W. Ten Rhyne: "An Account of the Cape of Good Hope", p. 93; and 
J. G. Grevenbroek: "An Elegant and Accurate Account of the African 
Race", p. 209. In the early 18th century Kolbe declared that: 
"In their customs and institutions they cannot be said to 
resemble any People besides the Jews and the old Troglodytes". 
Peter Kolbe: The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope, p. 30. 
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Church records to Ham in 1703.185 But this is - in that collection 
of documents, at least - unique. Moreover it is the language of 
religion, and does not reflect a pervasive definition of social 
reality in those terms amongst the colonists. It has been suggested 
that this Old Testament view of the Khoi, 'bastrds' and other non- 
whites was widespread. Yet all the main evidence that is used to 
illustrate that argument is not drawn from the 17th century or the 
18th century at the Cape. Rather, those propositions rely heavily 
on statements from the 19th century and later. No doubt the language 
of religion contained such notions and images, but their social 
usage for prescriptive and/or justificatory purposes is an entirely 
different matter. Recent studies confirm the view that the political 
and social exploitation of these notions lies in the 19th century and 
later. 
186 
Certainly there is no evidence whatsoever that East 
Indian and other slaves were regarded as inferior beings, and the 
range of skilled tasks they performed in the agricultural and 
domestic economy of the Cape will not have provided any basis for 
185. The Drakenstein Church Council wrote to Amsterdam, saying: "After 
a fair and laudable confession of faith before the congregation, 
we have accepted as a convert and member of the invisible 
(verborgen) body of Jesus Christ someone born of Muhammdaan (sic) 
parents. It were desirable that it please our Almighty God and 
Shepherd of the flock to bring the old occupants of this land 
(the Hottentots) into the fold of Jesus Christ, so that also 
Cham may also no longer be a servant of servants; this is 
desirable but seemingly cannot happen without the all-powerful 
hand of our merciful God, at which time the fullness of the 
heathens will come to pass". C. Spoelstra: Bouwstoffen voor de 
Geschiedenis der Nederduitsch-Gereformeerde Kerken in Zuid- 
Afrika, Part I, pp. 33-4, Document 12, dated 4th April, 1703. 
The Amsterdam Classis approved the action and said that it hoped 
that "... God may once and for all cast off the curse of Cham's 
offspring; that he will cause the fullness of the Heathens to 
come to pass, and that he will bless the entire Israel ... ". 
Ibid., Part 2, pp. 14-16, dated 21st December, 1703. 
186. F. A. van Jaarsveld: The Afrikaner Interpretation of South African 
History, pp. 6-7. His claim is weakly supported. The main evidence 
he adduces - apart from the above 1703 reference - .. is decisively 
outside the 18th century. This is the burden of Moodie's argument 
too. See Dunbar T. Moodie: Op. cit., p. 29. Also Irving Hexham: 
"Dutch Calvinism and the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism", 
im. pass 
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such a view. While one can see how a rough and ready impression 
of class and cultural hierarchy - from the Dutch at the top through 
to the Khoi at the bottom"- would have been a plausible kind of way 
for the structuring of perception by the dominant, the rapidity of 
the mixing and miscegenation of people at the Cape - East Indians, 
Africans, Khoi, Dutchmen (and combinations of them) - must have 
eroded any reliable basis for reading off culture and behaviour and 
lineage from appearance, certainly in the town. 
It is, moreover, highly unlikely that Cape settlers 
coming from the Netherlands and Protestant Europe in general in the 
17th and 18th centuries would have thought of the Khoi in Biblical 
terms or in the manner of Jenyns, Petty and others. Their perception 
of them as culturally alien and distant would not have entailed any 
direct implications for behaviour towards them, nor would it have 
called on any Ham-like notions for explanatory, prescriptive or 
justificatory purposes, and certainly there is no persuasive evidence 
of anything like that. One must constantly remember that there was 
no tightly segregated frontier - physical or sociological - between 
the colonists and the Khoi: as the colonial society expanded the 
Khoi became part of it, from very early on, albeit in subordinate 
capacities. 
And the closer and the more frequent the contact between 
them all in that colonial context, the less likely are Europeans to 
have considered Khoi to be non-human, in virtue of their daily 
experience of, and with them. And the more the interaction, the 
closer the (subordinate) sexual, social, economic and other links 
between them within the structures and emergent institutions of the 
new society. Yet those Khoisan who were outside the colonial society 
and who were resisting its advance and its predatory incorporations 
188 
were mercilessly hunted and fought and regarded as barely human 
adversaries who deserved to be eliminated. Though the Khoi never 
enjoyed an attractive or positive image, at least one farmer at the 
Cape rated their women higher than the Dutch women when he told 
Sparrman, in the 1770s, about his preferences in women. "First, 
the Madagascar women who are the blackest and handsomest; next to 
these the Malabars, then the Bugunese or Malays, after these the 
Hottentots, and last and worst of all, the white Dutch women". 
187 
Thus the image of the Khoisan in the eye of the represent- 
ative Dutchman in the first half of the 17th century, prior to 
systematic contact at the Cape, was consistently negative, but in 
cultural and behavioural terms. The stereotype of them - in advance 
of the interaction - had nothing whatsoever to do with/prior 
hostile 
predispositions towards people of colour rooted in any notional 
dichotomous categories of Calvinism. Nor did it reflect a blanket 
racist or colourist outlook in the Netherlands of the kind that was 
later to emerge in 19th century Britain in the heyday of Empire, in 
which immutable behavioural and cultural correlates were associated 
with physical features. Though later, as will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters, Khoisan were incorporated in subordinate roles 
and statuses in the Cape colonial political economy, the explanation 
for that must be rooted squarely in the local material conditions 
and the externally imposed constraints of the V. O. C., not in terms of 
'idealist' interpretations of causal relations in the formation of 
social structure. And so long as the cultural discontinuities 
187. A. Sparrman: A Voyage to the Cape of Good Hope, I, p. 75. 
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persisted in fact, so long were there readily available criteria 
for the bases of subordination and exclusion, though it is in the 
nature of such cultural criteria to permit people to move across 
boundaries by socialization and/or changing their behaviour, as is 
in some respects the case with class. What distinguishes exclusion 
or differentiation on grounds of culture and class from grounds of 
colour is that they allow (in theory, if not always in practice) 
for mobility. Colour, by definition, vetoes any such movement of 
individuals or groups, and thus consigns an outgroup to permanent 
exile from the entitlements of the polity or social system by 
locking them in a subordination from which there is no escape. The 
emergence of that development in South Africa has to be explained 
historically, in terms of the political economy of South Africa, for 
there are no grounds for it in the antecedent history or ideology of 
the Netherlands. In any event it is a phenomenon which may emerge, 
as such, at the far end of a long historical sequence during which 
cultural differences may first have been partly, or even 
(as in the 
case of the 'Coloureds') totally eliminated, while the need (in 
economic and class terms) to retain more or less rigid bases of 
exclusion from or access to, the scarce societal resources have 
remained. 
Finally, is there a problem to be resolved by the fact that 
the Dutch adopted slavery abroad, and at the Cape in particular, 
although the institution was dead and banned in the Netherlands? 
This relates to a further associated point. It is commonplace to 
find slavery blamed for the emergence of attitudes of white 
superiority in South Africa, and even at the Cape before the 19th 
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century industrial revolution. 
188 However, the simple explanation 
which links colourism and 'racialism' automatically to slavery is not 
satisfactory. After all, slavery has existed since time began, in 
one form or another, so far as can be said, and where there is 
evidence it does not indicate that slavery qua slavery produced 
anything remotely like institutionalized colourism. The distinction 
between slavery and freedom is most usefully conceived of as a 
continuum which was defined by the presence or absence of all or some 
of the classic freedoms of the citizen in ancient Greece: the right 
to a legal personality, the right to work at what one wished, 
personal mobility and personal inviolability. 
189 From Biblical 
times through antiquity to the Middle Ages, slaves had almost always 
been drawn from a variety of nationalities and cultures, usually also 
from outsiders, relative to the dominant group. Thus there was no 
structural basis for 'racialism' to emerge. Moreover in Florence and 
the Middle East in the Middle Ages the variety of 'colours' ranged 
from the Ethiopian to the Scythian, and included Circassians, Turks, 
Spaniards, Syrians, Armenians, Caucasians, Tartars, Bulgarians and 
Georgians. Being foreigners, the slaves were also outsiders in the 
society, having been brought into the settled dominant culture of 
the majority. If and when they adopted the culture and/or religion 
of their masters, manumission and absorption was not only possible 
but common, provided economic circumstances prevailingat the time 
permitted or encouraged it, as in 16th century Seville. too. What 
188. See for instance M. F. Katzen: Op. cit., p. 184. 
189. William L. Westermann: "Between Slavery and Freedom", p. 216. 
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distinguished the 'new' colonial slavery from the old legacy that had 
remained in the Mediterranean basis right into the period of expansion 
was that, by and large, not only were slaves in the colonies in the 
majority - with the important exception of the U. S. South - but also - 
like their masters - they were expatriates, but unlike their masters, 
they were Black or Coloured. 
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Furthermore, slavery had long died out in northwest Europe, 
and in particular the Netherlands, before the colonial expansion 
began. Hence Europeans could not be and were not enslaved by 
Europeans though the condition of indentured servant or knecht was 
pretty close to slavery, though for a limited period. But Dutchmen 
could not be slaves, and what is more, they knew it. Thus the 
slaves that they brought to the Cape came not only from different 
cultures - that is not new: the slave has always been an outsider,, - 
but also from different colours. Yet their colour alone did not 
prevent manumission and absorption as wives (mostly) or 'free blacks' 
into Cape or East Indian Dutch society. Manumissions not only took 
place in the East and at the Cape, but were quite common. The 
children of freed slaves or of freed slavesses married to colonists, 
filtered into and were part of the free burgher colonial elite, with 
formally equal acess to economic resources, political influence and 
social status. In the 18th century - and later - it is quite likely 
that a significant proportion of that elite were 'Brown Afrikanders'. 
The emergence of the co-called 'Cape Coloured People' is evidence of 
that, and the difficulty which 'white' Afrikanerdom has had in the 
20th century in defining their relations with 'Brown Afrikanerdom' 
190. D. B. Davis: Op. cit., passim and Rice: Op. cit., passim. 
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(the Coloureds) confirms that colour is an almost impossible basis 
of differentiation and discrimination to sustain where there are wide 
and major areas of institutional continuity between so-called colour 
groups. 
Thus slavery, in itself, explains very little about the 
formation and shape of the Cape political economy, its social structure 
and associated attitudes, in the same way that antecedent attitudes 
or institutions alone explain little. The Dutch officials at the 
Cape brought the institution there for a specific purpose: they 
needed labour, and slavery was the cheapest form, short of enslaving 
Dutchmen which was - by that stage - impossible. And when they had 
expanded into the mercantile system ... they were already 
faced 
with established slave-trading routes and the example of highly 
profitable Iberian use of slave labour". 
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But the Dutch also 
brought with them a history 'of, and procedure for, the manumission of 
those slaves who deserved it or qualified for it, as the discussion 
of Dort will have shown. Freedom meant, formally at least, equality 
with other free burgers. Now it has already been argued that Dutchmen 
are unlikely to have had any profound feelings of racial or colour 
superiority, though they did have a distinct sense of cultural and 
ideological distance between themselves and other groups, and 
considered their culture superior. Thus if attitudes of hostility 
hardened towards the culturally distinct Khoisan and, initially, the 
culturally alien slaves from Madagascar and the Indies, there is no 
cause for puzzlement: institutional discontinuities and slave 
desertions and Khoisan attacks are sufficient grounds for explaining 
that, given the context and situation, for the plural society is 
191. Rice: Op. cit., p. 15. 
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defined structurally by such discontinuities, and the differential 
incorporation of distinctive segments within it. But if cultural 
or religious distinctions faded, and manumission or inclusion in the 
common society was then stalled or denied, it is not to slavery as 
such that one must look for the explanation, but to the wider political 
economy that underpinned the whole system of unfree labour and set 
limits, therefore, to the amount of upward mobility possible in the 
society. 
This brings the argument full circle back to one of the 
" 
initial conceptual starting points, namely that the group of colonists 
and officials who arrived at the Cape were also constrained by the 
tight monopolistic policy of the V. O. C. This policy which acted to 
cramp the potential of the Cape colonial economy, pressed down through 
successive groups and layers of power, and imposed limits on the 
expansion of the political economy of the Cape, and thus affected the 
social structure and associated attitudes, goals and interests. 
Initially, therefore, cultural and somatic differences were not only 
readily observable indicators, but also handy and useable to the 
Dutch in the arrangement of the division of labour which the V. O. C. 
imperatives dictated. In short, the division of labour coincided 
initially with the division and discontinuity of cultures. When, 
later, these divisions began to fade and there began to emerge a 
common culture, then - if the political economy could not or did not 
expand sufficiently to take the strain, given that there was already 
much competition between the burgers in a limited market - new 
solutions to an old problem had to be found. One solution, as we 
shall see, was to trek: but was another solution to limit the 
manumission of those who earlier would have qualified? If that did 
happen, then it is in the context of that history and that matrix of 
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socio-economic and political factors that the explanation for a 
class-based system - with a deeply implicated 'racial' or colour 
dimension - has to be located. The shift in criteria that took 
place was - schematically - from culture to class. But the point to 
emphasize here is that the institution of slavery was brought to the 
Cape by the 'fragment', and the ideology of the fragment in no way 
vetoed it. But that ideology did not enjoin permanent servitude or 
inferiority on Biblical or any other grounds, nor did it endorse it. 
If anything, it urged the expansion of freedom and the community of 
Christians. Thus when later problems of the kind outlined above may 
have arisen, their solution evolved in terms of local Cape political 
and ideological resources. There was no prior prescription for such 
policies in the Netherlands, though there were aspects of the 
ideology which could be drawn on, and twisted, to legitimate them. 
These are questions to which the discussion will return in later 
chapters when examining key aspects of interaction at the Cape. 
Thus from the unique and complex bconomic history of the 
Low Countries which stood at a crucial temporal and spatial cross- 
roads in Western Europe, there developed a powerful, mercantile and 
trading economy. It expressed and gave rise to a largely urban and 
remarkably literate culture with a robust associated ideology that 
both articulated and sustained the secular institutions, norms and 
values of the society. They were materialist and acquisitive, 
oriented to trade and the making of profit, and geared to production 
or exchange for purposes of the generation of wealth and the 
accumulation of capital. In this context there emerged the Y. O. C. 
which chrystallized and concentrated such values, behaviours and 
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expectations. The role of Dutch Calvinism, it has been argued 
above, has been misrepresented in most of the historiography on 
South Africa, because it has started at the South African end. An 
examination of the Dutch Republic in the half-century or more before 
1650, does not reveal a society or a people uniformly gripped by the 
gloomy doctrines of Dort. Nor does it reveal any specific injunctions 
or philosophies enunciated at Dort which can be held to be primarily 
causally responsible for developments at the Cape. Moreover there 
is scant evidence for the view that there had already formed in the 
Netherlands that matrix of ideas which influenced or provided the 
justification for colourism or racism, and it will later be suggested 
that those developments - which need careful definition and specific- 
ation - were not typically prevalent at the Cape in the 17th and 18th 
centuries anyway. What has been argued here, and what will be 
developed later again is the view that while there was a profound 
sense of cultural distinction and distance, this did not predispose 
Dutchmen to be 'racist' inthe sense we understand it today. Nor did 
it entail any prescriptions for behaviour or justification for enslave- 
ment on the grounds of colour, though Grotius had defended slavery 
in general in the classical terms of Roman law as codified by 
Justinian. 
192 
The kind of relations that emerge in the structure of 
new societies constituted by diverse cultural groups and colours in 
given economic contexts are far too complex to be labelled 'race 
relations', and such a label conceals more than it reveals. 
In addition to this background of ideas, norms and 
institutions in the culture and ideology of Dutch society, there were 
192. Grotius: op. cit., III9 pp. 128-38. 
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the dictates of the V. O. C. tracking through its international and 
colonial trading empire, which were based on and reflected the 
interests of the metropolis. These imperatives came to bear on, 
and constrain the behaviour and emergent local interests of settlers 
at the Cape, and thus acted also to shape the structure of the 
society there. The 'fragment' which thus arrived at the Cape, 
therefore, bore with it the culture, ideology and institutions of 
the European antecedents which have been outlined. The burden of 
the argument has been to sketch these as essential background to the 
analysis of the nature, levels and kinds of interaction that sub- 
sequently ensued between the Dutch and the V. O. C. at the Cape, on 
the one hand, and the material and human environment on the other 
hand, subject always to the downward pressure of the V. O. C. and its 
interests. What the argument also does is to locate the problem 
at the Cape and in the structure of interaction there, which is 
where the analysis of colonialism and the constitution of new 
societies belongs. Before that can be done, the structure, culture 
and normative universe of the Khoisan - prior to systematic contact - 
needs to be examined. For the argument has also underlined the need 
to see the emergence of Cape society in terms of the clash of radically 
discontinuous economic systems, cultures and ideologies and the 
emergence from that clash of a single political economy and social 
structure in the form of the plural colonial society. 
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Chapter 4 
KHOISAN SOCIETY AT THE CAPE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of 
Khoisan society at the Cape prior to the establishment of the 
Y. O. C. settlement, and to outline the structure of relationships 
between San, Khoi and Bantu-speakers. Though some Khoi had been 
in contact with European seamen round the coast of South Africa 
from the end of the 15th century, the establishment of the station 
at Table Bay in 1652 marks a decisive and fateful turning point in 
the history of the Khoisan. 
1 
1. Schapera says "... although Bushmen and Hottentots are usually 
classed as belonging to one ethnic group, termed 'Khoisan' by 
Schultze, it is both more convenient and more accurate to 
regard them as two separate divisions of that group". 
I. Schapera: The Khoisan Peoples of South Africa, p. 21. 
(Hereafter referred to as Schapera (a)). My overall concern 
with the relationships between economy and culture, and the 
differences between cultures, underlines the case for treating 
them separately, while acknowledging the similarities between 
them. Most authorities treat the Khoi and San as different, 
or only regard them as a single group for certain purposes. 
See Shula Marks: "Khoisan Resistance to the Dutch in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", p. 53. Also, Monica 
Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders", p. 43. Ray Inskeep: 
"The Archaeological Background", p. 29. All draw on the classic 
piece by E. O. J. Westphal: "The Linguistic prehistory of Southern 
Africa: Kwadi, Bush, Hottentot and Bantu Linguistic Relation- 
ships". He says "The term 'Khoisan' is of no linguistic 
usefulness whatever", p. 243" 
The relationship between Khoi and San is dealt with later. 
Philip V. Tobias: "Physical Anthropology and the Somatic 
Origins of the Hottentots", passim. He says a "... variety of 
racial threads (have) become woven into the skeinwork of 
Hottentot culture in Southern Africa", Ibid., p. 14. 
198 
Prior to that time, so far as we can gather from the 
really quite slim evidence, 
2 the small bands of hunter/gatherer 
San, the larger hordes of Khoi herders, and the slash-and-burn and 
pastoral Bantu-speaking Nguni and Sotho (the latter also being 
skilled craftsmen in various metals) lived in relatively peaceful 
relations with each other. These relations varied from individual 
2. There is little direct evidence about the Khoi, for no group 
survived intact. There are important early travel accounts 
which provide the basis for most of the work on the Khoi. 
There is more firm material on the San, and modern studies of 
the : Kung, the G/wi and other hunters of Botswana and Namibia 
tend to confirm to the authorities many aspects of political 
economy and social life which tally with what is known about 
San hunters in the Cape from the 17th and 18th centuries. The 
main sources for ethnographic data on the Khoisan are: 
Schapera (a): Op. cit.; Wilson: Op. cit.; Schapera: "The 
Native Inhabitants" (hereafter Schapera(b)); C. G. Seligman: 
The Races of Africa; L. F. Maingard: "The Lost Tribes of the 
Cape"; Schapera (ed. ): The Early Cape Hottentots, being the 
collected writings of the 17th century observers, O. Dapper (1668), 
W. Ten Rhyne (1686) and J. G. Grevenbroek (1695); G. Stow: The 
Native Races of South Africa; M. Hodgson: "The Hottentots in 
South Africa to 1828" and John Cope's King of the Hottentots. 
There is also the remarkable work by Philip Tobias. Also, Mrs 
Marshall's: -work on the : Kung and other studies by modern 
writers like E. Marshall Thomas: The Harmless People, and L. van 
den Post's The Lost World of the Kalahari. Most are extensively 
used by Wilson, Harinck and Marks. Where appropriate I refer 
to the evidence as collated by the latter in secondary material. 
Also, L. F. Maingard: "The First Contacts of the Dutch with the 
Bushmen until the time of Simon van der Stel (1686)", and his 
"History and Distribution of the Bow and Arrow in South Africa"; 
L. Fourie: "The Bushmen of South West Africa" and H. Vedder: 
"The Nana". More recently the historical work by Richard 
Elphick has made our knowledge much richer. R. E. Elphick: The 
Cape Khoi .... Op. cit., passim. 
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client-patron connections between and within the three major groups, 
through temporary symbiotic arrangements to entirely independent 
self-sufficiency. What is central to the overall argument of this 
study is that what the Dutch impacted upon was a loose network of 
relationships between these groups which were distributed over a 
wide geographical area. The disruption this impact caused - and the 
destruction of societies and cultures which ensured - was as much a 
consequence of institutional and normative incompatibilities as it 
was the result of warfare, the spread of disease and an 'excessive' 
trade which imposed upon the Khoi to a level which was, in the end, 
beyond the capacity of their economy to sustain. Moreover, the taut 
political economy and social structure of the Cape settlement, which 
both expressed and exaggerated the aggressive and acquisitive norms 
and behaviour of the robustly individualistic Protestant culture, 
proved to be quite incompatible with the incorporation of the 
'refugees' from the shattered Khoisan societies on anything that, 
overall, approximated to an egalitarian basis. The detailed analysis 
of that is dealt with later. 
But before one can proceed to analyze that interaction, 
and to chart how and why the Khoisan broke up, it is first necessary 
to know rather more about the structure of Khoisan societies than 
the standard histories provide. 
3 What has to be done here is to 
express the internal structures of these societies, and the relations 
between them, their environment and the other groups in terms of a 
theoretical model that will give clearer meaning to the slim evidence 
3. The Khoisan did not crumble without a fight. Shula Marks has 
corrected the standard impression. See Marks: Op. cit., passim. 
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we have for them. Such a conceptual scheme will serve to point 
up also the kinds of structural incompatibilities and discontinuities 
between Khoisan and European societies which resulted in severe 
conflict when they met and interacted on a sustained basis for the 
first time after 1652. 
What, first, are the bare empirical bones about numbers, 
distribution and economic organization of the Khoisan and Bantu- 
speaking 'tribes' that will help at this stage to situate them? The 
Khoisan peoples of South Africa is a wider term used to refer to 
Khoi and San. 
5 The San, whose culture stems from the Late Stone 
Age, were the small 'yellow-skinned' hunters and gatherers who 
belonged to what Maquet describes as 'the civilization of the Bow'. 
6 
4. By using other contributions, theoretical and otherwise, to the 
analysis of similar sized hunter-gatherer band societies, it is 
possible to establish working models of these societal types, 
and the San in particular. It ought also to be said that by 
'European' I do not mean simply 'white'. Colour has no 
behavioural correlates and is therefore little analytical use 
in considering interaction except insofar as one can show that 
the individual is affected by the perception of the 'colour' of 
others. Thus by 'European' in this study I mean in the first 
instance that group at the Cape whose mode of production and 
culture reflected and was expressed in terms of typically indiv- 
idualistic Western Protestantism, committed to accumulation, 
the pursuit of trade and profit. By the mid-18th century this 
group was certainly not 'white' and probably never had been 
'purely' so anyway. 
5. See Note 1, above. 
6. J. Maquet: The Civilizations of Black Africa. The Khoisan in general 
are referred to in the literature as being 'yellow-skinned', though 
it is often suggested that Khoi were slightly taller and darker 
than theýan, possibly due to long contact and interaction with the 
Bantu-speakers. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 43; Wilson: Op. cit., p. 47. 
Elphick has suggested that the characteristically tall size of 
Khoi can be attributed to a regular milk diet over many generations 
amongst cattle-keepers. A similar point is made by G. P. Murdock 
in his Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture, pp. 52-3. Elphick: 
Op. cit., p. 30. The 'yellow-skinned' description is common. Wilson: 
Op. cit., p. 40; Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 20; Seligman: Op. cit., 
p. 16. Yet the variety of terms used by contemporaries in the 16th 
and 17th centuries gives one cause to doubt the significance of 
'yellow' and suggests that colour is a highly relative (to time 
and context) characteristic, which is given to others by a group or 
an individual. For a wide-ranging comparative study of hunters see: R. B. Lee and I. de Vore: Man the Hunter, especially chs. 1,4,5 ana 13" 
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They were distributed in small hunting bands through the more arid 
and mountainous regions of the Southern Africa away from the Eastern 
coastal strip, but where the game. nonetheless were plentiful. It 
has been claimed that there were some 10,000 San in the Cape before 
the Boer commandos and expansion of the colony on to their hunting 
and gathering grounds resulted in their sharp decline in numbers. 
But this figures`is speculative, and has been called into serious 
question, though no firm alternative has been given. There is as yet 
no hard evidence to suggest whether the number in the Cape area was 
higher or lower. However, in 1957 there were still some 51,000 
'Bushmen' in Southern Africa, most of whom were concentrated in 
Botswana and Namibia. Given both the continuity and distinctions in 
culture between 'pure' San - Elphick appropriately calls them 
'aborigines' - and 'pure' Khoi, it may be difficult to establish 
finally what the numbers might have been. They were very often seen 
with, or attached to, Khoi by the earliest writers, but do not appear 
to have been on or near the east coast, according to Maingard. 
7 
The pressure on the San was compounded from the narrowing 
scope for their free movement, the reduction in game and access to 
veldkos and the southward movement of Nguni - all of which acted to 
trap them in an impossible situation which precipitated their fierce 
resistance against, and assaults on, all cattle-keepers, for their 
7. Schapera(a): Op. cit., pp. 39-40. See also Wilson: Op. cit., 
PP. 72-3; Maingard: "The First Contacts ..... ", Op. cit., passim, 
and "History and Distribution of the Bow and Arrow ..... ", 
passim. He makes the point that the early Dutch expeditions 
to the north of the Cape probably ".... only touched the fringe 
of Bushman occupation in the seventeenth century". "First 
Contacts", Op. cit., p. 481. Also Elphick: Op. cit., chapter II. 
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very survival was at stake. The Khoi, on the other hand, were 
nomadic pastoralists, organized in larger 'tribes', or hordes, and 
were to be found in the Western Cape and along the coastal plain as 
far as the Mzimvubu in the northeast, and the mouth of the Orange 
river in the northwest. The groups of Khoi we know from van Riebeeck's 
time were distributed from the Orange round to the Mzimvubu in roughly 
the following contiguous order: the Nama: the Great and Little 
Charigriqua; the Cochoqua (or Saldanhars); the Peninsular groups 
known as the Goringhaikonas (The 'Watermen' or Herry's 'Strandlopers'), 
the Goringhaiquas ('The Capemen') and the Gorachourquas ('The Tobacco 
Thieves'); the Chainouquas; the Hessequas; the Gouriquas; the 
Attaquas; the Houteniquas; the Damaquas; the Damasonquas; 
the Hoemgeiguas; and the Gonaquas between the Keiskamma and the Kei 
who were really Xhosa-Khoi. Inland, slightly to the southwest of 
present-day Graaff-Reinet were the Ingua. The Khoi were to be found 
mainly in this coastal area, and it is reckoned that there were about 
200,000 Khoi south of the Orange when the Dutch arrived. 
8 Though 
there was a degree of institutional and normative continuity between 
the Khoi and the San, we must at this stage concentrate on the 
differences between them. In large measure these turned on, and 
flowed from the crucial distinction in their mode of economic life: 
the San were hunters and gatherers, while the Khoi - who also hunted - 
were herders of sheep and cattle. 
8. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 68. Schapera quotes Theal as estimating not 
more than 45-50,000 Khoi. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 46. This is 
now generally regarded as being far too low a figure. But no-one 
is by any means sure of their figures. See also G. Harinck: 
"Interaction between Xhosa and Khoi: emphasis on the period 1620- 
1750", pp. 150-1, and his map on p. 170. Also Maingard: 0_ p. cit., 
and Dapper, Ten Rhyne and J. C. Grevenbroek in The Early Cape 
Hottentots. There is also van Riebeeck's memorandum to his 
successor, Wagenaar, of 5th May 1662 which is in Leibbrandt: 
Letters Despatched, 1652-1662, Vol III, pp. 239-242. Elphick suggests 
a maximum of 100,000 for the Western Cape Khoi. Elphick: Op. cit., 
P-54. He also suggests an interesting account of Cape Khoi lineage 
patterns. Ibid., p. 97 ff. When Commissioner van Hoorn visited the 
Cape in 1710 he asked , "How many Hottentots subject to the Company (continued overleaf .... 
) 
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The Bantu-speaking people of South Africa, the Nguni and the 
Sotho, will not figure significantly in this study. Systematic and 
intensive contact with them occurs only from the 1770s. But they 
were at both 'ends', so to speak, of the web of relationships that 
existed in South Africa before the arrival of the Dutch. Nguni and 
Sotho refers primarily to a linguistic divide, though there were other 
differences too: the Sotho were skilled workers in metal, and tended 
to live in larger settlements, for example. But the Nguni/Sotho 
must be distinguished for our purposes from the Khoi and San in 
respect of the level of technology, system of production and the 
associated social and political structures. For the Nguni and Sotho 
were all cultivators as well as keeping beasts and hunting. Political 
organization and social structure was accordingly both larger in 
terms of the constituent units of various tribes and more steeply 
ranked in terms of hierarchy, which was accompanied by a greater degree 
of specialization. 
9 The Nguni were, broadly speaking, distributed 
between the Drakensberg and the sea, and from the area of the Fish 
river in the south to roughly present-day Swaziland. Their precise 
numbers are not known, but they were certain to have been far in excess 
of the Khoi: Shaka's army alone has been estimated to have been 
between 50,000 and 100,000 in strength and at the height of his 
imperial might he is said to have added about half a million people 
8. (continued from p. 203) .... " are there? " He was told, "This is 
difficult to establish since they lie now here with their cattle, 
now there". See F. Valentyn: Description of the Cape of Good Hope 
with the Matters concerning it, II, p. 243" 
9. M. Wilson: "The Nguni People" and "The Sotho, Venda and Tsonga". 
Also I. Schapera (ed. ): The Bantu Speaking People of South 
Africa, passim. 
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to his realm. 
10 The Sotho lay, broadly speaking, on the westward and 
landward side of the Drakensberg to the north of the Nguni, and 
stretched from the area of the Orange River in the south to the 
Limpopo in the north. Again, none of the authorities offer any 
estimates of the numbers of Sotho at the time of the Dutch arrival, 
but travellers at the end of the 18th century were amazed to find 
large individual settlements of up to 15,000 people. 
11 
In the previous chapter I suggested that an examination of 
the complex history of the rise of the Dutch Republic and its empire 
both illustrated and confirmed a number of assumptions which formed 
the starting point for an analysis of the economy-society, social 
structure-ideology and culture-ideology relationships. Of course, 
the economic 'base' does not 'determine' the 'superstructure' - as 
the mechanistic interpretation and 'language' used to describe these 
complex relationships implies. It is nonetheless the case (which 
can be demonstrated in respect of the historical period under consid- 
eration in the Netherlands) that the material interests and associated 
technological capacities of societies both generate imperatives which 
10. Schapera (b): Op. cit., p. 38; L. M. Thompson: "Cooperation and 
Conflict: The Zulu Kingdom and Natal", p. 344. Wilson however 
suggests that a 19th century Xhosa chiefdom probably ranged 
from 1,000 to 35,000 persons. "The Nguni People", p. 119. 
That's quite a range. 
11. Wilson: "The Sotho..... ", pp. 131-2, and p. 153; Schapera (b): 
Op-cit", pp. 33-5. 
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must be fulfilled for the survival of the group, but also set broad 
limits to what can be done to achieve those ends. Secondly, there 
is a complex relationship between any such mode of production and 
the associated political institutions, culture and ideology which 
express, influence and sustain it. Few anthropologists in their 
monographs of particular societies leave out of account an explicit 
consideration of the relationship between economy, social structure 
and the wider political, symbolic, religious and ritual life of the 
people. Historians have tended to be more coy: the relationships 
are hinted at, the complex welter of 'facts' judiciously arranged, 
and generalizations about interconnections avoided. Perhaps this is 
because the societies they characteristically study are more complex: 
but it also says something about the nature of the disciplines. 
What is relevant to our purposes here is that anthropoligists of 
different 'schools' and with a range of distinctive interests and 
emphases - social, economic and political - are more self-consciously 
aware of the need to confront the problems about the relationships 
between 'the economy', the central features of social structure and 
the distribution of political power. Thus one anthropoligist in 
analyzing'historical relevance of changing kinship structures to 
broader social change in Southern Africa has suggested that, in 
explaining the rise of kingdoms, for example, ".... the monopoly of 
trade is one clue to centralization". 
12 
Similarly, a political 
" anthropoligist, Barnes, in a study of the 'snowball state' of the 
Fort Jameson Ngoni, in looking for interconnections within the 
12. Monica Wilson: "Changes in Social Structure in Southern Africa: 
the relevance of kinship studies to the historian", p. 73. 
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society, argues from the assumption that while rights in land 
generally provide a key to the "... structure of society", this 
did not apply in the case of the Ngoni because the state was so much 
on the move. Thus, he suggests that ".... the principle index of 
power was the number of a man's dependents". 
13 And there are of 
course numerous other examples of this self-conscious 'inter- 
disciplinarity' within anthropology, and the frankness with which 
these relationships are sought. 
The point here is, in fact, quite straightforward and can 
be briefly stated. Within anthropology, and its more recent 
involvement with historical questions, scholars search more openly 
for interconnections between different dimensions of social life. 
Whether underpinned by synchronic structural-functional assumptions 
or not, they rightly assume (and often demonstrate with great skill) 
that there are relationships to be uncovered, identified and traced. 
Moreover, they generate hypotheses and 'theories' of a fascinating 
kind by use of the comparative method. 
14 
13. J. A. Barnes: Politics in a Changing Society, pp. 29-32. Another 
example of this explicit concern to seek connections may be 
found in Godfrey and Monica Wilson: The Analysis of Social 
Change. One of the questions they set out to ask was how 
".... change from a number of small, locally decentralized 
organizations, within which political authority was linked 
closely with religious and economic status, to an enormous 
centralized organization within which authority is less immediately 
linked with religion and economic status, is related to economic 
changes ..... ". G. and M. Wilson: 
Op. cit., p. 7. Their little 
study has recently been described as "the most ambitious attempt 
to explain the overall process of change since the Communist 
Manifesto". See Richard Brown: "Anthropology and Colonial Rule: 
the Case of Godfrey Wilson and the Rhodes Livingstone Institute, 
Northern Rhodesia", p. 195" 
14. One can do no better than refer to that work of M. G. Smith in 
this respect. In particular see his comparative tour de force 
on "Pluralism in Pre-colonial African Societies", Op. cit.. He 
concludes by making an unduly modest claim for the comparative 
method. 
207 
4 
But there are substantial analytical problems when one 
draws on conventionally historical studies and tries to integrate 
these with the anthropological interpretations and synchronic 
accounts of 'primitive' societies when analyzing the contours and 
consequences of contact, conflict and interaction in the colonial 
situation. Not only are the various societies which are involved 
in the process radically different in terms of their cultures, 
structures and normative universes, but the theories, concepts and 
categories in terms of which each has conventionally been described 
and analyzed by the disciplines, are also of a different order. It 
is necessary to carry those kinds of problems along in the course of 
the following chapters. But against that background it is worth 
setting out here the general orientation to the analysis of 
indigenous Cape societies, which, aided by insights about structure 
from the accounts of the anthropologists, offers an attempt at 
providing conceptual balance with respect to the approach used in the 
previous chapter about the Dutch. 
The Belgian anthropologist, Maquet, states the predicament 
of these societies succinctly, thus: 
15 
The most urgent aspect of adaptation consists in extracting 
from the natural habitat which is necessary to maintain the 
lives of individuals. (sic) This is why the production of 
material goods is the basis of a culture .... The other 
aspects of culture - economic organization, political 
institutions, world view, art, etc. - can only develop 
within the limits set by productioh. This dependence of the 
totality of the culture on the relationship between its 
environment and its technology is especially noticeable in 
societies which live only just above the subsistence level 
..... This dependence of certain aspects of a culture on 
its means of production is not determinism. It is simply 
the case that a subsistence economy precludes certain 
political forms such as, for example, the state: how could 
a body of officials, devoting their full-time activities to 
administration, exist in a society in which each individual 
consums as much as he produces? When the production of 
material goods provides a surplus, the possibilities of 
political forms increase. 
15. Maquet: Op. cit., p. 14. My emphasis, A. L. 
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As a general statement with quite direct implications for the analysis 
of the economy-society and economy-polity relationships it provides 
the basis for the comparative framework of assumptions that is 
needed here. It also provides a useful point of analytic entry to 
the structure and culture of the Khoi and the San. It will be 
apparent that the perspective which Maquet defines is congruent with 
the set of operational assumptions and orientations which were spelt 
out at the start of the last chapter and which gave shape to the 
Dutch and European material there. 
A consideration of hunting-band societies in Africa and 
elsewhere provides the basis for a rough model of such societal types 
which the San hunters and gatherers illustrate in all significant 
and relevant respects. 
16 The central structural and normative 
characteristics of these societies suggest the following features of 
the type. In terms of size and scale they are very small indeed: 
few would be larger than 200 persons, and most would be closer to 
about 50.17 At the core of the social system is what is usually 
16. In addition to the general literature on the Khoisan mentioned 
above, there is Mrs L. Marshall's ": Kung Bushmen Bands", and 
G. B. Silberbauer: "Marriage. and the Girl's Puberty Ceremony of 
the G/wi Bushmen".. The more general and comparative literature 
includes I4. Sahlins: "On the Sociology Pf Primitive Exchange"; 
Nanning Nash: Primitive and Pesant Economic Systems; Maquet: 
"The Civilizations of the Bow" and Power and Society in Africa; 
Colin Turnbull: The Forest People; and Lee and de Vore: Op. cit. 
passim. 
17. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 77. Wilson: "The Hunters and Herders", 
PP-49 and 74. The Mbuti whom Turnbull studied had about 25 
families in the band. See The Forest People, p. 61. Silberbauer 
suggests that 85 would be "positively enormous" for the G/wi 
Bushmen of the Kalahari. Silberbauer: Op. cit., p. 14. The same 
is true of the : Kung whom Mrs Marshall studied. 
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described as a 'subsistence economy' based on the collective hunting 
of game (generally by males, but often with female help, and also 
children), and the gathering of veldkos by all. It has long been an 
assumption of ethnographers and economic historians that this 
existence is precarious and fragile. That is only one view. Sahlins 
has observed that traditionally the hunter-gatherer "... is condemned 
to play the role of bad example, the so-called 'subsistence economy'... " 
Since scarcity is a relation between means and ends, and since - 
relative to their ends - the hunter-gatherers lived in plenty, he 
describes them as the 'Original Affluent Society'. In his survey 
of the economic life of thehunter-gatherers, Lee suggests, moreover, 
that life is not nasty, brutish and short, that a substantial volume 
(60-8c) of their food comes from gathering, and that their ecological 
balance is not nearly so precarious as previously thought and we need 
to see ".... hunting and gathering as a persistent and well-adapted 
way of life". 
17a Such economies generate no 'surplus' because 
individuals consume what they 'produce' - that is what they collect 
and hunt. Moreover they do not spend a great deal of time in such 
pursuits. Amongst the : Kung, for instance, Lee found that they 
rarely kept more than two days' food in hand, that the women spent not 
much more than 2-3 days per week in collecting veldkos and that the 
staple - mangetti nuts - were abundant. "Why should we plant", they 
17a. M. Sahlins: "Notes on the original Affluent Society", p. 88; 
Richard B. Lee: "What Hunters do for a Living, or, How to Make 
out on Scarce Resources", p. 43. This may exaggerate the 
'affluent society' argument somewhat, but it is a useful 
corrective. See also K. Jordaan: "The Bushmen of Southern 
Africa: anthropology and historical materialism", passim. 
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said, "when there are so many mangongo nuts in the world? ". 
17b 
Moreover, hoarding was frowned on, and individuals preferred to 
spend their time visiting, sleeping, embroidering or maintaining the 
camp. There is no cultivation and hunter-gatherers keep no beasts 
apart from some hunting dogs. The technology associated with this 
mode of subsistence is Late Stone Age, rudimentary, but quite 
adequate for the purposes of the groups. The bow, the poisoned 
arrow, the short spear, the hunting net and/or pit and a few bone or 
stone utensils are typical. In analyzing the social and political 
relations within such groups - and between them - one can trace 
connections running forward and back from this central fact: 
without game or access to the communal hunting grounds and veldkos, 
they must collapse, retreat or adapt. The implications of this mode 
of subsistence ramify throughout the system of social and political 
organization. 
All this clearly relates to the congeries of norms which 
sanction and express the behaviour appropriate for the collective 
pursuit and distribution of food, and the control of feuds which, 
in the absence of formal political organization, could rip through 
and destroy the band. "The civilization of the bow is a complete way 
of life, organized round a certain way of obtaining subsistence", 
writes Maque. 
18 
The hunt itself required cooperation. Men and women 
17b. Lee: Op. cit., p. 33. He says of the Dobe Bushmen that they 
"... eat as much vegetable food as they need, and as much meat 
as they can". Ibid., P-41. The same is true of the Hadza. 
See James Woodburn: "An introduction to Hadza Ecology", passim. 
18. Maquet: Op. cit., p. 66. 
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and children were needed to flush the quarry out of the bush towards 
the pit or the net, and a number of men would have to run down a 
beast. 19 Often a fusilade of arrows, or a concerted assault with 
spears on a downed animal, would be needed to finish the kill. Every- 
one would keep their eyes (and also ears in the case of bees making 
for a hive) open for veldkos, to be collected en route from one 
hunting ground to the next, or from camp to camp. For this is 
another central feature of the band - constant mobility and hence 
economy of baggage on the move. They would have few 'possessions', 
and life on the move for women demanded that they did not have more 
than one very small child to be looked after at any time. 
19a 
Moreover the implications for economic life of the close relationship 
between the band and the environment meant that division of labour 
19. Wilson: "The Hunters and Herders", p. 48; Maquet: OOp. cit., p. 51: 
Turnbull: The Forest People, pp. 89-91 gives a graphic account 
of a Nbuti hunt. And an analysis of the principles governing 
distribution of the spoils of the hunt is at pp. 95-6. A more 
detailed and technical account is in his Wayward Servants, pp. 
153-166. A description of a Kalahari hunt is provided by 
van der Post: Op. cit., pp. 231-2. 
19a. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 53. Amongst the Mbuti, Turnbull relates 
that ".... a woman can only feed on ac} 
ild at a time so she must 
not become pregnant again until her7chýild is weaned. This may 
be from one to three years". Wayward Servants, p. 122. 
Describing the : Kung, Marshall says: "On the long treks the 
mother carries all her worldly goods, including the ten or a 
dozen egg-shells filled with water, such roots and berries as 
she may have, and her infant in the pouch of her kaross". 
L. Marshall: ": Kung Bushmen Bands", p. 329. By contrast, Khoi 
of course could and did use oxen to carry their belongings and 
themselves. The implications of this difference for group 
size, mobility and social organization are crucial and obvious. 
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was elementary, tending "... to follow the natural lines of sex and 
age .... ". 
20 And the internal relations of distribution within the 
band were governed in general by the principles of "generalized 
reciprocity" which Sahlins so carefully identifies. 
21 Cooperation 
was enjoined between members of the band in hunting, and the 
principles of sharing what was hunted or collected was accordingly 
widespread. The size of the band, the mode of subsistence, the 
closeness of the relationship with the environment, and the principles 
of 'generalized reciprocity' meant a high degree of equality between 
members, and no stratification worth talking about. 
21a 
20. Nash: Op. cit., p. 21; Maquet: Op. cit., PP. 46-7. 
21. M. Sahlins: Op. cit., pp. 188-9. He distinguishes the sharing 
"vice-versa movements" of goods within this kind of economy by 
stating that characteristically "... goods collectively procured 
are distributed through the collectivity". This is typical of 
the economy like that of the San "... in which food holds a 
commanding position, and in which day-to-day output does not 
depend on a massive technological complex nor a complex division 
of labour". Ibid., pp. 186-7. The polar opposite of 'general- 
ized reciprocity' is, for Sahlins, 'negative reciprocity' which 
identifies the "... attempt to get something for nothing with 
impunity, and the several forms of appropriation, transactions 
opened and conducted toward net utilitarian advantage". Ibid., 
P"195. The latter principles of economic behaviour reflect 
concisely Dutch economic ideology in this period. 
21a. Discussing the associated 'reciprocal exchanges' Nash observes 
that "... the more homogeneous the society is in wealth the more 
likely is reciprocal exchange". Nash: Op. cit., p. 31. And 
Sahlins suggests that 'generalized reciprocity' is "... the bias, 
finally, of societies ordered by kinship", where "... force is 
decentralized, legitimately held in severalty, the social compact 
has yet to be drawn, the state non-existent. So peacemaking .... is a continuous process going on within itself". Sahlins: 0p. 
cit., pp. 186-7. These points accurately highlight and illustrate 
the situation amongst the San. 
213 
The implications of this for political and social 
organization are equally direct and immediate. Not being cultiv- 
ators or pastoralists they did not impose on, or alter, their 
environment. Rather, they responded and reacted to it. Given the 
limitations of size, the associated equality within the band and the 
imperatives and choices of their economic life, it follows that 
political organization was necessarily informal, non-hierarchical and 
oriented in processual and normative terms to maintaining the peace. 
There were no chiefs or headmen, but generally affairs were organized 
by an informal band council of adult men who would collectively take 
decisions particularly about the hunt or moving camp. There were no 
structural or substantive sources of direct coercion which could be 
applied: social control was crucial. 
Thus the economy-polity relationship in this societal type 
is characteristically direct: no 'surplus' was generated in the 
economy and, partly in consequence of this fact, the political structure, 
or rather the political dimension, was low-level and 'flat', 
articulating no hierarchies of power other than the authority of the 
individual family head or the informal council of elders within each 
band. The further implications of this political economy and social 
structure of the band (which was itself typically constituted by small 
patrilineal families), for external relations with other bands and 
other societies will be examined later. For the present, all that 
needs to be stressed is that the capacity of the band to expand and 
incorporate new members beyond a very limited point was nil. The 
system of production and the appropriately simple technology provided 
the ultimate constraints on growth and band size. Moreover the 
institutional arrangements and political forms precluded it. 
Accordingly, hunting bands were extremely fragile and vulnerable units, 
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in relation to pressures on them, and their central structural features 
could be easily undermined by environmental contingencies with 
immediate and disastrous consequences for the group. 
The political economy and social structure of the hunters 
generated and reflected an appropriate set of associated norms in 
which a high value was placed on collective solidarity and harmony, 
with hostility to individualistic or anti-social activity and deviation 
from expected procedure and behaviour. 
22 It is less easy to generalize 
more widely about the 'ideology' or 'world-view' of the hunters. 
Insofar as 'religion' goes it varied in its particulars and form as 
between different societies and their immediate ecological environment. 
But what does seem clear is that the horizons of the illiterate 
hunters were, by comparative standards, limited and low. The very 
simplicity of their material culture and social organization implies 
a not very complex system of ideas and beliefs. But more than that 
it is impossible to say: no-one has yet got inside the world-view of 
the hunters, but the evidence about religious practice and ritual 
behaviour suggests a strong bias directed towards, and turning on 
the immediate and rather a-historical concerns of the hunt, survival, 
and particular aspects or animals associated with it. Certainly, if 
the rock art of the San is anything to go by, this is clear. The 
hunters appear not to have had a strong sense of history or concern 
with either their ancestors or the future after death. 
23 
22. Turnbull's account of the behaviour of Cephu, the deviaant, and 
his treatment by the band, is revealing. See The Forest People, 
p. 91 if., and passim. 
23. The Mbuti do not speculate about 'the future' after death, though 
they have some nice degrees and gradations of being dead. The 
Wayward Servants, p. 347. Mrs Marshall claims that the ! Kung are 
very 'present orientated'. See Wilson: "The Hunters and 
Herders", p. 53. In literal terms the Namibian : Kung Mrs Marshall 
studied in the 1950s had a very limited horizon. "They knew almost 
nothing about the world outside this region. Our informants did 
not know of the existence of the Atlantic Ocean only slightly 400 
miles in a bee-line to the west, or the existence of any oceans". 
Mrs Marshall: Op. cit., pp. 326-7. Yet some 'Bushmen' were reported to 
have had a rich fantasy life. D. Bleek: "Bushman Folklore", passim. 
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What this account of the typical hunting band suggests, then, 
is a society in which the economy, culture and socio-political 
relationships were closely bound up one with another in a tight and 
mobile nexus of relationships between members of the group, between 
the group and the environment and between contiguous groups. The 
direct implications of their limited technology and the hunting and 
gathering mode of subsistence, which did not permit the storing up of 
surplus or its redistribution or exchange, are crucial in this respect 
and underline the fragility and vulnerability of the group, relative 
to structurally more complex and economically more aggressive and 
acquisitive groups. 
In all relevant respects the evidence for the San confirms 
the general picture: it will be useful here to fill out some 
particulars in relation to them. The contrast between the structural 
and normative features of these societies, and their particulars and 
form in the case of the San, is radical when compared with those of 
the Europeans who settled at the Cape in the mid-17th century. At 
that time the game was ample and anxieties about space were not a 
problem for the San. They lived in hunting bands of about 50 members, 
which were loosely aggregated into larger 'tribes' defined by a common 
language. 24 (But on the wider question of language there is doubt: 
Westphal claims that in Southern Africa "... there are (even now, A. L. ) 
four unrelated Bush language-types". 
25) The large herds of game 
provided adequate supplies of food, and individual bands also 
24. Schapera (a): Op. cit:., p. 76. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 50. 
25. Westphal: Op. cit., p. 244. 
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collected berries, roots, termites, caterpillars, locusts, frogs, 
lizards, scorpions and beetles: some, near the coast, caught fish. 
26 
Wild honey was gathered and there is evidence to suggest that some 
hives were the property of individual families in the band. Meat 
from a successful hunt would be distributed and shared amongst the 
band, according to the principles of 'generalized reciprocity', 
though a man kept the skin of an animal he had slain, and the 
clothes - cloaks, loin-cloths and aprons - for his family would be 
made from this. The territory of the band was jealously regarded, 
and trespass without permission by another band could lead to blood- 
shed. 'Trade' as such wasperipheral to the economic life of the 
band, though Schapera suggests that amongst neighbouring friendly 
bands people moved "... freely from one to another to trade and seek 
a wife or visit relatives ... ", but it is not at all clear what was 
traded or under what conditions. And Wilson says that the furs, 
ostrich-egg shells, beads and feathers from the hunt were used to 
trade in iron and tobacco. 
27 This 'trade' between San groups must 
have been marginal in the extreme, and it may be better to conceive 
of it as an extension, as between bands, of the generalized 
reciprocity and sharing that characterized intra-band relationships. 
On the other hand it is possible and likely that contact with Khoi 
or Bantu-spearers - which I shall return to later - included relations 
in which 'balanced reciprocity' (what we'd call 'trade') was one of 
the aspects, and symbiosis (at g oup level) and clientship (at the 
26. Wilson: OPcit., pp. 47-9. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 24. He says they 
did not eat hyenas or baboons. The Dobe : Kung actually despised 
rodents, lizards, termites and grasshoppers, but had affluence 
in nuts. Jordaan: Op. cit., p. 145" 
27. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 23, and Wilson: Op. cit., p. 49. Lee is 
emphatic that 'trade' was minimal. Lee: Op. cit., p. 33" 
Visiting between camps was common. 
217 
the individual level) were others. 
28 For it is hard to see what 
San bands could have systematically exchanged with each other, though 
it is much more plausible to see them engaging in very low-level and* 
limited and peripheral 'exchanges' with cattle-keepers, iron-workers 
and agriculturalists as they moved into and away from contact with 
them, possibly in return for various 'services'. 
The case for conceiving of economic relations between bands 
as being extensions of 'generalized reciprocity' within them is 
supported by the practice of exogamous, and occasionally (for elder 
men) polyggmous marriage, establishing new links between San bands. 
29 
As size grew, a split - based partly on the 'new' marriages - would 
have to occur and a new band be formed. Moreover, as if to cement the 
importance of the game and the hunt it is remarkable how thoroughly 
the imagery and imitation of the animals suffused the dance, art, 
ritual and 'religion' of the hunters. In their dancing -a feature 
of band life for which the members had almost endless energy amongst 
the Ituri foresters too - animals or the hunt would be mimed or re- 
enacted. And they painted kudu and buck and wildebeest on the rocks 
and in caves, and on ostrich egg shells, from which they also made 
ornaments, as they did with leather for bangles. Myths - in which the 
Eland figures prominently - were told as stories. When asked where 
'Kaang' (or Kaggen), the creator of all things was, a hunter informed 
28. "Balanced reciprocity refers to direct exchange. In precise 
balance the reciprocation is the customary equivalence of the 
thing received and is without delay". Sahlins: 0p. cit., p. 194. 
In his discussion of the G/wi Kalahari bands, Silberbauer says: 
"The G/wi have a system of loose alliances between sets of bands. 
This entails the exchange of visits between members of allied 
bands (and also en bloc visits) and, in times of drought, the 
sharing of all assets of their territories". Silberbauer: 
02-cit., p. 15. 
29. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 24. 
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J. M. Orpen that they didn't know, but the elands did. 
30 They seem 
to have identified Kaang also with the Mantis. It is not paradoxical 
that a people whose whole society, culture and existence was bound 
up with the animals would both hold them in respect and awe, miming 
and praising them, and at the same time 'pray' for good hunting. 
I propose to examine the relationship between San, Khoi 
and the Bantu-speaking people separately towards the end of this 
chapter. What must be said here, however, is that as the game 
supply - and access to what game was left - was reduced, and their 
area of mobility constrained, the San hunters hit back at all cattle- 
keepers - colonists, Khoi, 'Bastaards' and Nguni alike. In the 
process, old relations with Khoi were shattered and the typical basis 
of later conflict between San and colonist established. In the end, 
of course, they were forced to retreat away from the line of colonial 
advance. Or, qua San, they ceased to exist. They were either wiped 
out, or they were absorbed and incorporated into wider groupings, 
but not as San. The question of the extent to which 'cultural 
commuting' did, or could have, taken place as between the categories 
Khoi and San must wait until a more explicit characterization of the 
typically Khoi 'way of life' has been given. And it is to this that 
I now turn. 
The central fact about the Khoi meterial culture and way 
of life which distinguish it decisively from that of the San hunters 
30. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 54, and Turnbull: Wayward Servants, pp. 120-1. 
van der Post: 0p. citl, p. 244" He describes how when he showed some 
reproductions of San paintings to the Kalahari group he visited, 
".... the two old people, man and woman, began crying as if their 
hearts would break and hid their heads in their arms. But the 
younger men instantly crowded round and exploded with sounds of 
astonishment, as if suddenly they saw something confirmed that, 
until then, had only been rumour". The Lost World of the 
Kalahari, p. 221. These people no longer paint. 
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is that the Khoi were cattle-keepers. In short, what game was to the 
San, cattle (and sheep) were to the transhumant Khoi. Moreover, the 
herding of cattle, and the natural increase in stock which is 
associated, meant that it was possible to 'produce' a surplus over 
and above what was needed to maintain the community, and was accompanied 
by a greater division of labour. "The existence of both the surplus 
and the social division of labour makes possible exchange". 
31 I 
shall examine the limited evidence we have about Khoi'trade' under 
the separate consideration of relations between groups at the Cape 
later in this chapter. What needs to be pressed home here as the 
central comparative point in the examination of the societal types at 
the Cape prior to the Dutch settlement is that at almost any point of 
analytic entry to the Khoi political economy, social structure, 
ceremonial practice and belief systems, cattle are crucial. Though 
the Khoi also hunted and collected veldkos, it was their possession 
of often very substantial herds of cattle and sheep, off which they 
lived and which they infrequently slaughtered, that affected or was 
the basis of, horde size, political organization, typical causes of 
conflict and warfare, disputes and fission, social structure, ritual 
and ceremony, the capacity to attach San or poor Khoi as clients, the 
scope for barter and trade on the basis of 'balanced reciprocity' and 
their greater 'cultural compatibility' with the Nguni in the east, which 
enabled ahoi to 'incorporate' Xhosa, and vice-versa, because of the 
wide measure of institutional continuity. 
32 While it is tempting to 
31. Karl Marx: Pre-capitalist Economic Formations. See the Intro- 
duction, by E. J. Hobsbawm, P-13- 
32. The point about cultural compatibility is made in a careful 
analysis by Harinck: Op. cit., p. 146. Shula Marks rightly quest- 
ioned the use of the term 'horde'. It is no more adequate than 
'tribe', and she suggests 'chiefdom'. I think that is too 
restrictive, and retain 'horde', despite its inadequacies. 
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see the Khoi as standing 'half-way' between the San and the Bantu- 
speakers, the principles of classification from the different 
disciplines - in terms of culture, economy, language and physical 
type - do not converge on this conclusion. 
33 We simply do not know 
enough about the deep history of the Khoisan to be able to be more 
confident about this. And even if the Khoi are in certain respects 
unique - possibly in consequence of a long period of contact with, 
and borrowing from, pastoralists by southerly San - it is nonetheless 
possible to identify the broader structural and normative features 
of these 'men of men', men of cattle, and thus to regard them as 
belonging to the category of transhumant societies, displaying some 
general characteristics of that kind of economy. 
By contrast with the hunting-band, cattle-keepers moved in 
much larger units. In the case of the Khoi numbers varied between 
".... several hundred to a couple of thousand". 
34 Political organiz- 
ation is necessarily more complex whether 'informal' and characterized 
33" Schapera (a): Op. cit., pp. 41-3. But see also Ray Inskeep: Op. cit., 
passim. The 'interdisciplinary' implications of these non- 
matching principles of classification from the various disciplines 
are interesting. See also Wilson: Op. cit., pp-41-3; 
Schapera (a): Op. cit., passim. and Schapera (b): Op. cit. and _passim. 
34. Schapera (a): Op. cit., p. 225. Wilson says the Khoi horde was 
"twenty to fifty times the size of the hunting band". Wilson: 
Op. cit., p. 58. In his Journal, van Riebeeck recorded on 8th 
November 1659 that "0edasoa was lying in Saldanha Bay with more 
than 1600 of his Saldanhars". See Moodie: The Record., 19p. 195. 
The main Nuer 'tribes' are far larger: see E. E. Evans-Pritchard: 
The Nuer, pp. 117-9. Hecovits says that "... there seem to be 
almost no cases on record where, under aboriginal conditions, 
any shortage of suitable land for proper grazing existed in 
territories of non-literate pastoral folk". M. J. Herskovits: 
Economic Anthropology, p. 343" 
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by articulated hierarchies of power within and between sections, 
themselves ranked in terms of seniority (the case with the Khoi). 
In the latter case -a ranked hierarchy of authority within sections 
and between them - the wealth in cattle and the generosity of the 
headman or chief in times of hardship illustrate the close connect- 
ions between economy and socio-political structure. But if the 
wealth in cattle of such societies established the conditions for 
political rank, the nomadism associated with the keeping and grazing 
of large herds restricted the degree to which power could accumulate, 
since it made for a more loose alliance of segments and permitted the 
peeling off of a section and the establishment of a new core. Thus, 
in the specific case of the Khoi, the independent hordes were 
constituted by an alliance of patrilineal clans, in turn made up of 
a series of patrilineal extended families. The principle of seniority 
was reflected and expressed throughout the horde from relations 
between siblings, in the family, through the headship of the clan to 
the 'chieftanship' which was hereditary through the senior lineage of 
the senior patrician. Sitting with the heads of the other clans, the 
chief disposed of his authority in the arbitration of disputes between 
clans and the enforcement of some decisions. Thus the two central 
dimensions of the transhumant economy - cattle and mobility - set up 
a tension between two opposing principles. On the one hand, the 
accumulation of cattle, and its measurement as an indicator of wealth, 
status and authority, generated a hierarchy of power throughout the 
society, which was more steep than amongst the hunter-gatherers. On 
the other hand the nomadic principle and the relative autonomy of 
the patricians checked the centralization of power, making fission 
both possible and desirable when horde size became unwieldy. And by 
contrast with the Nguni, this entailed the establishment of new 
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hordes (or tribes). Even amongst the Ngoni, whose very history was 
bound up with constant mobility - 'the snowball state' which Barnes 
describes - segmentation "... was a process of growth", while fission 
"... did not bring into being any new segments, but merely dissolved 
the highest segment of all as a cohering political unit". 
35 Amongst 
the Khoi the constraints of size involved the break-up, not growth, 
of a horde and the formation of new ones based on departing patricians. 
At the Cape, the Goringhaiqua, Goringhaikona and Gorachouqua had 
originally been one horde - the Chochoqua under Gogosoa, the senior 
chief - but then split three ways, after dividing into 
two branches 
under Gonnema and Oedasoa. 
36 
As to conflict among cattle-keepers, the typical bases of 
conflict related to grazing territory, waterholes and cattle marauding, 
no doubt exaggerated in lean times. Trespassing was a major casus 
belli. Maquet suggests that, particularly amongst those groups which 
subsist almost entirely on pastoral products, warfare is common 
because cattle are easily lost and easily acquired by poaching. Thus 
there was a need for defence, since a dispute between groups could 
easily flare up and escalate. 
37 However, with an eye to the later 
discussion of the kind of relations that developed between the V. O. C. 
and the Khoi in respect of barter and conflict over cattle and land- 
usage, it is necessary to qualify this point. Although feuding 
35. J. A. Barnes: Op. cit., p. 57; my emphasis, A. L. 
36. See Schapera (ed. ): The Early Cape Hottentots, Introduction, p. vii. 
37. Maquet: Op. cit., pp. 120-1. On the frequency of conflict about 
cattle among the Nuer see also Evans-Pritchard: 0p. cit., pp. 48-50. 
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between Khoi hordes was common, the warfare was not aimed at the 
arkhilation of the enemy or the expropriation of their land or 
cattle, or the extraction of tribute or labour, nor did it result 
ih that. The structural constraints on size, anyway, would have 
precluded this. Rather, it was aimed at redressing grievances - 
either caused by trespass, or the seizure of cattle or setting fire 
to pasture grass - and, "When peace was desired the two sides came 
together at their boundary, and after they had agreed upon terms an 
ox was slaughtered with spears, and the corpse left a prey to wild 
animals. "38 Once again, in the typical causes, contours and conse- 
quences of conflict between hordes one finds cattle at the root. 
The importance attached to cattle - both in material and ceremonial 
terms - is common amongst cattle-keepers. Their uses, moreover, 
amongst the Khoi extended to their being deployed as battering or 
protective formations in warfare, and some Khoi could ride oxen, 
while cattle are reported to have been obedient to the whistles of 
their owners. All this implies "... a long and close association 
between men and cattle .... ". 
39 
In short, like the Xhosa to the east of them, the Khoi 
"... had a high value orientation towards pastoralism which was 
expressed in an elaborate cattle-cult associated with the veneration 
of ancestors, and at times of great stress, a supreme being". 
40 
38. Schapera (a): Op. cit., pp-351-2 and passim for an account of 
warfare. 
39. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 56. The importance of cattle is reflected 
in various rites. See A. W. Hoernle: "Certain rites of transition 
and the conception of Mau among the Hottentots", passim. 
40. Harinck: Op. cit., p. 147. 
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The practical implications of this for social life and social 
structure were direct and far-reaching. Amongst the Khoi, marriage 
was polygamous and exogamous between clans. The marriage ceremony 
involved the slaughter of beasts and the pouring of gall from a 
slaughtered animal over the bride's feet. Cattle passed from the 
husband to his mother-in-law, for it was the women who looked after 
the cattle and controlled the domestic milk supply, unlike the Nguni. 
Likewise, births, deaths, initiation ceremonies for girls and boys 
were the typical kinds of important occasions when cattle were 
slaughtered. Moreover the centrality of herding and grazing in the 
material life, culture and belief system of the herders is underlined 
further by the fact that the 'hero gods' - like 'Tsuni-//Goab' - 
were associated with good and rain, and were often perceived as being 
in conflict with the opposite, a mischievous and harmful 'supernatural 
personage', like '//Gaunab'. 
41 The concept of 'ideology' may seem 
an odd one to use in respect of the San or the Khoi. But the cattle 
cultures, like all others, were associated with a 'world-view', or a 
41. Schapera: The Early Cape Hottentots, pp. xii-xiii; Wilson: 
Op. cit., p. 62 and Seligman: OD-cit., p. 36. According to Hahn, 
the Naman believed that Tsuni Goab 'made' the people, gave them 
the country, and brought rain, causing the grass to grow. 
Schapera: Op. cit., p. 378. He also describes the Naman rain- 
making ceremony when cattle were ceremoniously slaughtered and 
prayers sung to the Father of Fathers. Ibid., pp. 378-380. 
Khoi danced at the new moon and full moon, though the authorities 
are not persuaded that this constituted explicit moon-worship. 
The mantis appears to have been identified with good grace and 
favour, as with the San. See J. G. Grevenbroek: "An elegant 
and accurate account of the African Race ..... commonly called 
Hottentots", in Schapera (ed. ): The Early Cape Hottentots, p. 187. 
Schapera also suggests that some Khoi worked in metal; 
presumably the Naman? And T. Hahn: Tsuni-//Goam. The Supreme 
Being of the Khoi-Khoi, ap ssim. 
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consciousness, that was intimately bound up with the imperatives 
of their material life - the cattle, the pastures, the grazing and 
the rain. The connections between the economy of such a societal 
type, the socio-political structure and the cermonial and religious 
life of the people were close. 
Finally, the principles governing internal relations of 
distribution and exchange and the ownership of property appear to 
have combined typical features of 'generalized reciprocity' and-; = 
'balanced reciprocity'. On the one hand the land of the horde was 
communally held, while the normative structure enjoined hospitality 
and widespread sharing within the groups. On the other hand, 
because they had more possessions, individual property rights were 
more highly developed than amongst the San. "Huts, livestock, 
weapons, utensils and other objects of common use" were privately 
owned. Moreover, amongst some groups, ivcay, copper, rings, bracelets, 
iron beads, axes, adzes, spears, karosses, iron and beads were 
obtained (by 'trade', to which I shall turn shortly) from Nama Khoi 
and conceivably from Bantu-speaking Tswana. 
42 The sharing within 
extended families, and more widely within the patricians, will have 
concerned food, not the items and luxuries gained by barter. However 
the latter - exchanged according to the principles of 'balanced 
reciprocity' - were made possible by the 'surplus' cattle or sheep 
which individual families of herders were able to generate. It is 
in this respect of that aspect of their economic life that subsequent 
42. L. M. Thompson: "The Forgotten Factor in South African History", 
p. 12. He is summarizing Harinck's findings. Also, Schapera(a): 
Op. cit., p. 317. Compare the range of possessions with that of 
a : Kung band. See note 19a, above. 
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contact with Europeans was to render the Khoi highly vulnerable as 
the pressure to trade mounted, as I shall argue later. There is, 
lastly, a suggestive point made by Schapera in respect of the role 
of the chief amongst some Khoi groups. He says that the "... chief 
may 
is generally the wealthiest man in the tribe ... ", that he/claim a 
part of every animal taken in hunting, and that, according to Hahn's 
account of the Nama Khoi of Namibia, a chief was expected "... to 
have an open house and an open hand", implying a special economic 
function of a redistributive kind. 
43 The point is speculative and 
the evidence unclear. However, if this were the case it would 
suggest that, at least among those hordes which were well endowed 
with cattle and sheep, and where the hierarchical structure was more 
systematically synchronized with an unequal distribution of wealth, 
the 'redistributive' principle operated. From a theoretical and 
comparative point of view this is neither odd nor unusual. Sahlins 
suggests that "... rights of call on the produce of the underlying 
population, as well as obligations of generosity, are everywhere 
associated with chieftainship". Moreover such 'redistribution' 
serves to sustain the community and acts as a ritual or symbol of 
the subordination of the community to central authority, and thus 
".... redistribution sustains the corporate structure itself". 
44 
43. Hahn: Op. cit., pp. 16-17. A mean 'chief' was said to be 
".... greatly left-handed or stingy". 
44. Sahlins: Op. cit., pp. 180-190. Nay emphasis, A. L. Nash makes 
a similar point. Reciprocity, he says, with a central agency - "a political/economic centre" - for collecting goods and 
distributing them defines the redistributive type of exchange 
system. This falls short of the system of 'mobilization' 
whereby an "elite collects goods and services .... for the broad purposes of the society". Nash: Op. cit., PP. 31-2. 
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It is, at least, not implausible that some Khoi groups approximated 
this level and degree of structural differentiation, division of 
labour and wealth. As we shall see, the closeness of some Khoi 
particularly in the east, to some of the Xhosa chiefdoms, and the 
similarity (and indeed elision) in structure, language and culture, 
renders this quite possible. The same may be said for the Nana Khoi 
north and south of the Orange river, who were in contact with the 
Sotho Tlhaping. 45 
At any rate, the evidence reveals a substantial variation 
between wealthy and impoverished Khoi - for example, compare the 
'Saldanhar' Khoi with Herry's Strandlopers scrounging round Table 
Bay - and that, in itself, suggests that there was a continuum, 
within the category of the herders, of differing degrees of structural 
differentiation developing out of the respective material circum- 
stances of the hordes in question at various times, and which was 
also related to the kinds of systematic interaction with other groups 
which they experienced. 
Against that background it is convenient to : examine here 
some aspects of the relationships between the Khoi and San before 
proceeding to look briefly at the structure of Nguni/Sotho society 
and the wider and loose network of relationships which existed between 
them and the Khoi, particularly with regard to 'trade' and clientage. 
45. Harinck; Op. cit. and passim; and Wilson: "The Sotho ... ", 
p. 116. 
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The precise nature of the histories and the relations 
of Khoi and San has long worried the experts. Recently, Elphick has 
persuasively suggested that the Khoi derive from a San core in 
northern Botswana. He suggests that several bands broke away and to 
the south from there, and acquired stock from Bantu-speakers. He 
suggests that this may have occurred at least in the mid-14th century, 
if not before. Moreover, he adduces strong evidence to support this 
argument that these people moved slowly south to the middle Orange 
river area, and that the Cape Khoi went straight on towards the south, 
while the Nama moved west along the Orange. He terms this process 
an 'upward ecological cycle', and supplements the argument by 
suggesting that it was balanced by the possibility of a 'downward 
ecological cycle', which - as a result of a variety of factors - 
could force Khoi back into typical hunter-gatherer patterns of life. 
46 
Marks had put this kind of case more forcefully by saying that there 
was ".... little to distinguish a landless and cattle-less Khoi from 
a Bushman, or a Bushman who acquired cattle from a Khoi". 
47 
Now it is apparent from the ethnographic specifics outlined 
earlier that there were many aspects of their cultures which suggest 
substantial institutional continuities and hence render this argument 
most convincing, especially in respect of Khoi origins. It is 
clearly the case that both San and Khoi could and did hunt and gather, 
and that herders who fell on hard times could (and did) revert to 
46. See Note 1 above. And Elphick: Op. cit., chapters I-IV. 
Elphick's work has resolved some important questions about Khoi 
origins, but there are some reservations which I outline below. 
47. Marks: Op. cit., p. 57 and passim. 
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this, using 'San' techniques. The general principles governing 
internal relations within the group, sharing and communal 
hospitality - 'generalized reciprocity', that is, in exchange 
terms - prevailed amongst the Khoi in many respects, particularly 
with regard to food. Moreover the principles, procedures and 
ceremonies relating to marriage, (exogamy and doing service for 
the bride's parents) were similar. 
46 Also, the imperatives of 
transhumance and nomadic hunting/gathering required spaced 
pregnancies and, if necessary, the disposal by the midwife of a 
baby born too soon - "... 'thrown away', in the Naron phrase". 
49 
Both Khoi and San danced, particularly when the moon was full, or 
at the new moon. It appears that their 'religious' practices - if 
we are not able to say much about beliefs - were not dissimilar. 
The mantis crops up in both San and Khoi religious symbolism and 
was identified with the 'good spirits'. But there one must pause 
in the argument before assuming that there could be a rapid upward 
cycle from 'pure' San to Khoi, though it remains legitimate to 
conceive of the possibility of a rapid downward cycle. And there 
are other reasons for proceeding with caution before regarding the 
San-Khoi continuum as one which could be traversed within a 
generation. 
The linguistic evidence is, first, important. It indicates 
that though all the hunters 'clicked', as did the Khoi, it is not 
probable that they all understood each other. Neither is it clear 
48. Wilson: Op. cit., PP-52-3, and p. 60. The husband was usually 
required to perform some kind of service for his parents-in-law 
before returning to his family group with his wife. Sometimes 
they would help to form the nucleus of a new group. 
49. Ibid., loc. cit. 
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that all Khoi were always understood by San and vice-versa. 
50 
If this is the case, how could all San and cattle-less Khoi 
communicate with each other? 
Secondly, some hunters painted, and the herders did not. 
That is evident from the content of the rock-art. This suggests 
a much more important distinction between the cultures of the 
hunters and the herders, and one that can perhaps not be so 
easily blurred by suggesting that there were two different 'ways of 
life' between which individuals or even groups could shuttle, 
depending on material circumstances. There are some finer yet 
crucial distinctions that need to be made which imply a difference 
in kind, as opposed to degree, between the hunters and the herders. 
It is quite likely that herding Khoi who fell on hard times lived 
like the hunting San. We know that the herders could and did hunt 
and gather veldkos. So it is likely that they fell back on those 
techniques until, by one means or another (which included attaching 
themselves as clients to cattle-keepers, as we shall examine 
shortly) they were able to begin to build up a herd again. Thus 
ignoring the uncertain evidence about physical appearance and the 
more persuasive linguistic evidence, it seems plausible to argue 
only that it was probably impossible to tell the difference between 
San and cattle-less Khoi, and the Dutch certainly did not do so 
initially. Thus it is likely that cattle-less Khoi 'became' - or 
appeared to - San in terms of behaviour and life-style, and 
attached themselves as clients to more prosperous Khoi. But that 
is an entirely different matter from suggesting that the converse 
therefore also holds; that is, that "... groups of San could 
50. Wilson: Op. cit., PP. 43-4, and, more directly for the complex 
linguistic argument, E. O. J. Westphal: Op. cit., assim. He says "From a linguistic point of view the situation is clear: the 
various Bush languages, Kwadi, Hottentot and Bantu, having 
nothing in common with each other". Ibid., p. 237. 
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acquire cattle and become herders .... ". 
51 As I have argued above, 
the differences between the societal types, anchored on the distinct 
economic systems, implies a series of different technologies, skills, 
belief systems, ceremonies and cultures, though Khoi originated 
from a San core. Moreover, the really quite elaborate 'cattle- 
cult' of the Khoi and the complex techniques of enlarging herds and 
controlling them - like riding oxen, and teaching cattle to respond 
to calls and whistles, and so on - meant that it was no simple 
matter to 'become' a Khoi. But in the light of this, the most 
testing evidence seems to be the generally unsatisfactory attempts 
made to turn hunters into herders. In the late 18th and early 19th 
century, stock farmers on the north-eastern periphery of the colony 
were so exasperated by the remorseless raids by San on their flocks 
and herds that they gave the hunters sheep and goats in an attempt 
to convert them into pastoralists. While raiding decreased for a 
while, and though some San took to stock breeding, "... few bands 
of hunters - other than those attached to a mission station or a 
group of herders - seem to have been transformed into herders". 
52 
The relationshiis between the farmers and the hunters in that area 
in this respect were complex. Colonel Collins who toured the 'North- 
Eastern boundary' of the colony in 1809 reported that many of the 
'Bosjemans' had been saved from perishing by "... the supplies of 
sheep and game which they received from the farmers". One family had 
supplied ".... the Bosjemen in the course of three months with 142 
head of large game". 
53 Given the tension on that border and the 
51. Marks: Op. cit., p. 59. My emphasis, A. L. And Elphick's account 
of origins. 
52. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 71. 
53" Colonel Collins: "Journal of a Tour to the North-Eastern 
Boundary", in Moodie: The Record, V, p. 3. 
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regular raids on stock by San in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, as they were forced back into the mountains and their 
access to game diminished as did the ample herds too, it is not 
unduly cynical to see the actions of the farmers as having a some- 
what more pragmatic purpose. If they could provide the San with 
food - game which the farmers could shoot on a large scale, or 
sheep and goats, or even the odd head of cattle - then it was no 
doubt their calculation that this would stop the raids on their 
more valuable herds. Certainly this seems to have been what 
Lichtenstein discovered near Tulbagh in 1804. There he found that 
the Landdrost had come to an arrangement with a group of San whereby 
"... in consideration of the yearly tribute of cattle to be paid them, 
they would maintain a quiet and peacable conduct .... on the other 
hand they were solemnly promised that no colonist should take into 
his own hands the right of punishing injuries received by him; and 
that they should not be pursued for past offences". 
54 
The points confirm the general argument that it is unlikely 
that commuting between the categories of Khoi and San (or, more 
loosely, herding and hunting) in both directions was either in 
principle possible or widespread. For as Professor Wilson writes, 
".... the transformation of hunter to herder involves a radical shift 
in values, in particular the willingness to forgo immediate food in 
order to preserve breeding stock for future supply. Hunters were 
likely to eat all the stock they acquired". 
55 
54. H. Lichtenstein: Travels in Southern Africa, Vol. 11, p. 189. NNy 
emphasis, A. L. 
55. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 72. Also, a person who is Mau ".. is also a 
danger to other people, and more especially to the animals and 
other living things on which the community depends... ". Hoernlh 
Op. cit., p. 67. The elaborate rituals associated with, for instance, 
childbirth, marriage, puberty and bereavement, all involved 
seclusion, and particularly separation from the herds. People 
couldn't simply 'become' Khoi given that degree of cultural and 
ideological difference and detail. 
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Given the two quite distinct societal models which San and 
Khoi exemplify at the extremes, and given especially the comparative 
evidence about the societal type of hunter-gatherer, the following 
argument may resolve some of the problems. The origin, of the Khoi 
in a Central Botswana San core makes great sense and explains many 
of the continuities. But three categories of people emerge from the 
evidence and the analysis - one at either end of a structural and 
historical continuum and the third rather more uncertainly in the 
middle. At the one extreme there are the aboriginal San. At the 
other extreme the established and prosperous Khoi hordes, like the 
Inqua, and they stood at the recent end, so to speak, of a number of 
historically complex transitions, involving the acquiring of new 
skills, different values and preferences and associated rituals and 
ceremonies. Between the extremes, on this schematic continuum q it 
seems useful to regard cattle-less Khoi as being difficult to 
distinguish from San. They utilized precisely the same techniques for 
survival and would therefore have necessarily been smaller in group 
size for precisely the same reasons that hunting bands in Southern 
Africa and elsewhere had to be. Such groups - either San or cattle- 
less Khoi - may have attached themselves to cattle-rich Khoi or, 
later, to veeboere. Once they had a sufficient cattle or sheep to 
start a self-supporting herd, the Khoi elements were able to do so. 
(Herry's ability later, at the Cape, to do this, is evidence of that). 
The San clients however would not have done so. Some 
might have been in temporary clientship, others in the process of 
slow absorption into the Khoi group. But the change in norms, 
consumption patterns, ritual associated with cattle and politico- 
social organization simply could not have been acquired in so short 
a time to permit San to 'become' Khoi within (or over) a generation. 
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However, the downward spiral could indeed have been very 
fast for Khoi, and brought about by disease, drought or warfare. 
But they would have retained the residual skills and latent 
capacities and potential to reverse their fate by acquiring cattle, 
as suggested above. 
This helps to explain why the Dutch at first made no 
distinction between Khoi and San and why there is some uncertainty 
about differentiation of cattle-less Khoi from San in the middle of 
the continuum. A final point is that there appear to be no rock- 
drawings which illustrate pastoral pursuits - only hunting. This 
and the other evidence suggests two conclusions: first, that the 
'upward ecological cycle' was very slow indeed - many generations, 
if not longer; while the downward cycle could be very rapid. But, 
secondly, groups could not shuttle between the 'pure' types. 
55a 
The theoretical argument about the significant discontinui- 
ties between cultures and the empirical evidence tend to converge on 
a conclusion. Khoi without cattle fell back on a San (or hunting) 
way of life. And there is little doubt, despite the problems 
generated by the linguistic evidence, that such Khoi formed loose 
alliances of interest with San and engaged in predatory offensive 
attacks against both other cattle-rich Khoi, and colonist veeboere. 
As early as the late 17th century Dapper had noted that "They (the 
San, A. L. ) are extremely great plunderers and marauders. They steal 
55a. There is probably less disagreement than meets the eye. A 
most stimulating and - to me - clarifying correspondence with 
Professor Elphick, and a useful comment on it by Dr Shula Marks, 
suggests that most of the differences in interpretation are 
attributable to the difficulties (and hence non-specification) 
of establishing the time taken for these processes. Elphiek's 
account of the origins of the Khoi must remain definitive. But 
the transition from the old 'Bushmen-versus-Hottentot' conception 
to the more fluid notion of an easy or rapid elision between San 
and Khoi must be handled with great caution, given the structural 
characteristics of the two societal typos in their ideal-typical 
and empirical aspects. I am grateful to Professor Elphick for 
his response to correspondence and to Dr Marks for making some 
most constructive points about the difficulties in all this. 
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from other (sic) Hottentots all the cattle they can get....,,. 
56 
Before looking finally at the wider network of relationships 
between the indigenous societies, under the headings of olientage 
and trade, a brief sketch of the typical features of the political 
economy and social structure of the Nguni/Sotho is needed here. 
57 
In respect of economic systems, associated population size, socio- 
political structure and culture, the Bantu-speaking chiefdoms of 
South Africa were respectively more diversified, larger in terms of 
constituent units, structurally more differentiated and hierarchical, 
while their wider institutional and belief systems were accordingly 
more complex. They all grew crops, herded cattle and sheep and 
goats. Some fished, and they all hunted. The wider and more diverse 
economic structure of these societies meant that there was a more 
complicated division of labour, both in respect of residential units 
(that is 'horizontally' within and between kinsmen and clansmen) and 
'vertically' in respect of the political hierarchy. They also were 
settled and, unlike the Khoisan, not nomadic. While the Nguni lived 
in scattered homesteads, the Sotho resided in more compact and quite 
substantial settlements. The resultant surplus which could be 
generated by this mixed economy entailed two things which are of 
importance for our purposes here. First, it meant that - unlike the 
San - they could incorporate or attach strangers to their lineages or 
clans on a considerable scale without the economic infrastructure 
56. O. Dapper: "Kaffraria or Land of Kaffirs, Also Named Hottentots", 
P-33. At this time of course no distinction was made by the Dutch 
between San and Khoi; they called the former 'Souqua' Hottentots, 
57. The two most succinct and compact accounts of the Nsuni and the 
Sotho are those by Monica Wilson in the Oxford History of South 
Africa, Vol 1. Also, Schapera (ed. ): Tho Bantu-apeaking Peoples 
of South Africa, passim. 
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being placed under intolerable strain. Secondly, they could 
exchange some of their surplus for other necessary or desired goods. 
But this did not take place on a wide scale. The Sotho, for instance, 
were skilled craftsmen in metal, ivory, wood and leather, and they 
exchanged these goods for cattle. The degree of specialization and 
division of labour this implies was a further consequence of their 
more diverse and substantial economies, not only between men and women, 
different age groups and various status strata, but also between men 
and men, chiefs and commoners. Developing out of these economies, 
then, and expressed in them, we have a more complex nexus of socio- 
political and cultural relationships. 
The typical unit was the territorially-based chiefdom, 
which was constituted by a number of patricians (which sometimes 
overlapped between chiefdoms as a result of splits in the latter) 
which were composed of a number of lineages all claiming descent from 
a common ancestor, and exogamy was in general practised between the 
clans, though the Sotho permitted and favoured cousin marriage. The 
predominance of one clan, that of the chief, determined status, and 
the others were ranked in relation to it. A common basis for splitting 
of a chiefdom, and the establishment of a new one, was the 'fault line', 
as it were, that ran - as a result of polygamy - between the sons of 
the 'great wife' (the bearer of the heir) and the right-hand wife (the 
first wife). The opening up of this 'fault' within the chiefdom 
meant that it split and a new one was established. Similarly within 
each clan, a split would occur when a component lineage would pool 
off and marriage took place between two lineages formerly of one clan, 
but now the nuclei of two. 
The elaborate cattle-cult of the Nguni and the Sotho has 
already been referred to; the details are not relevant hero. A 
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high value was placed on cattle, both in terms of 'wealth' and in 
terms of values associated with them. Strict regulations governed 
contact between women and cattle, and their "... rituals reflected 
the preoccupation of the Nguni with cattle". 
58 They passed as 
'lobola' at marriage and were the usual sacrifice at puberty, 
marriage, sickness, death, purification of women after childbirth, and 
so on. The authority of the chief was considerable in respect of 
arbitration, keeping the peace and maintaining the rule of law, and 
extracting fines and tribute. Yet illustrating the associated and 
checking principles of the 'centralizing movement' in exchange terms, 
and its correlate, redistriction, the chief had obligations of 
generosity, "... subsidizing religious ceremony, social pageantry, 
or war... ". 
59 "The Chief, everywhere acts as a tribal banker, 
collecting food, storing it, and protecting it, and then using it for 
the benefit of the whole community", days Malinowski. 
60 
"A stingy 
chief lost followers; a generous man attracted them". 
61 
The chief 
too was custodian of the past; the Bantu-speakers venerated their 
58. Wilson: ,. 'The Nguni", p. 127. Maquet suggests rather more generally 
the characteristics associated with cattle in such societies 
".... enable them to play a role which recalls, though not very 
closely, that of capital in western economic systems". The 
Civilizations of Black Africa, p. 120. 
59. Sahlins: Op. cit., p. 189. 
60. Ibid., citing Pialinowshii 
61. Wilson: Op. cit., pp. 120-1, and her discussion of the chief 
amongst the "Sotho, Venda and Tsonga", Op. cit., passim. 
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ancestors and evinced great respect for customs and tradition, and 
sacrificed to the shades. Witchcraft was identified as one source 
of evil and misfortune, and there were some people who were 
specialists in the interpretation of the "will of the shades and the 
identity of evildoers". 
62 
From the preceding account of the San, Khoi and Nguni/Sotho 
it is possible to identify and contrast one aspect of their 
respective political economies and social structure. The capacity 
of the hunters to absorb strangers into their bands was almost nil. 
Their economy could not cope with this, the organization of band 
structure precluded it and there was little they could offer in the 
way of patronage. Indeed such was the precariousness of their 
ecological balance that infanticide was a necessary means of 
controlling population. The Khoi, (or some of them), on the other 
hand, given larger herds of cattle, the capacity to generate surplus 
by careful tending of the beasts, and the consequent variations in 
wealth, could - in some cases - take in strangers at the margins. 
The patrilineal and patriclan organization of the hordes provided a 
structural point of entry, or attachment, for such people and they 
had the cattle and sheep to be herded which provided the basis for 
patronage. The Nguni/Sotho, by contrast with both the hunters and 
herders, could and did attach strangers on a greater scale because 
of their political economy and social structure. Indeed both the 
Ngoni - on the 'snowballing' movement to the north - and the Sotho 
were constituted by waves and layers of populations in the course of 
63 
their respective histories. But the loose network of relations 
between San, Khoi and Nguni/Sotho at the Cape prior to the arrival of 
62. Ibid., p. 128 and passim. 
63. See Barnes: 0 p. cit., pp . 39-4l. In the case of 
the Ngoni a combin- 
ation of thew of captive , their incorporation 
through age- 
sets and marriage made for internal uniformity and homogeneity. 
On the Sotho, see Wilson: Op. cit., P-133- 
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the Dutch is best analyzed in terms of the more general questions 
of clientship and 'trade', and it is to the former that I turn first. 
There is little systematic comparative and theoretical 
work on patron-client relations for Africa. 
64 
Thus there is no 
ready analytical framework upon which to draw, and in terms of which 
the structure of pre-colonial inter-group relations at the Cape may 
be explored. The absence of such an established body of theory may 
account, too, for the diverse and discreet ways in which the term 
'clientship' or 'clientage' has been used. 
65 
However, as a 
tentative way of ordering the variety of different arrangements 
subsumed under the head of client-patron relationships, the following 
characteristics, developing out of a core common to all, ought to 
help our purposes. The central features of the client-patron 
relationship are, first, that the institution is generally found 
between individuals (or reasonably small groups); secondly, that it 
is not institutionalized through a 'formal charter'; thirdly, that 
it is thus without 'legal consequences' but entails reciprocal 
obligations of service, exchange and/or protection, and fourthly, 
that it has both political and economic dimensions. The variations 
from this core of associated features - particularly in respect of 
64. The limited work on this for sub-Saharan Africa means that explicit 
and well established analytical frameworks which might bo tested 
hardly exist. See Maquet: Power and Society in Africa , pp. 195-216. Lucy Mair offers some empirical comparisons in Primitive Government. 
65. For example, see Mairt Op. cit., pp. 113-5, pp. 166-70, pp. 176-8, 
pp. 182-9, and pp. 236-9; also Maquet: Op. cit., pp. 195-6; 
M. G. Smith: "Institutional and Political Conditions of Pluralism", 
p. 56; Turnbull: Wayward Servants, pp. 223-8; The Oxford History 
of South Africa, Vol 1, pp. 63-4, pp. 120-1, and PP-155-69 and 
PP. 1 4-5; L. M. Thompson (ed. ): African Societies in Southern 
Africa, p. 41, p. 71 and p. 82. 
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of the groups we are concerned with here - and include the duration 
for which a particular client-patron relationships exists, the kind 
of duties and services provided by the parties, the purpose for 
which the relationship is entered, and the political implications - 
more so for the patron than the client - entailed. Moreover, it 
makes sense to locate the phenomenon at the middle of a continuum, 
the variations in which stretch on the one hand from tmporary 
symbiosis (between two socio-political and cultural groups which are 
".... internally autonomous and institutionally distinct.... "66) to 
relationships which led to complete absorption and incorporation on 
differential and equal terms. 
It is quite clear that many of these forms held in South 
Africa within and between most of the groups examined earlier. The 
variations indicated above can also be found to apply. Temporary 
symbiotic relationships obtained between Tswana cattle-owners living 
in substantial settlements and San hunters (called Sarwa). The 
latter brought game, pelts and ivory in return for iron weapons, 
tobacco, grown food and beads. It is not altogether clear whether the 
hunters were given cattle, though it is suggested that over a very 
long period ".... some Sarwa also were being transformed into cattle- 
owners". But the social and political correlates of this symbiotic 
relationships were direct and strict: the 'clients' were not incor- 
porated at all, had no access to the judicial process, and marriage 
between Tswana and Sarwa was frowned on. 
67 
Similarly, Nguni and San 
were involved in intermittent symbiotic relationships, and it is 
66. M. G. Smith: "Pluralism in Precolonial African Societioo", p. 110. 
67. Wilson: "The Sotho ..... ", pp. 155-6. 
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reported that the Mpondomise and Mpondo (Xhosa groups) ".... depended 
on San as rainmakers.... ", and it seems that such client groups 
were attached in the first instance to the chief and his kin. 
68 
This kind of symbiotic relationship - not always peaceful, for San 
raids on Nguni or Sotho cattle resulted in warfare - is in some ways 
similar to that which obtained between the Mbuti pygmies and Negro 
villagers, described by Turnbull. 
69 
An aspect of this type of 
relationship was that bands, or members of bands, were in no way 
incorporated within the institutions of the Nguni or Sotho, and 
remained segregated from them. Associated negative attitudes reflect 
this. Kuper says that the Kgalagari considered that "... the Bushmen 
live like wild animals, without leaders, without permanent villages, 
and without law. "7° And Turnbull reports that such negative 
attitudes -despite formal symbiosis - between Mbuti and the villagers 
were mutual. The Mbuti pygmies called the Bantu-speakers 'animald 
and 'savages', and the Bantu-speakers regarded the pygmies similarly. 
71 
Thus, this kind of symbiotic relationship between the hunters and the 
cultivators was neither close nor: intense. Rather, it was inter- 
mittent, reflected the socio-political and cultural autonomy of the 
groups, but provided for temporary economic arrangements of a mutually 
satisfactory kind, though the political and economic predominance of 
68. Ibid., pp. 179-80 and Wilson: "The Nguni People", p. 106. 
69. Turnbull: The Forest People, passim and Wayward Servants, pp. 223-8. 
70. Adam Kuper: Kalahari Village Politics, PP-44-5- 
71- The Forest People, p. 47. 
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the 'patrons' was clear. Smith says that this kind of clientage is 
"... institutionalized political symbiosis between individuals and/or 
reasonably small groups .... By itself clientage is unlikely to 
dissolve sectional boundaries whenever differences of culture, 
religion or race are prominent". 
72 The evidence from the Cape seems 
to confirm this. But the explanation needs to be taken further than 
simply the cultural, religious or 'racial' factors: the economic 
autonomy of the groups and also the temporary nature of the arrange- 
ments would need to be considered too, as well as the limited 
purposes for which such relationships were entered into by both groups. 
The second representative kind of clientship - the more 
typical form which the relationship takes - was between individuals. 
The economically more secure and established (that is, the settled 
Xhosa and Sotho in relation to the Khoi, and the herding Khoi in 
relation to the hunting San) tended to be patrons, not clients. These 
relationships were presumably temporary, unlike the hereditary 
ubuhake ('to pay a visit of homage') relationship in Rwanda which 
Maquet describes, though that could also be ended by either party at 
any time. 
73 The temporary client relationship must have ebbed and 
flowed with seasons, individual circumstances and the contingencies 
arising from natural and environmental conditions. It was common 
where the groups lived or came into close and proximate geographical 
relations, and no doubt it was precisely those same conditions of 
72. M. G. Smith: "Institutional and Political Conditions... ", p. 56. 
73. Maquet: Power and Society in Africa, pp. 197-8. 
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of contiguity which gave rise to the issues of conflict that have 
been described. There is evidence to indicate that the client- 
patron relation occurred amongst the cattle keepers, between them 
and also between hunters and herders. Thus the individual hunter 
and his family may have come to an arrangement with a herder - Khoi 
or Nguni/Sotho - and perhaps done some hunting and gathering for his 
patron in return for protection, food and other items. There is 
little firm evidence for the 17th century about the particulars of 
this hunter/herder relation, and many questions are not easy to 
answer. Did the hunters actually herd for the Khoi or Nguni/Sotho? 
I argued above that the transformation of a hunter into a herder was 
not simple. Given, moreover, the complicated evidence about 
language, how did they communicate? Perhaps those groups of hunters 
and herders that lived close to each other could understand enough of 
each other's language? No doubt the more permament relationships 
that also developed (see below) meant that clients learnt the 
languages of their patrons. In any event there is enough evidence - 
and a painting from the 19th century - to be able to support the 
San/Khoi client/patron relationship, though the form and content of 
it is less easy to be sure about. 
74 
74. Wilson: "The Hunters and Herders", pp. 62-649 and "The Sotho ... ", 
pp. 192-3. There is an interesting comparative point. Hunters 
have been known to become clients of farmers. But "... while 
clients of the farmers are drawn into the farming economy .... (they) often do not themselves adopt such an economy. Objeoto 
from the material culture of the farmers will comp into the 
possession of the clients but the appropriate technology will 
often remain the prerogative of the former group". D. W. Philipoon: 
"Early Iron-using peoples of South Africa", PP. 41-2. 
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Within the same category it was customary for 'poor' 
Khoi to attach themselves to richer Khoi as herders. Schapera 
says: "A wealthy cattle-owner will place some of this stock under 
the care of an impoverished tribesman, allowing him to use the 
milk for his own nourishment and to claim half the increase". 
75 
This is the classic form of the individual and temporary relation of 
clientship, for once the client had built up the basis of a new herd 
he could detach himself from the relationship and rejoin his clan, 
though he could also remain a herdsman for the rest of his life. 
The same was true for Khoi/Xhosa relationships, particularly in the 
Eastern Cape districts. 
Finally, at the end of the continuum there were those 
client/patron relations that resulted in full incorporation within 
the society of the patrons. When clientship becomes more permanent, 
says Wilson, the clients ".... learn the languages of their patrons 
and lose their own; their crafts mostly disappear and they become 
absorbed into the patron's culture". 
76 There are some theoretical 
questions to be asked shortly about the conditions under which this 
happened. But historically there is evidence to suggest that this 
probably occurred between some San clients and Khoi patrons - which 
is not the same thing as San 'becoming' Khoi. 
77 And within the same 
relationship category Khoi clients were absorbed by Xhosa groups in 
75. I. Schapera: The Khoisan Peoples, p-294- 
76. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 64. ray emphasis, A. L. This is how Elphick 
analyzes the longterm historical process of incorporation of 
San by Khoi through the processes of acculturation. Elphick: 
Op. cit., pp. 70-79. It nicely illustrates the slow movomcnt from 
differential to uniform incorporation. 
77. Wilson: loc. cit. 
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the Eastern Cape, though it appears from some of the linguistio 
evidence that this did not always entail complete and equal incor- 
poration, and that Khoi "... participation was limited to that 
extent in Xhosa society". 
78 The mixing and incorporation in the area 
of the Fish river was not only a result of client-patron relations 
but also the result of Khoi and Gonaqua living interspersed among 
Xhosa. Marriages took place between them or by the former attaching 
themselves to Xhosa lineages and vice-versa, for both Xhosa and Khoi 
societies "... had facilities which provided means of incorporation". 
79 
Thus, at this end of the client-patron spectrum, the causes and 
process of full or partial incorporation of individuals or small 
groups by another one merge with other wider processes of interaction. 
78. Harinck: Op. cit., pp. 152-3. Also Wilson: "The Nguni People", 
PP. 103-6. 
79. Harinck: Op. cit., p. 169. One wonders whether something analagous 
to this process of incorporation via lineages may not be 
identified in the boer practice of incorporating servile 
dependents and their children as 'members' of the family, albeit 
unequal and 'second-class' members? The descriptions that occur 
of homestead structure and life in, say, Olive Schreiner's 
Story of an African Farm suggests this strongly. More recently 
the superb novel by Andre Brink: Looking on Darkness (Kennil 
van die Aand) has some startlingly powerful observations on 
some aspects of the process. Not surprisingly - for many reasons - 
it is the first major novel in Afrikaans to have been banned in 
South Africa. And although we know very little about this 
process, the waves of population that were absorbed in the form- 
ation of the Sotho, as they came south, were many. "Cattle- 
keepers and cultivators absorbed both hunters and other 
cattle-keepers and cultivators". Wilson: "The Sotho ..... ", 
p. 133. It seems to have been happening from well before 1600. 
Ibid., pp. 134-5. In relation to Khoi and Xhosa in the East, 
Harinck suggests that Xhosa took Khoi women, and also that 
"Assimilation of Xhosa by Khoi occurred when leaderless Xhosa 
refugees entered Khoi chiefdoms". From these unions the Gonaqua 
emerged, and they in turn, he argues, "... were incorporated by 
the expanding Xhosa chiefdoms during the early 1700s". 
Harinck: Op. cit., pp056-8. 
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Thus the continuum stretching from intermittent symbiotic relations 
between autonomous entities, through the more typical individual 
and temporary client/patron relationships, to the partial or full 
incorporation of individuals and small groups into other cultures 
and politico-economic systems is illustrated by the Cape material. 
There are of course areas which are patchy, and aspects of these 
relationships about which one simply cannot be sure. But these net- 
works of quite distinctive societies were loosely linked together 
at their edges by a variety of systems of clientship and wider inter- 
action, which were also supplemented by long-distance trade. I deal 
with that shortly. Before doing so it is important to pull out some 
tentative theoretical conclusions which have comparative implications 
for the analysis of V. O. C. -colonist/Khoisan relations in later 
chapters. 
There were no overwhelming economic or material reasons 
for the more powerful groups - Xhosa in relation to Khoi, and Khoi 
in relation to San, to put it simply - to attack and swallow up the 
smaller or weaker groups, though some status derived from having 
followers and clients. Indeed so long as the game was plentiful and 
the landscape not a fiercely contested scarce resource, Khoi and San 
lived side by side, as did Khoi and Xhosa, and more generally Nguni/ 
Sotho and San. These contacts were expressed sometimes through 
client-patron relations and their form and content differed between 
groups at different times and places, and some absorption and 
incorporation - differentially and uniformly - took place too. That 
this was possible turns on a number of factors which are worth 
suggesting. 
First, intermittent symbiosis or temporary olientship must 
have depended for their transientness on the real posoibility for 
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the hunters or the herders to return to their hunting grounds or 
herding areas. And of course one of the critical factors that was 
to distinguish Khoi-Dutch dependency relations from these prior 
relationships was that, in general and as time went by, temporary 
clientship or symbiosis became impossible, and a return to their 
land had been foreclosed on because the colonists had taken it, or 
had moved onto it. Also, during their clientship, the clients must 
have had to retain their ".... internally autonomous and institution- 
ally distinct .... " cultures. These two related aspects of 
the 
broader socio-economic circumstances surrounding the arrangement were 
the preconditions of their survival as a culture under those conditions 
of clientship discussed above. Secondly, the full absorption of 
clients or 'others' into the culture and society of the patrons - 
though the two may be found together, or apart - presupposes, broadly 
speaking, two structural conditions. First, the economy of the 
patrons (or the 'hosts') must be able to tolerate whatever the 
increase in numbers may be, and irrespective of the point of entry. 
That is, it might either be attachment to a chief or to a lesser 
lineage. Secondly, and directly related to the latter consideration, 
the structure and institutional arrangements of the patrons' society 
must be such as to permit this admission and consequent 'acculturation' 
through integration. And we have seen how both Xhosa and Khoi - but 
not San - had this capacity. This, it seems, underlines the force 
of Smith's point that "... the most thorough social incorporation 
that unilineal descent permits involves adoption of outsiders into 
the host lineages as members with full rights. This is more easily 
done for individuals than for groups". 
80 Where, however, the 
incorporative process did not involve equality or 'full righto', we 
80. M. G. Smith: "Pluralism in Pre-colonial"Africa", p. 115. 
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have the germ of one form of 'plural society' through differential 
incorporation. But there are problems. If cultural absorption was 
complete, what means were used to distinguish the former clients? 
And why? This is part of a much wider problem and the answer in each 
case would need careful analysis. We need to ask more than "... 
which groups acculturate and why .... " at any particular time and 
place. 
81 We need to ask 'which groups absorb' and why? And how? 
The history, political economy, institutional arrangements - say, 
labour requirements, extended families and clans, or nuclear families - 
normative universe and goals of the dominant groups and their 
relationships, in respect of all these aspects, with the clients or 
the conquered has to be analyzed. For instance, among the Ndebele, 
the 'layers' of conquered and incorporated groups were separated 
largely in terms of prestige into a three-tier system with the 
descendants of the original Nguni warriors from Natal being the 
dominant stratum, known as zansi. Next came the enhla who were 
descended from the Sotho and Tswana groups taken in during the Ndebele 
period in the Transvaal. Last of all were the recently conquered 
Shona, called lozwi or holi. Marriages between these strata were not 
approved of, though in time the distinctions faded. 
82 By contrast, 
however, another Nguni offshoot - the Ngoni - developed an entirely 
homogenous society from "... a motley heterogeneous collection of 
individuals ... " whereby ... recent captives, both men and women, 
were indoctrinated in Ngoni ways and made to feel that theý, too, 
were Ngoni". 
83 The means were, in brief, through the age-set 
81. Marks: Op. cit., P-58- 
62. J. D. Omer-Cooper: The Zulu Aftermath, pp. 149-150; M. C. Smitht 
Op. cit., pp. 119-120. He says "... these differences of corporate 
status persisted despite enculturation within the age-set 
organizations". My emphasis, A. L. 
83. Barnes: Op. oit., p. 29 and p. 40. 
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systems and marriage. An important difference - which relates the 
discussion of the accommodative structures to the economic system 
and material organization of the society - is that "... cattle were 
a short-term asset and the control of cattle did not give rise to 
any cleavage of interest which was not already present in the 
residential system" of the Ngoni. 
84 This suggests that more than 
only the 'structure`of accommodation' needs to be examined, or rather 
that its particulars, with respect to form and capacity, in themselves 
need to be explained in terms of the wider economic systems and its 
associated normative features and values. 
65 In discussing Dutch/ 
Khoisan slave relations we shall have to return to this. But, if the 
culture, language, dress and religion come to be shared by two 
previously discre&* groups - that is, IF institutional continuity 
ensues - and IF the political economy of the conquerors or patrons 
does not require or enjoin particular categories or 'classes' of 
menials or specialists to be drawn from the conquered or the clients, 
nor demands a historically-based division of labour, how important do 
somatic differences, or differences in prestige based on history, or 
names even, become? And if the definition of particular aspects of 
physical difference, or the identification and valuing of certain 
prized historical associations are in themselves socially conditioned, 
wherein lies the explanation for that? These are bigger questions 
84. Ibid., PP-31-2. 
85. Smith says: "So far as our data extend, the only variable that 
correlates uniformly with these distributions of cultural and 
ethnic differences is the structure of accommodation; and 
clearly, as the examples show, it is this accommodative structure 
that sets the limits, forms and rate of enculturation and 
interaction across corporate boundaries". Smith: Op. oit., p. 141. 
But what institutes and fashions the particular forms of 
'accommodative structure' ? 
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than can be answered here. However, they set up a broader conceptual 
and comparative context within which relations between Khoi, the San, 
the Nguni/Sotho, later European settlers, and African and Asian 
slaves at the Cape will need to be assesoed. Before closing this 
chapter it is finally necessary to examine 'trade' relations at the 
Cape prior to the impact of the Y. O. C. settlement. 
In considering the wider question of relations between 
groups at the Cape prior to the intrusion of the V. O. C. and colonists, 
one has to take note of recent-., research which identifies a "... long 
distance trade network, extending from the Xhosa chiefdoms westwards 
through successive Khoi chiefdoms to the vicinity of the Cape Peninsula, 
and northwards to the Orange river and thence to the western Sotho 
or Tswana chiefdoms ..... ". 
86 In later chapters we shall look 
specifically at the impact of the V. O. C. /colonists upon the Khoi at 
the Cape, particularly in respect of the manner in which their 
economies were undermined, and the economics of that process. But 
before one can proceed to analyze those and other processes (military, 
political, etc. ), it is first necessary to examine the character of 
pre-colonial intra-Cape 'trade'. That is, one must first outline, in 
more abstract terms, the central features of the patterns of exchange 
between them and the Nguni/Sotho particularly. The position of the 
San in this network is less important for our purposes hero. More- 
these 
over, the evidence about their role in/rudimentary exchanges is 
minimal. And from what has been said above about their political- 
economies it is highly unlikely that they were in any way systematically 
involved. 
86. L. M. Thompson: "The Forgotten Factor in Southern African History", 
p. 12. Ho is oummarising Harinck's findings. Schapera writes 
that Tswana wanted cattle and gave, in exchange for them, tobacco, 
ivory, beads, copper, rings, bracelets, iron boads, adzes, 
barbed spears and karooces. Schapora(a): Op. cit., 317. The 
Sotho were of course skilled in the use of is they also worked 
in leather, ivory, wood and skins, and made earthenware pots. See 
Wilson: "The Sotho .... ", pp. 147-8. And Elphick: OOp. oit., pp. 109-120. 
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Emerging from what has already been said about the character 
of the Khoi and Nguni/Sotho political economies, and the principles 
and procedures governing their internal systems of production, 
exchange and distribution, it is evident that, in these kinds of 
societies, "... the economic exchange relation is not always easy to 
distinguish from other transactions involving goods.... ". 
87 
In 
these and other respects the economic systems of the Khoi and Nguni/ 
Sotho differed radically from those of the mercantilist nations of 
Europe. While all societies have dimensions in which strictly 
'economic' relations cannot be distinguished from the strictly 'social' 
or 'political' relations, the differences in degree between these 
types become, for our purposes, differences in kind, or certainly 
are at the polar opposites of a very long continuum. And it is in 
respect of the nature and role of 'trade' that this is particularly 
true, though a discussion of trade inevitably draws one back into a 
discussion of the very core of the contrasting economic systems 
themselves. 
The characteristics of 'trade' in, and between, societies 
like those of the Khoi and the Nguni may be identified in the 
following terms. First, given the limited productive capacity and 
the respective levels of specialization and diversification within 
the socio-economic structures, there was little 'surplus' generated. 
Amongst the Nguni/Sotho cultivators there was, of course, more than 
amongst the transhumant Khoi, though within the category of the 
latter there were some groups which were better off than others, and 
this had implications for their capacity to attach clients and 
followers. But in respect of both types, 'trade' was peripheral to 
87. Maquet: Power and Society in Africa, p. 232. 
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their economies. Secondly, where they did 'trade', what they 
exchanged was not primarily food or any goods which were essential 
to the productive capacities of their economies, but 'luxuries' 
and other items like ivory, iron pieces, ornaments and so on, and 
even then such exchanges were clearly at the margins. Thirdly, the 
surplus that was generated internally was used variously by chiefs 
or family heads for purposes which had a greater priority than 
'trade'. It was used to enable client-patron relations to be 
established or followers to be attracted and kept. Or it was used 
by chiefs to provide for the communities in times of hardship. And 
only over and beyond that, and at the margins, was it used in exchange 
for other goods. Thirdly, there was no 'money' involved, not even of 
the cowrie shell variety used in West Africa, nor the small copper 
crosses which were apparently used in the Katanga area as currency 
from the eighth century. 
88 
Finally, there were no markets. A 
'market' "... implies a site, a marketplace, and it implies a kind of 
exchange". 
89 
Neither that kind of regular exchange, nor the sites 
for such markets appear to have existed. 
90 In short Out, may be said 
88. Ibid., p. 238. 
89. Nash: Op. cit., p. 29. 
90. See Wilson's chapters in the Oxford History Vol. I, which deal 
with the Herders, the Nguni and the Sotho. She says: "It is 
clear that regular markets, such as were common further north 
in Africa did not exist among the Nguni, and the trade in metal 
must have been small because even iron remained so scarce until 
the 19th century". "The Nguni People", p. 114. Schapera says 
that ".... organized trading visits from one Hottentot tribe to 
another do not appear to have occurred to any extent, if at all". 
Schaper(a): Op. cit., P-349- For the Sotho, there is evidence 
that they were "... the chief metal-workers of the Transvaal, 
and supplied the coast", but the extent and scope of their 
'trade' is uncertain. Wilson: "The Sotho .... ", pp. 145-79 
pp. 150-1, and pp. 180-1. 
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to have existed generally was what has been termed 'autoconsumption', 
that is, where "Each unit of production consumed all that it 
produced". 
91 And of course that needs to be qualified by underlining 
the important variations between Khoi and Nguni/Sotho systems of 
political economy referred to earlier, particularly in respect of the 
degrees and kinds of diversification in the mode of production, the 
associated levels of technological capacity and the accumulation 
and redistribution of 'reserves' by chiefs and 'big men'. This had 
implications for other aspects of the relations between groups and 
individuals within groups, such as the symbiotic relationships and 
various forms of clientship mentioned above. And that-in turn 
underlines the closeness of the various 'circuits' of exchange, and 
the interpenetration of the 'political' and the 'economic' dimensions 
of social structure within wider normative contexts. The crucial 
point to emphasize here - before looking at the evidence - 
is that, 
whatever the actual scope and form of 'trade' within Khoi groups and 
between them and the Nguni/Sotho, none of these peoples produced or 
herded for exchange in the market or trade sense that we associate 
with the characteristics of 17th century Dutch economic behaviour and 
ideology in the European or imperial theatres. Whereas the latter 
were rooted in production for exchange and proft, and where, in 
general, men related to each other through the cash nexus - the 
most impersonal and 'most economic' form - and according to the 
principles of 'negative reciprocity', the Khoi and the Nguni/Sotho 
combined in their systems of production and exchange the opposite 
principles of 'generalized', 'balanced' and 'redistributive' 
reciprocity, or - to put it more sharply - production for collective use? 
2 
91. Maquet: Op. cit., p. 234. 
92. Sahlins: Op. cit., passim, and Nash: Op. cit., pp. 29-48. 
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Two points are worth noting here. The first is that the Nguni/Sotho, 
with their more substantial and diversified economic structures and 
their more complex divisions of political and economic labour, had 
the capacity and potential, on the one hand, to resist later 
encroachments of a military, political and economic kind by colonists 
in the late 18th and 19th centuries. On the other hand, their 
political economies were such that individuals and groups were able 
to respond - and did - to the market opportunities opened up during 
the 19th century: in short, the political economies of the Nguni/ 
Sotho permitted their transformation into peasantries or 'proto- 
peasantries'. 
93 How and why that happened is a separate question 
and beyond our scope there. The second point relates more centrally 
to our concerns. It is that the political economies of the trans- 
humant Khoi were more vulnerable, structurally speaking, to the 
economic and political demands for trade in cattle and sheep which 
were made on them by the V. O. C. and colonists, and - related to this 
- the scope for individuals to respond and direct this demand was 
considerable and had devastating implications for the coherence and 
integrity of the hordes. The process whereby this may be analyzed in 
abstract terms will be outlined after the evidence about the content 
and form of intra-Cape trade has been examined. 
The evidence about the long-distance trade network, 
stretching from the north-east, down through the vicinity of the Cape 
Peninsula and then north-west towards the Orange river, suggests a 
number of thin connecting strands. It seems that Saldanha Cochoqua 
93" See for instance Colin Bundy: "The Emergence and Decline of a 
South African Peasantry"; G. Arrighi: "Labour Supplies in 
Historical Perspective"; H. Slater: "The Changing Pattern of 
Economic Relationships in Rural Natal: 1838-1914"; and Monica 
Wilson: "The Growing of Peasant Communities". Bundy's thesis 
is that "... it is tenable to speak of the creation of an 
African peasantry in South Africa during the nineteenth 
century.... ". P"371. 
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got iron, copper and beads via Nama Khoi, and conceivably from Tswana 
or Sotho groups. It is not altogether clear what they gave in 
exchange but Harinck suggests that it might have been cattle, but 
certainly was dagga (the local hemp or cannabis) which came from the 
Xhosa in the east. If it was cattle - and the Inqua to the east of 
the Cochoqua were known to be rich in beasts - then it confirms the 
earlier point that some hordes at least were able to generate an 
available limited surplus, providing the basis for rudimentary 
exchanges at the margins. It must have been very marginal, it needs 
to be restated, because the Khoi lived off their cattle and it would 
have been collective suicide to barter away anything more than a 
fairly limited number at any time. In addition to this flow - or 
perhaps it was a trickle - of metal which moved from the northwest 
to the southeast, via the middle men who had cattle, there was a 
westward flow of dagga, which came from the Xhosa. 
94 In the East, 
moreover, it appears that the Gona ua (Khoi-Xhosa) were in close 
relations with the Xhosa where they gave beads and copper in return 
for dagger. And around the Western Cape, and in the peninsula region 
in particular, the local Khoi there exchanged beads and metals which 
they got from the North (and later from the Dutch) for dagger and 
cattle which they obtained from groups like the Inqua. The evidence 
is not entirely clear, but it may be the case that the Inqua, 
strategically located in the centre of this network, gained in cattle 
as 'middlemen' (literally and figuratively) both from a westward move- 
ment of dagga which they mediated, and an eastward movement in 
'luxury' items like iron, copper, beads and so on. 
95 
And from the 
94. G. Harinck: Op. cit., p. 164. Professor Wilson points out that the 
Sotho also used hemp and that it was important in barter with 
Khoi and San who wanted it. So there may have been a number of 
flimsy 'trade circuits' in this commodity, not only confined to 
the Xhosa in the East. See Wilson: "The Sotho.... ", p. 142. 
See Elphick on the "narcotics" trade, too. Elphick: Op. cit., pp. 
95. Harinck: Op. cit., pp. 165-7.109-120. 
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end of the 16th century, coastal Khoi, at least, will have been in 
receipt of some European trade goods like brass and iron, and it 
was such groups, in and around the Cape, who were first to feel the 
impact of the V. O. C. and colonist demand for cattle after 1652. 
There are many questions still unanswered about this trade network. 
Was it really 'long distance' trade with 'buyers' and 'sellers' at 
both ends? Did Xhosa and Sotho actually connect knowingly via a 
whole series of contiguous groups passing goods back and forth? Or 
was it more likely to have been a series of very local, very limited 
chains or circuits of 'balanced exchange' between contiguous groups? 
Apart from the Inqua and the Gona ua, the Khoi seem to have received 
barter goods and dagga - from both the northeast and 
the northwest 
and later, the Dutch - not much cattle. In return, 
the Sotho and the 
Xhosa may have got cattle in exchange for metal goods and 
dagga in 
the case of the Sotho, and dagga only in the case of the Xhosa. 
96 
In anticipation of the analysis of the course of events which 
will be looked at in later chapters, it is as well to indicate here 
how economies such as those of the Khoi became extremely vulnerable 
when they began to interact systematically with the V. O. C. and the 
96. In his stimulating article dealing with Khoi/Xhosa relations, 
Harinck makes some large claims. He says that the Table Bay 
area functioned as "the centre of diffusion of Dutch copper, 
brass, beads, and other products that ranked high in Khoi and 
Xhosa values .... At the other end of 
the network the Xhosa 
provided the diffusion centre of dagga. Between these two 
centres the Inqua (Hamcunqua) chiefdom was located. This chief- 
dom was vital in the western flow of dagga and the eastern flow 
of metal and beads. The Inqua obtained copper plates from the 
Khoi Orange River chiefdom and possibly from the Tswana. They 
exchanged these articles with the Gonaqua and Xhosa for Xhosa- 
grown. dagga. The latter filtered via the Inqua through 
successively contiguous chiefdoms between them and the Cape 
Peninsula". Harinck: Op. cit., p. 164. I am not sure whether 
the evidence he cites supports that degree of long-distance 
trade between these 'centres'. 
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colonists whose world-view, goals and purposes and contrasting 
patterns of economic behaviour posed a direct threat to their very 
existence, because the demands of the V. O. C. and colonists went 
directly to the heart of their economies - the cattle. 
The hordes lived off their cattle and exchanges at the 
margin were minimal, and they bartered for luxuries. The goods which 
constituted the luxury items were in relatively short supply, yet 
were attractive and tempting to the Khoi, as alcohol became later. 
For such groups it is not possible to exchange cattle beyond a 
certain point for non-productive items without committing collective 
economic suicide. The evidence suggests that in their exchange 
relations with the Xhosa and Sotho, they did not, and there was not 
much - in volume or kind - to be obtained anyway. 
The sudden 
implosion into those limited and balanced 'circuits' of exchange 
of abundant supplies of beads, brass, copper, tobacco and arrack 
from the V. O. C. had shattering effects. The way in which goods of 
this kind were pumped into the diffuse and precarious Khoi economies 
and the web of loose exchange relations between them and others, and 
the way in which this undermined their autonomy and created relations 
of dependence is perhaps analagous to the process of 'monetization' 
which has been identified and analyzed elsewhere in Africa, at later 
periods. The process can be briefly outlined. 
Marx observed that97 
We have an original unity between a specific form of 
community or tribal unit and the property in nature 
connected with it, or the relation to the objective 
condition of production as naturally existing, as the 
objective being of the individual by means of the 
community. Now this unity .... has its living reality 
in a specific mode of production itself, and this mode 
appears equally as the relationship of the individuals 
to one another..... 
97. Karl Marx: Pre-capitalist Economic Formations, p. 94. My emphasis, 
A. L. In this extract one can also see how Marx is suggesting that 
'economic' and 'social' relations are not easily separable. 
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Marx continued by pointing out that the disruption of such 
communities and the consequent creation of 'detached individuals' 
"..... necessarily arises from the intercourse with foreigners, from 
slaves, the desire to exchange the surplus product, etc., (and) 
dissolves the mode of production upon which the community rests, and 
with it the objectively individual man ..... Exchange has the same 
effect.... ". 
98 While these observations are general and abstract it 
is clear what the causal process in any given instance would be. It 
has a number of distinct but related elements and stages. First, it 
presupposes a desire for certain objects (and their availability) 
which 'rank high' in the values of the group. We have seen this to 
be the case with the Khoi in relation to such items. Secondly, it 
implies that these things - in this case, pieces of iron, copper, 
brass, etc. - do not themselves contribute to production of 
the means 
of subsistence. That is, they don't create food, nor enable it to be 
obtained from others, further up the line, without costs which are 
difficult to bear and at the same time retain the group integrity. 
Thirdly, the process generates a momentum whereby the material base 
of the society (the cattle and sheep) becomes thinned out to the 
point where the group cannot continue to exist. For the goods which 
they obtain from "... the intercourse with foreigners.... " do not 
exchange sufficiently or equally any longer (if they ever did), for 
more cattle and sheep (in this case) from other groups who still 
possess such herds. This is so because the 'price' is going up, or 
supply is ceasing as other such groups, perhaps, begin to retreat 
away from the vortex which could pull them in and destroy them, or 
because they are attracted themselves directly to it. Thus, fourthly, 
98. Ibid., loc. cit. My emphases, A. L. 
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the community becomes atomized and individuals or families are thrown 
into one form of dependent relationship or another. Over the century 
at the Cape, these kinds of dependent relationships varied and the 
whole process was punctuated by resistance and counter-attack. 
Moreover, it happened over a long period and was uneven and patchy. 
Some Khoi retreated, so linked up with San groups and fought back, and 
other presumably were absorbed into Xhosa and Sotho chiefdoms, while 
thousands died in warfare and as a result of disease. But many were 
forced into service for the farmers - and veeboere in particular - 
whose expanding farm areas were foreclosing on the possibility of 
Khoi returning - if they had the chance - to independent 
transhumance. 
Thus the point at which the V. O. C. /colonists met the Khoi, and 
through which they began to interact systematically with them - the 
meat trade - is the starting point for the subsequent analysis of 
the 
causes, contours and consequences of the collapse of the Khoi, and 
the subordinate incorporation of some in the new society. These 
questions are examined later. 
The attraction of certain goods for the Khoi, and the 
pressure - starting in Amsterdam - which came 
to bear down on them 
to exchange their cattle for these items, together combined to under- 
mine their economic base through the increasing 'monetization' by 
trade objects of their economies. This in turn acted to destroy 
their systems of subsistence - pastoral nomadism - and forced them 
into the emerging and expanding colonial political economy and the 
associated social structure. The use of the notion 'monetization' 
is only approximate; it is the anaiagoy however that is worth 
stressing. Neale has observed that 'monetization' provides 
'opportunities' and 'temptations'. For it is tempting to "... engage 
in commercial activities in respect of those things which have become 
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monetized and are saleable outputs and to acquire those things 
which have become monetized and are useful inputs into a process of 
production for sale. "99 Clearly the process at the Cape, as we 
shall see later, was not exactly like that. We may better talk of 
a 'qualified monetization' in which the inflow of trade-goods in 
exchange for cattle had the effect, over a long period, of destroying 
the modes and means of production and subsistence - herding and 
cattle - without creating an alternative, and thus necessarily 
compelling Khoi in the end to fight, to flee, to attach themselves 
to other Khoi or Nguni/Sotho in some variation of the dependent client 
relationships or to seek 'protection' and 'work' with the V. O. C., the 
mission stations (of which in this period there was only one, soon 
closed down) or as labourers for veeboere. 
The process was, of course, accompanied by other factors 
which all nonetheless converged to hasten the same result. There was 
disease (smallpox) that ripped through the hordes, and the wars of the 
17th century with the V. O. C. all left the Khoi weaker and more 
vulnerable. The overall process of their subordination and incorpor- 
ation was patchy and uneven. Yet the very. patchiness and the uneven 
character of the responses by different hordes at different places 
and at different times was itself a condition and cause of their 
99. Walter C. Neale: "Monetization, Commercialization, Market 
Orientation and Market Dependence". I have found discussion 
with Alec Erwin of the University of Natal, Durban, extremely 
productive in respect of these general questions about the 
process of dissolution of 'pre-capitalist modes'. See his 
unpublished paper: "Economic Growth and Change in South Africa", 
Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, May 1975 
for a useful survey of the arguments and for some suggestive 
points on this and related matters. 
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collective decline. But in addition to the resistance they put up, 
which Marks has carefully re-told, 
100 
there were some other methods 
which they could and did use at least to slow down the inevitable, 
though it is not likely that they saw it that way. 
They could also increase the asking price in the early 
days, and before the V. O. C. got its own herds going. The 'Strandloper', 
Herry, emerges from the history not as the first 'collaborator'101. 
The term 'collaborator' is in any event heavily freighted with 
unnecessary and distracting overtones, and it also does not encapsulate 
sufficiently precisely the role which Herry, and others later, played 
For Herry was, classically, a broker. Boissevain distinguishes between 
patrons and brokers by pointing to two distinct types of resource 
which patrons and brokers typically dispose of. The patron has 
'first order' resources, that is land, jobs, cattle, jobs, etc., 
while the broker has 'strategic contacts' with the people who have 
these resources, and these contacts are 'second order' resources. 
'Those who dispose second order resources are brokers". 
102 And we 
shall later see how the V. O. C. was regularly exercised to try to 
short-circuit the brokers and go direct to the source of the 'first 
order resources', and how the latter sought the V. O. C. But an earlier 
instance of the manner in which an individual Khoi could act as 
broker and also alter the 'terms of trade' by bringing new knowledge 
to the trading situation in a quite unexpected way was the case of 
Xhore (or Cory). 
103 Xhore was captured at the Cape and taken to 
100. Marks: Op. cit., passim. 
101. Ibid., p. 62. 
102. Jeremy Boissevain: Friends of Friends, PP-147-8- 
103- See John Cope: King of the Hottentots. He describes this extra- 
ordinary incident. 
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England by Captain Towrson in May 1613. In London he lived at the 
home of Sir Thomas Smythe, a prosperous merchant and trader who was 
anxious to know about the possibilities of the Cape. One of the 
things that Xhore learnt, it seems, was that brass (and other 
metals) were not in scarce supply at all in England, for he saw a 
great deal of it. He appears to have asked for, and obtained, a suit 
of brass armour. He was returned to the Cape in June 1614 - "Xhore 
go home, Saldania go! ", he cried mournfully in. London, we are told, 
till returned to Table Bay - and was put ashore, clutching his 'copper 
armour and javelin'. 
104' He promised to return with his horde and 
cattle. In due course he did so, but the price had rocketed. John 
Jourdain was at the Cape in 1617, and blamed (as did others) the 
difficulty and expense of the current barter for meat for the ships 
".... on that dogge Corye .... the cause of all 
this r ogerye.... ". 
Prior to Xhore's visit to England, claimed Jourdain, "... we had a 
cowe for half a yard of an old yron hoope, which nowe they esteems 
not ..... ". 
105 
This underlines a number of points. First, that the role 
of the individual in these kinds of volatile contact situations can 
be quite crucial. Secondly, that his or her intervention in 'the 
market'" can be important in shaping the structure of economic 
relationships, and that he or she can either slow down or speed up 
the interaction and its socio-political consequences. Thirdly, the 
Xhore incident - bizarre as it was, with brass armour and all - 
104. Ibid., p. 97. 
105. John Jourclain: The Journal of John Jourdain 1608-1617, p. 342. 
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illustrates how quickly the Khoi learnt the principles of 'negative 
reciprocity' and also how disadvantaged they had necessarily to be 
in the long run, once they became involved in 'trade' of this kind, 
whatever they did by way of raising the 'price'. Fourthly, once the 
trade goods got to the horde, the arrival of the stuff must have had 
consequences which acted to disrupt the community and, in the end, 
helped to dissolve the mode of production, as Marx indicated was the 
process which ensued when this kind of exchange took place. Finally, 
whatever a broker is able to do by way of playing both ends, he or 
she depends for his or her success on delivering the goods to both 
parties. In the case of the Cape therefore a successful broker must 
have contributed unwittingly to the demise of the hordes. For, by 
ensuring that both parties got what they wanted - meat for the V. O. C. 
and metals and tobacco for the Khoi - he or she was speeding up the 
process whereby the material bases of Khoi societies were being 
" eroded. We shall return to all these questions in later chapters. 
This chapter can be concluded by emphasising the main 
strands in the preceding argument. It has been shown how in respect 
of all the main dimensions of social life - economic behaviour, social 
structure, political organization, culture, world-view, normative 
universe and associated meanings - the Khoisan (and Nguni/Sotho) and 
Protestant European societies were radically at odds. The social 
organization and political economy of both the hunting San and the 
transhumant Khoi, moreover, sanctioned and permitted the breaking 
away of sections and the formation of new bands and hordes. The cores 
in turn replicated the self-sufficient features of the societies from 
which they can. They did not impinge on each other though there was 
marginal contact and exchange at the peripheries between Khoisan 
groups and between them and Nguni/Sotho through the medium of various 
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forms of client/patron relations and a loose system of 'trade'. 
Arguably this process of replication and relatively peaceful contact 
at the margins was the manner in which these societies provided for 
expansion. It also points up the structures of expanding patri- 
lineages within a particular political economy which could accommodate 
new members without necessarily segregating them or relegating them 
to specialized and/or subordinate roles. 
106 
That form of 'expansion' 
was not known to, and was also incompatible with, the political 
economy and associated social structure of the colonists and the new 
society which resulted from the settlement. Their expansion involved 
no self-sufficient breaking away and replication of autonomous units 
- though much later the trekking Boer polities of the interior may in 
some rought way be analagous. Rather, it was an inclusive, land- 
hungry geo-political spread, entailing no reciprocal toleration of, 
or symbiosis with other groups. It involved a necessary disruption 
of the societies - and the loose web of relations between 
them - they 
encountered in their way. And it entailed the incorporation as 
menials of the 'refugees' from that destruction in a labour-hungry 
economy. The entry point of the V. O. C. and colonists to the pre- 
colonial societies at the Cape was through 'trade'. It is to that 
process and the associated developments that it is now necessary to 
turn. 
106. See Harinck: Op. cit., pp. 167, ff, and Wilson: "The Sotho .... ", 
pp. 133-4, and "The Nguni People", pp. 106-7. One of the crucial 
questions which Smith asks is, ".... how far, and under what 
conditions, differential incorporation presupposes or generates 
the institutional and social differences that constitute 
pluralism". M. G. Smith: Op. cit., p. 106. My emphasis, A. L. 
His critics deny that he is interested in these central 
questions, and therefore ignore his concern with them. They 
have simply not read him carefully. 
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Chapter 5 
THE DESTRUCTION OF KHOISAN SOCIETIES 
Why did the Khoi hordes in and around the Western 
Cape, and then steadily further inland, collapse? What circum- 
stances surrounded this development over the first century of 
V. O. C. rule, and with what conditions was it associated? 
Moreover, what were the cumulative consequences of each stage 
of that process, and what were the implications overall for the 
political economy and social structure of the Cape? It is to 
this set of related questions that it is now necessary to turn. 
Together with later chapters which deal with labour, slavery 
and social structure, the answers to these questions provide the 
central structural clues to the manner in which the constitution 
of Cape society was gradually articulated in that period, and into 
the second half of the 18th century. 
In identifying the fate of the Khoi as one of the 
central themes which define the manner in which Cape society was 
constituted, and its shape, one is underlining a complex process 
which involves both destruction and construction. The former, 
with which this chapter is concerned, describes the factors and 
forces which acted to break up the hordes, disrupt and distort the 
relations within and between them and inland groups, and the 
consequences of this. The latter, that is the 'constructive' 
aspect of the process, describes the manner in which a new society 
- and, at its heart, a system of production and the associated 
arrangement of labour relations - was forged: that is, the 
formation of an entirely new structure of political, social and 
economic relations. The two processes - the,. destructive and the 
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constitutive - were two sides of the same historical coin. For the 
collapse and decline of the Khoi hordes - and the flight of some 
away into the interior over the Orange River - was also the 11 
overall cause and condition of their incorporation in the new society 
over time. For as the colony expanded, in response to the pressure 
put on it by the demands of the V. O. C., and in consequence of the 
emerging local interests and goals, the forces unleashed by that 
development cracked open and shattered the autonomy of the hordes. 
It thus created the conditions which forced individual Khoi and their 
families, detached from their collapsing hordes or clans, to be 
sucked into the colonial polity and be differentially incorporated 
in generally subordinate roles and systematically inferior status 
positions in its economic and social structure. In the first 
instance this process had nothing whatsoever to do with 'colour', 
or, for that matter, with the Christian/heathen divide which is 
usually identified as the main basis for differentiation. It was 
far wider than that. It turned on the manner in which members of 
one cultural group were first incorporated as labourers, herders 
and menials and then, later, lodged and locked there, even as 
cultural transformation was taking place. For the labour question 
at the Cape was historically linked to the fate of the Khoi. I 
shall argue later that the system of labour relations initially 
fashioned and was strengthened by the structure of 'cultural 
relations', and that, incidentally, the structure of so-called 
'race (i. e. colour) relations' was a product of this, and not the 
other way round. For the system of social stratification which 
emerged was shaped by the structure of labour, qualified and 
buttressed in certain crucial respects by the cultural discontin- 
uities at any given time - but changing over time - between groups, 
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particularly the Khoi and first-generation imported slaves from 
the East and Madagascar. But these are questions for later 
chapters. Here, the focus is on the process of the decline of the 
Khoi. Before looking at that in detail it is important to point out 
the dramatic nature of that process by illustrating the contrast 
between their situation in the 1650s and a century or more later. 
It is rarely recognized how substantial were the Khoi 
herds in the 1650s. And it is a useful starting point for this 
analysis to show how drastic was the shift in the balance of power - 
that is, command over the key resources of land and cattle - from 
that time to the later 18th century. While it is impossible to 
estimate accurately the number of cattle and sheep in the possession 
of the Khoi groups at the time the Dutch settled, one can get a very 
rough idea from the population estimate of 100-200,000 Khoi south 
of the Orange in 1650. Moreover, there is substantial evidence in 
the Dutch documents that, even around the vicinity of the Peninsula, 
and only slightly further afield, the size of the Khoi herds was 
enormous. From van Riebeeck's time onwards, the Journal and other 
reports are filled with details. In November, 1652 there was a 
report of ".... about 40 or 50 Saldaniers with at least a thousand 
cattle as well as sheep.... ". 
1 A few days later some 1500 or 1600 
animals were seen. 
2 By early December that year "... we saw on the 
slopes beside Table Mountain, the pasturage and the country all 
around covered with sheep and cattle like grass on the veld". 
3 
1. Jan van Riebeeck: Journal, I, p. 100. 
2. Ibid., I, p. 101. It is not at all clear from the internal 
evidence of the Journal whether this was a 'horde' or an advance 
party of a clan. It is more likely to have been the latter. 
When the full horde was at the Cape, the number of cattle was 
far in excess of this. See below. 
3. Ibid., I, p. 107. 
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On the 13th December, the diarist reflected that it would be 
quite possible("if we are ordered to do this") to seize "10,000 
head of cattle", which would provide ample supplies, and also stock 
for breeding. For "If one cannot get the cattle from them by 
friendly trading, why should one suffer their thieving without 
making any reprisal? This would only be necessary once: with 150 
men, ten or twelve thousand cattle could be secured without danger 
of losing a single person. On the other hand many savages could be 
captured without a blow as they always come to us unarmed; they 
could then be sent to India as slaves". 
4 By early 1653 it was 
reported that ".... easily 20,0001sheep and cattle had been brought 
to the area near the Fort since the previous November. 
5 The same 
picture was reported through the mid 1650s. By that time it had 
begun to become more or less clear that the main groups which 
visited the Table Bay pasture area in the late Spring and early 
Summer, were the Cochoqua (the "Saldanhars") whose cattle was 
"... as numerous as the grass of the fields.... " and by November 
1655 the Journal recorded 'innumerable' cattle, 5,000 to 6,000 
people and 400 to 500 huts. 
6 
4. Ibid., I, p. 112. Throughout the early period there is this 
strange mixture of tones in the Journal and Letters. Caution, 
expediency, aggression, passivity, and fear are common notes 
struck. As they got to know more about successive groups of 
Khoi, the characteristic tones of early caution and respect 
gave way to aggression, hostility and impatience that they 
would not trade, or trade in sufficient volume. When that 
phase in the attitudinal cycle was reached, ruminations about 
annihilating a particular group became pronounced. See also, 
Marks: Op. cit., p. 63 and fn. 34. But the V. O. C. had ruled 
out enslavement of the Khoi. The tone in the Journal also 
contrasts strikingly with that of the Directors and their 
(expedient) philosophy of non-intervention in Khoi affairs. 
5. Ibid., I, p. 129. 
6. Ibid., It pp. 368-370. 
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Because the supply of cattle through barter from these 
local groups was never adequate for the purposes of the Company, 
two strategies were pursued from the very earliest. The one was to 
send expeditions inland to make contact with supposedly cattle-rich 
groups, and the other was to breed cattle and sheep locally. We 
shall have to look at the implication and consequences of those 
strategies later, but from the expeditions undertaken - and their 
usually quite full reports - it is possible to get an impression of 
the size of the herds of some of the inland groups. When Eva (the 
Khoi woman who lived with the Commander's family) told the Dutch of 
the cattle-rich Namaqua, she advertised them in terms that met with 
the Commander's approval, and aroused his interest. She said they 
lived about 20 days' away, that they had stone houses, wore white 
skins, had churches and believed in God like the Dutch. Moreover, 
they had slaves who worked in crafts for them, and traded in tusks 
and ivory.? An expedition to contact them was quickly mounted and 
it was hoped that other groups would also be found. But it was 
only in 1662 that some Namaqua were located, and the diarist of the 
expedition, van Meerhof, described them as having "... a mighty. % 
large number of cattle" and reported having seen 4,000 cattle and 
3,000 sheep in one kraal. 
8 By the time of his departure from the 
Cape in 1662, van Riebeeck was able to leave a rough picture of the 
Khoi groups around the Cape. In his reference to the Chainouquas, 
the Chariguriquas, (who had mainly sheep), the Hessequas (with 
7. Ibid., III, pp. 8-9, dated 1st January 1659. The description 
sounds very mucks like some of the Sotho groups around the 
Orange River: it suggests knowledge, at least, by the local 
Khoi of the Sotho. 
8. Ibid., III, pp. 343-356, and Moodie: The Record, I, p. 233. 
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".... great herds of cattle .... "), the 'Chamaquas, Omaquas, Atiquas, 
Houteniquas' and Chauquas (who all had ".... countless herds of 
cattle ..... "), van 
Riebeeck confirmed the impression of a really 
very substantial number of cattle and sheep at the Cape at that 
time. 
9 
And they were in the possession of the Khoi, not the Dutch. 
TABLE I 
CATTLE AND SHEEP IN POSSESSION OF COLONISTS, 
Date Cattle 
15.12.1652 88 
9.1.1653 130 
5.6.1653 8o 
19.10.1653 42 
20.10.1653 1 Milch cow, 1 ox, 4 calves. 
1655 ±370 
20.8.1658 240 
27.12.1658 V. 0. C.: 20 
Burgers: 238 
19.10.1658 600 
20.6.1659 Very few. Not clear how many. 
7.1660 - 
12.1660 83 
1662 V. O. C.: 278 
Burgers: 300 
1668 V. O. C.: 400 
V. O. C.: 
Burgers: 
V. O. C.: 
Burgers: 
V. O. C.: 
1652-1793 
Sheep 
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350 
130 
60 
±650 
600 
1396 
348 
1300 
100 
± 90 at Fort 
80 
300 
800 
1000 
9. Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 246-251. In 1668, Dapper claimed that 
the Cochoquas ('Saldanhars') had "... well over a hundred 
thousand (cattle) in number, and about two hundred thousand 
sheep". Dapper: Kaffraria or Land of the Kafirs, p. 23. But 
later he says the Cochoqua had only 1000 cattle and 2000 sheep. 
Ibid., p. 73. (Dapper does not appear to have ever left the 
Netherlands. See Schapera's Introduction to The Early Cape 
Hottentots, p. 2. ) But Dapper's source was probably the anony- 
mous author of the Klare ende Korte Bes in e van het land 
aan Cabo de Bona. Esperanca, Amsterdam, 1652). 
TALE I (continued) 
Date Cattle 
1670 Burgers: 350 
1672 V. O. C.: 398 
1677 (T. Oo. C.: 662) 1087 
12.1678 511 in Hottentot Holland 
area. 
1681 3,300 (In all) 
4.1682 2,000 (It seems in total) 
1685 V. O. C.: 1331 
1687 V. O. C.: 1164 
Burgers: 2951 
1692 V. O. C. (? ): 4645 
1696 6441 
1700 Burgers: 8357 
V. O. C.: 'oxen' 1429 
1701 9,704 (Burgers) and the 
majority of the herds were 
now in the Stellenbosch 
District. 
1706 12,671 (Burgers). Majority 
of stock in Stellenbosch 
and Swellendam Districts. 
1708 14320 
1711 20743 
1713 16557 (of which 11000 were 
in the Stellenbosch and 
Drakenstein Districts) 
1718 16202 
1723 21888 (of which 14000 in 
Stellenbosch and Drakenstein 
Districts) 
1733 26824 
1743 34916 
1748 31375 
Sheep 
Burgers: 4697 
V. O. C.: 6172 
(V. O. C.: 1649) 1549 
910 in Hottentot-Holland 
area. 
14,000 (In all) 
18,000 
V. O. C.: 6983 
VI-O. C. 9218 
Burgers: 30142- 
V. O. C. (? ): 4852 
Burgers: 53971 
V. O. C.: 5956 
53126 
79314 
89533 
116256 
120208 
64381 
88837 
135014 
169440 
152092 
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TABLE I (continued) 
Date Cattle Sheep 
1753 36243, broken down, thus: 191511 
Stellenbosch: 5594 
Drakenstein: 10207 
Swellendam: 11694 
1763 33523 199339 
1769 38012 250000 
1775 39019, broken down, thus: 2850949 thus: 
Cape: 6103 Cape: 41060 
Stellenbosch: 5487 Stellenbosch: 42335 
Drakenstein: 15367 Drakenstein: 127380 
Swellendam: 12062 Swellendam: 74319 
1778 61961, broken down, thus: 376433, thus: 
Cape: 
_ 
7135 Cape: 28560 
Stellenbosch: 7366 Stellenbosch: 49594 
Drakenstein: 24417 Drakenstein: 194670 
Swellendam: 23043 Swellendam: 103609 
1783 62762, broken down, thus: 310904, thus: 
Cape: 7398 Cape: 21390 
Stellenbosch: 7827 Stellenbosch: 29405 
Drakenstein: 26067 Drakenstein: 183319 
Swellendam: 21470 Swellendam: 76790 
There seems to have been a massive decline in 
Stellenbosch and Swellendam sheep between 1778 and 
1783. Khoisan raiding? O r unreliable opgraaf figures? 
Or is this consistent with demand arising from French 
presence at Cape? 
1788 (total) 80921 (total) 445557 
1793 (total) 82110 (total) 475205 
These figures are taken from the same sources as for Table II, and 
also Neumark: Economic Influences on the South African Frontier 
1652-1836, Table 3- 
1. It is interesting to note that in 1793 when the total colonial 
figure for sheep was 475205, the Graf-Reinet figure was 281195 
- more than half. And in the sam e year, when the total cattle 
figure for the colony was 82110, the Graaff-Reinet and Swellendam 
areas together contributed 53385, again well over half. 
2. The 'demand' side of the cattle and sheep figures gives some 
indication of the economic forces at work. In the late 
1660s something like 300 cattle and 2000 sheep were required 
per but by 1683 about 100 sheep were being provided per 
ship. (Elphick: Op. cit., p. 210). During van Riebeeck's period 
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TABLE I (continued) 
between 1652-1662 some 5-6000 men called at the Cape each 
year and stayed for an average of 10-14 days. 
(M. H. de Kock: 
Op. cit., P. 10). The following figures set out the average 
number of ships for the stipulated periods calling at the 
Cape. It is important to note that after 1751 the figures 
include ships calling at both Cape ports, Table Bay and 
Simon's Bay, and include both Dutch and foreign ships. 
1652-1661 25 per annum 
1662-1671 40 per annum 
1672-1700 44 per annum 
1700-1714 67 per annum 
1715-1724 87 per annum 
1726-1750 75 per annum 
1751-1771 76 per annum 
1772-1780 117 per annum 
1781-1784 135 per annum 
1785-1789 164 per annum 
Taken from Theal: History of Africa, Op. cit., II, pp. 125,195, 
371,492, and Vol. III, pp. 77,166,215 and 259. Over the century 
the ships were becoming larger and carrying more men. 
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Similarly, in 1666 on his departure, Wagenaar confirmed 
this general impression again, pointing out that the Chainouquas were 
by that time the main source of supply, and they lived "... to the 
Eastward... ". 10 
By contrast, the Dutch stocks of cattle were meagre. 
They fluctuated wildly in numbers in the early years, as some of 
the figures in Table I indicate, particularly in the period between 
1652 and 1660. There was, for instance, a modest supply of about 
130 cattle and 350 sheep in January 1653, which plummeted to a 
desperate low of 1 cow, 1 ox, 4 calves and 60 sheep in October 1653" 
Van Riebeeck commented on this state of affairs: "May God make 
amends". 
11 There was some improvement in supplies and stocks over 
the next few years so that in December 1658 there were about 658 
head of cattle and 1434 sheep in the possession of the Company and 
the free burgers. But then, as hostilities leading up to the first 
war in 1659 mounted through the early part of that year, the stocks 
were depleted by raids and thefts. In May 1659 the Journal 
reported a very poor state of affairs, and in June only 100 of the 
500 sheep on Robben Island remained alive. 
12 But by the end of 
December, 1660, with hostilities ended and as a result of "..... 
generous trading... " with the new-found allies and friends, the 
Chainouquas, the Journal ended the year on a jaunty note. 
13 But 
the size of the Company and colonist herds hardly justified such 
10. Wagenaar to van Quaelbergen, 24th September, 1666. Moodie: 
Op. cit., pp. 290-6. The Chainouqua were in the region between 
the Caledon River and Danger Point. See Goodwin: "Jan van 
Riebeeck and the Hottentots", p. 46. 
11. Journal, I, p. 127, and p. 181. 
12. Ibid., III, p. 72. 
13. Ibid., III, pp. 302-7" 
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optimism, and the balance of command over cattle at the Cape 
remained decisively with the Khoi, even if the position of 
weaker groups closest to the settlement had become shaky, and 
showed signs of growing dependance on the settlement. 
14 It was, 
however, not until after 1677 - the year in which the second Cape 
war came to an end - that the Company herds of cattle and sheep 
began to mount steadily and systematically, as the figures in 
Table I show. And even then, as we shall see, expeditions for 
purposes of barter were often (annually sometimes) undertaken 
deeper and deeper into the eastern interior, well into the 18th 
century. 
If the balance of command over cattle resources was 
decisively in favour of the Khoi, the same is true for land. In 
the 1650s the area over which the Company had undisputed control 
was almost nil. The position of the fort and its immediate 
surroundings was hardly secure. 
15 The Khoi who came west and 
south to the Table Bay pasture areas in early summer continued to 
do so, and grazed their herds in and around the foot of Table 
Mountain. Company employees and officials were edgy, and often 
aggressive in their ideas about what to do to the Khoi. But 
specific instructions not to retaliate against 'offences' were 
14. I deal with the question of labour and dependence more fully 
in the next chapter. However it is worth pointing out here 
that as early as 1655 some Khoi - probably a clan of Goringhaika ('Capemen') who were described as 'Herry's allies' - sought 
'protection' at the Fort. "These allies of Herry accordingly 
requested to be allowed to live, with their huts and the 
residue of their stock, under our protection in the valleys 
between the dunes at the rump of the Lion Mountain, and said 
that for a bellyful of rice, some tobacco and arrack some of 
them would willingly fetch firewood for the cooks every day". 
From the context it appears that they had lost some cattle to 
other Cochoqua and possibly San raiders. Though they were asked 
to barter cattle by the Dutch, "They rejoined that they had to 
subsist on the milk, but that there were other tribes in the 
interior, and when these came hither we could get sufficient". 
Journal, I, p. 313. 
15. see next page 
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repeatedly issued, lest the cattle trade (such as it was) suffer, 
and stern warnings of punishment accompanied the instructions. 
16 
Almost ten years to the day after the settlement had been 
established it was still necessary to have a 'mounted guard'. 
17 
In 1662 the Company gardens consisted of 21 morgen (about 45 acres). 
The whole area under some kind of cultivation in the peninsula, in 
1658, was about 350 morgen. 
18 
15. See the Despatch from van Riebeeck to Batavia, dated 7th July, 
1659, in which he implored for an increase of strength for the 
garrison, needed ... in such perilous times .... to save what 
we have got .... ". Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 180-1, and Marks: Op. cit., p. 64. 
16. A typical Resolution of the Council, dated 21st October, 1653, 
illustrates the expedient character of the policy. Despite the 
loss of 44 Company cattle to Herry, the leader of the Strand- 
lopers (Goringhaikona), any revenge attack ".... might totally 
and for ever deprive us of the trade - at present the chief 
object of our masters at this place .... as we are not so much interested in taking vengeance upon a parcel of thievish 
Strandlopers as thereby to suffer in our needful traffic with 
the Saldanhars, which is of great importance to the Hon. 
Company .... ". Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 36-7. As the land and 
power balance tilted in the favour of the V. O. C. and colonists, 
this cautious and expedient approach vanished entirely from the 
records. And some offenders were punished. In October 1672 
a soldier who had been mutinous, seditious, broken prison and 
deserted and had stolen a sheep from a Khoi was "... sentenced 
to be severely flogged and dismissed .... his sword to be broken, to be pilloried the whole day under the gallows .... to labour in chains for 10 years and to forfeit his pay". 
Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 381. In September 1673, a free woman 
(and her servants) who had stolen and slaughtered 2 Khoi cows, 
was sentenced to be bound to a post at the execution place, 
severely flogged, branded and confined to Robben Island. Ibid., 
I, p. 382. Even a century later punishments - though few and far between - were meted out. In 1765 Johan Otto Diedrichs 
was sentenced to 25 years' hard labour on Robben Island for cruel 
treatment of Khoi. See Hoge: Personalia of the Germans, p. 73. 
One should not, however, conclude from this that all offences 
were detected or, when they were, that they were punished. But 
some were, and the wording of the regulations were quite clear. 
The case of Etienne Barbier, in 1739, is another instance. See 
E. A. Walker: A History, PP. 93-4; A. J. Böeseken: "The Company and its subjects", p. 54, and Gie: "The Cape Colony under Company 
Rule 1708-1795", p. 148. 
17. Moodie: 0 . cit., I, pp. 243-4" Despatch from van Riebeeck to 
Amsterdam, 9th April 1662. 
18. M. H. de Kock: Selected Subjects in the Economic History of South 
Africa, p. 46, and Journal, II, p. 403, where a census is given. 
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Thus, in respect of the two resources - cattle and land 
- which were central to the economic life, social survival and 
purposes of both the Dutch and the Khoi, the balance of control 
and command was decisively in the favour of the Khoi. A hundred 
years later the relationship had changed totally. As Table I 
shows, there were some 38000 cattle and almost a quarter of a 
million sheep in the possession of the colonists in 1769, and 
those may be low figures. And already by 1700 the colony had spread 
out to engulf the whole of the peninsula, and stretched as far as 
the Drakenstein and Hottentots-Holland mountain ranges, 
(running 
from north to south), in the East, and northwards along the western 
side of those mountains to some 45 miles north of Cape Town on the 
Atlantic coast. Some colonists had spilled over the Drakenstein 
ranges into the land of Waveren (now Tulbagh), and others had set 
up in the district of Riebeeck's Kasteel. 
19 Over the following 50 
years the expansion was consolidated. Though the borders were not 
clearly defined, by 1750 the colony stretched as far as Mossel Bay 
on the South-east coast and the Elephant river on the North-west 
coast. 
20 There was, of course, still bitter resistance, but it 
was largely by San, or Khoisan alliances or cattle-less Khoi "... on 
the periphery". 
21 The years after 1700 were filled with reports of 
incidents of 'attacks' on colonists and cattle in the outlying 
areas. The attackers were variousl1defined as 'Ubiqua', 'Hottentots', 
'Grikwas and Namaquas', 'bushmen or highwaymen', 'Sonqua Hottentots' 
19. See maps in Theal: History of Africa, Vol. II, PP-399-400- 
20. Ibid., Vol. III, PP. 87-8. By 1795 the colony's official border 
stretched to the Fish River in the east. To the west and 
north of this it bulged up almost to the Orange River and then 
ran down, across and gradually up again to the Buffalo River 
on the Atlantic coast, about 80 miles to the south of the 
Orange River mouth at present-day Alexander Bay (Oranjemund). 
The 'bulge' was to be the main area of the Graaff-Reinet district 
after 1786: it was the region in which some of the most bitter 
fighting between commandos and Khoisan resisters took place ý sr 
21. See Marks: Op. cit., pp. 69-70, and passim. 
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and 'Bosjemans-Hottentoten'. 
22 
Despite the fierce resistance in the far north and north- 
east which went on until early in the 19th century, it is quite clear 
that the Khoi in the western and settled eastern areas were no 
longer taken as a threat. They had been impoverished of their stocks 
and their land. In his account in 1668, Dapper had written that "... 
the principal wealth of the Hottentots lies in their cattle, and in 
the beadwork which they barter from our people . 00". 
23 And we have 
seen from other evidence that the Khoi herds were enormous. By the 
early 18th century, however, even the official reports to Amsterdam 
confirmed that Cape Khoi had been reduced to poverty and thence either 
dependence or banditry. Describing the situation in 1702, an official 
wrote to the Seventeen that "The Hottentots in the neighbourhood (of 
the Cape, A. L. ) have already been deprived of all their cattle, which, 
though not taken from them in violence, have been bartered from them 
for tobacco. and beads, after they have been made drunk with Brandy. 
Having been in this manner impoverished, they are tempted to steal, 
and to take to evil ways and ... to join the robbers, so 
that well- 
disposed inhabitants become the sufferers". 
24 And by the early 1770s, 
when Thunberg was travelling widely through the Cape, the position was 
clear. He met "... with but small remains of the once more numerous 
Hottentot nations, which, as late as the beginnings of this century, 
still inhabited these vast plains .... Now there are only a few scattered 
22. See for instance Leibbrandt: Journal, 1699-1732, in particular 
the entries dated 3.3.1701 (P-35); 7.4.1701 p. 37); 26.5.170t (p. 38); 
16.6.1701 (p. 38); 26.8.1701 (p. 39); and 31.1.1719 (p. 276). See 
also Marks: Op. cit., PP. 70-1; and Theal: 0p. cit., III, p. 45, ff; 
p. 81, ff; p. 118, ff; and p. 188, ff. 
23. Dapper: Op. cit., P-73- 
24- Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708, p. 191. It would be 
simplistic to believe that no violence was involved. It would also 
be unwise to dismiss the suggestion that Khoi had respondend enthus- 
iastically to metal pieces, tobacco and liquor. My emphasis, A. L. 
But this indicates that the alcoholism was a condition and conse- 
quence of Khoi collapse, rather than a cause of it. 
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villages (kraals) .... to be found, in which they either live by 
themselves or are taken into service at the Company's posts and 
grazing farms, or else by colonists themselves. For the most part, 
these societies, especially in the vicinity of the Cape, are far 
from being numerous; but fart er in the country they are both more 
populous and more wealthy". 
25 A century before, he observed, it 
had been easier to ".... learn the mode of life of these people. 
Now, the way to their abodes is very long, their societies very 
small, their manners and way of life much altered, and the whole 
nation under much restraint". 
26 
Whatever resistance was being put up by San or Khoi-San 
alliances, or cattle-less Khoi, on the north-eastern edges of the 
colony, the balance of control over land and cattle had already 
changed dramatically in the west before 1700, and was steadily 
altering through the eastern cattle-ranching areas as the 18th 
century wore on. How had this come about? What processes may be 
identified as being responsible for this massive shift in power, 
that is in the command and control of the crucial resources of 
cattle and land over the century? In short, how does one explain 
the collapse and decline of the Khoi hordes in the face of a 
relatively small number of colonists (as Table II shows), and in the 
light of only two major (but very localized) wars - that of 1659 and 
25. Charles P. Thunberg: Travels in Europe, Africa and Asia, I, 
pp. 304-5. Mentzel reported in the 1730s that a Khoi 'Captain' 
whom he had met had ".... confessed openly that they have to 
put up with having to move their cattle as soon as a white 
colonist covets their pasture". Manifestly'; things had changed 
substantially since the 1650s: one can also envisage the 
consequences of this movement as groups trespassed over the 
land of others. I return to this later. O. F. Mentzel: 
Description)III, P-330- 
26. Thunberg: Op. cit., I, pp. 173-4" 
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that of 1673-7.27 
27. Table II sets out the figures for the development of the 
colonial and slave population over the century. Apart from 
one reference in Neumark's study to a figure of about 
13000 to 15000 'Hottentots' in about 1830, I have never 
come across any data on the changing number of Khoi in the 
Cape during this period. Gie reckons there were about 
15000 'Hottentots' in the Cape in 1795, and 14000 of them 
were in the outlying districts of Swellendam and Graaff- 
Reinet. Gie: Op. cit., pp. 164-5. 
The 1805 Census reported a 'Hottentot' population in the 
Cape of about 20000. See Wilson: "The Hunters and the 
Herders", p. 68. The only criterion at that stage - or at 
any stage - upon which such arithmetic could have been 
based was cultural. [One only needs to ask the question: 
"When was a 'Hottentot' not a 'Hottentot', and the point is 
made. ] Given the shifting, changing and vague border-lines 
between cultural groups by the early 19th century, it is not 
clear that such a figure is accurate or indeed what it means. 
But whatever other meaning it may have hade, e. g. not 
'Coloured' or 'Bastard', it at least indicates that there 
had been a substantial decline of 'pure' Khoi, by which I 
mean clicking transhumants of the kind described in the 
previous chapter! 
The important thing to note here too is that there were only 
about 1300'Dutch' at the Cape in 1700 and about 811 adult 
slaves and 80 slave children. By 1750 there were about 5000 
colonists and V. O. C. employees, and 4019 slaves (and 742 
children). The main population jump, however, is after the 
mid-18th century, and it reached some 20000 by 1800. Thus 
Marks' argument that the population increase may have 
explained the relative speed of the collapse in the 18th 
century only applies to the second half of the century. At 
least, it only bites hard as an argument for that period. 
The Khoi collapse had, however, by then been largely 
accomplished. I suggest below the main reasons for this, which 
do not have a great deal to do with the relative population 
sizes of the colonists, but turn more centrally on structural 
questions. 
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TABLE II 
COLONIAL BURGER POPULATION AND SLAVES 
Date men women children slaves slavesses 
& slave- 
children 
1652 
1653 20 women & children 
1654 
1655 
1656 
1657 Total of 144 V. 0. C. men & women 
1658 57 89 slaves in all 
1659 
1661 Total of 381 V. O. C. persons in all 
1662 76 men & women 100 slaves in all 
1672 168 men & women 63 slaves in all 
1679 87 55 117 491 slaves in all 
1685/9 Arrival of 80 Huguenot families 
1687 612 burgers and wives in all 
1687 254 88 231 230 44 & 36 
children 
1691 1000 burgers and wives in all 
1700 1255 burgers and families 702 109 & 80 
1706 1769 burgers and families 
1707 513 290 843 841 145 & 117 
1710 995 burgers and families 1294 260 & 221 
1711 1870 burgers and families 1771 slaves in all 
1713 1873 burgers and families 1775 burger slaves 
& 440 V. O. C. slaves 
1723 2500 burgers and families 2224 408 & 290 
1728 1230 and wives 1483 2867 560 & 446 
1733 3191 burgers and families 4703 slaves in all 
Knechte 
99 V. O. C. men 
130 ýý ti 
133 " 
69 ý> >* 
120 
30 nu 
39 Knechte 
128 
114 
114 It 
119 of 
122 of 
117 of 
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TABLE II (continued) 
Date men ' women children 
1743 1075 700 2197 
1748 4589 burgers and families 
1750 5000 burgers and families 
1753 5419 burgers and families 
slaves slavesses Knechte 
(& slave- 
children 
4619 slaves in all 124 Knechte 
3322 821 & 779 81 
3591 880 & 848 
4137 1031 & 877 114 it 
1755 Second small-pox epidemic 
1758 5676 burgers and families 4105 
1763 1862 1278 3610 5072 
1772 8387 in all, including 'Coloured'. 
1021 & 806 101 
1214 & 929 127 
1778 9721 burgers and families 7380 2171 &1556 
1788 12661 burgers and families 9931 3075 &1804 
1797 18079 burgers and families 26281 slaves in all 
81 
43 
it 
it 
it 
it 
These figures are compiled from MacCrone: Race Attitudes in South 
Africa; M. H. de Kock: Selected Subjects in the Economic History 
of South Africa; Jan van "Riebeeck: Journal; Donald Moodie: The 
Record; A. J. Goodwin: "Jan van Riebeeck and the Hottentots"; 
A. J. H. van der Walt: Die Ausdehnung der Kolonie am Kaap der Guten 
Hoffnung; H. C. V. Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708; 
C. Beyers: Die Kaapse Patriotte, especially for the 18th century 
figures; A. J. Böeseken: Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse aan die 
Kaap; John Barrow: An Account of Travels into the Interior of 
Southern Africa, and H. P. Cruse: Die Opheffing van die Kleurlingiarolking. 
It is important to start from what has gone before. On 
the one hand there is the analysis of Dutch society and culture in 
the 17th century and the character of the 'fragment' which peopled 
the settlement at the Cape. On the other hand there is the 
structure and character of Khoi and San societies prior to the 
colonial intrusion. We have, in short, to. place at the centre of 
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the analysis of their subsequent interaction the fact that two 
modes of production, organized for radically contrasting ends and 
purposes, and associated with distinctive cultures and normative 
universes, became locked in conflict. And the cultures, like the 
two systems of political economy, were incompatible. I shall 
argue that what we have to see as central to that interaction, 
and therefore as crucial in understanding its consequences in the 
decline of the Khoi, is the manner in which one mode of production, 
and its associated goals, purposes and behaviours, penetrated the 
other, and thus accomplished its collapse partly from within and 
partly from without. But before proceeding to look at that in 
detail, a brief preliminary statement is necessary here. 
Because the causes, circumstances, conditions and 
consequences of the collapse and decline of the Khoi are so closely 
interleaved, they are best stated briefly in general terms first, 
and then elaborated under analytically distinct, but historically 
integrated heads. Their defeat and demise under colonialism was 
not accomplished simply by the systematic application of force and 
fraud. That is both too easy and too comfortable an explanation. 
It was the result of a combination of 'pressure' trading (to which, 
in some critical and damaging respects, the Khoi responded), 
punctuated by warfare and coercion, the expropriation and 'purchase' 
of their land, the deep penetration and disruption of intra-horde 
exchange and other relations by the 'commoditization' and corrosion 
of their economies by trade-goods, liquor and other items. It was 
also the consequence of the absorption and incorporation of refugee 
and detached Khoi in the limited but expanding and hungry labour 
'market' in the Cape economy, the associated but slow acculturation 
amongst some such Khoi, the expropriating and bullying tactics of 
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eastward moving veeboere (who were in part responding to the 
opportunity to meet the demand for cattle at the Cape), the 
ravaging effects of diseases (like the smallpox epidemics of 1713 
and 1755), and the consequential imposition of political control 
by the Y. O. C. - through an elementary system of indirect rule - as 
the autonomy of the hordes, and their internal political mechanisms, 
were disrupted and decayed. The possibility of wholesale flight and 
orderly withdrawal further towards the east or the north by 
refugees was largely foreclosed on by the presence there of Nguni, 
and the Sotho. 
Some of this is usually present in the general histories. 
But it is portrayed as a haphazard, desultory, unconnected and 
fragmentary set of happenings, constituted by contingent bits and 
pieces of conflict and scuffling fights, random attacks of disease 
and Khoi weakness in the face of temptations like tobacco and 
liquor and other items. All this is of course there, as part of 
the sad history. 
28 But there is a logic to that process that can 
be uncovered and analyzed, and ought to be examined in its own 
right, rather than being regarded as the secondary and consequential 
outcome of a generalized movement of Dutch expansion. For that 
'expansion' itself at the Cape is just another (unsatisfactory, I 
think) way of conceptualizing the trajectory of Khoi collapse. 
Moreover, the 'expansion' itself had a logic behind it, and a 
history. The history was the general rise and spread of the Dutch 
empire, and the logic was ordered by the specific requirements, 
arising out of that history, which were imposed on the Cape settlement 
28. It is extraordinary to note that there is no single major study 
of the fate and decline of the Khoi. Their story is a sad one, 
to be sure, and deserves careful attention, as a case study in 
one form of colonialism. Dr Elphick's study of the early period 
and the two 17th century wars is a major contribution to the 
early history of the Khoi. Elphick: Op. cit., passim. 
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by the V. O. C. in its initial and enduring purpose for it. Thus 
the content of the expansion of the colony has to be grasped 
clearly in terms of that initial rationale, the purposes of the 
V. O. C. and the emergent local interests of the officials and the 
burgers, and the implications of these for the indigenous societies. 
By concentrating on the fate of the Khoi in the light of these 
considerations and against the background of the V. O. C. and colonist 
pressure upon them, one is able to generate a causal model of the 
destructive colonial process of 'interaction', and its results. 
By way of a final preliminary statement to the main 
concerns of this chapter, it is worth pointing out that although it 
is not a major example or instance of the phenomenon, comparatively 
speaking, the history of the Cape and its peoples in the first 
century of V. O. C. rule illustrates in many of its forms and 
particulars the process of 'underdevelopment', which has been 
characterized by A. G. Frank. and others as the 'development of 
underdevelopment'. 
2 8a The factors and relationships that have been 
held to characterize that process in Latin America and elsewhere 
may be identified at the Cape, and are in some respects more 
dramatically exposed. The so-called metropolis-satellite relation- 
ship cannot be more explicitly illustrated than in the tight links 
between the V. O. C. in the Netherlands and the subordinate and 
subordinated role of the Cape settlement. And although the Cape did 
not contribute directly in kind in any significant way to the 
fuelling of Dutch capitalism in its middle and late mercantilist era, 
nonetheless the requirements imposed on the settlement were 
28a A. G. Frank: "The Development of Underdevelopment", in 
R. Rhodes (ed. ): Imperialism and Underdevelopment, pp. 4-17. 
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specifically geared to the wider accumulative purposes of the 
Dutch Republic, and to servicing V. O. C. operations. To that extent 
it illustrates Frank's thesis that the expansion of European 
mercantilism and capitalism "... penetrated even the apparently 
most isolated sectors of the underdeveloped world". 
28b The local 
emergence of a settler and colonial interest of course complicated 
and widened that process, as we shall see, and it is in respect of 
the configuration of social relations thus established within the 
colony that pluralist categories are so useful for explanatory and 
descriptive purposes. Conventionally, the collapse of the Khoi 
has been regarded as a subordinate or illustrative part of other 
thematic concerns, like the 'colour problem' or 'the emergence of 
the Cape Coloured people', or problems of 'administration'. And 
of course it can be seen as those too. But there is no single 
account of the fate of the Khoi as a case study in colonial 
penetration and 'interaction'. By identifying more carefully the 
complex relationships over that first century at the Cape, the 
process can be shown to be rich in detail and clear in design. 
For it is simply not the case that the Khoi (or San) were merely 
swatted out of the way by the Dutch. Rather, a careful examination 
of the century in the light of the conceptual considerations and 
theoretical orientations outlined earlier reveal a web of economic, 
diplomatic, political and social relations which both accomplished 
and accompanied the decline of the Khoi (and San), and acted to 
draw them into the structure of the colonial society thus constituted. 
This process, thus, involved complex chains of cause and 
effect. They were cumulative over the period, linking the demands 
28b Ibid., p. 6. Nay emphases, A. L. 
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and imperatives of the Heeren 17 to the collapse of those 
societies, via the policies and emergent local interests of the 
Cape officials and the settlers. The model which organizes the 
evidence to illustrate that process may be stated in general terms 
in the following manner here first, and then examined under the 
respective conceptual headings. 
From what has been argued about the structure of Khoi 
societies it is clear that their cattle-based economies were the`. key 
to their collapse, and because of cattle __ land. 
[For the San, it 
was game and veldkos land]. The Directors in Amsterdam wanted 
supplies for their ships passing the Cape. The local officials 
and servants could and did grow some produce but initially depended 
on the Khoi for cattle. The local Khoi however were not able to 
provide enough cattle on either a regular or predictable basis. 
This gave rise to the pattern of persistent, coercive and pressured 
barter which ultimately became a kind of long distance trade. Both 
the V. O. C. and the colonists used similar items: liquor, tobacco, 
metal pieces and other 'luxury' items, which tempted and - despite 
increases in the asking 'price' - created a 'demand' of sufficient 
momentum to carry the Company trading offensive deep and destructively 
into the heart of the politically loose structure of intra-horde and 
inter-horde relations, disrupting and then breaking up those 
structures and their relatively fragile ecological balances, from 
within. Once that process had begun, once - that is - the 
penetrating bridge-head through the cattle trade was established, 
success fed upon success, and conflict over cattle and land ensued. 
The impact on the Khoi of trading under this kind of constraint, and 
the deeper penetration in the interior of inter-horde relations was 
such as to leave successive and receding perimeters of Khoi groups 
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without the material means of social survival. Even in the 1730s, 
when Mentzel was at the Cape, he noted expeditions by eastern 
farmers who went 200 miles inland for cattle, or so they said. 
29 
At each stage some of the refugees from that process were left 
embedded in the expanding colonial society. 
29a The Khoi nearest 
the Cape felt the impact first. They - as with later groups 
further inland - responded ambiguously. On the one hand they did 
trade cattle and sheep for brass and copper and metal, and there 
are instances (which we shall see) of quite substantial exchanges 
of cattle. It is far from clear that they only traded under 
coercion. But, on the other hand, they also resisted fiercely the 
continued presence of the settlers and their systematic encroachment 
onto traditional Khoi pastures. The land was used for cultivation 
by colonists, but also as pasture for the increasing V. O. C. and 
settler herds. Having lost cattle and then land, the Khoi attacked 
these herds, thus causing further friction and establishing the 
basis for the wars of 1659 and 1673-7. V. O. C. and colonist 
frustration and irritation was exacerbated by the reluctance of the 
hordes deeper inland (like the Namaqua or the Inqua) to come down 
to the Cape on a regular basis, or to enter any formal and binding 
agreements to deliver a given amount of cattle at stipulated times, 
29. O. F. Mentzel: Description, Op. cit., I, p. 78. 
29a. de Kiewiet identifies this process in respect of later Boer- 
Nguni relations, but dismisses the century of Dutch-Khoi 
relations in a few pages. He sees each clash between them 
leaving Nguni embedded in "white society". A History of 
South Africa, p. 25. The colonial society - not in Balandier's 
sense, but meaning the overall political economy and social 
order - is unsatisfactorily conceived of as simply a 'white 
society'. By that time, as a careful examination of the 
Dutch/Khoi/slave relationships shows, it was a complex, plural, 
multi-'racial' social organization, not in any way 
approximating a 'white society'. 
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despite some of the absurd 'treaties' concluded. So the V. O. C. 
and colonists went inland, on a regular basis, and initially 
amicable trade relations in turn gave way to fighting as more 
Khoi groups were impoverished of their cattle, saw their grazing 
areas being occupied, and then resisted further barter. Commandos 
were despatched and further land expropriated. The cumulative, 
widening process of subjection through impoverishment went on. 
As hordes collapsed, some fled inland where they 'trespassed' on 
the territory of other groups and attacked their flocks. Internal 
wars broke out, and some Khoi who were in touch with the Dutch 
sought alliances with them against other inland groups. By 1700 
the trend was already established. If the Khoisan resisters further 
inland were a major threat to the cattle farmers in the north- 
eastern areas, separated from the west by the mountain ranges (but 
still connected to the western markets), in the latter areas the 
historical fate of the Khoi was settled. They had succumbed through 
a combination of pressure trading, bribery, temptation, coercion, 
the loss of their herds and customary access to land. Some, no 
doubt, became available as clients to other Khoi (and Nguni and 
Sotho) further afield, but there were quite severe economic and 
structural limits to the numbers of clients that could be 
supported. Others became available as labourers for menial tasks 
in ad hoc ways with the Dutch, while others fled north over the 
Orange River. The effects of diseases and fevers in the 17th 
century and then the smallpox epidemics of the 18th century added 
to the catalogue of other contingent factors that speeded the 
Khoi decline. 
Thus, with their herds savagely depleted, their trans- 
humance severely constrained, the capacity to regenerate their mode 
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of life reduced to almost nil, their resistance tapering off 
(with the important exception of the conflict in the Graafig- 
Reinet area) many Khoi became increasingly dependent upon farmers 
for odd jobs and food. Those who survived all this, and who had 
not retreated inland, were incorporated in the colonial society 
and came slowly to adopt the institutions and languages of the 
emerging Afrikaner people, and contributed to that emergence. 
In short, the initial V. O. C. requirements for cattle 
and agricultural. produce led to the local need for land, and that 
meant conflict, which in turn resulted in the accumulation of more 
land and cattle by the V. O. C. and the graziers, which then precip- 
itated the attacks by Khoi on their herds, and hence more conflict, 
more land, more cattle, more decay, more destruction. As the 
process worked itself out, the Cape Khoi - qua Khoi - disappeared 
from the face of the earth. But the transformation of the 
survivors of these people, and their descendants, over the 
centuries, was slow, yet decisive. On the one hand, they were a 
major factor in the formation of the so-called 'Cape Coloured' 
people. On the other hand they also contributed significantly to 
the constitution and extent of the equally so-called Afrikaner 
people. The line dividing these two 'communities' became increasingly 
vague, shifting and indistinct, because the communities were not 
distinct. The degree of cultural continuity between and within 
them was substantial. In any event, whatever dividing line may 
later have been imposed on the arbitrary basis of colour - though 
with a less arbitrary explanation - it had not emerged in this period 
with any clarity or force, as will later be argued. To concentrate 
on the 'colour' question is analytically unsound, and hence mis- 
leading. It is also historically confusing if one is to understand 
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the structure of relations, and its causes and antecedents, that 
emerged in the formation of the new society. For this structure of 
Cape colonial society before 1800 was in general 'non-racial', yet 
slave-owning. There is nothing particularly paradoxical or even 
unique about this: it was also the case in Brazil and the East 
Indies. 3° Though the argument about that must wait for a later 
chapter it is worth bearing the point in mind when considering the 
application of the general model to the historical material in 
greater detail. 
I propose to do that under the following broad headings. 
First, it is essential to look at that wide mobile nexus of relation- 
ships that are best subsumed under the heading of the "trading and 
raiding" syndrome. 
31 For this provides the clue to the initially 
gradual, then rapid tilting of the cattle and land balance in 
favour of the V. O. C. and colonists. It also raises some difficult 
problems about why some Khoi did barter to the damaging extent they 
appear to have done. Secondly, and associated with this, was the 
pattern and sequence of the collapse of Khoi hordes as independent 
and distinctive groups. The implications of this for relations 
with other ftnterior groups can be identified in terms of the rippling 
and corrosive effects of the process of 'commoditization' by barter 
goods, deep trading and its consequences. 
30. See Frank Tannenbaum: Slave and Citizen. Despite the serious 
criticisms of that study, it remains a masterly and lucid compar- 
ative account of a very difficult problem. See E. D. Genovese: 
The World the Slaveholders Made, and E. D. Genovese and L. Foner 
eds. : Slavery in the New World, which includes the critique 
of Tannenbaum by Marvin Harris in his "The Myth of the Friendly 
Master". On the East Indies, there is no better source book 
than de Graaf's Oost Indise Spiegel, for a contemporary description. 
31. This suggestive phrase is used by Legassick in "The Frontier 
Tradition..... ", p. 17, and is picked up by Marks in "Khoisan 
resistance ..... ", p. 67. On its on it is too limited concept- 
ually to encompass the complex and cumulative historical process. 
While it suggests a dynamic process on one dimension, it lacks 
historical depth and structural 'width'. But seen as part of a wider structure of unfolding relations f conflict and cooperation, ? 
continued on next page).... 
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Thirdly, the political techniques, (from very early on), 
of indirect rule and the establishment of tactical alliances which 
the Dutch used to establish contacts, supply lines and to confirm 
their supremacy, if not their control, over the Cape Khoi, needs 
to be described and analysed. Fourthly, there is the question of 
cultural change amongst some colonial Khoi and the agencies of 
that change. In later chapters some of the consequences of that 
will be taken up more fully in the context of the consideration of 
the labour/slavery question in the political economy and social 
structure of the settlement, with its connections to metropolitan 
Europe and the East. 
First, and centrally, how did the trading and raiding 
cycle work, and with what effects? It can be argued that some 
Khoi, at least, exchanged rather more cattle and sheep for metals, 
beads, tobacco and arrack than was, strictly speaking, in the 
interests of their social self-survival, but j? There are at 
least two perspectives on this exchange relationship and it needs 
to be examined from at least two sides - that of the Dutch and 
that of the Khoi. As is almost inevitable in situations of this 
kind, the evidence for and from the former is more substantial. 
But within it there is some material which illustrates the Khoi 
perspective. 
There can be little doubt that, from the first, the 
Dutch officials at the Cape intended to establish what they 
31. (continued from previous page) ..... 
expansion and resistance over time, it captures an essential 
part of the destruction and construction, as well as the 
cultural incompatibilities and assimilations. 
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believed could be systematic trading and diplomatic relations with 
the inland Khoi. 32 Every possible precaution was taken to ensure 
32. They had some grounds for believing this to be possible. From 
the time of da Gam Is voyage in 1497 cattle had been bartered 
in small numbers from Khoi around the Cape. The first record 
of such an exchange is given by the diarist of da Gama's 
journey, describing the events at the Aguada de Sao Braza 
(Watering Place of Saint Blasins, according to Mollema: De 
Eerste Schipvaart der Hollanders naar Oost-Indie 1595-7, p. 135). 
This was Mossel Bay. Could the people there have been Hessequas? 
See Raven-Hart (ed. ): Before van Riebeeck, p. 6. Thereafter, various 
Portuguese, French, English and Dutch callers bartered cattle 
at different points round the Cape. The Khoi developed a mixed 
reputation, but they were mostly perceived as aggressive and 
dangerous. But Janssen and Proot, marooned with the Haerlem 
crew at the Cape in 1649, commended them (and the Cape) to the 
Heeren, saying that ".... after we had lain there for five 
months, (the natives)..... came daily to the Fort which we had 
thrown up for our defence, to trade, with perfect amity, and 
brought cattle and sheep in quantities .... ". Raven-Hart: 
Op. cit., p. 178, and Moodie: Op. cit., I, PP-3-4- Houtman, in 
1595, at Mossel Bay, had a successful bartering experience. 
Mollema: Op. cit., and Raven-Hart: Op. cit., PP-17-18. So the 
potential for the cattle trade was considered good by van 
Riebeeck. While he was sceptical about the character and dis- 
position of the Khoi, he nonetheless entertained visions of 
establishing sustained barter with them for "... horned cattle 
and sheep", which - along with other animals - could have 
provided the basis of an export trade in hides, to Japan, he 
thought. "Further Considerations and reflections upon some 
points of the Remonstrance presented by Mr Leendert Janz ..... ", 
in Moodie: Op. cit., pp. 5-7. For van Riebeeck's period, see 
Journal, and also Goodwin: Op. cit.; Moodie, _: Op. cit.,; 
H. M. Robertson: "The Economic Development of the Cape under 
van Riebeeck", and Wilson: "The Hunters and the Herders". 
In his Instructions to Pieter Everaerds, leader of an exped- 
ition to the Namaqua in November, 1661, van Riebeeck stressed 
the need to establish trade links and hoped they would "..... 
enter into closer acquaintance and alliance with us". The 
Dutch believed that the Namaqua were "... in communication.... " 
with the gold-rich people of Monomotapa, and hence urged 
Everaerds to find out as much as he could abtut thosepeople and 
their trading preferences. Journal, III, pp. 429-33. Groups 
further afield, like the "Chamaquas, Omaquas, Atiquas, 
Houteniquas, Chauquas, Hancumquas, 'Choboquas, and Cobonas'.... III 
were believed to have settled villages, a great deal of 
cattle, dacha 'plantations' and much 'gold or 'Chory' and 'white 
gems'. The Namaquas were said to be "... a more active race 
than the Hottentots". See Memorandum from van Riebeeck to 
Wagenaar, in Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 246-251, dated 5th May, 1662. 
The difference in tone in the descriptions of these distant 
people as contrasted with that of the local known 'Saldanhars' 
is striking. Interestingly, when the odd generalizations, 
exaggerations and peculiar turn of phrase are allowed for, there 
is some kernel of fact in some of this. 
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that nothing thwarted the realization of the objective. 
33 The 
Company was determined to keep barter in its hands, and the reasons 
are well known. On the one hand they were following the monopolistic 
and mercantilist policy of the time which meant that they brooked 
no competitive independent bartering by colonists or employees 
which might raise the barter 'price'. On the other hand, in the 
particular circumstances of the Cape, they feared that 'incidents' 
might occur which could escalate into costly warfare. Thus edict 
after edict was issued forbidding any such barter, though there were 
a few short spells when it was permitted, though contrary to the 
preferences of local officials. 
34 It is clear, however, that 
33. One of the first proclamations issued by van Riebeeck on 9th 
April, 1652, dealt with how men should behave and was specific- 
ally geared to ensure "... the greater supply of all kinds of 
cattle .... " and the promotion of the Company's interests. 
Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 10. In February 1658, van Riebeeck wrote 
to the Seventeen that "... taking the number of ships at 30 
annually, this would require 240 cattle and 240 sheep .... " 
Another 200 sheep and cattle would be required for the settlement, 
making 440 of each needed annually. The Record, I, p. 119. By 
1695, Grevenbroek estimated 40 ships of all nationalities per 
year were calling at the Cape. Grevenbroek: "An Elegant and 
Accurate Account of the African Race ..... ", p. 281. 
34. The edicts forbidding illegal barter were issued 16 times between 
1658 and 1680. See S. D. Neumark: Economic Influences on the 
South African Frontier, 1652-1836. The initial proclamation 
of 9th April, 1652 had forbidden it. One of the earliest repeat 
edicts was issued on 8th January, 1654. See M. K. Jeffreys: Kaapse 
Plakkaatboek, I, p. 13. Others, re-affirming it were frequent and, 
one suspects, frantic. Certainly, they were regular. Thus 12th 
October, 1654; 26th September, 1657; 20th July/8th September, 1693; 
27th October, 1702; 4/9th April, 1727, and 8th December, 1739" They 
are, respectively, in Jeffreys: Op. cit., at I, p. 17; I, p. 107; 
I, p. 282; I, p. 326; II, p. 129 and II, p. 168. The edict of 1739 
actually specified that there could be no barter with "Hottentots 
or Caffers", which indicates that from early in the 18th century 
barter contacts had been made with Xhosa groups. Following 
pressure from the burgers and the visit of Commissioner van Goens 
in 1657, the cattle trade with the Khoi was temporarily thrown 
open, though they were forbidden to pay more than the V. O. C. did, 
while barter of ivory, rhino horns and feathers was prohibited. 
Resolution of 6th November, 1657, in Moodie: Op. cit., P-114. 
However, the ban was re-imposed, after confirmation of the 
policy was received from Amsterdam on 4th May, 1658. It was 
permitted again in late 1699 and banned again in 1702. Then it 
(continued on next page)..... 
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that illicit barter went on, and the frequence of the bans 
illustrates that. 35 What it also illustrates is that there were 
Khoi who were prepared to exchange cattle for trinkets or tobacco 
or liquor, and that they 'responded' positively to the barter 
with really quite disastrous consequences. There is thus an 
explanatory problem here to which one must shortly return. For it 
seems to be the case that this fatal flaw - bartering away more 
cattle and sheep than their economies could stand - has not been 
sufficiently considered by those whose historical sympathy is, 
understandably, with the Khoi. 
But in so far as the V. O. C. were concerned, the received 
view about the reluctance of the Company to let the settlement 
expand, while at the same time insisting upon the provision of meat, 
is somewhat misleading. It is true that "The Company set its face 
against the expansion of the Colony's limits", but it is simplistic 
to suggest that the colonists sought freedom "... by turning their 
backs upon the sea". 
36 Equally, it is true that van Riebeeck, and 
34" (continued from previous page) ..... 
was open again from 1707 to 1727. See Katzen: Op. cit., pp. 208-9, 
and Marks: Op. cit., p. 69. From the time the free burgers had 
been given their freedom, the sale of meat to any ships was 
forbidden to them. To prevent smuggling small packages of meat 
on board ship the slaughter of beasts was forbidden, unless 
specific permission had been obtained. See Moodie: 0 cit., I, 
p. 104, (June 1657), and also p. 107, pp. 124/5 and PP-357/8- 
A similar edict preventing colonists from killing cattle 
without permission of the Governor was promulgated in December 
1698. See Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708, p. 102. 
The clash of interest between the burgers and the officials 
which this illustrates was there from the earliest times as the 
edicts indicate. One of the first complaints of the free 
burgers, in their first petition of November 1658 was about this. 
They said that though "... we were expressly promised to be 
allowed to trade with the inhabitants called Hottentots, now 
that we are free .... that trade is forbidden ..... ". Moodie: 
Op. cit., I, p. 151. The Dutch mercantile turn of mind and 
behavioural patterns were strong, and their purposes and 
aspirations clear. 
35. In July 1660, one of the upstanding citizens, Herman Remanjene, 
was discovered to have been trading ille ally with the Khoi, and 
he was punished. See Moodie: Op. clt., p. 
254. In ctober of that 
year, Jan Zacharias was fined for bartering 4 sheep from the 
Chainouqua at the Duynhoop. Ibid., loc. cit. 
36. de Kiewiet: 0 p. cit., PP. 5-6. 
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others after him, were preoccupied with the cattle trade. 
37 But 
whatever the Company might have said, however constrained the Cape 
commanders may have felt, and however random and apparently 
unconnected the various aspects of the expansion of the colony may 
be described as having been, the fact remains that the logic of 
the Company's demands, and the implementation of their policies, 
required deeper and deeper penetration into the interior, without 
it necessarily entailing geographic expansion, and the officials 
of the Company at the Cape knew this. Local factors - namely, the 
colonists and their developing interests - accomplished the latter. 
But penetration into the interior - for cattle, gold, ivory, 
feathers and 'Monopotapa' for instance - was necessarily entailed, 
given the imperatives of V. O. C. policy and the emergent interests 
of the colonists. 
38 From the start, exploration and penetration - 
which went hand in hand - were part and parcel of the political 
economy of the settlement and. the logic of its purposes. The arrow- 
head of that penetration was trade, and the pressure behind it was 
the V. O. C. demand for meat for the ships and garrison. 
The repeated cycle of relations that was expressed through 
the 'trade' between the Dutch and successive Khoi hordes, or sections 
37. Wilson: Op. cit., p. 64. Even a cursory reading of the Journal 
confirms that. 
38. For evidence about the belief that gold, Angola and Monomotapa 
were within fairly easy striking distance, see Journal, I, p. 380, 
the entry for 22nd December, 1655. See also the "Instructions 
for Mr van Riebeeck .... " from van Goens on 16th April, 1657. 
Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 97-9" van Goens had written: "I see 
little difficulty in penetrating from this quarter to the River 
of Spirito Santo, and the City of Monomotapa, to see if anything 
is to be done for the Company there". Ibid., loc. cit. For a 
full list and brief account of the various expeditions under- 
taken between 1655 and 1795, see M. W. Spilhaus: The Making of 
South Africa, Appendix, pp. 399-405, and A. J. Bbeseken: "The 
Lure of Africa", passim. Wagenaar, in turn, in his Memorandum 
to his successors, declared that the first and foremost task of 
the Company was to "... endeavour to live, and trade, in peace 
with these tribes, at the same time and for the same purpose, to 
ýenetrate - by parties of volunteers -, further and further to the inerior". Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 24-51 (My emphases, A. L. ) The 
'official mind' at the Cape declared itself explicitly, and from 
the start. 297 
of them, had a pattern. First, trade or barter was the only way 
the Dutch could initially obtain cattle, and it was self-evidently 
the appropriate method which Dutchmen, coming from the Netherlands 
of the 17th century, would think of adopting. For trade was a way 
of life, as was shown earlier, and the pragmatic and expedient (and 
ruthless) search for profit was virtually stamped into the Charter 
of the V. O. C., and certainly characterized the expectations, norms 
and behaviour of its employees. So, from the start, the pressure - 
originating with the Directors in Amsterdam, and coming down the 
colonial hierarchy - was on the Khoi to barter their cattle. And 
nothing illustrates more clearly than this how different was the 
Dutch conception of the purpose and form of exchange relations from 
that of the Khoi. Thus, secondly, the initial caution and 
expediency which the officials at the Cape showed in their early 
dealings with the 'Saldanhars' (the Cochoqua) gave way to puzzlement 
as to why the Knoi seemed so reluctant to trade in the kind of 
quantity which the Dutch expected, given the size of the herds they 
saw near the Fort. Puzzlement quickly gave way to irritation, as 
instanced in April 1655, when the Journal recorded that a group of 
Khbi, with plenty of cattle, had not been disposed to barter any, 
which was a common complaint of the Diarists. In this particular 
instance, the writer contemplated the time when all their cattle 
could be taken from them, a fate which "... they richly deserved 
and continue to merit by their daily conduct". Earlier the Diarist 
had written that "These natives do not want to part with their 
cattle or sheep, although they have at least 1500 or 1600 altogether. 
It is therefore our opinion that it would not be out of place to 
deprive these rogues of the cattle and to remove their persons with 
wives and children". 
39 
39" Journal, I, p. 306 and I, p. 288. Other examples of this general view 
are recorded on the 18th January, 1654. Journal, I, p. 207. 
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This shows that the Dutch simply did not understand the structure 
of Khoi societies, for it was almost beyond their comprehension that 
such people did not play the economic game according to the rules of 
trade. And it was accordingly with some scepticism that the Journal 
recorded the reason given by some Khoi for not bartering when they 
said that they "... could not do without their cattle as they had to 
live on the milk, and so forth, as others had also alleged". 
40 
Whether they believed it or not, relations were not 
improved. And the Dutch inability to grasp the nature of the 
relationship between the Khoi economies and their behavioural 
hesitance and avoidance of immediate, sustained and large-scale 
exchanges only exacerbated tension and the potential for conflict in 
that situation, which was the next phase in the cycle of relations. 
For as the settlement expanded onto land for the free burgers in 
1657, and as both V. O. C. and free burger herds began to grow, the 
local Khoi struck back. The war of 1659 was not so much about 
cattle as it was about pasture land. 
41 The Goringhaiqua (a Cochoqua 
offshoot), known as the 'Capemen' were primarily involved. When 
peace was finally made in April 1660, the Dutch - in response to the 
charge that they had unjustly taken Khoi pasture land - retorted and 
justified what they had done in terms of which Grotius would have 
approved. They said that the "land had ..... justly fallen to us in 
40. Ibid., I, p. 314. A Dutch visitor to the Cape in 1655, Gijsbert 
Heeck, wrote "... cattle (as aforesaid) the inhabitants would 
not barter - which, because of the quantity we had seen inland, 
seemed to us pretty strange". Raven Hart: Cape Good Hope, I, p. 39. 
41. See Marks: Op. cit., p. 64, ff. Also Journal, III, pp. 45-197 
dealing with the war period from 19th May 1659, to 6th April 1660. 
The hold of the V. O. C. on the Cape was never less secure than 
in that period. After that, however, its position was never 
seriously threatened again. All the key Khoi 'chiefs' and 
brokers - Oedasoa, Gogosoa, Herry and Doman (who had been to 
Batavia with van Goens) were involved one way or another. The formal resolution of 19th May, 1659 declaring war on them aimed to ".. capture as many cattle and men as we can". Journal, III, p. 48. Also, Spilhaus: The First South Africans, pp. 197-212. The war is 
described in detail by Elphick: Op. cit., pp. 165-172. 
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a defensive war, won by the sword, as it were, and we intended to 
keep it". 42 
It requires little effort to see how much scope there was, 
in this kind of situation, for misunderstanding, not to put too fine 
a point on it. The persistent and progressive penetration of the 
interior was associated with scuffles, counter-raids by Khoi and 
San, and retaliatory strikes by the Dutch. The behaviour of the 
colonists and employees of the Company in provoking Khoi counter- 
attacks was something which even the officials acknowledged. When 
the 1660 Peace was concluded the Goringhaiqua are reported in the 
Journal to have said ".... that the colonists and others who lived 
in the country had done them much mischief, by sneaking off with 
either a sheep or a calf on occasion, by snatching off their beads or 
armlets .... or by beating and striking them, without the Commander's 
knowledge - and there is some truth in thisl. 
43 The immediate cause 
of the more prolonged war of 1673-7 against the Cochoqua under 
Gonnema appears to have been the activities of some freemen who, 
with officials permission, had been on an expedition to shoot hippos 
"and other large game", and were themselves killed in a fight with the 
Cochoqua. 44 But there had been a history of tension in respect of 
that area and that group, and the conflict that followed was 
42. Journal, III, p. 196. A concise statement of grievances over this 
issue had been voiced much earlier, in February 1655, when 
Peninsula Khoi said that the Dutch "... were living upon their 
land and they perceived that we were rapidly building more and 
more as if we intended never to leave, and for that reason they 
would not trade with us for any more cattle, as we took the best 
pasture for our cattle. ". Journal, I, p. 292. In 1678 the 
'Hottentots-Holland' region was opened up to colonists for their 
cattle. This can not have been reassuring to Khoi in that region. 
See A. J. H. van der Walt: Die Ausdehnung der Kolonie am Kap der 
Gutten Hoffnung, pp. 12-13. 
43. Journal, III, p. 196. My emphasis, A. L. 
44. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 327. The Resolution of 11th July, 1673, 
declared war on the Cochoqua section under Gonnema. Also, see 
Elphick: Op. cit., loc. cit. 
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sustained. 
45 
However, the full-scale, all-out formal warfare of this 
kind was neither characteristic nor representative of the 
conditions which were associated with the penetration of the Khoi 
political economies. It was, in fact, the exception. It is clear, 
of course, that individual colonists, or parties of them, bullied 
and cheated Khoi where and when they could, perhaps more often when 
the barter trade was legalized during the periods mentioned earlier. 
46 
45. See, for instance, the discussion in MacC one: Op. cit., pp. 60-62. 
An initial attack by the V. O. C. raiding party, despatched on 
the 12th July, netted 800 horned cattle and 900 sheep. Moodie: 
Op. cit., p. 330. With that level of retaliation it is not 
surprising the war dragged on for 4 years. A second offensive, 
in May 1674, by a V. O. C. force of 100 soldiers and burgers 
(with the aid of "250 Hottentots") cleaned out "... the greater 
part of the enemy's cattle, being fully 800 horned cattle and 
about 4000 sheep". Ibid., p. 338. Equally, it is not surprising 
that Gonnema and Oedasoa finally 'agreed' to a humiliating peace 
which included a commitment "... to deliver yearly, upon the 
arrival of the return fleet, 30 horned cattle". Ibid., p. 352. 
The loss of 1600 cattle was probably tantamount to the effective 
shattering of that alliance of clans under Gonnema. Shortly 
afterwards, Gonnema sought V. O. C. 'protection'. Another account 
of the war with Gonnema is in Böeseken: "The Lure of Africa", 
pp. 43-44. Elphick describes the sequences of this second war 
in detail. Elphick: Op. cit., chapter vii. 
46. In 1702, the Cape government banned the cattle barter again, 
"... in consequence of the great and intolerable excesses of 
most of the freemen, who committed violence, robbery, murder - 
robbing the poor natives of their main subsistence which only 
consists of cattle, by such detestable proceedings.... ". Letter 
of 1st Apri1,1703 to Amsterdam. Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 
1696-1708, p. 192. Even allowing for van der Stel's anxiety to 
retain the monopoly for himself and his clique - and not taking 
the crocodile tears too seriously - independent evidence before 
and after his governorship confirm that this sort of thing was 
common, though as we have seen, not frequently punished. For a 
discussion of an instance of bullying of Khoi by colonists and 
officials see L. Pouche: The Diary of Adam Tas, pp. 368-373. 
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But this, as with the wars, was the consequence not the cause of 
the process of pressure trading, penetration and impoverishment 
that defined the shift in control and command of cattle and land 
resources and accomplished the Khoi collapse in the face of this 
kind of colonialism. From the Dutch perspective, then, the 
trading aspect of the cycle turned rapidly into a raiding and 
counter-raiding pattern in roughly the following sequence. First 
came expeditions to locate the Khoi groups. This was followed by 
the establishment of some kind of edgy though amicable bartering 
relationship, and then, perhaps, some expression of resistance to 
further bartering by the Khoi. At that moment in the cycle almost 
any incident - offensive or disrupting to either side- could give 
rise to the outbreak of conflict, ranging from very localized 
raiding and counter-retaliation through to the full-scale 'war' as 
outlined above. 
Then, as one Khoi group after another, over the century 
and beyond, was more or less cleaned out of their cattle, the Dutch 
were sucked deeper into the interior to establish new connections 
and make new alliances, and find new supplies. For it soon became 
clear to the officials that local hordes round the Cape stood in the 
way of close and (they thought) promising trade relations with other 
. more distant but fantastic groups like the Namaqua and also the 
"Chamaquas, Omaquas, Atiquas, Houtuniquas and Cauquas", as they were 
described in the Journal. 47 
47. Journal, III, pp. 302-3. The first statement of local ethnography 
and commercial relations suddenly appeared in the Journal on the 
19th October, 1657. Journal, II, pp. 171-2. There are hints here 
of more complex trading and political relationships among the 
groups. Herry is reported here as saying that local Khoi obtained 
their copper from the Nauaqua, but he did not know where they got 
it. Ibid., II, p. 185. It was only, however, in June 1658 that the 
officials learned about the Hancumquas (Inquas or 'Daccha Makers') 
who grew dagger, according to Eva. Journal, II, p. 286. 
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pagination is correct. 
often at times of scarcity, or after an outbreak of disease 
affecting the cattle - still went inland to supplement the herds 
or to provide the Company with sources of supply which were 
independent of the colonist herds. 
55 Most of the relationships 
established with new groups of Khoi turned bitter in the end as the 
hordes were impoverished of their cattle, and as the veeboere moved 
eastwards on to their domains. The same was true of the area 
directly north of the Cape. In 1724 an expedition to re-establish 
and improve barter connections with the Namaqua was undertaken by 
Rhenius. Some 200 miles north of Cape Town, near Meerhof's Kasteel, 
he encountered a group who told him that for "... two successive 
years we had cleaned them out of all their cattle.... " and they 
added, apparently meaning it to be threatening, that ... they were 
no more inclined to trade withAhe Company and if all their cattle 
were gone from them they would come and fetch cattle from the Dutch". 
56 
Thus even when the cattle stocks held by the colonists were 
substantial, as Table I indicates, the Y. O. C. continued to send out 
expeditions to barter. In some instances this was no doubt caused 
55. Leibbrandts Journal 16 -1 2. See 18th October, 1710 
(p. 243); 
13th September, 1711 (p. 252); 14th September, 1716 (pp. 269-70); 
28th September, 1722 (pp. 291-2); 19th September, 1725 (p. 301) 
and 15th September, 1726 (p. 303). Almost all these expeditions 
were undertaken in the late Spring or early summer in antici- 
pation of the return fleet. On the fleet, see A. J. Bbeseken: 
Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse en die 18de Eeuse Samelewing aan 
die Kaap, "Die Retoervloot". 
56. The Journals of Brink and Rhenius, edited by E. E. Mossop, pp. 138-9. 
They also said that "... as soon as they saw our coming (they) 
had taken the best of their cattle in the mountains and were dis- 
inclined to barter with us". Ibid., p. 141. Defensive aggression 
and strategic withdrawal were combined. In the Journal and 
reports and letters, the new inland groups about whom the Dutch 
had heard but who had not been contacted, were regarded differently 
and discussed with respect. Once they were contacted the cycle 
applied to their relations with the Dutch. See Note 32 above. 
After 1720, the Namaqua were the main source of cattle in the trade. 
See Legassick: The Griqua, the Sotho-Tswana and the Missionaries, 
pp. 107 and 126. In 1726, Khoi in the Rivierzondereind area 
complained about 'European' depradations, and again this happened 
in 1739 in the Piketberg area, the latter incident leading to the 
Barbier episode. Theal: History of Africa, Ill, p. 24 and PP. 43-4. Also 
Neumark: Op. cit., pp. 95-6.305 
In practice, the process can be shown working itself out. 
In the early 1650s the exploration and penetration was rather 
local - they sought the 'Saldanhars' and traded with them. By 
the end of that decade there was urgency to make contact with the 
Namaquas. The 1660s brought promising barter with the small but 
cattle-rich Chainouquas, and then in the 1670s the group that had 
become a major source of cattle was the Hessequas. By the time 
the peace with Gonnema had been concluded, the V. O. C. was looking 
further East, having exhausted the supplies from the Goringhhaikas 
(Capemen) and the Gorachouquas (the Tobacco Thieves). 
48 By 1669 
the Saldanha supplies were drying up, and interest in the Namaquas 
(in the north) was again being expressed, for it was believed that 
they were "so rich in cattle". 
49 In 1679 it was stated that 
". ... the neighbouring Hottentots are now so impoverished of cattle... " 
that even had a trading party been sent to them, little would have 
been obtained, and the future for the trade lay in the east with the 
Hessequas. 50 By 1681, van Goens could assert that "... the Company 
48. See the Memo from Wagenaar to van Quaelbergen, of the 24th 
September, 1666 in Moodie: Op. cit., pp. 290-296. And van der Stel 
wrote to Amsterdam that there was "... a scarcity of cattle 
among all the neighbouring Hottentots, including Gonnema". 
23rd December, 1679. Ibid., p. 373. 
49. Ibid., pp. 303 and 305. It is likely that the V. O. C. incurred 
the anger of the Cochoqua under Gonnema by using the Saldanha 
area as a staging point to penetrate further north to the Namaqua. 
See the Resolution to this effect dated 10th January, 1670. In 
Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 305. 
50. Ibid., I, p. 372. Thus Grevenbroek described the Hessequas as "the 
chief tribe". Once a year, he wrote, "... a merchandise of 
tobacco, arrack and copper necklaces, is sent to them to be 
profitably exchanged for cattle. The natives are agape for these 
articles owing to the long interval of waiting". "An Account 
of the Cape of Good Hope", p. 109. In the previous year, the 
Khoi in the area as far east as the Hottentots-Holland mountains 
were said to be "... impoverished in respect of cattle.... " and 
hence it was resolved to send an expedition inland to the 
Hessequas for a six-week bartering mission. Resolution of 26th 
October, 1678. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 367, fn. 1. 
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no longer depends so much upon the barter with the Hottentots, as 
was formerly the case .... ". 
51 Nonetheless almost annual barter 
expeditions to the east were being undertaken, but by 1685 skirmishes 
with the Hessequas punctuated the country "... which, in former 
times ..... was quite safe and could be traversed without fear... ". 
52 
As the Hessequas lost their cattle and hostilities broke out, the 
Council at the Cape was already resolving to send an expedition to 
the Inqua, so that ".... both parties might enter into an exchange 
of their several articles of merchandize .... " adding that the Inqua 
country was very populous, and that ".... no Europeans or white 
people had ever been there.... ". 
53 In due course Ensign Schrijver 
set out on his expedition and, having made contact with the Inqua, 
learnt of yet further groups deeper inland, such as the Gonaqua 
".... from whom these Inquahase Hottentots barter Dakka, which is 
used by them as the Indians use opium .... " and other, including 
the ".... Briqua, who are eaters of men....,,. 
54 
The process was relentless and rapid. At the same time, 
the balance of cattle stock being built up by the Company and the 
colonists was on the increase. Despite this, regular expeditions - 
51. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 380. "By 1700 the settlements between Cape 
Town and Tulbagh were more than capable of supplying the 
Company with all the vegetables, grain, fruit, wine, brandy, 
beef and mutton required for its garrison and ships. The main 
aim of the Company had thus been realized, and consequently it 
had no particular inclination to promote and extend colonization 
any further". M. H. de Kock: Op. cit., p. 31. 
52. Moodie: Op. cit., p. 395" This illustrates the rapid degeneration 
of relations as the trading gave over to mutual raiding. 
53. Ibid., I, p. 429. 
54. Journals of the Expeditions of O. Bergh and I. Schryver, edited by 
E. E. Mossop, p. 234. The edges of the Nguni were now being 
reached. But there is no foundation for the assertion of 
cannibalism. He returned in April, 1689 with 1000 head of cattle 
bartered mainly from the Inqua. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 430. 
304 
by the colonist refusal to sell their cattle at the prices being 
offered. Thus regular Company expeditions continued through the 
first half of the 18th century, as Mentzel, who was at the Cape 
until the early 1740s, described. 
57 By the 1770s, however, barter 
with the Khoi was tapering off, but was not over. "This bartering 
traffic", wrote Thunberg a little prematurely, but making the 
general point, "has now quite ceased as well in this north western 
as in the south eastern parts of Africa, especially since the land 
is well peopled, and the farmers, who abound in cattle, are now 
capable of delivering as many soever may be wanted". 
58 
57. "At intervals of 3 or 4 years the government usually sends out a 
commando of about 40 to 50 European soldiers and sailors, besides 
a few bastard Hottentots under the command of a reliable 
officer .... to obtain cattle from the Hottentots 
in exchange 
for. tobacco, dagga and such trifles". Mentzel: Op. cit., Vol 
III, p. 123. Elsewhere Mentzel implied that in the Drakenstein 
district the hordes and their herds had collapsed into depend- 
e ncy and most cattle was "... obtained in large numbers from 
the great Namaqua Hottentots". Ibid., Vol III, pp. 72 and 77. 
He also pointed out that that bartering had been "unjust and 
cruel towards the Hottentots". Ibid., loc. cit. Did he mean the 
inequality of the exchange, or its manner, or both? 
58. Thunberg: Op. cit., Vol II, pp. 156-7. He indicated further, how- 
ever, that the next candidates for 'such traffic' would be the 
".... Caffres and Namaquas, who are possessed of a great 
quantity of cattle, and whose lands have not hitherto suffered .. ". 
Ibid., loc. cit. In any event, Thunberg's claim that the barter 
had ceased was probably a bit premature. For in 1774 Plettenberg 
authorised a ".... journey to barter cattle", issuing "4 half-aums 
arrack, 240 lbs of tobacco, 100,000 copper beads and 4 gross of 
pipes" for the expedition to use. Moodie: 0 . cit., III, p. 40. 
The Landdrost and Heemraden (local officials) of the Swellendam 
district were not too hopeful of any successful trade as 
"... little remains to the Hottentots .... ". Ibid., p. 33. This 
was deep in the eastern Cape, north of the Gamtoos River mouth. 
Similar indications of impoverishment were reported from the 
northern Cape. See letter from Plettenberg to the Stellenbosch 
Landdrost, dated 14th June, 1774. Ibid., p. 33. 
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From the Dutch side of the trading-raiding relationship 
the process was thus one of purposeful, progressive inland 
penetration, accompanied by insistent and apparently insatiable 
trading pressures, considerable bullying, Khoi counter-attacks and 
raids on colonists and their cattle, Dutch retaliation in turn 
followed by Khoi withdrawal, defeat, exhaustion or submission to 
imposed 'peace agreements'. This in turn drew the V. O. C. further 
inland yet again in search of cattle supplies. The cycle bored 
its way on until the edges of the Nguni peoples in the east, and 
the Sotho in the north were reached. By the time that this 
happened - though contact with the Nguni had been made much earlier 
by expeditions which had set out for the East5 
8a 
- in a systematic 
way, the disintegration of the main Cape Khoi hordes had either 
taken place or was well advanced. The eastern-moving veeboere in 
the 18th century took every advantage of the situation. But as they 
moved into the north-eastern regions they forced fleeing and refugee 
Khoi up against the mountainous areas, where alliances with San 
precipitated ferocious resistance and counter attacks. And even 
though formal 'war' was rare, the use of the officially sanctioned 
Commando operations became widespread. 
59 In the second half of the 
58a. In 1702, on an expedition to the Eastern Cape, burgers with Khoi 
servants and helpers plundered 2000 cattle and 2500 sheep from 
the Inqua. Elphick: Op. cit., p. 289. This episode is referred to 
again later where it illustrates a different point. 
59. In December/January, 1715/1716 official permission was granted 
to Jacob Mostert to get up a commando to regain 36 oxen stolen 
by 'Bushmen'. Leibbrandt: Requesten, II, p. 733. This is an early 
example of many such instances. See also Marks: Op. cit., pp. 70-1. 
Earlier than this Johan Schreyer who was at the Cape between 
1668 and about 1674 observed this process and described it 
succinctly, thus: "They (the'natives') have indeed many times 
tried to resist the newcomers, namely the Dutch, but since they 
have no such equipment as the Europeans they have usually been 
defeated, and must surrender to the enemy and suffer the loss of 
some hundred oxen and sheep. " From his Neue-Ost-Indiansche 
Beschreibung, 1679, in Raven-Hart: Cape Good Hope, I, p. 131. 
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18th century there were periods in the north-east of the 
Stellenbosch and Swellendam districts - the area which later became 
Graaff-Reinet in 1786 - when an almost permanent state of war 
existed. But this was not so to the west and south. 
In turning to examine the character of the Khoi side of 
the relationship, one thing is clear. If the Dutch side of the 
relationships exhibited a single-minded and purposive deep trading 
offensive, backed by military and other means, the Khoi hordes 
responded with more ambiguity and divisive variation. But at the 
centre, the analysis of their decline can, in large measure, be 
approached in terms of the manner in which they responded, and 
succumbed, to inducements and to the trading pressure in its various 
forms. 
The first thing that needs however to be emphasized, and 
then put aside and borne in mind, is that the Khoi and later the 
San did resist, and at different times did so fiercely. The 
conventional view that the colonial advance was only marginally 
hindered until the Nguni and Sotho were reached has been corrected 
in recent years. 
60 
But, despite the war of 1659 (when the V. O. C. 
presence at the Cape was almost ended), the war of 1673-7, the 
coercive and bullying tactics, and the systematic use of commandos 
60. Marks: Op. cit.. She argues that the It... complex range of 
responses of the Khoikhoi .... " included collaboration and 
resistance. This is a useful corrective, but my argument is of 
a related but different kind. It starts with the Khoi social 
structure and political economy and I argue that its loose and 
relatively precarious nature hindered wider and more effective 
alliances of resistance, made penetration and division of the 
hordes and the interior easier, and hence accelerated their 
disintegration, despite the resistance which some groups put up. 
The simplicity of Khoisan social organization may have made 
adaptability and change possible, Marks argues. I argue that 
the simplicity placed severe constraints on adaptation and 
change, and accounts primarily for their collapse, in the face 
of various inducements, pressures and offensives. 
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by the Dutch, it is too easy and too comfortable to explain Khoi 
decline in those terms alone, or even largely in terms of those 
factors. Nor is it sufficient to indicate the technological gap 
that gave such considerable fire-power advantage to the Dutch in 
the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. And it is simply not 
the case that the Khoi were reluctant and defiantly unwilling 
partners in the barter trade, as we shall see. On the question of 
resistance, there can be little doubt that the most systematic and 
sustained phase of this was in the second half of the 18th century: 
there is nothing in the earlier period that compares to it, though 
there had been conflict and fighting. 
60a 
The last-ditch character, 
it seems, of the fighting between the Khoisan resisters and the 
veeboere communities (including the often well-armed Khoi and 
'Bastaard' members of the commandos) ran right across the northern 
and especially the north-eastern edges of the colony, and even 
beyond the formal 'boundaries'. In the Roggeveld, Bokkeveld, 
Hanta. m, Nieuweveld, Camdebo, Sneeuwberg and Bruintjes Hoogte areas, 
the fighting increased steadily and systematically through the 
second half of the 18th century, reaching its peak in the 1770s 
and after. Theal's accounts of the escalation and violence of the 
period after 1730 makes grim reading. 
60b 
In a series of co-ordinated 
60a. San groups were involved in systematic attacks on the cattle of 
farmers in the North between 1701-1703. The areas hardest hit 
were round Riebeeck's Kasteel and the Piketberg. Khoi cattle 
were also seized, and commandos moved against the attackers 
".... on behalf of the Hottentots". Theal: OP. cit., II, pp. 414-6; 
and Leibbrandt: Letters Received, 1696-1708, from Stellenbosch 
to Cape, dated 13th Narch, 1701. 
60b. "The Hottentots broke down undramatically and simply". De Kieweitt 
Op. cit., p. 20. That kind of view has been challenged by Marks: 
Op. cit., p. 71, ff. Her useful survey of the history of this 
period shows this clearly and decisively. Also, for some of the 
more bloody details, see Theal: Op. cit., III, p. 45, ff, p. 81, and 
p. 188, ff. Many farmers were forced to abandom their farms or 
cattle outposts. Here Theal refers to raids by Khoisan resisters - 
and no doubt also groups which were near to starvation - between 
(continued on next. page)...... 
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commando retaliatory strikes, for instance, in 1774 alone, some 
were 
500 'Bushmen' (as they/called in the official reports) were shot 
and killed and 239 taken prisoner. 
60c 
It has been estimated that 
in the decade between 1785 and 1795 some 2500 'Bushmen' were 
killed and 669 taken prisoner. 
60d 
Nothing in the 17th century 
or the first half of the 18th century matched that. 
It is of course not possible to be certain about the 
precise composition of the groups which resisted the penetration 
and expansion across that range of space and time. They are usually 
referred to in the literature as 'Bosjeman-Hottentotte'. They may 
have been San; they may have been cattle-less Khoi, or combinations 
of both - in warfare their methods were the same. They raided 
cattle-stations and farms, slaughtered (or maimed) stock, drove off 
cattle and sheep and attacked veeboere families and their dependants. 
The resistance was fierce. There may be a prima facie case, as a 
rough rule of thumb based on the previous analysis of the differences 
between the Khoi cattle-culture and the San hunter-gatherer culture, 
60b. (continued from previous page).... 1754-1763 in the Roggeveld 
and in the Bokkeveld. In the 1760s, there were attacks in the 
Zak River area, and in May 1770 near present day Beaufort West. 
Also, see Marais: The Cape Coloured People, pp. 16-30. 
Many years later, George Thompson was told in the Roggeveld 
area by a farmer who had been involved in many commando 
operations against the Khoisan that ".... a great number had 
been shot and their children carried into the Colony. On one 
of the expeditions, not less than two hundred Bushmen had been 
massacred". George Thompson: Travels and Adventures in 
Southern Africa, Part One, pp. 6-7. 
60c. "Report of Field-Commandant Nicolaas van der Merwe .... " in 
Moodie: OP. Cit., III, pp. 35-7, and passim. Also, Walker: A 
history .... Op-cit., p. 97. 
60d. G. E. Cory: The Rise of South Africa, I, pp. 19-20. Also, 
MacCrone: Op. cit., pp. 118-125, and Schapera: The Khoisan Peoples, 
p. 39. 
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for assuming that, where the resisting group kept the cattle they 
had driven off and tried to build up herds from them, they were 
remnants or refugees from Khoi hordes which had collapsed and 
retreated and re-grouped. Conversely, as was often the case, 
where the cattle were subsequently found by commandos (or so they 
said) to have been quickly slaughtered, and eaten, it is possible 
that the core of the groups were San. But it seems to have been 
the case, as Marks suggests, that Khoisan alliances - between 
groups with both Khoi and San antecedents - were common, though ad 
hoc. Some escaped slaves and Khoi servants joined these groups too. 
The rugged mountains into which they retreated made for quite 
appalling methods of brutality to flush them out of caves and kloofs. 
Prisoners were taken too - mainly women and children - and they were 
distributed as servants to the members of the commando. This 
illustrates another manner in which scarce labour was secured on the 
periphery, where of course there was only a handful of slaves. 
60e 
Even as the fighting raged in those areas in the second half 
of the 18th century, barter arrangements and expeditions continued 
to be organized with groups nearer the coast. In the same year as 
the combined commando operations of 1774, the Swellendam Landdrost 
requested ".... for the trade for the Hottentots, 200,000 Amsterdam 
copper beads, 504 lbs of tobacco and 338 cans of arrack". 
60f 
This resistance must be seen as a constant background to 
what follows here. Over the extremities of the colony, at different 
60e. See for instance the report of the Commando under Gerrit van 
Wyk in Moodie: Op. cit., III, pp. 37Q8, especially fn. 1. 
60f. Ibid., III, p. 39. Letter from Landdrost of Swellendam to 
Governor Plettenberg, 20th November, 1774. 
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places and at different times from the mid-17th century to the 
late 18th century, a combination of features was present in the 
trading-raiding relationship. Barter and withdrawal, attack and 
defence, accommodation and submission, as well as submission and 
incorporation - these all defined the process on ever widening arcs 
of the colony. But - and this is the central strand of the 
argument which follows - they expressed, in different forms and ways, 
the conditions and consequences associated with the fundamental 
thrust of colonialism through the trading and commodity penetration 
by the V. O. C. of the Khoi economies, and the geographical expansion 
of the colonists which followed, and sometimes (later) even led 
this process. 
The apparent spped with which successive Khoi groups 
disintegrated, though not usually without a phase of struggle, can 
only be satisfactorily explained in terms of the precarious nature 
of their transhumant economies relative to the new pressures on 
them, and the looseness of their political organization. In asking 
why and how the Dutch were able - despite the wars of 1659 and 1672-7 
- to gain decisive control and supremacy so quickly, thus establishing 
bridgehead after bridgehead into the interior, the answer must turn 
on structural factors first and foremost. 
Two questions of a general kind will serve as a basis for 
examining the Khoi side of the trading-raiding relationship. First, 
what features of the political economy, social structure and ecology 
of the Khoi (as analyzed in the previous chapter) made those 
societies particularly vulnerable to this sustained offensive of 
the V. O. C.? Secondly, and related to this, why do some Khoi groups 
appear to have traded off really quite substantial numbers of 
cattle and sheep in return for non-productive barter goods? 
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The character of the variable and ambiguous Khoi 
response may be illustrated in the following ways. On the one 
hand there is enough evidence to indicate that various groups at 
different times and in different places responded quite positively 
- and with a shrewd sense of value in their own terms - to the 
opportunity to exchange cattle and sheep for metal pieces, beads, 
arrack and tobacco. On the other hand, resistance to Y. O. C. and 
colonist pressure was, in general, by a succession of small groups 
and rarely involved any serious alliances or large-scale bonding 
for defensive or offensive purposes. 
61 
Moreover, the internal 
disputes within and between hordes and sections of them which was 
in part (and only in part) a consequence of the corrosive effects 
which the barter goods had on intra- and inter - horde relations, 
must also be seen as part of the overall structural context of the 
'response'. The explanation for the above may be located in the 
loose 'federal' socio-political structures of the hordes themselves, 
which rendered them vulnerable to penetration, division and dis- 
integration. Why was this so? 
The 'fissiparous tendency'62 outlined in the previous 
chapter gave considerable autonomy to the patricians and their 
heads. Taken with the transhumant way of life and mode of production, 
primarily for use, not exchange, it meant that horde unity was 
61. Stow suggests that ".... there does not appear to have been a 
single tribe or clan capable of bringing two or three thousand 
men into the field". Native Races of South Africa, p. 246. 
Though that may seem to represent a sizeable military force, 
their arms were relatively feeble compared with the Dutch guns. 
The fact also that they had to move with and protect their 
cattle must have seriously limited the form of their 
resistance.. The figure Stow gives may be an exaggeration anyway. 
62. Schapera: Op. cit., p. vii. 
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structurally difficult to establish and even harder to maintain. 
Given the presence at the Cape of an abundance of barter goods - and 
the penetration of the interior by traders - individual clans and 
clan-heads were able to establish independent relations with 
Dutchmen, officials or colonists. No doubt some clans 'favoured' 
barter more than others, and perhaps those that did were in a 
position to support a higher level of exchange than those who did not. 
Nevertheless, by bartering off their 'surplus', any group must have 
weakened itself and brought it closer to the edge of decline in 
status and wealth as a corporate group, hence establishing the prime 
condition for fission. It is important to stress here that within 
societies of this segmentary kind, the role of the individual clans, 
or clan and/or family heads was decisive. For the structure gave 
scope for such individuals, or groups of individuals involved in 
decision making about such matters, to take decisions about the 
exchange of beasts (in this instance), the consequences of which 
could have been disastrous. The 'individual's role' in historical 
change is, in the final analysis, given room or constrained by its 
structural context. For beyond a certain point in barter relations 
the vulnerability of a section or a horde increased dramatically. 
And once the herd size was reduced by decisions of that kind, other 
factors - drought, disease, inter-clan or inter-horde conflict and 
raiding - would have tipped the group in question to the edges of 
survival, as a group. They would, broadly speaking, have had three 
options open to them. They could have fallen back on hunting and 
gathering; or, they could have broken up and sought temporary client 
status with a better-endowed group; or, they would have perished. 
The sudden implosion, into the loose and fractious network 
of political and economic relationships within and between hordes, of 
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a quite substantial supply of barter goods like copper, brass, 
beads, liquor, etc., must have been very tempting indeed to Khoi. 
For, within their frame of values, as was pointed out in the 
previous chapter, these items ranked high in terms of their 
preferences, for decorative purposes and limited exchanges. The 
pumping of such goods into that system of relations also severely 
sharpened rivalries, and initially created considerable opportunities 
for the brokerage skills of the likes of Herry and Doman, which in 
turn underlined the divisions. 
62a 
Liquor and tobacco soon, too, 
became popular as items of consumption, and not in any sense as 
exchange goods. 
The point to emphasize here is not simply or solely that 
they idly bartered away their cattle for 'baubles', but the character 
of the exchanges involved, and the consequences. The analysis of 
such exchanges across sharply discontinuous cultural lines and 
between two radically contrasting systems of production with 
differing norms and purposes and distinct hierarchies of value, is 
technically in economics a complex matter. But what seems clearly 
to have been the case in this instance is that, by any comparative 
62a. As an example of the sheer volume of the commodities being 
pumped into the interior, consider what was taken by one 
expedition "for purchasing livestock" in February, 1658. They 
had 660 lbs brass, 75 lbs tobacco, and 3 gross pipes. Journal, 
II, p. 238. In 1655 Wintervogel had only taken 6 lbs of brass 
and 6 lbs of tobacco. Ibid., I, p. 301. The 1659 expedition to 
the Namaqua took, inter alia, cloth, earings, bracelets, chains, 
beads, brass bells, hundreds of needles, copper plate, brass, 
copper, wine, tobacco. "They are to find out if any of these 
commodities are in demand". Ibid., III, p. 14. Icy emphasis, A. L. 
A similar volume of barter goods - on 5 oxen - including spades, 
choppers and pick-axes accompanied the 1661 expedition to the 
Normaqua. Ibid., III, p. 328. And although the 'price' of cattle 
was being hiked up by the Khoi and the enterprising brokers, 
it is not difficult to image what impact this kind of volume of 
goods was having. See below, note 64. 
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reckoning, that exchange of cattle and sheep for bits of copper 
and brass etc., was a highly unequal and destructive one. The 
almost suicidal character of such exchanges on any scale, for the 
Khoi, and the unequal nature of the exchange is demonstrated by 
pointing out two things. First, the reverse process (Khoi success- 
fully obtaining back cattle and sheep from the Dutch in return for 
such barter items) is unthinkable: it could not have happened. 
To that extent, the Dutch were effectively getting something for 
almost nothing. 
63 
The Khoi, on the other hand, were bartering away 
the very core of their socio-economic systems and hence the basis 
for clan or horde autonomy. We know, secondly, that metal pieces 
had exchanged for dagga in the inland trade, but there is no 
serious evidence to indicate that cattle or sheep on any large scale 
were being obtained by this means by Khoi from other groups, or from 
the Xhosa or Sotho. The Sotho had supplied metal bits and the 
Xhosa had supplied dagger. In fact, there is very little evidence 
of a substantial or compensating trade in cattle amongst the groups 
in the pre-colonial period, though other items did exchange at the 
margins, as we have seen., 
Thus, without the Khoi being able to replenish their 
stocks of cattle and sheep by exchanging the things 
(or some of them) 
which they got from the Dutch with other groups further inland, who 
were not or could not get in touch directly with the Dutch, their 
economic systems were edged to the point of dissolution. And we 
63. In his account of trading expeditions to the Hessequas, Ten 
Rhyne advised that ".... care must be taken not to let them see 
the supply of merchandise; otherwise our men would be in 
instant peril of death". Ten Rhyne: "An Account ..... 
op. cit., p. 137. 
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also know that barter of that kind and for those things (cattle and 
sheep) was no central part of Khoi economic life. They did not 
breed cattle for a 'markets. Prior to the advent of the V. O. C. 
at the Cape, barter was in any event peripheral to their economic 
life, and its existence should in no way be taken as central to 
their mode of production. More centrally, the structure of Khoi 
social organization, communal familial ownership of the herds and 
the principles governing distribution and the regulation of 
political life, effectively precluded the systematic exchange of 
collectively held goods (crucial for the survival of a group) for 
individually consumed or enjoyed 'luxury' items. Once that process 
commenced in anything more than a marginal form, its effects were 
shattering on the whole structure of Khoi society, and dissolved the 
normative bonds which sustained it. 
The trading-raiding offensives by the V. O. C. and the 
colonists thus penetrated and corroded deep into the structures and 
relationships within and between Khoi hordes. What it did was to 
create enough 'demand' for barter goods to upset a potentially 
precarious and loosely-slung socio-economic, political and ecological 
balance. In the process it sharpened rivalries, tempted, dazzled, 
and divided clans, thus initiating - or perhaps hastening? - intra- 
and inter-horde warfare. From the Khoi side of the relationship, 
therefore, their inability to collaborate in widespread or systematic 
defence or attack, the opening up of new and bitter rivalries and 
divisions within and between them, the corrosive effects of 
'commoditization' (rather than 'monetization') on social cohesion 
and economic life, all stem from their inability to fuse into more 
effective alliances in the face of the penetration of their 
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economies. 
64 
The preceding analysis depends on evidence of three 
related kinds. First, it needs to be shown that successive Khoi 
groups did barter quite large numbers of their herds, and not only 
under duress. Moreover, many groups only resisted when a certain 
low level in their stocks was reached, and/or when the Dutch or 
other Khoi herds increased or trespassed on their pasturage. This 
may be seen as revealing that the 'moment' when resistance 
commenced was relatively late (and perhaps too late? ) in the trading 
cycle and thus came to define the start of the raiding, counter- 
raiding and resistance phases of the relationship. Secondly, it is 
important to show that from quite early on the Dutch barter goods 
were penetrating along the thin lines of inland exchanges and that, 
in consequence of this, some interior groups were lured or enticed 
64. In the previous chapter it was suggested that the process of 
corrosion and decay was analogous to the effects of 'monetiz- 
ation' in the 'underdevelopment' of African economies in more 
recent times. In the case of the Khoi the process was achieved 
by barter commodities, not money. Elsewhere in Africa the 
forcing of people into the labour market was achieved by 
various measures, including the imposition of taxes. It is 
therefore interesting to find Mentzel referring to the barter 
at the Cape as ".... more like a tax levied on the nearest 
Hottentot kraals under the pretext of trade". Mentzel: Op. cit., 
III, p. 123. My emphasis, A. L. Though the analogy is loose and 
the term clumsy, 'commoditization' conveys in some respects the 
essence of the process of corrosion of Khoi economies by the 
penetration of unproductive Dutch commodity goods. In some 
respects the consequences were more disastrous: elsewhere 
money could at least be exchanged back for food, and was. It 
does not seem to have been the case that barter goods were 
exchanged further inland for much other than dagga, and not 
enough cattle to maintain economic viability. The Dutch are 
unlikely to have given anything back for copper or beads. But 
they took on impoverished Khoi as labourers, so the effect 
seems remarkably similar. All of this helped to reduce the Khoi 
to dependency and hastened their incorporation in the colonial 
economy. 
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into the barter relationship, which in turn drew the Dutch deeper 
inland to make contact with groups such as these about whom they 
heard, and vice-versa. Finally, on the Khoi side of the relation- 
ship, it must be shown that one of the critical major consequences 
of all this was sharpened friction between and within hordes, and 
that, as their impoverishment and hence their decline proceeded, 
inter-Khoi raiding increased and that refugees from the disintegration 
which ensued were pulled into the colonial economy by the undertow 
created. 
What then is the evidence that can be assembled under the 
first head: about the volume of Khoi barter with the Dutch at 
various times and places? It has been suggested by Schapera that 
the Khoi were guilty of "reckless trading". 
65 
Others have 
challenged the view that ".... the Khoi 'willingly' bartered away 
their cattle for 'mere baubles'.... ", but assert that in the end they 
"..... literally acculturated themselves out of existence". 
66 
It 
will be clear from what has been said above that the argument here 
is that the former process was a condition of the latter, and that 
historically they were deeply implicated with each other, though 
sequentially the loss of their means of independent existence 
preceded or was associated with their incorporation in colonial 
society. 
The commitment to penetrate inland by the Y. O. C. to 
the 
establish contacts and trade was not/only initiative being taken in 
respect of those relationships in the early days. Indeed, during 
65. Schapera: Op. cit., p. xiv. 
66. Marks: Op. cit., p. 80, and p. 77. 
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the first decade most of the barter was done in and around the 
Table Bay by Khoi who brought cattle to exchange for barter goods. 
67 
In that first decade, and more, groups were arriving - often 
unexpectedly - at the fort, and they came with sizeable herds, 
though they rarely bartered large numbers. For example, in 
November, 1657 a Chainoqua 'chief' ".... arrived at the fort with 
100 men and 71 head of cattle ..... " and after a few hours ".... all 
their cattle were bought from them ..... "68 In general, however, 
the numbers of cattle exchanged at any one time in the 1650s were 
not as substantial as they later became. 
69 
67. If we are to believe the documents, it is quite evident that 
this aspect of the relationship was there also. Curiosity about 
the Dutch too, no doubt, brought Khoi to the Fort. A Chainouqua 
group ".... none of whom had ever been at the Fort ..... " 
appeared on the 16th December, 1657. According to the Journal, at 
any rate, they "'.... had come to see what sort of people the 
Hollanders were ..... they promised also to bring us much 
cattle". Journal, II, p. 193. Presumably, all this communication 
was being done via Herry, who was described as "... a broker 
for other natives of the interior .... ". Ibid., loc. cit. Herry's skills as a broker are well known. His popularity with 
the Y. O. C. ebbed and flowed directly in proportion to his success 
in bringing new contacts and generous supplies. In June, 1655, 
for example, the Journal recorded official gratitude and satis- 
faction to him ".... who knows how to conduct the trade to our 
contentment, and how to earn his brokerage". Ibid., I, p. 325" 
Clearly at an early stage they recognized and approved of a 
successful middle-man. But when he got in their way, they 
turned on him. See Elphick: Op. cit., pp. 148-165. 
68. Jo urnal, Il, pp. 182-3. 
69. Prior to the 1660s the numbers were always small. For example, 
3 cows and 4 sheep in October 1652; 29 cattle and 32 sheep in 
January 1653; 3 cows in November 1654; 26 cattle in June 1655; 
67 cows and 12 sheep in July 1655; 16 cattle and 20 sheep in 
November 1655 and 66 cattle in December; 53 cattle in December 
1657; in 1658 the trade remained limited and patchy as tension 
built up towards the war of 1659, though contact with the 
Chainouqua was promising. In 1660 as peace negotiations began, 
trade picked up again. It is likely that not only did those who 
were in conflict with the Y. O. C. not barter, but others further 
inland would not trespass over the land of Cape Khoi, and did 
not want to risk their herds by moving towards the fort. In 
January 1660,20 sheep were obtained from the 'Saldanhar' Cochoqua 
and similar numbers through the year. 
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In the early 1660s however van Riebeeck was exuberant in 
reporting a "flourishing trade" with the Chainouqua, including a 
single exchange for some 83 cattle and 71 sheep. 
70 Thus by 1662, 
he was able to inform his successor that the Company had a good 
and constant trade with the Cochoqua sections under both Gonnema 
and Oedasoa, and that the Chainouqua and Hessqua would shortly be 
coming to the Cape. 71 Earlier he had explained the lack of success 
in contacting other inland groups by informing the Directors that 
groups like the Chainouqua had ".... a great distance to travel, 
and having to travel slowly with their cattle, cannot reach us so 
soon, as we had supposed or as we had understood them to have 
promised .... ". 
72 But as the 1660s wore on the barter with the 
Chainouqua was sustained, and on Wagenaar's departure in 1666 he 
described them as "our good friends". The relationship led later 
to friction with the Cochoqua under Oedasoa, as we shall see. 
73 
70. Journal, III, pp. 301-7. A useful chronological summary of the 
trade is in Goodwin: Op. cit., and also there are references here 
and there in H. M. Robertson: "The Economic Development of the Cape 
under van Riebeeck", passim. 
71. Another instance of Bhoi bringing cattle to the fort - and there 
are many other instances which replicate the point - was 
recorded on 6th November 1660, when "... some of Gonnema's 
people brought 19 sheep and 6 cattle to the fort". Journal, II, 
p. 280. Within 13 years the relationship between Gonnema and the 
Y. O. C. had deteriorated into a prolonged war. Wouter Schouten, 
in 1665, observed that "... the Hottentots" continually "... 
bring all sorts of beasts from their neighbours in the Sardaigne 
Bay and from the southerly regions of Monomotapa, for sale with 
the people in the Table Bay .... ". Raven Hart: Op. cit., I, p. 14. 
72. van Riebeeck to Amsterdam, in Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 244" This 
may of course have been optimistic or misinformed. He may also 
have been trying to cheer himself up. But the other evidence 
confirms that some inland groups did want to come south to 
contact the Dutch. 
73. Wagenaar to Amsterdam, on the 16th May, 1666. Moodie: Op. cit., I, 
p. 281. To van Quaelbergen, Wagenaar wrote: "For the last six 
years we have begun to be acquainted with the tribes who live to 
the eastward, named the Chainouquas, and we have always lived in 
perfect friendship with them, as we still do". Ibid., I, p. 293" 
Their main 'demand' was for tobacco, it seems. 
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Even allowing for misunderstanding, communication 
blockages, distortion and generous embellishment for the benefit 
of the Heeren at home, the sheer arithmetic of barter deals - 
confirmed or observed by travellers at the Cape or sometimes by 
visiting Commissioners - indicates that from the 1670s onwards the 
numbers of cattle being exchanged were increasing, as were V. O. C. 
and colonist stocks. Since the officials were quick to point out 
'offences' against them or the colonists by the Khoi (or San), the 
absence of mention of attacks by Khoi may be taken as evidence of 
relatively peaceful barter. It is evidence that Khoi groups were 
bartering in substantial numbers, and that trading relationships with 
the cattle-rich Hessequa (and later Inqua) had not yet degenerated 
into raiding and conflict. For example, with the Hessequa alone, in 
the 1670s, the numbers of cattle and sheep obtained were high. 
Individual deals with them through the decade yielded numbers of 
cattle such as 178 (in 1672), 256 (in 1673), 239 (in 1676), 164 (in 
1677), 142 (in 1678), 100 (in 1679) and 250 (in 1681). Over the same 
period the numbers of sheep obtained increased from 375 in one of the 
1672 visits to 1000 in 1681.74 While Marks is right to correct the 
impression that the Khoisan gave little or no resistance, and to 
point to their unwillingness to trade beyond a certain point, none- 
theless internal evidence in her article confirms that the volume of 
bartered cattle was considerable. "Thousands of sheep and hundreds 
of head of cattle were bartered for iron, copper, beads, arrack and 
tobacco". 75 But even this seriously underestimates the number 
exchanged. A count of some numbers recorded from the barter with the 
74. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 321; p. 323; P"348; P"367; P"368; P-360- 
75. Marks: Op. cit., p. 66. Elphick suggests a total 'sale' of Khoi 
cattle between 1652 and 1699 of between 15,999 and 25,000. 
Elphick: Op. cit., p. 224. 
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Hessequas alone suggests at least 1332 head of cattle between 1672 
and 1683. In 1677 The Directors praised the Cape Governor for 
having obtained, "... near Mossel Bay, upwards of 900 cattle and 
sheep before the arrival of the return fleet". 
76 Ten Riyne 
described the Hessequa as being "... agape for these articles" (the 
barter goods) which were "... profitably exchanged for cattle". 
77 
Again, in 1683 Amsterdam noted with approval that 669 head of cattle 
and 2374 sheep had been obtained in three visits during one year 
from "..... the east of Africa". 
78 
Expeditions during the first quarter of the 18th century 
(see note 55, above) netted good numbers too. For example, the 
figure of 288 head of cattle obtained on one 1716 mission was not 
unusually high. 78 In 1707, the trader, Hartog, returned from one 
of his frequent trips with 220 oxen and 242 sheep. 
79 
Taken thus as one dimension of the trading-raiding syndrome, 
it would be unwise to argue that there was systematic and principled 
unwillingness of Khoi to barter, just as it would be unwise to ignore 
the coercion and bullying tactics by the Y. O. C. and colonist 
commandos, official and unofficial. There was pressure, there was 
resistance, there was raiding, but there also is evidence of sub- 
stantial and suicidally high levels of barter by Khoi groups - levels 
which no clan or family or horde can for long have been able to 
sustain, and hence they were bound to have been weakened, at least, 
76. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 351" 
77. Ten Rhyne: Op. cit., p. 109. The Hessequas, he said, though 150 
miles away "agree in their habits with those who are regularly 
settled at the Cape of Good Hope". 
78. Leibbrandt: Journal, 1699-1732, pp. 269-70. There must have been 
some double counting, but not enough to alter the significance 
of the numbers. 
79. Ibid., p. 140. 
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as a result of this. Being thus weakened, they were vulnerable to 
attack, drought, disease or raiding by other Khoi, or colonists. 
Certainly their capacity to attach clients would have been seriously 
reduced and the overall prestige and power of a family, clan or 
horde undermined. The explanation for how such a loss of cattle came 
about - that is, the structural looseness of the hordes and the 
patricians - is supported by this kind of evidence. Thus when small 
groups of Cochoqua, for example, so often mentioned in the Journal as 
having come to the Fort or as having been met and contacted a short 
distance inland, are described, it is likely that these groups were 
in fact small, relatively autonomous clans, or sections of hordes, 
making independent deals. Later evidence from the Mossel Bay area 
and further afield confirms that impression. 
so Thus it was by this 
80. In April, 1655, Jan Wintervogel and a party travelled 50 miles 
inland. Here "they had also found some Saldanhars - as they 
called themselves - in several parties, some 15 or 16, others of 
20 or 30, tolerably but not abundantly supplied with cattle, and 
a certain band about 15 or 16 miles from here, approximately 70 
to 80 men strong, with countless numbers of cattle and sheep... ". 
Journal, II, p. 305. My emphases, A. L. In June, 1657 some free burgers 
came across "two encampments about 5 or 600 in number". They 
bartered a few head, but were told that "... the right Saldanhars 
lay about 12 days' journey further, and that towards the dry 
season they were likely to come with cattle enough.... ". Moodie: 
Op. cit., I, p. 103. The Hessequas were distributed in the 16708 in 
quite a substantial area from Mossel Bay to 'Botte River'. Ibid., 
I, PP"321-372. In 1689 Ensign Schryver described finding three 
Hessequa kraals at Lange Kloof and "... some of them came and 
bartered to us (a few) cattle ..... ". Ibid., I, p. 439. Dapper, 
whose work was apparently based on the anonymous Klare end Korte 
Besgryvinge van het land aan Cabo de Bona Esperanca Amsterdam, 1652) 
said of the Cochoquas that they lived in "... fifteen or sixteen 
different villages about a quarter of an hour's distance from each 
other.... Each village consists of thirty, thirty-six, forty or 
fifty huts, more or less, all placed in a circle a little distance 
apart". Dapper: Op. cit., p. 23. And as early as 1666 even 
Wagenaar noted that the 'Hottentots' "... within a space of 40 
or 50 mylen to the east and north of this African Cape .... are in the habit of wandering from one place to another with their 
cattle (and) .... are divided into 9 hordes 
(geslachten) or 
(continued on next page)... 
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means that the volume of barter goods was filtered, unevenly, into 
different levels and segments of the hordes and this in turn must 
have established disruptive rivalries and jealousies. No horde 
chief, or clan head - given the loose political structure of the 
Khoi societies - could have prevented or vetoed such deals, and the 
consequences of loss of cattle and sheep above a certain critical 
level must have radically altered internal structures and relation- 
ships. It is a pity that we have no single example of the process 
in all its details, but there can be little doubt, given our knowledge 
of the structure and shape of those societies, that this is what 
happened when barter goods arrived. And the overall loss of cattle 
meant that, in time, the ability of impoverished Khoi to become 
clients and thereby re-establish a herd, was systematically fore- 
closed upon. There thus remained three possibilities: to flee, in 
80. (continued from previous page).... assemblages of Families, or 
rather villages, or members of the same kraal". Moodie: Op. cit., 
I, p. 291. On the expedition to the Inqua in 1689, Schryver 
expresses precisely the practice of making widespread deals with 
lesser clan or family heads when he reported that on one day 
"Captain Hykon (the 'king') held a council in his kraal, there- 
fore he was not with us once during the day (which we passed in 
bartering notwithstanding)". Ibid., I, p. 437. My emphases, A. L. 
The interesting thing about Schryver's mission is that in 
addition to these instances of peaceful barter, he gives an 
account of a fight with some 'Hougliqua Hottentots' (the 
description of whom is not at all clear) in which having ".... 
knocked down 30 of them" with a "general volley", "... we took 
possession of their cattle". Ibid., p. 438. Willing barter, 
divisive barter with sub-clans and detached segments, and 
coercive theft by the Dutch were all part of this particular 
expedition's experience. It illustrates the overall process 
in general, combining all the features at once. Moreover the 
often quite clear observations of the different groups and 
kraals which are described above in some of the extracts in 
this note suggest that, given an awareness of the segmentary 
nature of the hordes, individual initiatives to trade with each 
were very likely to have been taken. The Dutch appear to have 
understood less about the internal relations of Khoi society. 
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desperation and hunger, inland; to form ad hoc defensive and 
offensive alliances with other cattle-less groups or San; or to 
seek food by working for the Dutch doing odd jobs at first and 
becoming herders later. 
In the light of an analysis of the structural vulnerability 
of the Khoi to the temptations and consequences of such barter, along 
with the other pressures on them, the decline, decay and collapse of 
the hordes appears thus as less random and more explicable. An 
attempt to answer why the barter items ranked so high in their 
preferences, and w they seem to have risked so much in order to 
get them will be looked at shortly. Now, the second kind of evidence 
that supports the analysis above needs to be examined briefly. 
The question that needs to be put is this. What evidence 
is there to show that the Dutch barter goods were being moved along 
the slim but effective exchange routes into the interior, and thus 
enticing Khoi groups there to establish some kind of contact with 
the Cape, or drawing the Dutch out into specific directions towards 
specific groups? 
There can be little doubt that the Dutch stumbled into a 
rudimentary and tenuous network of political and economic connections, 
and that such a network effectively conveyed information deep inland 
about the availability of barter goods, and also conveyed information 
back to the Dutch about the groups that were anxious to make 
connections with them. From the earliest days, if the Dutch 
documents are to be believed, Khoi groups were interested in the new 
arrivals at the Cape. Likewise, the Dutch were able to utilize the 
networks to feed information and 'samples' through to the interior, 
however blindly and gropingly they must initially have perceived 
the demographic lay-out to be. For instance, on the 20th April 1653, 
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twelve head of cattle were bartered 
from other natives who live further inland but are clad 
similarly to those who had been here before. They said 
they had come because they had seen the Saldanhars 
returning with so much copper and had also understood 
from them that there were people living here (meaning 
us Netherlanders) who had more copper. (81) 
They hinted too that as soon as others heard, they would come south too. 
In advertising their presence, the V. O. C. seems to have 
found Herry's broker role to be useful and he cleverly used for 
personal gain the manouverability which access to Dutch goods gave 
him. He may well have been able to persuade relatively close groups 
to come down to barter, or not. It is likely, moreover, that when 
he or Doman or Eva promied, or set off to establish, links with 
inland groups, they made contact with individal clan or family heads, 
rather than more senior chiefs. 
82 In the case of Eva we know that 
her sister was one of the wives of Oedasoa. He was a 'captain' of 
one of the main Cochoqua hordes and the Dutch were clearly excited 
about the possibilities of trade which this particularly advantageous 
connection might provide. 
83 
81. Journal, I, p. 153" 
82. Herry's skills and cunning as a broker - which he was actually 
called in the Journal - are well known, but in support of the 
point here, consider the following entry dated 27/28th 
Novemper, 1654, which reads: "... we have bartered 2 head of 
cattle from new natives, but always with the oft-mentioned 
allies of Herry in attendance, who appear to act the part of 
brokers .... ". Journal, I, pp. 273-4. What was meant by 'new 
natives'? A new horde or alliance of clans or a clan? 
83. Ibid., II, pp. 362-3. See also Elphick: OP. cit., pp. 157-165 
on Herry, Doman and Eva, and their role and connections. 
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It was via links of this kind that information and 
barter goods flowed inland to the hordes, and information about them 
and their interests flowed back to the Fort. The Dutch became 
involved in a network of connections which drew Khoi groups south 
to them and which lured the Dutch deeper and deeper into the area, as 
we have seen. It is in this wider sense that the Cape can be seen 
as a "centre of diffusion" as Harinck describes it. 
8' Herry was 
active in all this. In 1655 he offered to take copper inland some 
30 miles and to initiate barter with un-named groups there. The 
Company agreed, and he disappeared for some months, to return with a 
rather meagre supply. 
85 By the late 1650s the Dutch were beginning 
to get a sense of the political and gconomiofgeography of the hordes 
and were persuaded that if copper were given to the Goringhaika they 
would in turn be able to exchange it for more cattle further inland, 
though this never seems to have happened in practice. 
86 At the same 
time the Dutch soon learnt about the Hancumquas (Inquas) from Eva. 
She alleged that the Goringhaika were harbouring some runaway slaves 
and would pass them further along the network 11... to the Hancumquas 
living far inland from here, and cultivating the soil in which they 
grow daccha .... . 
87 And in October 1657 the first ethnography of 
84. Harinck: 0 p. cit., p. 164. Wider, because more than commodities 
were being distributed. Information, rumours, appeals, deals, 
invitations and requests were filtering back and forth. 
85. Journal, I, pp. 336-340. He left on 7th September and only returned 
in early December, having only brought 13 cattle. The Dutch 
were suspicious about what he'd been up to, during his absence. 
'Klaas' made a similar offer in July 1672, saying he'd go Inland 
to barter if the Y. O. C. gave him brass, tobacco and beads. The 
Company agreed and gave him small quanities of trade goods. 
Moodie: 0p. cit., I, p. 321. 
86. Journal, II, p. 214. 
87. Ibid., II, pp. 286-288. 
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the different groups appeared in the Journal. 
88 
Within a few 
years further evidence of a connection between the Cape and the Inqua 
was provided when Eva claimed that they would be sending cattle to 
the Fort via the Chainouqua. 
89 In the same year, 1660, a visit by 
some freemen to the 'king' of the Chainouqua revealed that he had 
close links with the inland Inqua who "... make a living by keeping 
cattle and planting the valuable herb dacha .... ". Two of the 
Chainouqua returned to the Fort with the freemen where they were 
entertained and given presents. Officials hoped that, somehow, the 
9 bunches of red beads, six bars of brass, a small mirror, six pipes 
and 1- lbs of tobacco would be carried deep inland and would so 
favourably impress their 'king' that ".... when the countryside was 
drier and their lords came closer we would comply with their proposal 
of regular traffic between our people and theirs with merchandise and 
cattle". 
90 
The first direct contact with the Namaqua has already 
been referred to and thus the Dutch and the Nan qua will have become 
roughly familiar with each other's preferences and offerings, if 
they were not already well informed by this quite lively intelligence 
system that served them both. 
91 
88. Ibid., pp. 170-2. The first statement of local ethnography and 
commercial relations appeared suddenly in the Journal on 29th 
October, 1657. See Journal, II, pp. 171-2. There are hints in this 
of a more complex trading and political relationship amongst the 
groups. (It was only later, however, in June 1658, that the 
officials learnt about the 'Hancumquas' (Inqua or 'Daccha makers') 
who grew dagga, according to Eva. Ibid., p. 286). They also 
learned that the Cape Khoi got beads "which that nation made and 
sold"), copper and cattle from the Namaqua. Ibid., II, p. 185. 
89. Journal, IIItp. 205. Then in December 1660, the Y. O. C. learned 
directly from (a presumably drunken) Soeswa, the Chainouqua chief, 
about the cattle-rich Hancumquas and the internal dagga and 
cattle trade. Ibid., III, pp. 302-3. 
90. Ibid., III, pp. 259-261. Also Harinck: Op. cit., pp. 160-1 (My emphases, 
A. L. ) One wonders whether that is what was really meant by the 
Chainouqua. 
91. Journal, III, p. 343, ff. 
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It is not surprising that by 1672 there was some evidence 
of the internal market actually being saturated with copper and 
brass if one considers the volume of these commodities which had 
been pumped into it over the previous twenty years. Expeditions 
were suspended (but not for long) on the grounds that ".... the 
Hottentots are oversupplied with copper and tobacco, and will only 
part with inferior cattle at enormous prices. "92 But if the Dutch 
side of the initiative faltered temporarily, by the late 1680s the 
Inqua sent an emmisary direct to the Fort seeking, in 1687, to 
"... open communication with the Commander", and within a year of 
that visit Schryver's expedition to them had been despatched, with 
much success. 
93 
92. Theal: Abstracts, dated 4th March 1670. The same anxiety was 
expressed in a resolution of 5th March. Moodie: Op. cit., I, 
pp. 305-6. In February that year, the Commander - replying to 
questions from Commissioner van der Bronck - had said: "The 
Hottentots are a cunning people, and seeing that our constant 
parties leave them no rest, nor time to supply, by breeding 
the deficiency caused in their stock by barter, would sell no 
more, except at trebble the profit .... the barterers must 
admit that on every journey they left behind one half of the 
stock purchased; whereas by discontinuing the journeys the 
Hottentots would be compelled to the fort, for they cannot 
exist without barter nor can they sell their cattle for tobacco 
and brass to any but us". Ibid., I, p. 306, fn. And of course the 
'prices' were hiked up by Khoi as Dapper described early on 
when he wrote that they "... had grown wiser through intercourse 
with us". Dapper: Op. cit., p. 73. At that time (the 1660s) their 
".... favourite and most desired articles" were tobacco, brandy, 
beadwork and copper. Ibid., loc. cit. 
93. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 415. Harinck: Op. cit., p. 162. An earlier 
example of a request of this kind had come in 1676 when an 
"...... invitation of the Hosiquas .... of considerable barter 
... " persuaded the V. O. C. to send a mission to them. Resolution 
of Council, 18th April, 1676. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 343" 
Schryver reported moreover that north of the Inquas lay other 
groups from whom they "procure the flat and thin plates of 
copper, which they again dispose of to the Khoikhoi and 
Namaquas .... ". Journals of Bergh and Schrijver, p. 234. 
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This evidence confirms a number of points made in the 
preceding analysis. First, the loose network of contiguous 
contacts linking the Table Bay with inland groups like the Inqua 
and the Namaqua was sufficient to draw and entice Khoi groups 
towards the Dutch and the Cape. Secondly, from 1657 onwards a rough 
political and economic geography of the area was beginning to 
crystalize in Dutch thinking. They were not hesitant to push 
barter goods out into the interior in the hope that they would serve 
to convey information about their presence to the inland groups and 
lure them to the Cape. In short, the overall process of the Khoi 
decline and collapse must be seen in the light of these effects 
which the barter goods had on their internal structures and relation- 
ships. What made that process not only possible, but also speedy, 
was the part played by these networks in moving barter items and 
information about them into the interior, and the drawing of the 
Dutch out to seek specific arrangements with specific groups. By 
the time the Inqua were contacted and relations established with 
them - by 1690 - the corrosive effect of these goods along the net- 
works on the internal structures and external relations of most 
major Khoi hordes had already reached a critical and decisive point. 
Thirdly,, then, what evidence is there to show that one of 
the most damaging and disrupting effects of the cattle barter was a 
dangerous increase in conflict and bickering within and between 
hordes? It is necessary to start with a reminder that transhumant 
segmentary societies are structurally prone to tensions and Conflict. 
94 
The scope for differences and disputes over cattle, grazing grounds 
and waterholes is substantial, and it was suggested in the previous 
94. See a discussion of the dynamics of this in, for example, 
Lienhardt: Social Anthropology, p. 38, ff. and, G. Balandier: 
Political Anthropology, ch. 3 and passim. 
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chapter that it is likely that this was a feature of Khoi 
relations even prior to the arrival of the Dutch. The presence of 
the Dutch per se did not seriously accelerate tensions, but the 
sudden availability of barter goods, and their penetration inland, did. 
For as the successive Khoi groups responded to the lure of the 
barter goods, and as the Y. O. C. traders went inland, bringing herds 
back with them, and as others in turn heard about this and invited 
contact, the effects of all this criss-crossing of land and 
pasturage must have been to stir up a flurry of raiding and counter- 
raiding. Add to that process a steady impoverishment of some 
groups, and an attempt by them to prevent richer groups encroaching 
on their domains, and the consequent poaching, trespassing, warfare 
and disintegration of hordes must have been savage. Moreover in 
what appears in the documents to be a hectic and jealous jockeying 
for advantaged status with the Dutch, Khoi rivalries were sharpened, 
and the Dutch were not slow to take advantage of them. The erratic 
history of relations between the Dutch and Gonnema, for instance, 
(a "firm alliance" in 1662 had disintegrated by 1673 into a 
relationship involving ".... sundry acts of violence and outrage. 
confirms that the officials were quite unconcerned about these 
effects of their pragmatic trading offensives, except in so far as 
they hindered access to the current favourite suppliers, or access 
by the latter to the Fort. 
One of the rare examples of a contemporary clearly 
identifying the overall process and the cumulative causation under- 
lying the collapse of Khoi groups, was the Landdrost, Starrenburg. 
95. van Riebeeck to Wagenaar, 5th May 1662; and Resolution of War, 
11th July, 1673. Moodie: Op. cit., I, p. 247 and p. 327. See also 
note 71, above. 
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In 1705 he made a journey to the 'Namcqua Hottentots' to trade. In 
his Journal he recorded that he found very little cattle and noted 
that some 'vagabonds' - Dutch burgers, like 'Dronken Gerrit' 
(Drunken 
Gerrit) - had been using bullying tactics in getting cattle from the 
Khoi, and this in turn set in motion the processes that have been 
described here. He wrote: 
95a 
By this I realised with regret how the whole country had 
been spoilt by the recent freedom of bartering, and the 
atrocities committed by these vagabonds, since when the 
cattle of one kraal is carried off by the Dutch, they in 
turn go to rob others, and these again rob their neigh- 
bours, running off with the spoil into the mountains and 
feasting there until it is finished and then again 
seeking fof more; and so from men who sustained themselves 
quietly by cattle-breeding, living in peace and contentment, 
divided under their chiefs and kraals, they have nearly all 
become Bushmen ('bosjemans'), hunters and brigands, 
dispersed everywhere between and in the mountains. 
One could not find a better description of the rapidity of the down- 
ward cycle, initiated by the Dutch pressure and bullying but not 
systematically sustained by it. The forces set in motion put Khoi 
group against Khoi group in various ways, including this. 
Not a single major named group escaped becon4ng 
involved in hostilities with others between the 1650s and 1700. 
Oedasoa's section of the Cochoqua were reported by Eva to have 
planned attacks on an impoverished Goringhaika clan in 1659.96 In 
1664, Oedasoa made an effort to enlist Y. O. C. support for an all-out 
attack on "... his enemies, the Hessequas and their allies .... "I 
offering the Company a share of the spoils to the tune of 1200 head 
95a. Cited in Valentyn: Op. cit., II, p. 41. 
96. Journal, III, p. 39. 
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of cattle. 
97 In the north, as Gonnema and Oedasoa found them- 
selves under pressures, through loss of cattle and some bullying 
by the Company, they probably started to raid Namaqua herds, and 
they became involved in fighting with the Namaqua (who were to the 
north of them), and a ".... yearly war between the Namaqua and the 
Hottentots on this side, in which the latter are plundered of 
cattle..... " appears to have resulted. 
98 Not slow to take 
advantage of the plight of the Saldanhar Cochoqua, the Company 
determined to use that area as a base for expeditions into the land 
of the Namaqua. 
99 And this no doubt was among the factors which 
later gave rise to the war with Gonnema in 1673. In April and 
December, 1672 the Company noted with concern that those ".... who 
are richest in cattle" had not been coming to the Fort, while 
those nearest the fort had "... been so ruined by internal wars 
against their neighbours ..... " that they had little 
to offer in 
barter. It was apparent to the Company that the cattle-rich distant 
groups in the east would not visit the Cape "... from fear of being 
massacred and robbed by their enemies, (our neighbouring Cape 
Hottentots) through whose territory they would have to pass .... " and 
who were destitute of cattle. 
100 The complex tumbling causality of 
97. Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 274-5. The Council considered the proposal 
seriously, contemplating taking all Oedasoa's cattle which he 
proposed to leave in V. O. C. care while he dealt with the 
Hessequa. By this time, of course, the Chainouqua - "our good 
friends", the allies of the Hessequas referred to by Oedasoa - 
were a major source of cattle to the Dutch. On balance the 
Council decided it was not worth the risk of getting ".... 
easily led into some new disputes and entanglements". Ibid., 
loc. cit. See also, pp. 289-292. 
98. Theal: Abstracts of the Debates, p. 104. Entry for 17th August, 1668. 
99. Moodie: Op. cit., I, pp. 303-5. March 1669/January 1670- 
100. Theal: Op. cit., 28th November, 1672 (p. 130) and Moodie: Op. cit., 
p. 319 and p. 323. 
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conflict is evident here: distant groups with cattle, proximate 
groups impoverished, raiding and warfare between them, hesitation 
by the inland groups to traverse the territory of the impoverished, 
and the consequent Dutch decision to go inland. This internal 
cyclone of conflict and mutual marauding and counter-attacks 
continued to the end of the 17th century and well beyond into the 
18th century. In March, 1699 a letter to Amsterdam from the Cape 
bemoaned the "... continuing .... mutual wars and thefts .... " which 
resulted in the diminution of Company supplies. 
101 And deep into 
the 18th century, cattle-less Khoi and hard-pressed San (and alliances 
between them) raided not only the veeboere moving east, but also 
those hordes and clans amongst the Khoi who were still left with 
cattle, and who were retreating before the advancing trekkers towards 
the Xhosa. 102 
This evidence confirms the three aspects of the analysis 
of the ambiguous Khoi side of the relationship and their collapse in 
the 17th and 18th centuries. First, it shows that successive Khoi 
groups did barter what turned out to be disastrously large numbers 
of their herds. Secondly, it illustrates the point that information 
about the availability of valued commodities (and the objects 
themselves) were filtering inland along the chain of contacts 
between contiguous groups, and that inland hordes were systematically 
enticed into bartering relationships, while the Dutch penetrated in 
the specific direction of groups they heard about via these connect- 
ions. Thirdly, it confirms that as these processes went on, 
101. Leibbrandt: Letters Despatched, 1696-1708, p. 104. Letter of 
13th March, 1697. See also Elphick: Op. cit., p. 292. He discusses 
the situation north of the Cape in 1712. 
102. Schryver reported that the Inqua feared the 'Sonquase Hottentots' 
(San) attacks on their herds. Through the period there were 
constant reports of San attacks on Khoi herds, thus establishing 
the basis for some Khoi/Dutch alliances against the hunters. 
Journals of Bergh and Schriiver, p. 235" 
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internal disputes within and between hordes errupted in cycles of 
internecine conflicts which speeded the process of disintegration. 
Overall, it illustrates the processes which result in this form of 
colonialism when a market and profit-oriented set of economic 
imperatives and purposes penetrate another relatively fragile 
system of self-sufficiency. For it left more and more Khoi in the 
classic condition of dependency, thereby establishing the basic 
condition for their incorporation in the colonial economy as servile 
labourers, or compelling them to flee. 
Before turning finally in this chapter to examine the 
techniques of political subordination that accompanied this process, 
there is one relevant remaining and puzzling question to confront 
in this section of the analysis. Why did the Khoi want those barter 
goods? The question raises wider issues of a psychological, socio- 
logical and indeed philosophical kind that cannot really be answered 
satisfactorily. It seems that we do not have the theoretical tools, 
or wisdom, to handle problems of this kind which raise such funda- 
mental questions about so-called 'human nature' and behaviour. 
But they are worth raising. Is it enough to say that the Khoi 
wanted copper and brass pieces, coloured cloth, beads, needles and 
artificial hatbands because they 'ranked high' in their value system ? 
Why did they rank high? Were they - or some of them - functional in 
that they could either be used (say in hunting) or exchanged in turn 
for other items which they were not themselves able to produce, like 
dagger? The question can be posed at a more general level in 
comparative terms in respect of other societies at other times. Why 
do (some) people want decorative objects, or new fashions or any 
other such items that do not have a self-evidently functional role 
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in any system of production and exchange? 
102a Many of the barter 
items that were pumped into the Cape were worn or consumed and not 
exchanged, like necklaces, tobacco and arrack. To get these things 
some Khoi were prepared, it seems, to barter away some of their most 
valued resources, their cattle, which were so utterly central to all 
aspects of their systems of social and political organization. They 
thus irrevocably weakened their capacity to sustain more frontal 
attacks. How strong was the novelty factor? How important did items 
like this become within groups in respect of very fine but 
significant gradations of status or esteem? Was the gulf between 
the simplicity of Khoi society and the abundance of these barter 
goods of the Dutch so great that the Khoi were partly dazzled and 
unable to resist? These questions cannot be answered. Perhaps it 
is sufficient to say that most Khoi groups lived in such a potentially 
precarious ecological balance that once their herds were reduced 
beyond a certain critical point - by a combination of barter, 
raiding, warfare and disease - it was impossible to re-establish a 
viable basis for their social and cultural survival. As the colonists 
moved on to their lands and as remaining Khoi hordes were squeezed 
back against the Nguni and the Sotho, and attacked by the defensive 
and retreating San, their final collapse could not be staved off. 
Their simplicity did not permit them to adapt and change. It was, 
on the contrary, a condition of their disappearance as corporate 
groups with distinctive modes of production and socio-cultural systems. 
For the closeness of the relationship between their economy and their 
socio-political and cultural systems meant that the latter were 
102a. It has been suggested that Khoi were partial to ornaments for 
the women. Elphick: Op. cit., p. 226. But why? 
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unable to 'tolerate' any significant variation in the former. 
Cattle cultures depend on cattle. Hence, once their cattle reserves 
were depleted, the structure of social organization and associated 
institutions were doomed to spin in a downwards spiral of partly 
self-inflicted and partly imposed fragmentation and disintegration 
as the Y. O. C. economic and military penetration of their societies 
proceeded, and the geographical spread of the colonists took place. 
It was the latter which foreclosed steadily upon temporary client- 
ship between Khoi and veeboere: for the land to which Khoi would 
have returned to re-build their herds was no longer open to access 
by them. 
Conversely, the decline, disintegration, inccxporation and 
retreat of the Khoisan was a necessary condition for the 'expansion' 
of the colony. As the balance of command over the prime resources 
of cattle and land tilted sharply towards the Y. O. C. and the 
colonists, the economic development of the settlement proceeded. 
Although the level of economic activity and exploitation of the Cape 
was very low by contrast with other colonial situations in Africa 
and Latin America more recently, it nonetheless is illustrative of 
the theory of the development of underdevelopment. This asserts 
essentially that "Economic development and underdevelopment are the 
opposite faces of the same coin ..... " and that they are ".... not 
just relative and quantitative .... 
(but) 
.... relational and 
qualitative, in that each is structurally different from, yet caused 
by its relation with, the others". 
103 
There remain two questions from the original slate at the 
start of this chapter. First, what techniques of political control 
103. A. G. Frank: Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 
P-33. 
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and attempts to legitimate their position did the Y. O. C. use to 
try, also, to hasten and order the process analyzed above? 
Secondly, to what factors can one point in describing and accounting 
for, in a preliminary way here, the cultural changes that were 
taking place amongst those Khoi embedded in the colonial economy 
or on its fringes? 
No colonial power or regime has ruled, or tried to rule, 
without attempting to adopt some procedures of control and legiti- 
mation which will both ease its costs and lighten the burdens, 
while trying to ensure its fundamental goals and purposes. The 
Y. O. C. is no exception in respect of the Cape. Given its 
objectives to stimulate and sustain a constant supply of slaughter 
cattle, at least cost, the Company sought - as we have seen - 
alliances and accommodations, attempting agreements and treaties. 
As conflict ensued and economic weakness forced the Khoi groups to 
seek 'protection', the Y. O. C. turned to the use of Indirect rule. 
In the 1650s there are instances at the Cape of the first examples of 
this later well-known strategy in the history of colonial Africa. 
Indeed from the perspective of political analysis of the changing 
structure and relations of power, the period of Y. O. C. rule can be 
conceptualized as one which shifted slowly but systematically from 
Indirect to Direct rule. The process '-accompanied the direct and 
differential incorporation of Khoi and some San in the economic 
development of the colony and also was marked by the shift from 
exclusion to'their inclusion within the associated social structure 
of the plural society in both the west and the east, as will be 
argued later. 
The encroaching process in political (and social) terms 
may be outlined, in abstract, by way of four stages. They were 
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brought about by the side effects of the disintegrating economies 
of the Khoi and the collapse and decay of the central institutions 
of their societies. First, as the combined effects of war and 
barter left successive groups impoverished, they either sought 
political alliances and 'protection' from the Dutch, or protection 
was thrust upon them. Secondly, as the remnants of hordes or a 
series of associated clans came together, they would re-form under 
a clan head and obtain recognition from the V. O. C., or the Company 
itself would appoint such a person and expect - at least initially - 
that he maintain 'order' and ensure compliance with 'agreements'. 
Thirdly, as more and more Khoi fell away from the core institutions 
of their political economies and social systems, they congregated, 
very much like refugees, in 'kraals' under government-appointed 
'captains', and the drift away into initially temporary and then 
permanent 'employment' had commenced. The final phase of the process 
was their complete incorporation on the farms and (less so) round 
Cape Town, in the colonial political economy and social order. 
These stages are only analytically distinct. They overlapped in time 
and differed in speed from area to area, each influencing the sequence 
and experiences from place to place. The process was well under way 
in the Western Cape by the last decades of the 17th century, as the 
subsequent discussion on labour will show. By 1727 (14 years after 
the first smallpox epidemic) the western areas only had a few kraals. 
104 
By the second half of the 18th century "... the majority of the dis- 
possessed Hottentots drifted into the service of the farmers, making 
104. One author wrote: " in dicomtrek van ongeveer 250 tot 300 myl 
rondom die Kaap (was daar) nie meer Hottentott krale aan to 
tref nie, hoewel daar hier and daar nog 'n geisoleerde familie 
of twee saamgewoon het". P. J. van der Merwes Die Trekboer in 
die Geskiedenis van die Kaapkolonie, p. 143. He goes on to 
state, without identifying the process which accomplished it, that: "In die loop van die agtiende eeu het die Hottentots lang- 
samerhand hul ekonomiese selfstandigheid verloer, en gepaard hiermee het hul politieke organisasie verdwyn". Ibid., loo. cit. 
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general a movement already partially developed and forming a 
definite class of hired labourers". 
105 And when Governor van 
Plettenberg toured the colony in 1778 he noticed ".... that there 
were no kraals left, but everywhere Hottentot families lived with 
farmers on their farms". 
106 
This process may be identified in a variety of instances 
that studded the whole period. Initially, the organizational problems 
in attracting sufficient cattle and maintaining 'order' edged the 
V. O. C. in the direction of striking formal deals with individual 
Khoi clan or horde chiefs, or the brokers, whereby they would 
deliver a regular amount of cattle and sheep in return for Company 
'protection'. At the core of this system was the embryonic system 
of Indirect rule. In essence, what was involved was a deal whereby 
the chief (or head or broker) recognized V. O. C. authority and accepted 
its 'protection' which gave a kind of 'favoured nation' status, in 
stý1 
return for which he guaranteed to a stipulated and regular amount of 
cattle and sheep, and/or the maintenance of local order and good 
behaviour within the clan or the horde. 
The difficulty of course with any agreement of this kind 
across vast cultural and political divides is that the definition of 
what constitutes 'order', or misdemeanours and crimes, varies 
directly with the structure, culture and normative universe of the 
societies involved. There is, thus, inherent in any such system of 
indirect rule within an emergent plural society (and nothing illustrates 
105. M. L. Hodgson: "The Hottentots in South Africa to 1828", p. 601. 
My emphases, A. L. The term 'class' is used by the author here 
to denote, I take it, a category. Its more complex sociological 
use in this situation - and its overlapping edges with 'culture' 
as a category - will have to be examined later. Barrow says 
the same dependant condition obtained amongst Namaqua by the end 
of the century. Travels, pp. 387-8. In his report, de Mist in. 
1802, confirmed this impression for all Khoi groups including the 
Namaqua. Memorandum on the Cape, pp. 253-6. 
106. A. J. Bbeseken: "The Company and its subjects"9 pp. 61-2. 
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the plurality more clearly than this), and its shifting lines of 
cleavage, a fundamental disparity between the expectations of the 
dominant group and the capacity of the 'intercalary' leader, chief 
or head to deliver the goods, however willing he or she may be to do 
so. 
No carefully ranked system of hierarchy and compliance is 
possible on a basis of consensus in a situation where two political 
economies and cultures, and hence two normative universes, do not 
mesh. Thus, in practice it was rare for these early agreements of 
Indirect rule to work. For example, as early as 1656 Herry was given 
protection and recognition, ".... provided that for every large 
ship that arrived, he supplied 10 head of cattle, and every yacht 
or small ship 5 head, in payment for which he was to receive more 
copper and tobacco than the other Hottentots.... 0,007 This, the 
most rudimentary system of 'Indirect supply' .a feature of brokerage 
- and an illustration of the 'favoured nation' tactic, never worked, 
nor could it. Herry neither had the cattle nor the means to ensure 
their delivery on such a regular basis for such a 'market', despite 
his occasional success as a broker. For he was dependent on other 
groups as suppliers, and a constant stream of slaughter cattle was 
something which neither he nor they could guarantee. 
As the problems of local 'administration' (that is, 
107. Journal, II, p. 39. The special treatment he got - more copper - illustrates the 'favoured broker' principle, and also Y. O. C. 
desperation. It is also a classic tactic aimed at and 
producing division and rule. In 1678 Governor Bax claimed in 
a letter to the Heeren "That we have also made a treaty with 
all other Hottentot Captains hereabouts, namely, they shall be bound to bring up, annually, upon the arrival of the return fleet, a certain number of horned cattle and sheep and thus 
shall render them more and more tributary without their 
perceiving it, provided we always give them a present in 
return..... ". 18th May, 1678. Moodie: OP-cit., I, p. 362. 
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domination and control) increased - after the free burgers were 
established and the first slaves arrived in 1657 - additional 
problems faced the officials. Flurries of raids and counter-raids, 
the harbouring of runaway slaves by Khoi groups and, still, the 
problems of the meat supply, compelled them to try to expand the 
terms of such agreements and impose heavier burdens of the chiefs 
and 'captains'. In 1658 an 'agreement' was reached with Gogosoa, 
the head of a Goringhaika alliance of peninsula clans, which 
provided that each party punish its own transgressors. It also 
specified the border of their respective 'territories', required 
the Khoi to return any runaway slaves and deliver them to the Fort 
in return for payment for each in "... brass and tobacco as for an 
ox .... ", and to provide 10 cattle and 10 sheep for every large 
ship in the Bay. 
108 This, as with other similar deals later, did 
not work either, nor could it: Gogosoa's control over the clans in 
his alliance - as with any chief - was not absolute by the very 
nature of horde structure. He simply could not have guaranteed 
compliance in respect of any or all of the other conditions on any 
systematic or long-term basis. 
While the interests of the Y. O. C. dictated that it would 
be to their advantage to establish such arrangements if they could, 
the politics of impoverishment for some Khoi groups compelled them 
to seek protection and recognition too. The interests of the Y. O. C. 
and the desperation of such Khoi converged on a rudimentary, ram- 
shackle and unworkable system of indirect rule which marked the 
critical passage from the first to the second stage of the process 
outlined above. Any such group which accepted that shift in the 
108. Journal, II, pp. 300-2. 
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relation - however tactical and short-term they thought or hoped 
it might be - had started out along the path of elision from 
Indirect to Direct rule. 
Initially, staffs of office, mounted with a copper head 
on which was stamped the Company mark, were issued to Khoi chiefs. 
These staffs identified the chiefs in the chain of Indirect rule 
command, but also symbolized the dependency relationship that was 
consequential upon the economic weakening of the clan alliance or 
horde in question. The practice had commenced within the first 25 
years of the Y. O. C. presence, and some staffs had been issued as 
early as the 1660x. 
109 The practice lasted throughout the 18th 
century, but the function and meaning of the staffs changed radically. 
They no longer represented symbols of authority, nor were they 
symbols of an agreement. They came rather to symbolize acceptance 
and submission and the promise of good behaviour, and appear to have 
been issued widely and frequently after particular bouts of conflict 
and retaliation. They were given to 'Bushmen' 'captains' (sic) too. 
110 
For instance, when the peace with Gonnema was concluded 
in 1677'it was a harsh one. It exacted a heavy price - or tried to - 
from the vanquished, and it provided that in addition to having to 
control his people ".... as we do ours ..... ", he had to ".. promise 
as a tribute, and acknowledgement for this peace, to deliver yearly, 
upon the arrival of the return fleet, 30 horned cattle ..... ". 
111 
109. Theal: History of South Africa, 1489-1691, I, p. 228. In the 
Swan, Sonnenschein, Lowry and Co., edition of 1888: there are 
a number of Theals, and pagination and quotation is difficult 
without this specification being clear). He says about 6 or 8 
had been issued to Khoi 'captains' near the Fort. 
110. Moodie: Op. cit., III, p. 69, fn. 1. Also, Ibid., III, P"37, P"39 and 
P"53. At least it was thought they were 'Bushmen'. 
111. Ibid., I, p. 352, dated 24th June, 1677. It's unlikely that he was 
able to deliver regularly or that he ever did. On the 14th November, 1678 the Journal recorded that he had only delivered 9 of the annual tribute of 30 horned cattle he'd promised. 
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With the capacity of the alliance to resist having been broken, 
Gonnema shortly thereafter appealed for protection as one "..... 
among the number of the Company's allies.... " and requested a 
staff of office, too, as proof of this. 
112 
But by the 1730s the politics of the overall process of 
elision from Indirect to Direct rule had reached the point where the 
Cape government was appointing new 'captains' and was generously 
issuing the staffs which Mentzel says were called 'Palanbangars'. 
113 
Viewed from the perspective of narrow political analysis, this 
practice of appointing headmen complements the analysis of the 
economic disintegration of the hordes. The process had begun to 
change quite decisively. It reflected the internal political decay 
of Khoi groups which was directly associated with the economic collapse. 
Moreover, if the 'naming process' (that is, who 'names' 
whom, and by what name) is at least an index of a changing political 
and social relation, then even the early 18th century names given to 
some Khoi 'captains' is further evidence of this change. They were 
called, inter alia, Scipio, Hannibal, Jason, Hartloop (literally, 
'fast runner'), and Hasdrubal. 
114 It became uncommon for horde 
names to be used, and rarely the names of the 'captains'. The groups 
were referred to loosely as 'Bushmen' or 'Hottentots' (though this 
tended to become associated with the loyal, or employed) or 
'Bosjemans Hottentots'. All this supports the view that, in political 
112. Ibid., I, p. 367. This is earlier than Marks suggests such requests 
for recognition were. 
113. Mentzel: Op. cit., p. 37. 
114. Leibbrandt: Journal, 1699-1723, p. 258. 
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terms, they had lost structure and coherence as larger on-going 
corporate political entities. Nonetheless, people live - and must 
live - in groups. Thus the refugees and remnants, initially 
perhaps squatting on the edges of cattle farming areas, retreated 
and re-grouped in ad hoc defensive and offensive alliances. In their 
attacks on the farms and the herds they were not only resisting: they 
were also fighting for food, and survival. 
In May 1774 a commando set out, bristling with powder and 
shot - and nine staffs of office. These were to be issued, but to 
whom? It seems clear from the context that they were to be given to 
the leader (if they could identify one) of the defeated resisting 
group, and acceptance of it was presumably taken to mean, in that 
particular language of interaction, acknowledgement of defeat and 
submission. "h15 But what options were 
then open to such groups? 
Presumably the same as those that had always been open, with one 
exception. The possibility of retreating still further was limited 
by the closeness of the Nguni in the east and the Sotho in the north. 
Thus, either they were sucked into the colonial economy or they fled 
- far away - to the north and west. But if and when they came 
into 
the domain of the V. O. C. they were increasingly subject not only to 
its economy, but also its law. 
This overall political process is expressed too in the 
encroaching scope of V. O. C. law and jurisdiction. Initially, and 
implied in the early 'agreements' with Khoi chiefs, only employees 
of the V. O. C. and free burgers fell under the jurisdiction of the law 
which applied at the Cape. 
116 The border line between who was and 
115. Letter from O. Bergh (Council secretary) to Stellenbosch Land- 
drost, in Moodie: Op. cit., III, pp. 31-2. 
116. The legislatures whose enactments could have had force at the 
Cape were those of the States General, the States of Holland, the 
Government of Batavia (through the Statues of the Indies, or of 
(continued on next page)... 
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was not a '-subject', was largely a social, cultural and political 
one, not a colour one. It quickly became blurred, but not by 
colour considerations. As the V. 0. C. control encroached over and 
onto Khoi groups so too did political power. The politics of the 
situation enabled the Company to apply its laws directly to Khoi, 
not only because they put themselves under Dutch law by a changed 
way of life, but because the V. O. C. had the power to impose the law, 
though not frequently in the 17th century. 
117 As the sphere of 
control broadened out, so too did the jurisdictional sweep of the 
Court claim authority to judge and to punish. 
It is not at all clear if and when any specific decision 
of a general enabling kind was taken which could have permitted or 
116. (continued from previous page) ... Batavia), and the Council 
of Policy at the Cape. See E. F. Watermeyer: "The Roman-Dutch 
Law in South Africa", being chapter XXXI of the CHBE; also 
Walker: Op. cit., pp. 101-2, and J. L. W. Stock: "The New Statutes 
of India at the Cape". 
117. It has been claimed (by Katzen) that in the 17th century only 
Christian and Dutch-speaking Khoi who had been assimilated 
were subject to Cape Laws. Katzen: Op. cit., pp. 215-6. This is 
not strictly true; it was wider than that, and the criteria 
for who was subject to the 'law' seems to have been a function 
of political power and tactical considerations, rather than 
simply cultural definition. In 1672 and 1678 Khoi - who were 
manifestly not 'assimilated' - were tried and convicted of theft. Their names included most un-Dutch ones like Kharri, 
Dhaurry, Chamtagou, Quisa, Gamaka, Ore and Derva. They were 
hanged. See Moodie: Op. cit., p. 317, p. 380 and p. 383. 
In the case of the distraught Khoi woman Sara, who committed 
suicide on 12th December, 1671, the Court of Justice had to decide whether the Roman Law applied to her and thus whether her body should be ".... hanged on a gibbet as carrion for the 
fowls .... ". On the grounds that she had lived under the 
protection of the V. O. C. and had entirely relinquished the 
".... heathenish or savage Hottentot mode of life ..... " it was decided (that is, on cultural and religious grounds), 
presumably after a long discussion, that the Roman Law applied. See Leibbrandt: Journal, 1671-4 and 1676, p. 35 and Moodie: Op. cit. I, p"315-6, fn. 1. 
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enjoined such a shift in policy, at least from the standpoint of 
colonial jurisprudence. 
118 
What is clear however is that by 1769, and probably before 
that, the Courts were regularly passing sentences on Khoi 
(described as 'the Hottentot X'). The variety of their names 
reveals furthermore the transitional and thus transformative process 
that was, socially and culturally, under way. Direct rule and 
direct application of Dutch and Cape law reflect direct political 
control and power by the Cape government through district administr- 
ations and courts, loose as they were. No doubt the arbitrary and 
Direct rule of the masters applied more widely and with as much, if 
not more, force. 
118. Katzen claims that "... in the 18th century .... the Cape 
government claimed jurisdiction over all Khoikhoi within its 
boundaries". Katzen: Op. cit., loc. cit. It is also said that 
".... legally they existed in an ambiguous region between law 
and the arbitrary will of their masters". de Kieweit: Op. cit., 
p. 20. Marais puts it this way: "There was no law regulating 
the relations between master and servant. And by the second 
half of the eighteenth century most of the colonial Hottentots 
were in the position of servants". Marais: Op. cit., pp. 111-2. 
Jurisdiction over some Khoi living in the colony, but not 
really as part of it in a structural sense, commenced through 
the instructions of Commissioner Nolthenius in 1748 that. Khoi 
could complain through the courts about their treatment by 
farmers. Böeseken: Die Nederlandse Kommissarisse, Op. cit., 
PP-76-9. 
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The names of the 'Hottentots' included the following: 
Frederick, Kalkoen (a derogatory name, and certainly meant as such 
even today, meaning roughly, 'stupid Turkey'), Willem Stroo, Louis, 
Klyn Booy (Small Boy), Cupido, Toontje, Jantje ('Little Jan'), 
David Paardewagte, Wittebooy ('Whiteboy'), Cobus Anthony (which, 
like Cupido, was a clasic combination of two common slave names at 
the Cape), Abraham de Vrees and Hans. 
119 Were they still 'Khoi', 
and what does it mean to say they were? If they were, by what 
definition and criteria were they judged to be so, and by whom? I 
return to this question in the course of looking at the constitutive 
side of the story and in the analysis of social structure in later 
chapters, where its consideration is more appropriate. But it is 
worth mentioning here, as indicative of the probably fluid and 
shifting character of social structure and stratification by that 
time, particularly as it arose out of the consequences of the Khoi 
collapse. 
But what the court records also reveal is an accumulation 
of power, for the scope of law is a fairly reliable index of a 
changing social and political relation. In respect of major areas 
of the Cape, particularly the west, it suggests moreover that naked 
power - formally exercised by official commandos or unofficially 
deployed by raiding colonists - was being converted into authority, 
following the distinction Weber made. Taken in conjunction with other 
119. I have drawn these from the "Abstract of Convictions before the 
Court of Justice in the Castle of the Cape of Good Hope, 1769- 
1782", in Moodie: Op. cit., III, pp. 106-109. The assortment of 
Dutch names, derisory and derogatory names, slave names and 
first names only, illustrates *umber of sociological conditions 
of a society undergoing change, and also the complex inputs in 
the colonial situation. 
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contrasts this chapter has demonstrated between the mid-17th and late 
18th centuries, it indicates the extent to which a new society was 
being constituted. But within it there was no unified culture, with 
homologous institutions replicated across the sprawl of the colony. 
There were still substantial institutional discontinuities (and 
'class' and status differences) between various groups and categories, 
within the same political economy and constituting its social 
structure. That brings to the forefront again the question of the 
plural society. And it becomes appropriate, finally, to make here 
some brief points about the cultural changes that accompanied the 
incorporation of the Khoi in the colonial economy, in consequence 
of, and associated with, the disintegration of their societies. 
The identification and definition of the plural society 
requires the minimum conditions of two cultures, --at least, present 
within one society. If large areas of the Cape - with the important 
exceptions of, for example, the Camdebo region and northern Graaff- 
Reinet (as it was to be) and Stellenbosch - were coming gradually 
to be more and more fully under the control and authority of the 
Cape government in the 18th century, it is possible to talk of a 
society being established in the process. Insofar as those groups 
over whom that authority was exercised can be shown to have been 
differentiated from each other in terms of culture, as well as other 
dimensions, it is possible to talk of a plural society. But it 
cannot be suggested that it was . static in` form or; stable -iii terms` öf 
social. 'relations:. the very nature of that pluralism was undergoing 
change as the groups and categories that constituted the society were 
changing too. The long-term logic of those changes through accultur- 
ation in the 19th century and beyond, in the western Cape, were in 
the direction of a 'non-racial' but class-based society. In the 
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history of South Africa, wherever a region other than the Cape 
was included in wider political and social provisions of legislation 
- colonial or national - the effect has always been to stamp 
'colour' differentiation on the Cape when the historical and 
structural logic in that area has always run strongly against that 
process. 
The detailed examination of those changes are dealt with 
later. Here, some preliminary questions arising out of the collapsing 
Khoi societies must be posed, and the preliminary answers carried 
forward to the later substantive discussion. What indicators of 
cultural change can be pointed to, and how was this process related 
to the disintegration analyzed above? 
Part of the reason for the abrasive and conflictual side 
of the Dutch/Khoi relationship stemmed from their radically 
contrasting cultures and normative universes. In certain important 
respects they 'talked past' each other. Moreover, the V. O. C. and 
Dutch, despite pragmatic concern for the establishment of treaties 
and deals, regarded the Khoi way of life as being in general bestial 
and Godless. Their observation and experience of them confirmed the 
already severely hostile and negative stereotype they had been given 
in the travel literature and, no doubt, by word of mouth accouhts, 
in the 16th and 17th centuries. A further note crept in to the tone 
of official and travel literature at the Cape in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. It was that Khoi life styles were somehow (and the San 
certainly) inferior and worthless, though this had nothing to do 
with their colour, but everything to do with their culture and 
behaviour. Thus, as and when the Dutch came to dominate over the 
Khoi, and their societies were undermined, the cultural distance which 
still remained - despite changes - provided a logical and self-evident 
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basis for the differential incorporation of Khoi in the colonial 
society, though some upwards (and inwards) mobility across those 
discontinuities was possible but, initially, not frequent. 
The initial divide between the contrasting and competing 
political economies and the cultural zones associated with them 
(that is, between the societies) is dramatically symbolized in the 
case of Eva, the Khoi woman who lived with the family of van Riebeeck 
and later married the Company surgeon, van Meerhof, in 1664. On one 
occasion, she was setting off as an emissary to obtain cattle. On 
leaving the fort she ".... at once dressed herself in hides again 
and sent her clothes home. She intended to put them on again when 
she returned to the Commander's wife, promising, however, that she 
would in the meantime not forget the Lord God, Whom she had learnt 
to know in the Commander's house; she would always think of Him and 
endeavour to learn, etc. ". 
120 
In political, economic, social and geographical terms the 
sharpness of that kind of divide decreased steadily as the relative 
power, wealth, status and physical expansion of the Y. O. C. and 
colonists occurred. Increasingly, Khoi groups and individuals were 
included within the embryonic society and its emergent economic, 
political and social structures. From the start - as in all 
situations where women from the invading group are scarce - sexual 
relations, extra-marital unions, concubinage and multi-cultural and 
multi-'racial' families, incorporating Khoi servants (and slaves) 
within the micro-pluralist, but hierarchical and patriarchical 
extended family structures, were frequent and common. 
121 As this 
120. Journal, II, p. 343. That, at least was what she was reported to 
have said. 
121. see next page. 
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social process developed and as more Khoi fell away from the core 
institutions of their societies and came into the colonial society, 
cultural changes took place. However, in any particular instance it 
is probable that complete continuity with the emergent Afrikaner 
culture - particularly its languages and religions - took at least 
two fully-integrated generations, given the initial cultural 
distance and also the strong likelihood of its maintenance, to some 
degree, by both groups. 
The immediate influences and compulsions of the domestic 
economy and the familial structure was thus one agency 
(and probably 
the most important) through which meso-cultural change took place in 
consequence of the economic and political disintegration of successive 
Khoi societies as outlined above. But there were others at this 
level too. Occasional baptisms and conversions were recorded, and 
while educational provisions for them were negligible, some elementary 
instruction was probably received by'some Khoi children whose parents 
were in service with the farmers. 
122 A short-lived missionary effort 
121. from previous page).... See for instance the accounts in 
J. S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, pp. 9-13; and Anon: "The 
Origin and incidence of miscegenation at the Cape during the 
Dutch East India Company's regime, 1652-1795"" passim; and 
P. L. van den Berghe: "Miscegenation in South Africa", particularly 
pp. 68-70. Later, this question will be discussed more fully in 
relation to the wider matrix of social relationships with and 
between slaves, Khoi, 'Bastards', and 'Europeans'. It is 
interesting to note in this context however that on his expedition 
to the Namaqua in 1685, Simon van der Stel "... issued an order 
as we began more and more to approach to the Hottentots kraals, 
that none of our people should have any intercourse with the 
female Hottentots on pain of*being flogged and dismissed from the 
Company service as schelms (knaves, rascals, rogues)". 
"Extracts from a Diary .... of Simon van der Stel", in Moodie: 
O . cit., I, p. 400. 
122. P. S. du Toit: Orrrwys aan die Kaap onder die Kompanjie, 1652L1795, 
p. 185; Spilhaus: 0 . cit., pp. 48-9; E. Pells: 300 Years of 
Education in South Africa, p. 6; E. H. Malherbet Education in South 
Africa 1652-1922, pp. 28 ff; and Muriel Horrell: TheEducation of the 
Coloured Community in South Africa, 1652-1970, pp. 1-6. 
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by the Moravian, Schmidt, in Baviaans Kloof between 1737-43 (which 
was unpopular with local farmers, as was its successor in the 1790s) 
had only fractional success. 
123 
Cultural change, however, lags behind political and economic 
decay, though they are closely bound up in a changing nexus of internal 
and functional relations. It is this lag,. that accounts for the 
discontinuities that remained within the new society and makes 
possible, and necessary, the description of its constitution in 
terms 
of the categories of pluralism. Some groups - like the Griqua, Gona 
and Korana - survived through adaptation, and retreated, 
joining 
others (or colliding with them) and forming new entities, some of which 
survived and some of which did not. 
124 Khoi servants and 'Bastaards', 
often well-armed, were active on commando duties against San and 
Khoisan raiders. 
125 
123. J. du:: Plessis: A History of Christian Missions in South Africa, 
pp"54-59, and B. Kruger: The Pear Tree Blossoms. 
124. Wilson: Op. cit., pp. 68-9; H. Vedder: "The Nama", pp. 113-114; 
J. S. Marais: The Cape Coloured People, PP. 32-4. Also see Peter 
Carstens: The Social Structure of a Cape Coloured Reserve for 
some interesting insights into the origins of the Baster 
Community, p. 19. He describes their ancestors as "... the 
Voortrekkers of Little Namaqualand ..... ". He has also told how 
when he first voiced this view publically in South Africa at an 
anthroplogists' conference, there were outraged objections from 
some quarters. He also suggests that an elementary tiered 
'class' structure had emerged in that northern Cape area with 
the Dutch at the top, the Basters next and the Khoi at the 
bottom. Ibid., p. 239. This kind of conceptualization is 
interesting but needs refining. To use 'class structure' to 
conceptualize a hierarchy of, in fact, cultural categories 
(though the may have been more than that in their relations to 
one another) conceals the complex overlapping of class and 
culture. 
125. Katzen: Op. cit., pp. 226-7; S. F. N. Gie: "The Cape Colony under 
Company Rule, 1708-1795", P-150. See also the various Commando 
reports in Moodie: Op. cit., III, ap ssim. 
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Overall, the picture was unclear, with different degrees 
and kinds of cultural change taking place and varying from area to 
area. But that is the point: it was the contrasts which defined 
the institutional discontinuities at the extremes, and the fluidity 
which defined the overlapping forms and emerging common culture at 
middle levels of the plural society. And those are the features of 
the society which make concrete analysis of its constitution (and 
change within it) so elusive and difficult. 
During the second half of the 18th century the process of 
disintegration amongst the inland hordes was observed and commented 
on by many travellers. Thunberg, Sparrman, Le Vaillant, Stavorinus 
and Barrow confirmed the picture of decaying institutions . 
126 it 
varied from south-west to north and east: the latter showing less 
outward signs of the settling hierarchical social structures of the 
west, in part defining the different character of their pluralism. 
But despite the fierceness of the resistance to the north and north- 
east, the slow process of incorporating the refugee and remnant 
kraals and 'captaincies' in the social order of the ranching areas 
was taking place. 
By the 1770s Sparrman's account describes the features that 
preceded and accompanied the cultural changes: fragmentation of the 
hordes was far advanced, meaningless 'captaincies' were still being 
appointed, a general policy of divide and rule prevailed, there was 
decay in morale, with some groups spying against others for the V. O. C. 
126. Thunberg: Op. cit.; Andrew Sparrman: A Voyage to the Cape of 
Good Hope, see pp. 238-242 in particular; F. L. Le Vaillant: 
Travels in the Interior Parts of Africa by way of the Cape of 
Good Hope; J. S. Stayorinus: Voyages to the East Indies; 
John Barrow: An Account of the Interior of Southern Africa. 
Stavorinus claimed they were "very roud of this mark of 
distinction", (the staves of office). Stavorinus: Op. cit., I, 
P-547. 
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In sum, the cultural and behavioural changes that 
occurred were consequent upon the economic and political fission 
of Khoi structures, leaving individuals and families ensnared as 
labourers and dependants in the settled agricultural economy of 
the west and the spreading pastoralism of the east. 
127 
The central clue to the articulation of the social 
structure of the new society that was being constituted behind the 
outer edges of this movement lies in the organization and shape of 
the system of labour and slavery in the political economy of the 
colony. For what this chapter has demonstrated is one face of the 
two. ided logic of colonialism - its destructiveness and its relent- 
lessness. Now it is necessary to turn to examine the other side of 
the story: the analysis of the kind of society that was built in 
the course of that process. I shall argue, moreover, that the 
implications of the system of labour and slavery were central to the 
system of stratification, and that taken together with the changing 
but enduring cultural divisions, they established-locally the 
structural context for the emergence of a range of attitudes which 
included, but were not exhausted by, so-called 'colourism'. For 'race 
relations' at the Cape started out by being 'international' and 
'cultural relations', became labour and class relations and - as 
cultural changes took place - emerged uneasily in a vague, shifting 
and confused interlocking and overlapping of them all, with 'colour' 
as only one factor in a complex mix. 
127. It has been said that the Khoi "... is geassimileer in die 
ekonomiese stelsel van die blanke". P. J. van der Merwe: Op. cit., 
P-143- My emphases, A. L. It will be necessary to correct the 
notion of a 'white' (blanke) economic system. The whole point 
of the approach being used in this study is to move away from 
that kind of conceptualization of structure and differentiation. 
Rather, an inclusive society with en economy including (and using) 
all groups - differentially - but mutually dependent on each 
other must be postulated, for without that it is not possible to 
understand or even describe the colonial situation and its devel- 
opment. The destructive and constructive aspects of colonialism 
at the Cape are intertwined, as argued at the start of this chapter. 
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